

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA


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CHINA - PROPER

VOLUME II

MODERN HISTORY AND
ADMINISTRATION

June 1945

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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

MUNSHI RAM MANOHAR LAL
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PREFACE

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IN 1915 a Geographical Section was formed in the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty to write Geographical Handbooks on various parts of the world. The purpose of these handbooks was to supply, by scientific research and skilled arrangement, material for the discussion of naval, military, and political problems, as distinct from the examination of the problems themselves. Many distinguished collaborators assisted in their production, and by the end of 1918 upwards of fifty volumes had been produced in Handbook and Manual form, as well as numerous short-term geographical reports. The demand for these books increased rapidly with each new issue, and they acquired a high reputation for accuracy and impartiality. They are now to be found in Service Establishments and Embassies throughout the world, and in the early years after the last war were much used by the League of Nations.

The old Handbooks have been extensively used in the present war, and experience has disclosed both their value and their limitations. On the one hand they have proved, beyond all question, how greatly the work of the fighting services and of Government Departments is facilitated if countries of strategic or political importance are covered by handbooks which deal, in a convenient and easily digested form, with their geography, ethnology, administration, and resources. On the other hand, it has become apparent that something more is needed to meet present-day requirements. The old series does not cover many of the countries closely affected by the present war (e.g. Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Portugal, to name only a few); its books are somewhat uneven in quality, and they are inadequately equipped with maps, diagrams, and photographic illustrations.

The present series of Handbooks, while owing its inspiration largely to the former series, is in no sense an attempt to revise or re-edit that series. It is an entirely new set of books, produced in the Naval Intelligence Division by trained geographers drawn largely from the Universities, and working at sub-centres established at Oxford and Cambridge. The books follow, in general, a uniform scheme, though minor modifications will be found in particular cases; and they are illustrated by numerous maps and photographs.

The purpose of the books is primarily naval. They are designed first to provide, for the use of Commanding Officers, information in a

comprehensive and convenient form about countries which they may be called upon to visit, not only in war but in peace-time ; secondly, to maintain the high standard of education in the Navy and, by supplying officers with material for lectures to naval personnel ashore and afloat, to ensure for all ranks that visits to a new country shall be both interesting and profitable.

Their contents are, however, by no means confined to matters of purely naval interest. For many purposes (e.g. history, administration, resources, communications, etc.) countries must necessarily be treated as a whole, and no attempt is made to limit their treatment exclusively to coastal zones. It is hoped therefore that the Army, the Royal Air Force and other Government Departments (many of whom have given great assistance in the production of the series) will find these Handbooks even more valuable than their predecessors proved to be both during and after the last war.

J. H. GODFREY

Director of Naval Intelligence

1942

The foregoing preface has appeared from the beginning of this series of Geographical Handbooks. It describes so effectively their origin and purpose that I have decided to retain it in its original form.

This volume has been prepared for the Naval Intelligence Division at the Cambridge sub-centre (General Editor, Dr H. C. Darby). It has been written mainly by Professor P. M. Roxby, with contributions from Mr T. W. Freeman, Mr B. M. Husain, Dr Yuen-li Liang, Sir George Moss, Mr P. O'Driscoll, Sir John Pratt, Mr J. C. Stuttard, Dr C. S. Wang, and the Research Department of the Foreign Office. The maps and diagrams have been drawn mainly by Mr A. O. Cole, Miss K. S. A. Froggatt, Miss M. Hart, and Mrs Marion Plant. The volume has been edited by Professor P. M. Roxby, assisted by Mr P. O'Driscoll.

E. G. N. RUSHBROOKE

Director of Naval Intelligence

June 1945

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Chapter I

OUTLINES OF MODERN CHINESE HISTORY TO THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE IN 1912

The European Struggle for Admission to Chinese Trade : Early Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch Contacts ; The Rise of British Trade ; The Macartney and Amherst Missions ; The Causes of Conflict ; The Two Anglo-Chinese Wars ; The Treaty Port System.

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The history of China has already been broadly sketched from its remote beginnings in the basin of Hwang ho in the third millennium B.C. to the close of the long reign of the emperor Ch'ien Lung at the end of the eighteenth century, when the empire had attained its greatest extent, and was at the height of its prestige (see vol. i, Chapter xii). The present sketch is concerned with the momentous changes involved in the impact of the West on the ancient civilization and with the emergence of Modern China.

No sharp line of division can be drawn between the old and the new, but the exertion of strong Western pressure to break down the isolation of China and gain admission to her trade closely corresponds in time with the marked decline in the vigour and efficiency of the reigning Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, which became very apparent after the death of Ch'ien Lung in 1799. China was then entering one of those troughs of acute economic distress and unrest and of administrative weakness and corruption which had so often before marked the decay of her strongest dynasties. But her entry into this particular trough—perhaps the deepest in her history—coincided with a vital change in her external relations. China at her weakest had then to meet the challenge of the Western trading nations in the confident and ambitious mood engendered by the Industrial Revolution. The result was a prolonged crisis without any parallel in her experience, and demanding for its solution not

TIME CHART

EXTERNAL EVENTS

- 1497 Vasco da Gama's voyage round the Cape to Calicut.
- 1511 The Portuguese at Malacca (first European holding in Far East).
- 1557 The Portuguese permitted to settle at Macao.
- 1637 First appearance of English traders (Captain Weddell's voyage).
- 1642 Malacca taken from Portuguese by Dutch, accompanied by establishment of Dutch power in Indonesia; monopoly of European trade with Japan and temporary control of Formosa (1624-62).
- 17th century. Monopoly of English trade with China by East India Company (Charter 1601).
- 1757 Foreign trade with China restricted by imperial edict to Canton.
- 1775 Formation of Council of Super-cargoes.
- 1793 Lord Macartney's embassy from Great Britain to China.
- 1816 Lord Amherst's embassy.
- 1834 Abolition of East India Company's monopoly. China trade thrown open to British merchants. Appointment of Lord Napier as British Trade Commissioner. His credentials refused recognition by Viceroy of Canton.
- 1839-42 First Anglo-Chinese war (The 'Opium' war).
- 1842 Treaty of Nanking. Cession of Hong Kong, opening of the Five Ports to foreign trade.
- 1853 American fleet under Commodore Perry in Bay of Yedo to ask for opening of Japanese ports.
- 1856-60 Second Anglo-Chinese war (The 'Arrow' war).
- 1858 Treaty of Tientsin }
1860 Convention of Peking }
Elaboration of treaty port system and principle of extraterritoriality.
- 1858-60 Russian frontier advanced to the Amur, and the Ussuri up to the border of Korea.
- 1868 The 'Restoration' in Japan. The Meiji Era.
- 1862-85 French annexation of Indo-China (1862, Cochinchina; 1863, Cambodia; 1884-85, Annam and Tongking). Recognition by China after Franco-Chinese war (1885).
- 1891 Building of the Trans-Siberian railway begun by Russia.
- 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war (over question of Korea). Formosa ceded by China to Japan. Liaotung peninsula also ceded, but restored to China as a result of the 'Triple Intervention' (Russia, France, Germany).
- 1898 Year of maximum encroachment on China. Kaiochow (Shantung) leased to Germany. Port Arthur and Dalny leased to Russia. Weihaiwei

INTERNAL EVENTS

- 1368-1644 THE MING DYNASTY.
- 1628 Capture of Peking by the Manchus.
- 1644-1911 THE CH'ING (MANCHU) DYNASTY.
- 1662-1723 *Reign of K'ang Hsi.*
- 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk between China and Russia.
- 1723-35 *Reign of Yung Cheng.*
- 1729 Imperial edict against sale of opium.
- 1736-96 *Reign of Ch'ien Lung.*
- Chinese Empire at its greatest extension.
- 1796-1821 *Reign of Chia Ch'ing.*
- 1800 Imperial edict against importation of opium.
- 1821-51 *Reign of Tao Kuang.*
- 1838 Appointment of Lin Tze-hsü as Imperial Commissioner to stamp out opium traffic.
- 1851-62 *Reign of Hsien Feng.*
- 1850-65 The Taiping rebellion.
- 1862-75 *Reign of T'ung Chih.*
- 1863 Sir Robert Hart appointed Inspector-General of Imperial Maritime Customs.
- 1865-73 Moslem revolt in Yunnan.
- 1862-70 Moslem revolt in Kansu and Shensi. Revolt spreads to Chinese Central Asia under Yakub Beg. Suppressed, and order restored by 'Agricultural Army' under Tso Tsung-T'ang.
- 1875-1909 *Reign of Kuang Hsu.*
- 1898 The 'Hundred Days of Reform' by the emperor Kuang Hsu. Sept.—*Coup d'état* of the empress-dowager. Reformers suppressed.

EXTERNAL EVENTS

INTERNAL EVENTS

(Shantung) leased to Great Britain. Hong Kong New Territories leased to Great Britain. Kwangchowwan leased to France.

1899-1900 Boxer rising.

1901 The Boxer Protocol. Indemnity imposed. Russian occupation of Manchuria.

1900
1902

1902 Trans-Siberian railway completed. Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

1904-5 Russo-Japanese war. Treaty of Portsmouth (U.S.A.). Lease of Liaotung peninsula (Kwantung) and railway rights in southern Manchuria transferred to Japan. Paramount influence of Japan in Korea recognized.

1906
1908

1910 Annexation of Korea by Japan.

1908-12

1912 Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed.

1909

1911-12

1914-18 War period.

1912

1914 Capture of Kiaochow from Germany and retention by Japan.

1913

1915 Japanese ultimatum to China ('The Twenty-one Demands').

1915

1917 China's entry into the war of 1914-18.

1916

1919 Treaty of Versailles. Kiaochow awarded to Japan.

1917

1919

1921-22 Washington Conference. The Nine-Power Treaty and Four-Power Pact. Treaty between Japan and China restoring Kiaochow to China.

1922-28

1922-25 Remission of unpaid portion of Boxer Indemnity by several powers to China.

1925

1927-29 British Concessions at Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, and Amoy returned to China. Recovery of tariff autonomy by China.

1926-28

1931-32 Seizure of Manchuria and Jehol by Japan. Formation of 'Manchukuo.'

1932-37 Japanese encroachments in North China.

1928-37

1937 July Sino-Japanese War. Beginning with attack on Chinese forces by Japanese in Hopeh.

1939 Beginning of the war in Europe.
1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.
(Dec.) United Kingdom and U.S.A. at war with Japan, and China at war with Germany and Italy.

1943 Sino-Japanese War Merged in the European War. Treaties with China by United Kingdom and U.S.A. renouncing extraterritorial rights.

1937

1938

Siege of the Peking Legations. Return of the Imperial Court to Peking. Beginning of moderate reforms. Abolition of old examination system. Creation of new Board of Education.

Promise of a constitution. Death of emperor Kuang Hsü and the empress-dowager. *Reign of Hsuan T'ung.*

Meeting of provincial assemblies. Request for a parliament.

Chinese Revolution.

Abdication of Manchus.

INAUGURATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Dr Sun Yat-sen provisional president. Resignation in favour of Yuan Shih-kai. Formation of the Kuomintang.

Revolution of the southern leaders against Yuan Shih-kai. Parliament dissolved.

Dictatorship and attempted *coup d'état* of Yuan Shih-kai.

Death of Yuan Shih-kai.

Organization of military government in Canton under Dr Sun Yat-sen.

Development of the Student's Movement in protest against the Versailles award. Rival governments in Peking and Canton (Kuomintang).

Civil War in China.

The War-lord Phase.

Kuomintang reorganized on lines of Communist party in Soviet Russia. Whampoa Military Academy formed under direction of Chiang K'ai-shek.

Death of Sun Yat-sen at Peking, 30 May, 'The Shanghai Incident.' Student demonstrators killed. Anti-British riots and boycotts.

Northward Advance of the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Army under Chiang K'ai-shek. Occupation of Yangtze Valley (1927) and Peking (1928). Split between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Rival governments at Nanking and Hankow.

The Nanking (National) Government. Gradual assertion of authority over greater part of China. War-lords suppressed. Military unification.

Administrative, financial, and legal reconstruction. Conflict with Communist forces in south-central and north-west China. December 1936, the Sian Incident. Rapprochement between the Government and Communists. 'United Front.'

Chinese capital moved to Hankow after fall of Nanking.

Capital moved to Chungking.

only the recovery of her ancient sources of vitality but their direction to new ends and objectives, a recasting of the whole fabric of her civilization. For the Chinese the nineteenth is the century of disaster and humiliation. Its closing decade, however, when these disasters and humiliations reached their climax and when the partition of China was thought by many Europeans to be imminent, saw also the first definite signs of revival. Her history in the first half of the present century has been no less stormy and troubled, but, in spite of many vicissitudes and much current anxiety and uncertainty as to the future, the dominant note has been one of recovery and reconstruction. Perhaps no 'fifty years of Europe' have seen changes so remarkable as those which have occurred in what the West used to regard as unchanging Cathay.

THE EUROPEAN STRUGGLE FOR ADMISSION TO CHINESE TRADE

The beginnings of China's commercial contact with the West are to be found in the results of the notable expeditions despatched by the Han emperor Wu Ti, in the second century B.C., beyond the Pamirs to the Turanian plains with their legacy of Hellenic civilization. Thereafter China was indirectly linked with the commerce which already existed between the Mediterranean, Iran, and India. The famous silk-trade which presently developed between China and *Ta Ts'in* (as the Roman Empire was known to contemporary Chinese) is essentially associated with the trans-Asian trade-routes which, although frequently interrupted, continued to be the chief means of access to the Far East until the Great Age of Discovery. They were not, however, in Roman times the only routes. The overland silk-trade impinged upon the Roman world in Syria and Egypt, and from the latter maritime commerce with India and southern Asia was developing with some rapidity at the opening of the Christian Era, as a result of better knowledge of the monsoons of the Indian Ocean. This new sea-route to the East was gradually extended via the west coast ports of India to the mouths of the Irrawaddy and Salween in Indo-China, and finally round the Malay peninsula to Tongking, which under the Han dynasty was part of the Chinese Empire, and through which it was in contact with the southern seas.

By the later part of the second century A.D. it was possible for
GH (China Proper II)

Roman merchants to reach this southern extremity of China directly by sea, and to some extent the sea-route competed with the overland route for the lucrative silk-trade.¹ By sea also the highly valued cinnamon bark, 'Chinese bark,' as it is called in Persian records, reached the West via the Persian gulf, to which it was brought in Indian and sometimes in Chinese ships.

Direct intercourse by sea between the Mediterranean and the Farther East did not survive the decline of the Roman Empire. As early as the third century A.D., Red sea commerce was intercepted by the Arabs and by the Ethiopians of the Abyssinian kingdom of Axum with their flourishing seaport of Adulis. In the seventh century the separation of Europe from the Indian Ocean was made complete by the Arab conquest of Syria and Egypt. The silk-trade was already dwindling as the result of the introduction of the silkworm into the Eastern (Byzantine) Empire, and for several centuries China, under whatever name, receded beyond the horizon of Europe.

The situation, however, was fundamentally changed by the Pax Tartarica established under the great Mongol Empire in the second half of the thirteenth and the early part of the fourteenth century (see vol. i, pp. 342-3). The land-routes across Central Asia were revived and extended and assumed a greater importance than ever before. At the same time the friendly attitude of the Mongol rulers of Persia, before their conversion to Islam, allowed of direct access to India, Malaya, and the Farther East. China in the time of Marco Polo was again accessible both by land and sea. The imagination of mercantilist Europe was fired not only by the accounts of the wealth and splendour of the empire given by the great travellers, but by its known relative proximity to the chief sources of the spice trade in Indonesia, on which the West was becoming increasingly dependent. 'The mental transition,' as G. F. Hudson well puts it,² 'from the outlook that accounted all other seas secondary to the Mediterranean to a point of view already "Oceanic," began two centuries before Columbus, and it was the outcome of the discovery, with the facilities of the Pax Tartarica, of the vast extent, population, and wealth of the Asiatic lands beyond Syria and of the range and

¹ In his valuable book, *The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India* (Cambridge, 1928), E. H. Warmington points out (p. 71) that in later Roman literature the *Seres*, named from the most famous and beautiful of their products, are the northern Chinese and the *Sinae*, the southern, 'in other words, the Seres were the Chinese as approached by the overland route, and the Sinae were the Chinese as approached by the southern sea route.'

² Hudson, G. F., *Europe and China*, p. 161 (London, 1931).
GH (China Proper II)

volume of maritime traffic in the Indian and Pacific Ocean.' The fact that after the collapse of the Mongol Empire the land-routes across Asia were again completely closed concentrated attention on the seaways to the East. To reach the Indies directly by sea whether by rounding Africa, as in the case of the Portuguese, or by sailing west across the Atlantic, as in the case of Columbus, and to break the Arab monopoly of the spice trade were the primary motives which heralded the Age of Discovery and profoundly changed the environment of China.

EARLY PORTUGUESE, SPANISH AND DUTCH CONTACTS

The memorable voyage of Vasco da Gama round the Cape to Calicut on the Malabar coast of India in 1497 quickly led to direct contact between China and the Western world. The Portuguese were primarily interested in the spice trade, and this was the chief motive for Albuquerque's seizure in 1511 of Malacca, then the chief emporium of the Moluccas and Java. But Malacca was also at that time the terminal port of Chinese shipping and the gateway to Far Eastern waters. Within three years of its capture was made the first Portuguese trading venture to the coast of China, followed shortly afterwards by a royal mission under Pirez, who, it was hoped, would be received at the Chinese court as an accredited ambassador of the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa.

Throughout the rest of the sixteenth century Portugal, which wrested the spice trade from the Arabs, and by means of its heavily armed ships partly suppressed the piracy that from time immemorial had infested the seas around Malaya, was the dominant European Power in the East Indies and the China seas. Macao, where the Portuguese were allowed to settle in 1557, after being driven successively from Canton, Ningpo, and Ch'üanchow (Fukien), was the first European trading base in the Celestial Empire (see p. 341), as Malacca was the first European possession in Far Eastern waters. Their only rivals at first were the Spanish, who approached the coveted spice region across the Pacific from their New World empire. The final outcome of Magellan's famous voyage in 1519 was the seizure of the archipelago renamed the Philippines, and the establishment of Manila as their base for trade in the Far East in 1571. Macao and Manila, facing each other across the South China sea, were naturally rivals, but Spanish intercourse with China was mainly

indirect and chiefly concerned Chinese traders and immigrants in the Philippines themselves.

Late in the sixteenth century the Dutch, prevented from trading with Lisbon, then the chief emporium of oriental products in Europe,¹ began to challenge the Portuguese in Indonesia. In the next half century they laid the foundations of their great empire in the East Indies and wrested Malacca from their rivals (1642). They failed in their efforts to capture Macao and to trade directly with Canton, but for a period of forty years (1624-62) they established themselves on the coast of Formosa opposite Fukien and obtained a virtual monopoly of European trade with Japan (Fig. 1).

It was from the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch, but particularly from the first-named, that the Chinese derived their first strong impressions of Western traders, and these were of considerable importance in shaping their subsequent attitude to the British, who in the eighteenth century became the dominant European mercantile power in the China seas.

The Chinese Attitude

Foreign merchants were by no means a new phenomenon in the great seaports of south-east China. Under both the T'ang (618-907) and the Sung (960-1279) dynasties there had been a large number of Arab and Persian traders in such centres as Canton, Ch'üanchow (probably the Zaiton of Marco Polo), Hangchow, and Ningpo. The government attitude seems to have been distinctly tolerant, and they were allowed not only to trade and reside but even to travel into the interior. As Moslems they practised their own religion and had their own mosques. At Canfu near Hangchow there were 120,000 Moslems in the ninth century, according to the Arab traveller, Abu Zaid. The Arabs at Canton appointed their own *Kadi* and governed themselves according to Koranic law, which was in accordance with the Chinese tradition of group responsibility.

The strikingly different treatment accorded to the Western traders cannot be adequately explained by the fact that, after the expulsion of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) adopted a more nationalist policy, less favourable to foreign intercourse

¹ The closing of Lisbon to the Dutch followed the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1580, which did not, however, materially affect the rivalry of the two Iberian peoples in the Far East. In 1594 Philip II prohibited sales in Lisbon to merchants of Protestant countries.

(see vol. i, p. 348). The initial reception of the Portuguese was friendly. The first unofficial trading venture under Perestrelo was well received by the Cantonese merchants and the royal mission of Pirez (see p. 6), sent in four ships under the command of Fernando d'Andrade, was escorted to Peking for presentation at court. But while they were there news arrived of the piratical activities of another Portuguese expedition to Canton under Fernando's brother, Simon d'Andrade. This was a definite turning-point, and thereafter Chinese suspicions of Portuguese motives grew




Fig. 1. Early European trade depots in the Far East

B British ; D Dutch ; P Portuguese ; S Spanish.

The dates are those of acquisition or of period of occupation.

apace. In turn they were allowed to settle at Ningpo and Ch'üanchow, and in both cases they were expelled (from Ningpo in 1545 and from Ch'üanchow in 1549) for violence and aggression. It was singularly unfortunate for future Sino-European relationships that both the Portuguese and the Spanish at this critical period displayed the Iberian intolerance which regarded the pillage and massacre of 'heathen' as legitimate activities. That the Portuguese were eventually allowed a trading-base in the closely guarded peninsula of Macao was in part due to the help given to the Chinese authorities in the suppression of Chinese pirates and in part to a growing realization of the value of their commerce. But from this time onwards

there was an increasing tendency to restrict the centres at which foreign trade was allowed and to limit the movements and curtail the freedom of the foreign merchants.

Chinese experience of the Dutch was no more favourable. The Dutch pillage of undefended Buddhist temples in the Chusan archipelago (1661) was perhaps the worst example of European violence, and the large-scale Spanish massacre of Chinese traders and settlers in the Philippines was matched, as late as the eighteenth century, by a similar massacre by the Dutch in Java. By the time of the earliest English trade expedition to Canton under Captain John Weddell in 1637 the pitch was already queered. Weddell, too, attempted to use force, but more, it would seem, from irritation at the excessive caution and suspicion of the Chinese authorities than in the spirit of a freebooter. Later, when English trade in the Far East had come exclusively under the control of the East India Company, there was no repetition of the earlier excesses.¹ Its merchants were bent on legitimate commerce and the buccaneering phase was virtually over. But the early reputation of the Western traders as marauders and would-be pirates, 'ocean devils' in the Chinese phrase, was undoubtedly one of the factors in the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Chinese towards quite reasonable requests for trading facilities.

There were, however, other and more enduring causes of friction and misunderstanding. The Chinese and West European conceptions of commerce were fundamentally contrasted and reflected a profound difference in their respective histories and types of society. The Western traders, especially after the formation of the great chartered companies, of which the British East India Company that had the monopoly of British trade with China in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century was a perfect example, were organized in powerful corporations. These chartered companies managed their own affairs and made their own regulations but had the backing, in case of need, of their national governments which were interested in the success of their trade. They were the heirs of the strong mercantile power built up on European experience of trade in Greek city states and Italian commercial republics. Moreover, the Western merchants were dominated by the European conception of separate sovereign states trading with each other under the aegis of international law and with the right to have accredited

¹ In earlier days the English had been no more scrupulous than the Dutch or Portuguese in attacking Chinese junks trading in the East Indies and southern seas.

representatives at the seat of government of the countries with which they trafficked.

All these ideas were completely alien to the Chinese tradition. China had always been essentially a land empire. Its revenue, institutions, and whole theory of government were based on agricultural interests. The merchants, though numerous and eager to trade, were without political influence or large-scale organization. The central government, with its seat in Peking far away from the chief centres of foreign trade in south-east China, delegated control entirely to the local mandarins, and disclaimed any interest in commercial transactions. A still more important consideration is that there was always the assumption of the world sovereignty of the Chinese state. Diplomatic recognition of other states and of their right to trade with the Middle Kingdom on equal terms was utterly foreign to Chinese ideas. All alien traders were regarded as "tribute-bearers" to the Celestial Empire, without legal rights and to be tolerated only as long as they gave no trouble and took full responsibility for the misdeeds of any of their members.

To these deep-seated causes of clash between two entirely different types of civilization, once they were brought into intimate contact, should be added a circumstance peculiar to that time. In the eighteenth century the Manchu dynasty was still extremely unpopular in south-east China and had only recently established its authority in that part of the empire (see vol. i, p. 354). The government was highly suspicious of the coastal provinces and anxious to prevent any dangerous intimacy between foreigners and its own disaffected subjects.

THE RISE OF BRITISH TRADE

The conditions described in the preceding paragraphs form the background of Anglo-Chinese relations throughout the eighteenth century and up to the outbreak of the first Anglo-Chinese war in 1839. After numerous efforts had been made to establish depôts for the China trade in Tongking, at Amoy, and at Taiwan in Formosa, Canton from 1715 became the recognized base of the East India Company's commercial contact with China, and in 1757 an imperial edict restricted all foreign trade to that port. Notwithstanding the limitations placed upon the trade it grew steadily in volume and organization.

In Europe there was a rising demand for Chinese products, for

both raw and woven silk, for nankeens, as Chinese cotton fabrics were called, for porcelain or Chinese ware, for rhubarb and quicksilver; tea was at first a rare and costly commodity, but by the early nineteenth century had become the company's chief export from China. Unfortunately there was no corresponding demand on the Chinese side for English products. Apart from a very limited sale for English woollens and for some Indian or Indonesian products such as sandalwood and pepper, collected on the voyage from England, Chinese goods were purchased by the import of silver, and the company's profits on sales in the home market were often seriously offset by loss on the outward trade. The position was later redressed by the unhappy import of Indian opium (see p. 15).

In course of time the trade became rather elaborately organized. The senior employees of the company, known as the supercargoes because their original function was to take charge of the ships' loadings, were given wide authority and in 1720 were combined into a council, eventually called the Select Committee, which took charge of operations at Canton during the trading season and moved to Macao for the rest of the year. The president of the council was the chief official, with functions similar to those of a *chargé d'affaires*. On the Chinese side direct trade contact with the foreigners became limited to a group of wealthy merchants known as the Co-Hong. They paid a heavy price for the privilege and were responsible to the Chinese officials; they had, for example, to choose from among their members so-called Security Merchants to stand surety for every foreign ship during its stay in port, including the payment of dues and the good behaviour of its crew. The Co-Hong merchants were thus the intermediaries between the foreign traders and Chinese officialdom, represented by such local mandarins as the Viceroy of Canton, and, above all, by the Imperial Commissioner of Customs known to the Westerners as the Hoppo. He was invariably a Manchu and frequently used his position to secure enormous profits. The Co-Hong formed in fact a convenient screen behind which the high officials could mulct the foreign traders without having any personal dealings with them.

The actual relations between the English and Co-Hong merchants were on the whole extremely good. The detailed accounts which have come down give abundant evidence of great mutual respect and confidence, and the picture of social intercourse and hospitality drawn by travellers such as William Hickey, who visited Canton in 1769, is in many ways very attractive. The Company's grievances

were never against the Chinese merchants and people but against the arbitrary restrictions and the haughty and capricious attitude of Chinese officialdom. These restrictions and this attitude, however, became increasingly galling. The foreign merchants were not allowed to enter Canton but were rigidly confined to their 'factory' quarter during the trading season and had to move to Macao during the winter. They could not bring their wives and families to the Canton factory, although they were allowed in Macao. They were forbidden to employ Chinese servants and were denied all facilities for learning the native language, ignorance of which was a frequent cause of misunderstanding. Their merchandise was subject to arbitrary and uncertain dues, and while they were held responsible for the misbehaviour of any drunken British sailors, they had no confidence in Chinese justice. Official proclamations about them, posted in public places, were often highly insulting. Above all, except by pressure through the Co-Hong, there was no means of voicing their grievances or prospect of getting them redressed.

THE MACARTNEY AND AMHERST MISSIONS

In 1793 a carefully planned effort was made to place the trade on a more satisfactory basis by the despatch of an embassy from Great Britain under Lord Macartney bearing personal letters from George III to the aged emperor, Ch'ien Lung. It was equipped with a large expert staff and everything possible was done to create a favourable impression. The sails of the vessel which brought the mission up the Canton river were painted by the Chinese with the words: 'Tribute-bearers from the country of England,' and the embassy was then escorted from Canton to Peking by the famous 'Ambassadors' Road' down the Kan valley. Eventually it was received by the emperor at his summer residence in Jehol. The ceremony of the *Kowtow* was waived and the mission was well received and sumptuously entertained, although apparently with the assumption on the part of the Chinese that it had really come to do honour to Ch'ien Lung, who was then celebrating his eightieth birthday.

It completely failed, however, to achieve its purpose. The exhibition at the Summer Palace in the Western hills of King George's presents, designed to excite the imagination of the Chinese with the range and value of English products, made no impression, with the single exception of some specimens of Wedgwood ware.

No mention was made at the time of the requests which Lord Macartney transmitted, these including the right to send an official envoy to Peking, the setting aside of an island in the Chusan archipelago or elsewhere as a trade depôt and place of residence for the British merchants, permission to propagate the Christian religion, and facilities for learning Chinese, 'a knowledge of which may enable them (the merchants) to conform more exactly to the laws and customs of China.' But in a subsequent written reply to George III by the emperor they were all rejected. This oft-quoted reply of Ch'ien Lung perfectly epitomized the official view of China's relations to other powers and of external trade. The British king was commended for 'the earnest tones in which his memorial was couched,' revealing a respectful humility which was highly praiseworthy, but a British envoy could not be allowed to reside in Peking 'because it is doubtful whether he could acquire the rudiments of Chinese civilization, and in any case it would be impossible for him to transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil.' As for the request for extended trading facilities that too must be disallowed: 'Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no products within its own borders. There is, therefore, no need to import the manufacture of outside barbarians in exchange for our products. But as the tea, silk, and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves, we have permitted as a signal mark of favour that foreign hongs should be established at Canton so that your wants may be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence,' and again, 'The distinction between Chinese and barbarian is most strict and your Ambassador's request that barbarians should be given full liberty to disseminate their religion is utterly unreasonable.'

A later mission of a similar character under Lord Amherst failed more ignominiously. Lord Amherst made the mistake of landing at Tientsin instead of Canton, in contravention of Chinese regulations, and as he refused to perform the *Kowtow* he was denied admission to the royal presence. A like fate befell a mission sent by the Dutch.

THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT

This consistent denial by the authorities of any right on the part of European nations to trade with China, and to install for that

purpose the diplomatic machinery to which the Western countries were accustomed, was undoubtedly the primary cause of the clash that followed. The position became more serious when in 1834 the monopoly of the East India Company was abolished and the China trade thrown open to British merchants. It was then deemed essential to appoint a Trade Commissioner or Superintendent directly representative of the British Crown. Lord Napier was sent out in that capacity, but the Viceroy at Canton contemptuously refused to receive his credentials and the quarrel now assumed a national character. 'The respectful humility' of King George's letter transmitted by Lord Macartney was replaced by language of a very different character in Lord Napier's indignant reply. This pointed out that 'His Majesty the King of England is a great and powerful monarch, that he rules over an extent of territory in the four quarters of the world more comprehensive in space and infinitely more so in power than the whole Empire of China, that he commands armies of bold and fierce soldiers who have conquered wherever they went, and that he is possessed of great ships where no native of China has ever yet dared to show his face. Let the Governor then judge if such a monarch will be reverently obedient to any one.' Whether the major issue could have been peacefully settled if the British attitude at this critical stage had been more conciliatory and forbearing, and if the relations between the two countries had not been complicated by the unhappy opium controversy, remains an open question, but it is hardly open to doubt that it was not the matter of importing opium but of the right to trade under tolerable conditions which was the real bone of contention. The opium controversy, however, profoundly confused the issue and exacerbated the quarrel.

The Opium Question

Opium had long been used in China for medicinal purposes, but the habit of opium smoking was recent. It is believed to have originated through opium being mixed with tobacco imported into Amoy by Chinese traders from Formosa, which the Dutch controlled between 1624 and 1662. The emperor Yung Chêng prohibited the sale and use of opium by edict in 1729. Its import was not expressly forbidden until 1800, but when the East India Company became aware of the official disapproval of the trade, repeated orders were given to its ships' captains to avoid handling the drug, and it is

claimed that no East Indiaman carried any to China after 1782. It was, however, extensively imported by private traders in the so-called 'country' or non-company ships from India, which was the chief source of supply. As there was only a small market in India for Chinese goods these private traders were chiefly paid for the opium which they imported by silver, and by an arrangement with the Company's agents at Canton this was exchanged for drafts on their Indian agencies. By thus acting as international bankers the Canton agents began to solve the problem which had so long confronted the Company of how to balance their purchases of Chinese goods for export to England by importing a commodity for which there was a strong demand in China. In effect British purchases of Chinese silk and tea were increasingly paid for by the import of Indian opium into China, and the East India Company cannot therefore be exonerated from complicity in the trade.

Gradually the imports of opium became so heavy that there was a large outward movement of silver, and China lost the favourable balance of trade which she had hitherto enjoyed. There was thus a strong economic as well as moral objection to the trade. The edict of 1800, prohibiting import, had no effect. On the contrary, the trade, which was now contraband, increased to alarming proportions. The import rose from 1,070 chests in 1796 to nearly 5,000 per annum between 1811 and 1821, to nearly 10,000 between 1821 and 1828, and to over 18,000 between 1828 and 1835. The nationals of many countries took part in this nefarious drug traffic, which was greatly facilitated by the venality of many Chinese officials, who made huge profits out of it. None the less, there was a rising tide of opposition to it on both moral and economic grounds, and this closely coincided in time with the vital change in Anglo-Chinese relations marked by the Chinese refusal to accept Lord Napier's credentials as Trade Commissioner.

THE TWO ANGLO-CHINESE WARS

In 1839, four years after the Napier incident, Lin Tze-hsü, Viceroy of Hu-Kwang, one of the most important administrative posts in the empire, was sent to Canton as a special commissioner by the Chinese government with instructions to make the imperial edicts against the import of opium effective. Lin's attitude to foreigners showed the arrogance and hostility characteristic of most highly

placed Chinese officials at that period, but he was a man of ability and determination and of unquestioned sincerity and patriotism. Shortly after his arrival at Canton he ordered the foreign merchants to surrender all the opium in their possession and to give a bond not only that they would never again import opium in their vessels, but that they would hand over for execution any person found to be guilty of secreting it on board. Pending the surrender of the opium the factory quarter was placed in a state of siege. To avert bloodshed, Captain Elliot, who had succeeded Lord Napier as Superintendent of Trade (although his credentials had similarly been refused), agreed to the surrender, and over 20,000 chests of opium were burnt with dramatic ceremony by Commissioner Lin. Elliot, however, refused to re-open trade and the whole British community withdrew for a time to Macao. Further incidents followed and, in particular, a refusal by the British authorities to hand over to native justice some sailors who in a drunken fray had murdered a Chinese. By this time two British warships had arrived, and a clash on 3 November 1839 between them and Chinese war junks, under an admiral who demanded the surrender of the murderers, began the first Anglo-Chinese war. It has been persistently called the 'Opium' war, although, for the reasons already given, it is a misleading title. The fundamental issue was the British claim to equality of status with China and the right to trade with her on equal terms, and the question of whether or not foreigners were to be amenable to Chinese law provided the actual *casus belli*.¹

The two wars between Great Britain and China, although separated by several years of uneasy peace, were in direct sequence and concerned with similar issues. The treaties enacted at their close forced China from her isolation and determined the conditions under which she was to trade with the Western world for nearly a century. The wars and their results are therefore best considered as a connected whole.

¹ The causes of the first Anglo-Chinese war are exhaustively and objectively analysed by H. B. Morse in his monumental work, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London, 1910). Although most popular Chinese histories, not unnaturally, denounce it as 'The Opium war,' it has been impartially studied by more than one writer. A well-known historian, Wei Yuan, in a work entitled *The Military Operations of the Present Dynasty*, written about 1850, discusses it with great frankness and fairness, and concludes that 'It was the closing of trade, not the forced surrender of the opium, which brought on the Canton war.' See also Kuo, P. W., *A Critical Study of the First Anglo-Chinese War* (Shanghai, 1935).

The First or 'Opium' War

The first, or so-called 'Opium' war (1839-42), whose origins have just been considered, began with a rather desultory series of engagements, including the storming of Canton, followed, after the arrival of more ships and troops from Great Britain, by a vigorous attack on the key positions of the Yangtze estuary and delta. The capture of Ningpo, Woosung, Shanghai, and Chinkiang, where the Grand Canal crosses the Yangtze, and an imminent threat to Nanking, induced the Chinese government to open negotiations with Sir Henry Pottinger, Captain Elliot's successor as British Trade Commissioner. The result was the Treaty of Nanking, signed on board H.M.S. *Cornwallis* on 29 August 1842.

The Treaty of Nanking. By this treaty and a supplementary agreement of the next year, 1843, the following principal concessions were obtained from China :

(1) The surrender to Great Britain as a commercial and naval base of the island of Hong Kong, then very thinly peopled and little used except by pirates.

(2) The opening to British trade and residence of five important ports : Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai (Fig. 2).

(3) The abolition of the Co-Hong.

(4) British officials to have intercourse with Chinese authorities on a basis of equality.

(5) The establishment by the Chinese of a 'fair and regular' tariff on imports and exports in place of arbitrary and unfixed dues. The supplementary agreement of 1843 fixed the scale at 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, and stipulated that imported goods, after payment of this tariff, could be sent into the interior without incurring further charges except those for actual transit.

(6) The supplementary treaty also contained 'the most-favoured nation' clause giving Great Britain participation in all privileges granted by China to other nations.

(7) The beginnings of the system of extraterritoriality or exemption of British subjects from Chinese jurisdiction. This was developed and made more explicit by the later Treaty of Tientsin (see p. 19).

Friction soon developed over the interpretation of the articles of the Treaty, since the Chinese were not yet reconciled to giving to foreigners the treatment which the latter considered as just and

reasonable. Moreover, the foreigners, too, had by no means gained all that they deemed vital for their commerce, particularly the right to trade and travel in the interior and to have direct access to the central government through diplomatic representatives at Peking. At the same time the first war had demonstrated the naval and military weakness of China.

The Second or 'Arrow' War

The roots of the second Anglo-Chinese war (1856-60) lay in the refusal of the Chinese officials to treat foreigners on an equal footing. The immediate issue which led to the differences breaking out into open war was the incident of the *lorcha* 'Arrow' at Canton. The earlier treaty had guaranteed the security of British ships trading with China, and it was not difficult for Chinese or other foreign owners at Hong Kong to buy a register which entitled them to hoist the British flag and claim immunity from search. Such a boat was the *Arrow*, Chinese-owned and manned, but with a British captain and flying the British flag. By order of the Chinese Commissioner Yeh it was boarded by Chinese police in October 1856, its crew searched and some of them arrested on suspicion of recent piracy. The British Consul at Canton, Sir Harry Parkes, immediately demanded the return of the imprisoned crew, and that the charges against them should be investigated at his consulate and not by the Chinese authorities. Yeh's refusal to apologize or to admit error led to the British bombardment of Canton.

On the pretext of the murder of a priest in Kwangsi, the French, who had been recently allies of the British in the Crimean war, participated with them in this so-called 'Arrow' war. The bombardment of the Taku forts, barring the approaches to Tientsin and Peking, induced the Chinese government to agree to the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), but difficulties arose as to its ratification at Peking. The Chinese, in their desire that the accredited British representatives should approach the capital by the overland route traditionally associated with 'tribute-bearers,' refused them permission to sail up to Tientsin. When they attempted to do so they were fired on by the Taku forts, and two British gunboats were sunk. The war began again, but was soon brought to a decisive conclusion by the landing of a considerable force which defeated

the Chinese army at Palichiao, stormed one of the gates of Peking, and compelled the capital to surrender. The Convention of Peking (1860), which was then signed, ratified and somewhat enlarged the scope of the Treaty of Tientsin.¹

The Tientsin-Peking Treaties (1858-60). By these agreements the following concessions were obtained :

(1) The opening of several new treaty ports which gave foreign traders access to northern Chinese ports, including Tientsin and Newchang—then the outlet for Manchuria—and to several great Yangtze river-ports, an immense extension of the field of commerce.

(Navigational rights for British ships to participate in the important coastal and Yangtze river-trade were not expressly included in these treaties but naturally developed as a result of the opening of the treaty ports, and they were legalized under the 'most-favoured nation' clause after Denmark had obtained this concession in a treaty of 1863.)

(2) The right to establish a diplomatic mission at Peking with direct access to the central government.

(3) The right to travel in the interior.

(4) The right to the propagation of Christianity in China and complete toleration for the practice of this faith by foreigners and Chinese converts alike.

(5) The cession of Kowloon on the Chinese mainland immediately opposite the island of Hong Kong and considered necessary for the security of its harbour.

(6) The legalization of the opium traffic by placing a duty upon its import.

(7) An extension and elaboration of the principle of extra-territoriality.

THE TREATY PORT SYSTEM

The relinquishment in 1943 by the United Kingdom and the United States of their extraterritorial rights in China, means the virtual end of what is usually known as the treaty port system which for nearly a century dominated China's external relations and,

¹ A fortnight earlier, in retaliation for an outrage committed on emissaries sent forward by Lord Elgin, the British High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, to demand the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin, the celebrated Yuan-ming-yuan, or Summer Palace, built for the great emperor K'ang Hsi early in the eighteenth century by Jesuit architects, had been completely destroyed by British and French troops.

directly or indirectly, affected nearly every aspect of her national life. A fair and objective appraisal of the working of this system in its historical perspective is at last becoming possible (see also vol. iii, Chapter xiii).

The events of the critical period which culminated in the com-




Fig. 2. The treaty ports

Based on Gull, E. M., *British Economic Interests in the Far East*, p. 48 (London, 1943).

The dates are those of the treaties or decrees opening the ports. The actual Customs openings generally occurred some years later than these, and in some cases over ten years later, e.g. Nanking 1899, Amoy 1862, Foochow 1861, Ningpo 1861, Wenchow 1877.

pletion of the main features of the system by the Tientsin-Peking agreements of 1858-60 must be distinguished from those of the later nineteenth century when European aims in China assumed a much more sinister and aggressive form. Sir Frederick Whyte has called the former 'The Period of European Admission' and the

latter 'The Period of European Aggression,' and the distinction is valid and important.¹

In the former period, which alone is now under consideration, Great Britain was the foreign power which led the way in China and was the architect of the trade system imposed upon her. Great Britain, however, was far from pursuing a monopolistic policy. One power after another, including the United States, made treaties with China on similar lines, and the operation of 'the most-favoured nation' clause, introduced into most of them, diffused the privileges obtained very evenly. Before the war of 1914-18 the countries which enjoyed extraterritorial privileges in China were Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

As the architect of the system, Great Britain, then in the plenitude of the commercial strength which her industrial lead and the adoption of a free-trade policy had given her, desired nothing but the extension of trading facilities in what was recognized to be a market of vast possibilities. There was no wish or intention of returning to the monopolist practices of the Portuguese and Dutch in earlier centuries or of obtaining exclusive spheres of influence or territorial possessions. On the surface the acquisition of Hong Kong runs counter to this generalization, but it was more an apparent than a real exception. The utilization of its fine harbour and elimination of piracy was an ultimate benefit to Chinese trade, and from the first it was a free port, open to the commerce of all nations.

To say that Great Britain had no territorial ambitions in China is not, however, to imply that there was no real infringement of Chinese sovereignty. That was involved in some of the essential characteristics of the trade system itself. But to appraise the system as a whole it is necessary to review it under different aspects.

The Expansion of Trade

An elementary but fundamental consideration is that the treaty port system greatly increased the volume of Chinese trade, and from this Chinese merchants benefitted no less than European and American. It is also true to say that, on the whole, the mutual trust and confidence which had characterized the relationship of the British and Co-Hong merchants in the old days of very restricted

¹ Whyte, Sir F., *China and Foreign Powers* (London, 1928).
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trading was now extended to a much wider field of Anglo-Chinese commerce.

The ultimate consequences of this expanded trade almost inevitably involved the introduction of the industrial system which Western Europe and America had developed. The treaty port system paved the way for the industrialization of China which is now beginning, but it is beyond the scope of this summary to estimate the consequences of this momentous change on the character of the ancient civilization. It seems certain that the isolation of China could not under any circumstances have been preserved much longer, and it may be contended that the treaty port system provided a framework within which the inevitable changes took place more gradually and less violently than might otherwise have been the case.

The Controlled Tariff

The limitation by treaty of Chinese dues on European imports and exports to a uniform tariff of five per cent. *ad valorem* was at once one of the greatest advantages secured by Western traders and the most serious infringement of Chinese sovereignty. The tariff remained practically unchanged until the Nanking government recovered commercial autonomy in the late 'twenties of the present century (see vol. iii, Chapter v).

A charge frequently made by Chinese and some European critics is that the rate was excessively low, and, by allowing the cheap import of Western goods and depriving China of a more ample customs' revenue, prevented the earlier development of a national economy. For the greater part of the period during which the system was in force China was in no position to use a scientific tariff or to devise any system of national economy in the Western sense, but the criticism probably has considerable force for the later stages and, apart from the principle involved, a revision of the tariff in China's favour was certainly overdue.

In fact, however, the customs' revenue, even if it was less than it should have been, became the great financial mainstay of the Chinese government, and its organization was one of the happiest results of the treaty port system, although one that was indirect and unforeseen. In 1854 when Shanghai, which had become a treaty port twelve years before, was threatened by the Taiping rebels (see p. 35) the local Governor, who found great difficulty in collecting the customs, placed their administration temporarily in the hands of a

board containing representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States, the three nations with greatest trade interests in China. The experiment worked so well that it was quickly extended by the Chinese to all the ports that were opened for foreign trade. Soon the office of Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs became one of the most important administrative posts in China, and the Irishman, Sir Robert Hart, who held it from 1863 to 1908, made the Customs' administration one of the most efficient and successful organizations of its kind in the world. No foreigner in China has ever been more respected and trusted than this remarkable man who, when he was on the point of becoming British Minister in Peking in 1885, yielded to the request of the Chinese government to retain the Inspector-Generalship instead.

The success of the administration was mainly due to the fact that Sir Robert Hart always regarded himself as the loyal servant of the Chinese government whose appointee he was, and instilled his own sense of obligation and responsibility into all his colleagues, foreign and Chinese alike.¹ No attempt was made to control or dictate the use of the revenue collected; indeed the dues were not actually collected by the foreign side of the administration, which was concerned only with assessing the amounts to be paid and recording and reporting them to Peking. Through this system the obligations of the treaties were discharged with a minimum of friction and the Chinese government could rely on a certain source of income.

Apart from the efficient discharge of this primary function and from the invaluable administrative training and sense of corporate loyalty developed in its *personnel*, the Maritime Customs performed a number of most useful extra-customs services, including the buoying of river approaches and channels, the lighting of the dangerous Chinese coastline by both lighthouses and lightships, and the development of pilotage. The modern Chinese Post Office, which has enjoyed a high reputation for efficiency, also emerged out of the activities set in motion by Sir Robert Hart and became an independent organization in 1911.

¹ The fine work of Sir Robert Hart and his successors is fully recognized in modern Chinese works, e.g. Cheng Shi-gung, *Modern China: A Political Study*, p. 205 (Oxford, 1919). 'The foreign members of the staff (of the Maritime Customs) have served China loyally and have never shown any prejudice in favour of their country. They have maintained the standard of efficiency and loyalty set up by Sir Robert Hart, and have won the admiration of foreigners and the Chinese alike.'

Extraterritorial Rights and Foreign Settlements

The essence of the extraterritorial principle was the exemption of the nationals of the treaty-making powers from Chinese jurisdiction and their right of trial by their own consular courts. This demand was natural in the light of bitter experience. As a modern Chinese writer puts it in a detached and objective study: 'In the absence of a civil, commercial, or industrial code and with a criminal code harsh and imperfect, it was difficult to expect foreigners to believe in the infallibility of Chinese judges and submit themselves to Chinese law.'¹

The principle in itself was by no means new to the Chinese, and its initial concession did not outrage the official mind nearly as much, for example, as the foreigners' insistence on their right to place diplomatic representatives in Peking in close proximity to the Son of Heaven. This was because the principle of devolution of responsibility had long been recognized in the administration of the empire and had been applied by the Chinese themselves to Arab and other foreign traders living in China in times long prior to the coming of the Europeans (see p. 7). They were not only permitted but required to manage their own affairs and so to give a minimum of trouble to the imperial authorities.

The principle, however, received an immense and quite unforeseen extension under the treaty port system, and ultimately came to be regarded by the Chinese as one of its most obnoxious features. The right of foreigners to live in the treaty ports led naturally to the growth of concessions and settlements,² such as Hankow and Shanghai, set aside for their residence, and as the treaty ports multiplied, China became studded with what were virtually alien city-states beyond the control of its government. In some cases, and notably at Shanghai, the new foreign-controlled towns largely superseded the older Chinese cities in whose neighbourhood they developed. Out of a total population in recent times of considerably over one and a quarter millions in the International Settlement and the (separate) French Concession at Shanghai less than 50,000 were foreigners.

The most important of the settlements and concessions were as follows (the dates given are those of establishment and of period of extension):

¹ Cheng Shi-gung, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

² For the distinction between concessions and settlements, see vol. iii, Chapter xiii, where the treaty port system is discussed in connexion with British trade interests in China.

<i>Amoy, Kulangsu</i>	International Settlement	(1903)
<i>Canton, Shameen</i>	British Concession	}
	French Concession	
		(1859)
<i>Chinkiang</i> . . .	British Concession . . .	(1861)
<i>Hankow</i> . . .	British Concession . . .	(1861)
	German Concession . . .	(1895)
	French Concession	}
	Russian Concession	
		(1896)
	Japanese Concession . . .	(1898)
<i>Kiukiang</i> . . .	British Concession . . .	(1861)
<i>Shanghai</i> . . .	International Settlement	(1846-99)
	French Concession . . .	(1849-1914)
<i>Tientsin</i> . . .	British Municipal Area	(1860-1902)
	French Concession . . .	(1860-1900)
	German Concession . . .	(1895-1901)
	Japanese Concession . . .	(1896-1900)
	Russian Concession . . .	(1900)
	Italian Concession . . .	(1901)
	Belgian Concession . . .	(1902)
	Austro-Hungarian Concession	(1902)

Chinese in these foreign-controlled areas remained subject to Chinese jurisdiction, but the existence of the foreign administration acted as a check on the arbitrary executive action, which was characteristic of Imperial and early Republican China. The treaty ports, as places of refuge, often sheltered genuine Chinese reformers and political refugees, and they served as the home of many valuable movements, which, under reactionary regime of the later Manchus or in the devastating war-lord period of the early 'twenties of the present century, could hardly have originated or made progress elsewhere in China. It was not until the period subsequent to the war of 1914-18 that they became the target of Chinese nationalists, who claimed that as an *imperium in imperio* they stood in the way of the unification of the country. It might more justly be said that they served China well in the troublous war-lord years by saving her from relapsing into complete anarchy, though clearly they have outlived their usefulness.

Outside the treaty ports, the exercise of extraterritoriality was not without its complications. The rights of both foreigners and Chinese to propagate Christianity and to have complete toleration in its practice were guaranteed by the 1858-60 agreements. Missionaries, however, claimed the right to intervene with the local officials to prevent what they deemed injustice being done to their converts. The effect was that the latter regarded themselves as in a privileged position, which in many cases they abused. This was one of the main causes of Chinese Christians often being called 'secondary foreign devils,' and of the missionary effort being so often identified in the

minds of the Chinese with European political ambitions. The position was aggravated in the second half of the nineteenth century by the murder of missionaries being made the pretext on several occasions for a demand for fresh concessions by the European powers.

The Psychological Aspect

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century it was the superiority complex of Chinese officialdom which had been one of the main causes of the friction and trouble that led the foreign traders to press their governments to the use of force in order to establish tolerable conditions for their trade. The arrogance and pretentious claims of the Chinese authorities were no less galling because they were in part animated by fear. But by the end of the nineteenth century the position had been largely reversed. The superiority complex, as manifested in what has frequently been called the 'Shanghai mind,' was the almost inevitable result of the long enjoyment by Westerners of a highly privileged status, backed by force, in an alien land. This in time aroused the resentment of educated and sensitive Chinese, conscious that, however evil the days on which it had fallen, their country was the scene of an ancient and high civilization.

The most far-seeing members of these Western communities in China, such as Sir Robert Hart, had long realized that the treaty port system, whatever its original justification and the real services it had rendered, could not long survive the birth of a genuine national movement. The verdict of history will probably be that its role was to break down the isolation of the old civilization and prepare the way for China's full entry into the main currents of the world's life.

THE TAIPING REBELLION

The relations of the Chinese government and the Western nations in the nineteenth century must be seen against the background of increasing economic unrest and political upheaval in the country as a whole which reached a climax in the Taiping rebellion. These phenomena had been normal in the later stages of Chinese dynasties which were losing their vitality and grip on affairs, but the form which they assumed under the later Manchus was greatly influenced by the new contact with the West.

Even before the retirement of Ch'ien Lung in 1796 there were signs that the prosperity, internal peace, and relative contentment, which had prevailed in China in the later seventeenth and through

almost the whole of the eighteenth century, were coming to an end. The Manchus, at any rate in Central and South China, had never ceased to be regarded as an alien dynasty, and there were still secret societies pledged to the return of the Mings and ready to take advantage of any signs of general unrest. The first serious revolt, that of the White Lotus, which broke out in 1793 and affected much of the Yangtze valley, was of this character and was suppressed with some difficulty under Ch'ien Lung's successor, Chia Ch'ing, in 1806. Another plot against the same emperor's life, organized by the so-called Society of Heavenly Reason, and again directed to a Ming restoration, was within an ace of succeeding in 1813; on this occasion Chia Ch'ing was rescued from would-be assassins, who had gained admission to the palace and had actually seized him, by the prompt and courageous action of his son and successor, Tao Kuang. The largest of these pro-Ming secret societies was known as the Triad (Heaven, Earth, and Man) or Society of Heaven and Earth, and had an elaborate and widespread organization which gave the officials constant anxiety in the Si kiang basin and South China generally in the early and middle nineteenth century.

The earlier risings, ominous as they were, were local and did not receive any general backing from the peasantry, but, as the century advanced, the economic situation rapidly deteriorated and the inability of the now decadent dynasty to cope either with it or the new external menace presented by the pressure of the Western Powers became increasingly evident. The growth of official corruption, which always attended the decay of a dynasty, was matched by the increase of brigandage and of piracy on a tremendous scale along the south-east coasts. A series of natural calamities, both of droughts and floods, intensified the distress just as they did in North China during the war-lord period of the nineteen-twenties.

CAUSES AND SIGNIFICANCE

Such were the general antecedents of the great Taiping rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century, but before discussing its special features, which are of great interest, something more should be said as to its deeper causes.

It is beyond question that the primary reasons for this tremendous upheaval were economic. Repeated stress has already been laid on the almost chronic poverty of the peasantry as China's greatest and most persistent problem throughout the whole range of her

long history (see vol. i, Chaps. xi-xii). In the analysis of the causes of that poverty the two of greatest significance have been seen to be: (1) The constant tendency to over-population, itself the result, in part of the great concentration of the peasant families in the basins and valleys adapted to the technique of arable farming worked out by the Chinese at a very early period—almost to the exclusion of mixed and pastoral farming in other types of terrain—and in part of the excessive cult of the family with the sanction of the Confucian ethic behind it; (2) Exploitation of the peasants through excessive taxation and land-grabbing by officials who were usually themselves landowners.

The latter cause always operated most strongly when an originally vigorous dynasty was becoming decadent and corrupt. This was the very time when the phenomenon of over-population, due to the rapid increase under the peace and prosperity which it had established in its early period of firm rule and good government, had itself become a serious problem. Thus the two major causes of agrarian distress nearly always coincided in the intensity of their operations. It is also more than a coincidence that natural calamities of drought and flood so often seemed to occur on a portentous scale at this stage of the Chinese economic cycle. The extent of the destruction and misery caused by them has been less the result of abnormalities of nature than of the neglect of dykes and flood-control and of the breakdown of the machinery for distributing food from government granaries in periods of administrative chaos and corruption.

The cycle was never better illustrated than in China under the Manchu dynasty. There had been a tremendous increase of population under the firm rule of the emperors K'ang Hsi, Yung Ch'eng, and Ch'ien Lung. One estimate puts it at 237 millions between 1722 and 1812, and according to another, the population grew from 143 millions in 1741 to 432 millions in 1851, an increase of approximately 200 per cent.¹ As noticed earlier (see vol. i, p. 358), the central government in the eighteenth century was fully aware of both the fact and the danger of this colossal growth of population, and by imperial decrees and in other ways, had sought to foster more intensive cultivation and reclamation of waste land. Such indeed did occur on a large scale. The great intensity of farming for which modern China is renowned is said to date mainly from the eighteenth century. Much new land was also brought into

¹ For a discussion of the increase of population in China, see vol. i, pp. 357-8, and also pp. 282-7 in this volume.

cultivation, particularly in South China, and the hostility to the government of the Yao, Miao, and other aboriginal tribes, of which the Triad society and the Taipings made full use in their rebellions, was largely due to resentment at the loss of their most valuable lands. The Chinese settled in all the available valleys, and the aborigines were driven farther back into the hills.

But this increase in productivity did not nearly keep pace with the expansion of population. The ratio of increase between 1741 and 1851 has been calculated as about 1:2.2. To this inevitable cause of peasant distress another, which has steadily increased in importance ever since, began to operate with the increase of foreign trade in the nineteenth century. The large fortunes built up by Chinese merchants¹ in the coast cities, particularly Canton and Shanghai, were often used to acquire big estates, and the 'cornering' of the rice crop in some of the richest regions of the country became increasingly possible.

At the same time the burden of taxation, apart from official extortion, was beginning to fall more heavily on the peasantry. To encourage trade in his expanding empire K'ang Hsi had substituted a land poll-tax for a general poll-tax, and this is said in the end to have largely removed taxation from traders and merchants.

Until the end of Ch'ien Lung's reign the empire had been solvent, but thereafter to the still remaining costs of the many wars which that emperor had waged, to establish his authority in Central Asia, were added those of suppressing numerous revolts in China Proper and the payment of indemnities to foreign powers. Still more serious was the effect of the loss of the favourable balance of foreign trade after 1831, resulting in the increased cost of silver, for which the peasants had to pay in debased copper coinage. The continued growth of the opium trade, apart from its effects on morale, is said to have drained China of at least ten million taels a year about the second quarter of the nineteenth century. All these circumstances greatly aggravated the distress fundamentally due to the overgrowth of population in relation to the means of subsistence.

The other primary factor, that of exceptional official corruption, was no less conspicuous. The early Manchu emperors had set high standards both for themselves and the bureaucracy through which they worked and took elaborate precautions to prevent the

¹ The famous Cantonese merchant whom the foreign traders knew as Howqua assessed his own wealth on retirement at 26 million dollars. He was greatly respected and noted for his generosity and once subscribed 100,000 taels towards a special levy laid on Canton.

misuse of power, whether by court eunuchs, imperial clansmen, or military commanders, which had wrecked so many earlier dynasties. The extreme vigilance with which the great K'ang Hsi (1662-1722) supervised the affairs of his vast empire is reflected in the interesting, partly autobiographical essay on the functions of an emperor which he wrote when he was close on eighty and had been on the throne well over half a century: 'I have worked all these long years carefully, patiently, and faithfully, as if for a day. The word 'hard' is not enough to describe the nature of my work. . . . Some hold the theory that the emperor should attend only to very important affairs and leave the routine to the officials. I do not agree with this theory. For a tiny mistake in a little thing may give troubles to the whole country, and a moment's carelessness may bring unhappiness to peoples of hundreds of generations,' and again, 'The silver reserve in the Treasury has never been used by me except for military campaigns and famine relief. . . . Each of my palaces is run with ten or twenty thousand taels of silver, which is less than 1 per cent. of the annual expenditure on reconstruction of dams and dykes.'¹

On the whole Yung Ch'eng and Ch'ien Lung maintained these standards, although they did not always show K'ang Hsi's quite exceptional wisdom and statesmanship or, in the case at any rate of Ch'ien Lung, his care for economy. Yet even these emperors had to rely to a considerable extent for the preservation of their power on the Manchu military garrisons placed in the Chinese cities and on a high proportion of Manchus in the mandarinates, although they were most careful to conciliate the Chinese Confucian scholars and to employ as many as they could trust.

After Ch'ien Lung the royal house rather rapidly deteriorated. Chia Ch'ing (1796-1821), Tao Kuang (1821-51), and Hsien Fêng (1851-62) were, in comparison, weak men, unable to resist the growing effeminacy and luxury of the court life around them. They relied increasingly on their own people, the Manchu clansmen, to maintain their authority. These in general had always been much inferior to the Chinese *literati* in administrative capacity and grasp of affairs, and they had now completely lost their original virility. The 'Bannermen' or Manchu garrisons in the cities had become a byword as idle and worthless parasites on the community, and many of the Manchus who, by favouritism, had secured high positions in the mandarinates were little better. Many of the ablest Chinese were not employed at all, except in times of extreme emergency,

¹ Quoted in Hsieh, P. C., *The Government of China*, pp. 33-4 (Baltimore, 1925).

such as that of the Taiping rebellion itself. Promotion by merit, to which the earlier emperors had carefully adhered in the case of Manchu and Mongol candidates for office, was gradually abandoned and the nadir was reached when it became customary to put the highest offices and honours up for sale. This contravened all the best traditions of the Chinese administrative service and was a most potent cause of corruption.

Thus when China in the middle of the nineteenth century was confronted with an almost desperate agrarian situation, as already described, she was also cursed with the most inefficient and corrupt administration that she had known since the last days of the Ming dynasty. The first and most fundamental aspect of the Taiping rebellion is that of a great peasants' revolt aiming at the overthrow of a dynasty which had clearly 'exhausted the Mandate of Heaven' and at the achievement of tolerable conditions of life. This in itself was no new phenomenon in Chinese history, although it was perhaps on a larger scale and more ambitious than any of its predecessors.

But other new factors were at work which gave the Taiping rebellion, in spite of its fundamentally economic causes, a different bias and somewhat different character from any that had gone before it. For the first time the influence of Western ideas, though in a distorted medium and in a strange form, was reflected in a Chinese rising. In this aspect the Taiping rebellion is a kind of prelude to the greater Chinese revolution of the twentieth century, but whereas the latter was profoundly affected by the political theories and experiences of Western countries, the Taiping showed the result of the Christian teaching of European and American missionaries in China itself.

THE COURSE OF THE REBELLION, 1851-65

In the immediate origins of the Taiping rebellion it was these new Christian influences which were most apparent. The author and central figure of the rebellion, Hung Hsu-Ch'üan, was the son of a village headman of Hakka descent and was born in Kwangtung in 1813. A keen student of the Chinese classics, he aspired to public office through the state examinations. Failure to achieve the success which he believed that he deserved produced a violent revulsion against the accepted ethical system. After a severe illness, in the nature of a nervous and mental breakdown, during which

he had hallucinations or 'visions,' he eagerly read some Christian literature written by a Chinese convert which had been given to him some years before. Hung interpreted the new teaching in the light of his visions, discarded Confucianism, baptized himself and one or two relatives and friends, and began a kind of missionary campaign among the discontented Miao aborigines of the Kwangsi hills. At first he made some effort to aline his movement with the presentation of Christianity by the missionaries and visited a well-known American teacher, the Rev. I. J. Roberts of Canton, but he did not receive much guidance, and his version of Christianity remained crude and distorted. There was, however, much real fervour among his followers, and the *Shang Ti Hui* (Society of God or God-worshippers), which he formed on his return to the Kwangsi hills, was in its origins a genuine religious movement. Hung, as its leader, called himself 'The Younger Brother of Jesus Christ,' but the term 'Younger Brother' carried with it the Chinese implication of loyalty and subordination.

Soon, however, the movement acquired a political character and was joined by or linked up with other associations and secret societies, notably that of the Triads, which had the expulsion of the Manchu dynasty as their chief aim. The rebels discarded the pigtail or queue, a form of wearing the hair which had been imposed on the Chinese by the Manchus as a mark of servitude and was of definitely Tartar origin; because they did not shave the crown of their heads, the popular nickname of the rebels was *Ch'ang-mao*, the 'Long Haired.' The revolt, for such it had definitely become by 1850, spread rapidly in the hill-country of south-central and southern China, mainly in Hunan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung. This was a favourable *milieu*, for it was a wild and rather inaccessible part of China which had never fully accepted the Manchu yoke and harboured hardy mountaineers, many of them aboriginal tribesmen, including Miao, Yao, and Hakka,¹ who, as noticed above, had suffered much dispossession of their lands. It was also a region where many Christian communities flourished unmolested by the authorities.

The bulk of the adherents of the movement were either tribespeople or peasants, but it was also joined by some scholars and genuine social and economic reformers. At this stage it was a blend of religious fervour and economic aspirations, influenced both by

¹ The Hakka were not strictly aborigines but were (and are) a distinctive Chinese group with their own customs and quasi-national consciousness; see vol. i, p. 418.

the traditional Chinese idea of the right to revolt against a dynasty which had exhausted its mandate and by the new Christian conception of human brotherhood. In the minds of the more enlightened of its leaders and followers there was a definite, if vaguely formulated, idea of a new social order to be established, based on the principle of the fatherhood of God (the term *Shang Ti* was used in a strongly personal sense) and the brotherhood of Man, with social justice and a redistribution of wealth, according to need, as primary aims. In these respects the Taiping rising was in its inception more than a revolt of the traditional Chinese kind and was a revolution comparable in kind, however different in its manifestations, with the famous 1848 rising in Europe, which, curiously enough, almost exactly coincided with it and, like it, was destined to ultimate failure. It has been well described as 'the most picturesque as well as the most significant movement of the nineteenth century in China.'

It is difficult to know how far Hung himself at this stage was really swayed by these idealistic aims or how far he was guided by purely personal ambitions. But, as the movement swelled, his plans became increasingly grandiose, and, in 1851, when his followers had captured the important city of Yungan in southern Kwangsi, he proclaimed himself *T'ien Wang* or Heavenly King, and the dynasty which he intended to establish as the *T'ai ping* ('The Great Peace'). This is usually taken as the technical beginning of the rebellion. This development alienated those who, like the Triads, were anxious for a Ming restoration, but for the time enhanced the general popularity of the movement, which now became more elaborately organized. The new government was to be a theocracy with Hung as its spiritual and political head, but under him were several regional chiefs or kings (*Wangs*).

The local mandarins had completely failed to suppress the revolt in its earlier stages, and the Manchu government, now thoroughly alarmed, despatched imperial troops under their most experienced commanders to deal with it. Yungan was recaptured, but the rebel army, at this stage well-led and well-disciplined, moved north by the historic military route of the Siang valley and the Tungting lake to the Central Basin of the Yangtze. Its first outstanding success was the capture in swift succession in the winter of 1851-1852 of Hanyang, Hankow, and Wuchang, the key Wuhan cities in the very heart of China. Thence the Taiping fleet sailed down the great river and, after taking Kiukiang and Anking, the provincial

capital of Anhwei, the rebels laid siege to the famous city of Nanking. In spite of a strong garrison, it was taken by assault on 19 March 1853, and for eleven years was the capital of the rebel empire.

The capture of Nanking conferred immense prestige upon the Taipings and represents the high-water mark of their success. The relatively good behaviour and discipline of their armies and some initial efforts to carry out their avowed social programme contrasted very favourably with the excesses and poor morale of the imperial troops sent against them. It was at this stage that the movement most appeared in the light of a genuine peasants' revolt and made its greatest appeal to sympathetic foreign observers. 'China,' said the first Bishop of Hong Kong (Bishop George Smith), in a charge delivered in Trinity Church, Shanghai, when the Taipings were actually attacking the city in October 1853, 'long immovable, obeys in her turn the general law of change; dynasties and throne are crumbling to dust.' It is generally thought that if at this crucial moment the Taipings had resolved to direct their full strength to the capture of Peking, the discredited and tottering Manchu regime would have collapsed half a century earlier than it did. Even as it was, a relatively small rebel force under one of the ablest of their commanders, an ex-charcoal burner, General Li, after a remarkable march through North China, almost reached the capital, and was with difficulty checked and ultimately defeated by the imperial commanders; of these, Li Hung-chang, destined to become at the end of the century the one Chinese name really familiar to Englishmen at home, won his first laurels in averting the menace.

After this first great setback the Taiping organization rather rapidly deteriorated. Demoralization set in at the centre, and Lord Acton's famous dictum that 'all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely' was painfully illustrated in the case of the self-styled Heavenly King, living in luxury and comparative inactivity at Nanking. It was the energy of some of the subordinate *Wangs* who maintained the still formidable character of the revolt, and Hung Hsu-Ch'üan, always unbalanced, was nearly mad in his later years. Personal intrigues and divided counsels stultified the rebel leadership and nearly all the original inspiration of the movement gradually died out. Weakened morale and shortage of supplies led to increasing indiscipline and exactions and the destructiveness of the rebel armies soon matched or exceeded that of the imperial troops. Irreparable damage was done to some of the fairest and most historic cities of China, notably Hangchow and Nanking.

FOREIGN REACTIONS

In its earlier and hopeful phases the Taiping rising had attracted much interest and considerable sympathy among European and American missionaries in China, although they were always suspicious of Hung's understanding and interpretation of Christianity. Even prominent officials had thought it worthy of careful study as very possibly capable of giving China a better government than that of the decadent Manchus, and especially as its leaders constantly affirmed their friendly attitude to foreigners.

With the deterioration of the movement this sympathy naturally evaporated, and new factors gradually led to active foreign support of the existing regime. One was the menace to the trade which had been rapidly expanding in the flourishing new treaty port of Shanghai but was now suffering from the devastation of its great hinterland, the Yangtze valley, and the attempts of the rebel armies to capture Shanghai itself. The Chinese merchant guilds now declared active hostility to the Taipings and themselves helped to finance the imperial army which, under one of the ablest of the generals, Tseng Kuo-fang of Hunan, played the leading part in ultimately crushing the rebellion. The Chinese merchants of Shanghai also helped to finance a force under foreign leadership which, from its exploits, came to be known as the 'Ever-Victorious Army.' Its first commander was a remarkable American adventurer, Frederick Ward, who was responsible for moulding an originally very motley force into a strongly disciplined and effective army. After his death in action his place was taken for a time by his associate, Burgevine, but ultimately Li Hung-chang, now entrusted by the Manchu government with supreme control of the direction of affairs in the Yangtze valley, appointed a young British engineer, Charles Gordon, to lead the 'Ever-Victorious Army.' In co-operation with the imperial army of Tseng Kuo-fang, the *coup-de-grâce* was at last given to a revolt which had devastated most of the richest provinces of China and is estimated to have cost more than twenty million human lives. The decisive stroke was the recapture of Nanking in July 1865. The Heavenly King had committed suicide a few days earlier, but his son and heir was taken and executed, as was also the most heroic figure of the revolt, the *Chung Wang* or Faithful Prince. His devotion and bravery won the enthusiastic praise of 'Chinese Gordon,' later to be known as 'Gordon of Khartoum.' His execution was delayed a week in order to enable

him to complete the memoirs of his own part in and interpretation of a revolution which had once held great promise.

A strong motive for foreign aid to the Manchu government in the final stage of the rebellion, and one which probably decided the British government to give official support to its suppression, was the fact that the Taiping regime, by the corruption and deterioration of its leaders, and by the indiscipline and excesses of its followers, no longer offered the prospects of a stable Chinese government. On the maintenance of law and order depended not only the successful development of foreign trade, but also the realization of the commercial advantages secured by the Treaties of Tientsin and Peking.

It has often been contended that, by thus helping to strangle the rebellion, Great Britain was responsible for prolonging the life of a dynasty which itself was delaying the national rebirth of China. Although it may be admitted that foreign help was given mainly from interested motives, this contention can hardly be upheld. It was the Chinese themselves who ultimately rose against the rebels. Not only was the merchant class definitely hostile, the great bulk of the scholars and those who, like the distinguished soldier-statesman Tseng Kuo-fang, appreciated the real values of the classical tradition, were completely alienated by the destructiveness of the revolutionaries and disliked their theories. At first the movement received the genuine support of millions of peasants but these were rapidly disillusioned by its later developments, and the rebellion was thoroughly discredited some years before its final collapse.

For all its failure, the Taiping rebellion was a phenomenon and a portent of much significance in the history of China. It had raised the flag of social revolution and had come very near to success. It had shown how powerfully the ferment of new ideas could act upon traditional Chinese conceptions. Its embers continued to smoulder and its memory was among the influences which formed the early environment of Dr Sun Yat-sen, the 'father' of the Chinese revolution of our own times. One of his uncles had served in the Taiping army, and as a boy he is said to have called himself Hung Hsu-Ch'üan the Second.

FOREIGN AGGRESSION AND CHINESE DISINTEGRATION

The Far Eastern drama as seen to-day has its source in the history of the second half of the nineteenth century, and more

particularly in that of its closing decades. It is a complex story but mainly turns on four closely interwoven themes :

(1) The accelerated decline of the Manchu regime, resulting in the almost complete political and military impotence of China at a time of maximum external danger.

(2) The consolidation of Russian power in central and north-eastern Asia and the definite adoption by the Czarist government of an aggressive 'Forward' policy in the Far East, which was a challenge both to the Chinese interests of the maritime powers of Western Europe and to the newly arisen Far Eastern power of Japan.

(3) The increasing competition and rivalry of the Western industrial nations for raw materials and markets which assumed more and more a political form and culminated, towards the end of the century, in an era of unrestrained commercial expansion, with the Far East and the Pacific as one of its principal fields.

(4) The 'unsealing' of Japan, quickly followed by its amazing transformation in the Meiji Era into a formidable and very ambitious World power.

The object of the present chapter is to summarize and trace the interaction of this series of events and to show their significance as the background of the revolutionary and nationalist movement in modern China which had its origins in them.

THE LAST YEARS OF MANCHU GOVERNMENT, 1865-1912

The slowness of China to react to Western pressure and to make any systematic attempt to adapt the ancient civilization to radically changing conditions was due to several causes, and perhaps most of all to the inherent conservatism of the privileged Confucian scholar-bureaucracy with their vested interest in the maintenance of the traditional culture. The loss of China's prestige and her repeated humiliations at the hands of the 'Western barbarians' were less distasteful to them than the price which they would have to pay for a modernized national state. It is, however, almost certain that this inertia and reluctance to change would have been earlier removed and the way opened for new men and new policies but for the unhappy prolongation of the life of the decadent and alien dynasty which presided over the government of China.

For the greater part of the last inglorious half-century of its existence, the 'power behind the throne' was the notorious Tzū
GH (China Proper II)

Hsi, familiar to several generations as the empress-dowager or the Old Buddha. In the verdict of history, the responsibility of this gifted and often fascinating but utterly unscrupulous and sinister woman for a large part of the bitter cup of sorrow which the Chinese people were called upon to drink is seen to be increasingly great. Yet the circumstances under which she achieved and maintained her power were typical of the deep corruption which so often marked the decline of an oriental dynasty, and, in conjunction with the influence of ideas imported from the West, help to explain why the most responsible sections of Chinese public opinion were later averse to the restoration of the imperial office, even when the newly established republican form of government was obviously functioning very badly.

It is convenient at this point to summarize the later history of the Manchu imperial family, even at the cost of alluding to events to which fuller reference will have to be made at a later stage. On this history much new light has been thrown by the publication in recent years of important Chinese memoirs, particularly those of the court historian, Yün Yü-ting.¹

Tzü Hsi ('the Motherly and Auspicious'), the daughter of a minor Manchu official, was born about 1835 and first acquired influence as the favourite concubine of Hsien Fêng, the emperor (1851-62), who gave his reluctant consent to the treaties of Tientsin and Peking (see p. 19). When this monarch fell a victim to his own excesses in 1862, Tzü Hsi engineered the selection as emperor of a five-year old boy, who was alleged to be her son, and of herself and Hsien Fêng's consort, Tzü An, as co-regents. Tzü Hsi was the virtual ruler of China until the young emperor, T'ung Chih (1862-1875) came of age in 1872. Three years later he died, ostensibly of smallpox, but under circumstances which point strongly to the direct machinations of Tzü Hsi, who now procured the imperial office for her own sister's infant son, Kuang Hsü (1875-1908), and was again appointed co-regent with Tzü An. The latter is believed to have been her next important victim, and from Tzü An's sudden death in 1881 until Kuang Hsü came of age, in 1888, Tzü Hsi was the sole regent and ruler of the country.

The break in 1888, however, was nominal rather than real, and she retained the substance of her power through all but a very brief period of the long reign of her hapless nephew. Few monarchs have

¹ Collis, Maurice, *New Sources for the Life of the Empress Dowager Tzü Hsi* (London, 1944).

had a more pathetic history than Kuang Hsü, the only emperor in the last half-century of the dynasty to reach years of maturity and to make some effort to retrieve the desperate position of his country. A weak man, living in almost complete isolation and in constant terror of the Old Buddha, he nevertheless became aware of the real situation and, under the influence of the constitutional reformers, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (see p. 58) was responsible, during the temporary retirement of Tzü Hsi, for the famous 'Hundred Days of Reform' in 1898. This assumption of power was short-lived. Kuang Hsü's plans for safeguarding his authority were betrayed to his formidable aunt by Yuan Shih-kai, afterwards the first President of the Republic. Tzü Hsi returned to Peking to take control, and for the remaining ten years of his life Kuang Hsü was a virtual prisoner in her hands. He was the helpless spectator of the reactionary policy which led to the siege of the foreign legations in Peking by the Boxers in 1900, was taken with the court when it escaped from the capital on the raising of the siege by an international force, and brought back to confinement in his own palace when it returned in 1902.

After the ignominious failure of the attempt to extirpate the foreigners, which was inevitably followed by fresh humiliations for China, Tzü Hsi attempted to save the dynasty which was so largely responsible for them by a conversion, real or pretended, to the necessity for reform, and admittedly showed considerable skill in initiating a new policy. In 1908, however, she felt her end approaching, and, according to the evidence which the cautious court historian has revealed, was determined that her unhappy nephew emperor should not outlive her. Kuang Hsü died under mysterious circumstances on the day before the Old Buddha herself expired in November 1908. On her death-bed this extraordinary woman, asked, according to ancient custom, for a final message, is said to have replied: 'Never again allow any woman to hold the supreme power in the state. It is against the house-law of our dynasty and should be strictly forbidden. Be careful not to allow eunuchs to meddle in government matters. The Ming dynasty was brought to ruin by eunuchs and its fate should be a warning to my people.'

Her warning, however, was unheeded, and for the remaining three years of the dynasty's existence there was yet another child-emperor, Hsüan Tung (1909-12), and yet another empress-dowager who virtually controlled the nominal prince-regent, together with

the usual entourage of scheming eunuchs and courtiers. The constitutional reforms which Tzū Hsi had initiated in her last years were vitiated by the packing of the new provincial assemblies, the First National Assembly and the new 'cabinet,' with Manchu henchmen and corrupt courtiers. The attempt of the imperial authorities to control the projected trunk railway-lines, made possible by loans from the Four-Power Consortium (British-French-German-American), was one of the chief immediate causes of the Revolution of 1911-12, which at long last terminated the Manchu dynasty, and with it the imperial system of government.

The evil effects of the deep corruption of the central government, as indicated by this brief summary, on the capacity of China to cope with either the grave internal problems with which she was confronted or the ever-growing menace of foreign encroachment, can easily be imagined. In the second half of the nineteenth century all the best traditions and safeguards of the 'Classical' administration of the empire had been abandoned. The corruption of the mandarinat by the sale of the highest offices and honours to the highest bidder, already pronounced before the Taiping rebellion, grew worse after it. One of the chief safeguards against excessive misgovernment had been the activity of the body of officials—over fifty in number—known as the Censors. They were distributed over the different districts of China and charged with the duty of reporting to the throne on government matters affecting the well-being of the people and of impeaching, in case of need, magistrates who were abusing their office; they could also protest against the policy and actions of the central government itself. The immunity of the censors in the exercise of their functions had always been considered one of the cardinal principles of administration, but whereas during the first century and a half of the Manchu dynasty only four censors were punished, twenty-one such cases occurred in its last fifty years of rule. The best elements among the Chinese *literati* became increasingly reluctant to enter political life, and with some conspicuous exceptions, the most highly placed Chinese officials were tarred with the same brush of corruption that blackened the Manchu courtiers.

China could hardly have been in a worse position to face the menace of foreign intervention and was further weakened by continued internal unrest. The Taiping was only the greatest and, in some respects, the most significant of a long series of risings and revolts. Hardly less serious were two great Moslem rebellions, the

one in the south-west, known as the Panthay rebellion, which devastated the great province of Yunnan from 1855 to 1873, and the other in the north-west (Kansu and Shensi), from whose devastations between 1862 and 1870 this once prosperous region of China has not yet fully recovered.¹ Moreover, the flame of Moslem revolt spread from these provinces along the corridors to Central Asia until it involved the vast interior territory of Chinese Turkestan and Dzungaria, which Ch'ien Lung had incorporated with China as Sinkiang or the 'New Dominion' in the middle of the eighteenth century (see vol. i, p. 362). Under the leadership of a great Moslem soldier, Yakub Khan, much of this region was consolidated in resistance to Chinese rule, and it was even anticipated by many competent foreign observers that the Celestial Empire itself would eventually come under Mohammedan domination, as had India three centuries before in the time of the Moghul Empire. Yet the way in which this widespread revolt was eventually mastered and Sinkiang saved to China furnished a remarkable illustration of Chinese resiliency and capacity under able and disinterested leadership.

The hero of this great recovery was General Tso Tsung-t'ang, a colleague of Tseng Kuo-fang, who had played the chief part in crushing the Taiping rebellion. Both came from Hunan, a province which has produced some of the most distinguished of Chinese generals. The circumstances under which the entire region from Suchow, near the western limit of the Great Wall, in the Kansu corridor, to the vital trading marts of Yarkand, Khotan, and Kashgar round the fertile borders of the Tarim basin in Chinese Turkestan were slowly but surely recovered (1870-78) are strikingly reminiscent of the greatest days of the Han dynasty two thousand years before. General Tso's army, at an immense distance from its Chinese bases, supported itself by the systematic cultivation of the oases strung along the trade-routes to the west and earned the sobriquet of 'The Agricultural Army.' Incidentally 'red rice' was introduced, with permanently good results, into many of the outlying agricultural areas of the north-west, and a fine avenue of trees was planted along the historic highway linking Shensi with Turkestan. The whole episode constitutes a remarkable achievement which relieves the gloomy record of China's decay in the later nineteenth century.

¹ It should be remembered, however, that north-west China had suffered terrible devastations in the first onslaughts of the Mongol conquests (see vol. i, p. 343), and had never recovered the prosperity which it enjoyed in the times of the Han and T'ang dynasties.

FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS ON OUTER CHINA

The weakness and ineptitude of China at this stage was a direct incitement to the rapidly rising ambitions of the Western powers. In China Proper, i.e. the historic 'Eighteen Provinces' within the Great Wall, there was, it is true, a relative respite from further encroachment for some thirty years after the Treaty of Tientsin and the Convention of Peking. These agreements had given Great Britain the facilities which she needed for the expansion of her trade, and Great Britain, whose commercial interests in China far exceeded those of any other nation, had no desire for territorial aggrandisement or special 'spheres of influence.' She had a genuine interest in the maintenance of a completely 'open door' in China, and for that purpose was anxious to uphold the integrity of the Chinese government. Any departure, whether real or apparent, from this principle on Great Britain's part in the later phase of the 'Battle of the Concessions' was due to the altered conditions which made China the scene of acute international rivalries. But in the vast peripheral regions which constituted the Chinese Dependencies or Outer China, the encroachment began much earlier. It was when this led to the virtual encirclement of China Proper that the 'Battle of the Concessions' began.

Between the 'fifties and the 'nineties of the last century China's greatest losses were in the north, at the hands of Russia, and in Indo-China in the south, at the hands of France.

The Advance of Russia

The Muscovite Empire, in its remarkably rapid expansion across Siberia, had reached the Pacific seaboard round the Gulf of Okhotsk and come into conflict with the Manchu-Chinese Empire in the region of the Amur before the end of the seventeenth century. The two governments, as already described (see vol. i, p. 360), in the time of the great emperor K'ang Hsi, had made the important Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) by which the frontier between their respective territories was placed along the Stanovoi Mountains, the water-parting ranges between the Amur and the Lena. Thereafter for a century and a half, i.e. during the golden age of the Manchu dynasty, there was no serious friction between China and Russia, and Russian energies were mainly directed to the development of the fur trade in north-eastern Asia and Alaska and to the consolidation of the huge area between Russia proper and Kamchatka.

From the middle of the nineteenth century, however, new factors affected the orientation of Russian Far Eastern policy and led to a systematic southward advance into the Chinese sphere. The Crimean war (1854-56) had prevented Russia from acquiring the outlet to the Mediterranean which she coveted, and in the prosecution of that war against Great Britain and France she had been anxious about the safety of her exposed Pacific seaboard, to which her most natural and easiest approach was by the avenue of the Amur. The Manchu government, in the thick of the struggle with the Taiping rebels and engaged in the war with Great Britain and France which led up to the treaties of Tientsin and Peking, was in no position to resist the Russian demands for frontier revision. These demands were made to appear less offensive by services of mediation between China and Great Britain which were offered and rendered by the Czar's government. By the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 China consented to the frontier being moved southward to the Amur, and by the supplementary Treaty of Peking in 1860¹ she yielded to Russia the large seaboard territory of Primorsk, lying between the Pacific and the Ussuri, the most easterly of the southern tributaries of the Amur, which continues its northward alinement below the confluence at Khabarovsk. This large addition of territory made Russia what she has ever since remained, a great Far Eastern power. She now possessed the whole western seaboard of the Pacific as far south as the frontier of Korea, a feeble oriental state over which China claimed suzerainty, and very near this frontier, in Peter the Great bay, she was able to develop the magnificent, although not completely ice-free, port and naval base of Vladivostok.

Across the Sea of Japan, where it rapidly narrows northwards, southern Primorsk faces Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan Proper, and across the Gulf (virtually the Straits) of Tartary northern Primorsk faces Sakhalin, whose political ownership was still unsettled. Moreover, the natural hinterland of Vladivostok was the fertile plains and valleys of Manchuria, which thenceforward has formed a huge Chinese salient, surrounded on three sides by Russian territory. At this period, too, Manchuria was much underpeopled, relative to its very considerable natural resources, as a result partly of the movement of the Manchu clansmen into China Proper when the Ch'ing dynasty conquered the Middle Kingdom, and partly

¹ To be distinguished from the *Convention* of Peking made between China and Great Britain and France in the same year.

of the short-sighted Manchu policy of preventing Chinese colonization in their own home country.

Primorsk, however, was so inaccessible on the landward side and at such a vast distance from Russia proper that full use could not be made of its possibilities until the era of trans-continental railways. It was not until thirty years after its acquisition that Russia embarked on the great experiment of the Trans-Siberian railway. In that interval Japan passed through the transformation of the Meiji Era. While she was still a relatively weak state in the throes of transition, she was given reason to fear Russian designs, as exemplified in an attempted seizure of the strategic island of Tsushima, in the narrow seas between Japan and Korea, which was chiefly averted by prompt British action (1861), and in the actual occupation of Sakhalin.¹ But by 1890, when the Czar's government decided to construct the trans-continental railway to Vladivostok, Japan was strong enough to prepare to meet the much greater danger that then menaced her.

The Loss of Suzerainty in Indo-China

Meanwhile in Indo-China, 2,000 miles to the south, China was suffering further loss of suzerainty. Her interest in this great peninsula went back to the last centuries before the Christian Era, when the region round the delta of the Red river, now known as Tongking, was conquered under the former Han dynasty and incorporated as part of *Nan yueh* (see vol. i, pp. 318-9). Most of the Chinese ports visited by Western traders in the time of the Roman Empire (see pp. 4-5) were there located. China retained control, although it was sometimes interrupted, for about a thousand years, but in the tenth century A.D. the native people known as the Annamese revolted and established an independent kingdom. Like their probable kinsmen, the Cantonese, the Annamese had been sinicized, and their mode of life, institutions, and type of society have always retained the Chinese imprint. But, living on the extreme margins of the Middle Kingdom, they were never so completely assimilated as the Cantonese and have developed a distinct national consciousness.

In course of time the Annamese Empire was extended from its original nucleus in Tongking over the east coast strip (now known as Annam proper), the Mekong delta, i.e. Cochin-China, and much

¹ By a treaty in 1875 Japan abandoned her claims to Sakhalin in return for Russia's renunciation of claims on the Kuriles archipelago between Hokkaido and Kamchatka.

of Cambodia. This was at the expense of other peoples, particularly the Champa and the Khmer of Cambodia, whose culture had been mainly derived from India. With the extension of their empire, the Annamese themselves spread over large parts of these regions, so that by the nineteenth century they formed more than three-quarters of the total population of the area now comprised in French Indo-China. Their chief rivals were the Thai or Siamese, who had originally come southwards from the Yunnan plateau in a number of waves, but particularly after Kublai Khan had seized the ancient (Thai) kingdom of Nan Chao about 1250 (see vol. i, p. 340). Many of these Thai peoples lived and still live as detached tribal groups in the northern mountains (e.g. the Laos), but those that settled in the fertile plains of the Mekong established the unified state of Siam. Beyond the water-parting of the Mekong, and occupying approximately the western third of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, was the Burmese kingdom, which, by the middle of the nineteenth century, had already lost its western provinces to British India, chiefly owing to the incredibly provocative actions of its half-insane royal house.

With one or two exceptions, such as a temporary occupation of Annam between 1407 and 1428 under the Ming dynasty, China had made no further attempt directly to control any part of Indo-China. The policy of the later dynasties was to surround the Middle Kingdom with buffer-states between it and the outer world, administering their own affairs but acknowledging the overlordship of China. This mainly took the form of periodically sending 'tribute' to Peking and of despatching envoys thither to obtain imperial patents for the investiture of each new sovereign. Under Ch'ien Lung (1736-96) these practices had become fully established, and the three principal states of Indo-China, Annam, Siam, and Burma regularly sent tribute to Peking until late in the nineteenth century.

France began to be interested in Indo-China in the eighteenth century as a field of activity which might possibly compensate for her disappointed hopes in India. At the instance of the celebrated Jesuit, Pigneau de Behaine, a French force intervened on the side of the local (Annamese) king of Cochin-China,¹ whose throne was threatened and, partly through this help, he reunited all the Annamese lands under his own sway, with Hué as his capital, and obtained investiture from the Chinese emperor, Ch'ien Lung. France, in the

¹ The Annamese Empire was at this time divided between the two separate states of Tongking and Cochin-China. For a full account of its history see the N.I.D. Handbook on *Indo-China*, pp. 164-72 (1943).

throes of the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, made no further move for a long time, but her interests were kept alive by a number of French priests who, under cover of the services rendered to the new monarch, Gia Long, were very active and were often traders and explorers as well as missionaries. But gradually they became extremely unpopular with the official Confucian class of Annam, whose status and outlook were very similar to those of the Chinese *literati*. There were frequent persecutions under Gia Long's successors, and it was these which gave a pretext to the imperially minded Napoleon III to intervene. The opportunity was provided by the alliance between France and Great Britain in their joint war on China (The 'Arrow' war of 1856-60, see p. 18) and the presence of French troops in the Far East. When they had completed their task in China, they occupied the three eastern provinces of Cochin-China which were ceded to France by Annam in 1863. This was the nucleus of French Indo-China which was built up in the course of the next twenty years until it included, in addition to the 'colony' of Cochin-China, the protectorates of Annam, Tongking, and Cambodia. Later were added much of the Laos country and certain districts detached from Siam on account of their former connexion with Cambodian or Annamese territories.

The later phases of the conquest of Annam involved France in a second war with China (1883) as its overlord and protector. In this war, France, after some severe reverses, was successful, and her title to French Indo-China was eventually established by separate treaties with Annam (1884) and China (1885).

The fear, by no means groundless, that France would ultimately also absorb Siam, considerably alarmed Great Britain on account of its relative proximity to India. The anti-British activities of King Thibaw of Burma and his negotiations with the French at Tongking led to the third Burmese war of 1885 and to the annexation to British India of the rest of the Burmese state. In this China acquiesced, although her formal suzerainty was not relinquished until later.

Siam, lying between French Indo-China and British Burma, was in a very precarious position during the long period of strained relations between Great Britain and France and of their rivalry in the peninsula in the 'eighties and 'nineties, but eventually the two Great Powers agreed to a convention (1896) guaranteeing her independence as a buffer-state between their respective territories. Some years earlier (1882) the king of Siam had formally rejected the obligation to pay tribute to China.

It remains to add that the importance attached to the establishment of French Indo-China and the British conquest of Upper Burma was in large part due to their supposed potentialities for tapping the trade of southern and south-western China. A notable French exploratory expedition established the fact that the Mekong river was so obstructed with rapids as to be useless as an avenue of approach to China Proper but better things were hoped of the Red river, and Tongking, embracing its rich delta and outlet of Haiphong, was the predestined base for French activities in the ensuing 'Battle of the Concessions' in China Proper.

Before this battle was joined, however, two other formidable competitors had entered the lists.

THE FAR EASTERN ASPIRATIONS OF GERMANY

One of these was the new German Empire which, under the impulse of rapid industrial development and maritime activity, was searching for new markets and colonies in the 'eighties and 'nineties. In the Far East, as elsewhere, she had already been largely forestalled, and for her, unlike Russia and France, there was no prospect of a land approach towards the tempting prizes which China seemed to offer. But as a naval power she was in time to take part in the partition of the Pacific islands, most of which were appropriated by the Great Powers in the last two decades of the century.

German acquisition began with north-eastern New Guinea or Kaiser Wilhelmland and the adjacent Bismarck archipelago in 1884, and to these were added the Marshall islands in 1885 and Nauru island, the Caroline islands, and the Marianas (or Ladrone islands) in 1899. Her pretensions as a Far Eastern naval power were clearly demonstrated in 1898 in the course of the Spanish-American war, by which the Philippines passed from Spain to the United States. In that same year, as a part of the 'Battle of the Concessions,' she obtained the foothold in China which she had long coveted (see p. 54).

THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN

When Commodore Perry of the United States navy sailed into Yedo (Tokyo) bay in 1853, with letters virtually demanding the opening of some Japanese ports for trade and with an intimation that he would return the following year, Japan had been almost completely sealed off from the rest of the world for nearly two and

a half centuries. After a very few years of hesitation and divided counsels, the momentous decision was made to modernize the country, carefully to study the sources of the strength which made these Western barbarian nations so formidable and, in the light of the surveys, to recast the whole national structure.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe or discuss that amazing transformation, carried out in the course of a single generation in the so-called Meiji Era, which began with the accession of the emperor Meiji ('Enlightened Government') and the abolition of the Shogunate in 1868. It shows, however, certain outstanding contrasts between China and Japan which help to explain the strangely different responses made by the two countries to Western pressure and which have an important bearing on all subsequent Sino-Japanese relationships. Apart from the obvious but fundamental factor that Japan is a relatively small country and China a sub-continent, the difference of response was primarily due to the profound contrast of their social structures. In China, the extreme reluctance of the governing class of Confucian *literati* to change the pattern of the civilization with which its very existence was bound up has been already emphasized. In Japan, in spite of an imported element of Confucian learning, the governing class was not the scholars but the feudal chieftains known as the *daimyo* and their knightly retainers, the *samurai*, nurtured in the long traditions of a strict military code and maintaining their essentially warlike energies in the bitter clan feuds which had characterized the whole medieval history of the country. During the two and a half centuries of seclusion when the Tokugawa Shogunate repressed feudal anarchy, without, however, changing the structure of Japanese society, these energies were repressed, but the *daimyo* and *samurai* chafed under the restriction and, after the American challenge of 1853, intensely resented the humiliation of yielding to the threat of foreign naval and military force. They were, therefore, already profoundly dissatisfied with their position and ready for a radical change which would restore their own power and identify their traditions and natural energies with the salvation of their country.

It was men of this type who carried through the transformation of the Meiji Era, installed the emperor in Yedo, now renamed Tokyo (Eastern Capital), as the visible embodiment of national power and made him the object of that religion of nationalism, expressed in the native cult of Shintoism, which ever since has been the driving force of Japanese fanaticism. The old feudal loyalties were given

a new national orientation, and all the traditional sanctions, more particularly the deeply ingrained belief in the divine origin of the emperor and of the Japanese 'race,' were skilfully used to uphold the new regime.

The changes of the Meiji Era were radical and far-reaching, but there was no social revolution. The *daimyo* surrendered their fiefs and the *samurai*, hitherto restricted to the profession of arms, were now free to enter the realms of business, finance, and civil administration, but all effective power remained in the hands of the same military class, and this was in many ways increased by the wider range of activities and sources of wealth now open to its members. The outward forms of representative government and the Cabinet system were adopted, but the army remained outside their control and the Minister of War was responsible to the emperor alone.

It has sometimes been contended that the aggressiveness and militarism of modern Japan, of which China has been the principal victim, have their origins in the fear and the example of European imperialism and in the restrictions on Japanese emigration and foreign trade. There has, indeed, been much in the historical experience of modern Japan to strengthen the control of her foreign policy by the military group, but the origins of its power and the character of its objectives are deeply rooted in the traditions and social structure of the country. Apart from the interlude of the Tokugawa Shogunate, there was no break in continuity between the Old and the New Japan. Even the modern plans for the subjugation of China and the building up of a Greater Eastern Asia under Japanese hegemony have their counterpart in the grandiose schemes of Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century (see vol. i, pp. 351-2).

The international outlook in the 'eighties and 'nineties for the newly modernized Japan, with its army and navy built up on Western models, was dark and threatening. The emergence of this new World power corresponded in time with the triumphs of France in Indo-China, the growing threat to Manchuria and Korea of the southward advance of Russia and the paralysis of China already described. In 1890 Russia made the momentous decision to build the Trans-Siberian railway, and in the following year its construction was begun from both the Vladivostok and European ends simultaneously. Schemes for carrying it by the most obvious and direct route across Manchuria, i.e. through Chinese territory, were already under consideration, and the prospects of Russia ultimately absorbing both Manchuria and Korea and so of dominating the Chinese court

at Peking were brought appreciably nearer. Apart from the menace to her own independence, the consummation of these projects would have completely excluded Japan from the raw materials and markets of the mainland, essential to her new policy of industrialization.

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894-95

The most immediate threat to Japan was through Korea, whose geographical position in relation to her has often been compared with that of the Low Countries to Great Britain, a pistol pointed at her heart. The weakness and appalling corruption of the government of Korea and the chronic internal disorders of the country at this period provided many pretexts for foreign intervention, but the Chinese claim to suzerainty stood in the way of all Japanese attempts to establish order in a land whose fate so intimately concerned her.¹ A clash between a Japanese cruiser and a fleet carrying Chinese troops to Korea led to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. In this war, which lasted seven months, Japan first demonstrated to the world the reality of her naval and military progress, and by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April, 1895), negotiated by China's leading statesman, Li Hung-chang, China was forced not only to recognize the independence of Korea, which implied a free hand for Japan, but to surrender to Japan the large tropical island of Formosa, the strategically significant Pescadores archipelago, in the Formosa strait opposite Fukien province, and—most important prize of all—the apex of the southern peninsular projection of Manchuria known as Liaotung. Incidentally this humiliating defeat and loss of territory to a nation which they had always regarded as inferior was a tremendous shock to the Chinese, intensified anti-foreign feeling and resentment of Manchu incompetence, and led to the first marked symptoms of a demand for radical reforms.

Japan, however, was not allowed to reap the full fruits of her victory. Formosa was occupied without delay, in spite of native

¹ Japan had certainly good reasons for safeguarding her own security by intervention in Korea, but there can be no question about the aggressive nature of her objectives there. On the eve of war a Japanese diplomatic representative in Europe stated: 'This at least I can tell you for certain, we neither can nor will leave Korea again until our aim has been attained in one way or another. We are fighting in Korea for our own future—I might also say for our independence. Once let Korea fall into the hands of a European power and our independence will be threatened.' London correspondent of *Kölnischer Zeitung*, 7 September 1894, quoted by Morse, H. B., *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, vol. iii, p. 29 (London, 1918).

(Chinese) opposition,¹ but Russia, France, and Germany united in the famous intervention by which, within a week of the treaty, they demanded the retrocession of Liaotung to China on the ground that Japan's control of it 'would mean a constant threat to the capital of China and would render illusory the independence of Korea.' Russia had already despatched a fleet of warships to the Pacific, and Japan, financially weakened by her exertions in the war, was compelled to yield to the threat of force.

The intervention was ostensibly made in the interests of the integrity of China and the peace of the Far East, but the hypocrisy of these pretexts was to be quickly demonstrated. 'In Korea, China had lost one of the few remaining and most important of her 'buffer-states,' and the plans of the Powers which expected her own complete disintegration had matured. The time was ripe for the 'Battle of the Concessions.'

THE BATTLE OF THE CONCESSIONS

In the decade between the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 the Far East was the principal scene of the fierce rivalries of the leading European nations, and the Chinese Empire—commonly believed to be on the eve of dismemberment—was one of the biggest factors in world politics. In this period European imperialism reached its climax. The major question was not whether on ethical grounds acquisition of territory or 'spheres of influence' was justified, but whether it could be so arranged between the Great Powers as to avert the outbreak of a major war. Before the great shock of Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 the assumption that, in the words of a contemporary Russian statesman, 'The affairs of Asia are settled in Europe' was a common one; even Lord Salisbury quoted with approval Disraeli's dictum, that 'In Asia there is room enough for us all.'

The United States was also temporarily affected by the imperialist fever, and of this the greatest example in the Far East was her annexation of the Philippines after the Spanish-American war of 1898. It is, however, important to note that the United States took no part whatever in the 'Battle of the Concessions' in China, and, on the contrary, promulgated at a very critical stage (1899) the doctrine or policy of the 'open door' (associated with the name

¹ The great majority of the inhabitants of Formosa, then as now, were Chinese, whose ancestors had originally come mainly from the province of Fukien.

of John Hay), to which all the Powers, with the partial exception of Russia, gave their assent. These circumstances have always given the United States great prestige among Chinese nationalists which remains to this day a very important factor in the international outlook and the orientation of the political thought of China.

In actual fact Great Britain, as already emphasized, had from long before the time of John Hay both advocated and practised the policy of the 'open door,' which indeed was in her own best interests, but in the period of the wild scramble for concessions she was judged, whether rightly or wrongly, to be abandoning it and to be joining the ranks of the concession-hunters. Thus it was that the United States got the credit for a policy which saved China from even worse misfortunes than actually befell her.

In an outline sketch of modern Chinese history such as this, the wider international implications of the 'Battle of the Concessions' cannot be fully considered, but a brief reference to the alinement of the Great Powers in the closing years of the nineteenth century is vital to an appreciation of the issues in the Far East itself.

At this period the stage was being set for the national groupings which were the prelude to the war of 1914-18, and the Far Eastern developments played a large part in determining their final form. Russia and France had already come to the understanding which culminated in the Alliance of 1894, and for many years pursued a common policy in China which vitally affected British interests there and influenced her attitude. The expansion of the great landpower of Russia towards the margins of Asia, whether in Persia, India, or China, was much mistrusted and feared by Great Britain, with her dominant commercial interests in these peripheral regions and her vital stake in India. In the same period colonial rivalry between Great Britain and France in Africa was at its height, and the 'Fashoda Incident' in the Sudan, which so nearly led to war between the two countries in 1898, was exactly contemporaneous with some of the gravest developments in the Chinese situation.

Germany, as has been pointed out in a previous section, had strong Far Eastern aspirations and was determined to acquire a *pied-à-terre* and an exclusive 'sphere of influence' in China. To that extent she was necessarily the rival of France and Russia, but, on the other hand, Germany greatly welcomed the diversion of Russian activities from the Balkans, where they directly clashed with her own, to the Far East where there was 'room for all.' Up to a point Germany was prepared actively to encourage Russia, and

had, as we have seen, participated with her and France in the intervention which warned Japan off the mainland of Asia.

Japan itself was the new and incalculable factor in the international setting of the Far Eastern stage. Her power and her future role were differently estimated by her European rivals. By France, Germany, and particularly by Russia, who was destined to pay a heavy price for her mistake, they were greatly underestimated. Japan's victory over so weak a military opponent as China was not taken very seriously. In Britain, Japan's prospects were rated higher, and as yet there was little fear of her ambitions. There was indeed considerable sympathy with her determination to defend herself against the rapacity of Russia in Korea.

Finally, in the years round the turn of the century, the unpopularity of Great Britain on the continent, so clearly shown in the course of the South African war (1899-1902) fostered doubts in many minds as to the wisdom of maintaining the historic policy of 'splendid isolation.' From this the conception of an alliance between the two great maritime nations on either side of the Euroasian landmass against the colossal landpower of Russia, which seemed equally to menace the interests of both, was a not unnatural development.

This brief indication of the international background may help to make intelligible the rapid sequence of momentous events in China and the Far East in the decade after 1895.

Encroachments of the Great Powers on China Proper

After the success of the Triple Intervention which forced Japan to retrocede southern Liaotung to China, Russian designs in the Far East developed very quickly. It was thanks to this intervention that China had escaped some of the worst consequences of her defeat by Japan, and Russia continued to pose as China's friend in averting fresh danger from the same quarter. To enable China to pay the first instalment of her heavy indemnity to Japan, Russia and France provided a loan on easy terms, and to facilitate the transport of Russian troops to the danger-zone, China consented in the secret Sino-Russian Treaty of June 1896, to the construction of what subsequently became known as the Chinese Eastern Railway across central Manchuria. This afforded the shortest route from Chita to Vladivostok and the Korean border, with prospects of a subsequent southward extension to Talienwan and Port Arthur at

the base of the Liaotung peninsula. The railway, which was nominally controlled jointly by China and Russia and to revert to China after a long term of years, was financed by the powerful Russo-Chinese Bank whose operations were increasingly distrusted by Great Britain.

Meanwhile in China Proper, Germany struck the first blow in the 'Battle of the Concessions.' The pretext, for which she had been almost openly waiting for some years, was afforded by the murder of two German missionaries in the interior of Shantung province, and by way of retaliation and compensation, a German squadron occupied, in November 1897, Kiaochow bay on the southern coast of the Shantung peninsula, possessing in Tsingtao incomparably the finest natural harbour in China north of the Yangtze. In March 1898 China yielded this valuable territory to Germany on a 99 years' lease¹ together with a 'sphere of influence' in its hinterland which amounted to virtual German control over the future economic development of Shantung, one of the most vital of Chinese provinces (Fig. 3).

The German seizure of Kiaochow was a signal for the other powers to stake out their claims. Within a week Russia, which claimed a prior right of using Kiaochow bay, sent ships to Port Arthur, and in March and May 1898 the Czar's government obtained by conventions with China a twenty-five years' lease of the apex of the Liaotung peninsula, from which, in the name of the integrity of Chinese territory, she had warned off Japan only three years previously. It contained the naval base of Port Arthur, which was to be closed to all but Chinese and Russian ships, and the commercial port of Talienswan (now renamed Dalny), which was to be an open trading-port (Fig. 3). In the same eventful spring of 1898 France occupied Kwangchowwan on the southern coast of Kwangtung, half-way between Canton and the border of French Indo-China, and after some delay China ratified the lease of the port and surrounding territory to her in January 1900. The intrinsic value of Kwangchowwan was much less than that of Kaiochow or

¹ The system of 'leased territories' gave the occupying powers full control, while preserving the convenient fiction of Chinese sovereignty. As a modern writer puts it: 'Actually, the leased territories in China were the colonies of the powers that held them, and, together with "railway zones" attached to them, formed enclaves of foreign dominion destructive of China's sovereignty. The occupying powers had full rights of administration, police, and defence, and their ports became fortified military and naval bases from which they could either coerce China or make war on each other.'—Hudson, G. F., *The Far East in World Politics*, p. 101 (Oxford, 1939).

Liaotung, especially as France already possessed the much better outlet of Haiphong in comparative proximity to it, but it gave her a *pied-à-terre* in China Proper and strengthened her claim to a 'sphere of influence' in South China as a whole.

Nor was Great Britain inactive. She now took the steps which by some have been judged to mark a departure from her traditional policy of strictly upholding the integrity of Chinese territory, and of seeking no special 'sphere of influence.' She made two territorial acquisitions, the one as counter-measure to Russia's occupation of southern Liaotung and the other to France's occupation of Kwangchowwan. Fear and resentment of the first, with all its implications of future Russian control of Manchuria and dominance of Peking, led to the British demand for the lease of Weihaiwei on the northern coast of the Shantung peninsula in March 1898. Lord Salisbury's instructions to his envoy at Peking were that 'as the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechihli (Pohai) is materially altered by the cession of Port Arthur to Russia, it is therefore necessary to obtain a lease of Weihaiwei . . . on terms similar to those for Port Arthur.' Japan's assent was obtained, and in order to avoid friction with Germany, her lease of Kiaochow and 'sphere of influence' in Shantung were expressly recognized by Great Britain. Within a few days the Chinese government consented to the lease of Weihaiwei and a small territory around it 'for so long as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia (Fig. 3). In actual fact, the Chinese were very willing to lease Weihaiwei as a counterpoise to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula.

Very shortly afterwards, when France occupied Kwangchowwan, Great Britain demanded and obtained the lease of the hinterland of the Kowloon peninsula, which had remained in Chinese hands after Kowloon itself had been incorporated with Hong Kong by the Convention of Peking in 1860, following the second Anglo-Chinese war. The extension of 1898, called 'The New Territories,' was claimed on strategic grounds as necessary for the safety of Hong Kong (Fig. 34).

Great Britain was also induced by the menace of the situation in 1898 to take strong steps to safeguard her interests in the great valley of the Yangtze, which was by far the most important sphere of her commerce in China. It was known to the British government that Russia and France had a joint plan for tapping the trade of Central China by railways from their own territories or spheres in the north and south respectively and that these would be used to obtain a




Fig. 3. Leased territories, North China

Based on (i) Herrmann, A., *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China*, p. 64 (Cambridge, Mass., 1935); and (ii) 1 : 1,000,000 G.S.G.S. series 2555 Asia.

P-M.R. Peiping-Mukden railway; S.M.R. South Manchuria railway; T-T.R. Tsingtao-Tsinan railway.

The 'Neutral Territories' were zones within which the lessee powers exercised certain military rights, although the administration remained in Chinese hands.

virtual monopoly. After the cessions of southern Liaotung and Kwangchowwan, China was asked to give 'a definite assurance' that she would 'never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze to any other power (than Great Britain), whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation.'¹ In June, Lord Salisbury instructed the British minister in Peking that, 'other things being equal, railways in the Yangtze region should be conceded to English companies, and in the province of Shantung should be conceded to German companies.'² Two months later (August 1898) it was discovered that the Russo-Chinese Bank had an important interest in a concession recently given by the Chinese government to a Belgian syndicate for the Peking-Hankow railway, destined to become China's trunk line from north to south. After an unavailing protest against the ratification of the contract, Great Britain demanded the concession of several railway projects, and later (April 1899) reached an understanding with Russia by which the latter power agreed not to interfere in the Yangtze basin, in return for a similar British abstinence beyond the Great Wall.

Arthur Balfour defined the Yangtze valley as a British 'sphere of interest,' and controversy on the subject has mainly turned on the reality of the distinction between this and an exclusive 'sphere of influence,' such as that claimed by Russia, France, and Germany in other fields. It may at least be justifiably contended that Great Britain was seeking to prevent the establishment of a monopoly rather than to create one and had no intention of excluding the trade of other nations.³

The fresh series of humiliations in the scramble for the concessions, added to the effect of ignominious defeat by Japan, at last produced a decided reaction in China itself. It took two very different but equally unavailing forms of activity.

'The Hundred Days of Reform'

The first of these was the remarkable episode of attempted reforms by the emperor Kuang Hsü to which a brief reference has already been made (see p. 39). These gave expression to a growing demand for constitutional reform by a small but important section of the

¹ Morse, H. B., *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 120. ² *Ibid.* p. 121.

³ For opposing views see Hudson, G. F., *The Far East and World Politics*, chap. iv (London, 1939), and Pratt, Sir John, *War and Politics in China*, chap. x (London, 1942). A fully documented account of the 'Battle of the Concessions' will be found in Morse, H. B., *op. cit.*, vol. iii, chaps. iv and v.

literati and gentry who realized the absolute necessity of change if China was to survive as an independent country. This is to be carefully distinguished from the revolutionary movement, already initiated by Dr Sun Yat-sen, which aimed at the removal of the Manchus as the *sine qua non* of any real progress and of which an account is given in the succeeding chapter. One of the most prominent of the Chinese viceroys, Chang Chih-tung of Wuchang (Central China), had published a famous book called *Learn*—translated into English under the title of *China's Only Hope*—advocating moderate reforms, under the aegis of the existing dynasty, and proclaiming that 'the fate of China depended upon the *literati* alone'; it is significant that this book is said to have had a circulation of a million copies within the empire. In Peking, a Cantonese scholar, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, whose brilliant political essays were to have a great influence on later generations of Chinese students, had established a weekly journal, which about this time was converted into a daily paper, called *Chinese Progress*, also with a considerable circulation. But the moving spirit in this reform movement was K'ang Yu-wei, another Cantonese scholar, whose books, which included *The Reform of Japan* and *The Reform of Russia* (under Peter the Great), were brought to the notice of the young emperor and produced an immediate effect upon his eager if untrained mind.

While the empress-dowager, Tzū Hsi, was in temporary retirement, K'ang Yu-wei was summoned to the royal presence, and then for a period of about three months (20 June to 16 September 1898) Peking was startled by a long series of imperial edicts enjoining reforms over a wide field, but particularly in education, and—in the later part of the series—sweeping away many useless or obstructive posts. The reforms as a whole were admirable in intention and in themselves not impracticable, but no machinery existed for carrying them into effect, and neither the emperor nor K'ang Yu-wei had any administrative experience. Inevitably the deeply entrenched forces of reaction and the vested interests of the corrupt court were thoroughly alarmed, and the empress-dowager, although she herself sometimes toyed with the idea of reform, became suspicious.

In the final stage the emperor called in the help of Yuan Shih-kai, one of the strongest and most experienced of the mandarins, put him in charge of army organization, and entrusted him with the execution of a plan for getting rid of the most formidable opponent of reform, after which the empress-dowager was to be kept under

constraint. Yuan Shih-kai promptly betrayed him and disclosed the plot. The tables were completely turned. Tzū Hsi seized the reins of power once more. The emperor, not herself, was placed under restraint, and would almost certainly have been put to death but for her fear of the reform party and the constant and pointed inquiries as to his health by the foreign legations. K'ang Yu-wei, warned by the emperor, fled from Peking and, with British help, escaped from China. The reforming edicts were annulled and reaction again reigned supreme.

The comments of the shrewd Sir Robert Hart on this strange and pathetic episode are illuminating: 'The emperor's head was set in the right direction, but his advisers, K'ang Yu-wei and others, had no experience of work and they simply killed Progress with kindness—they stuffed it, against its power of assimilating and digesting, with food enough in three months for three times as many years; so it is killed for the present, but it will have its proper representatives to the front again later on.'¹

The Boxer Rising and the Siege of the Legations

The dismal failure of Kuang Hsü and of the constitutional reform movement and the triumph of the highly placed reactionaries played into the hands of those who hoped to retrieve a desperate situation by getting rid of the 'ocean devils' altogether. After the Sino-Japanese war and all through the period of the 'Battle of the Concessions,' China was seething with unrest. Secret societies and brotherhoods multiplied, always in China a sure sign of trouble brewing. Some were primarily anti-dynastic and others anti-foreign. Many outrages were committed against missionaries and the 'secondary devils,' their Chinese converts, who in the mind of the masses were considered largely responsible for the disasters befalling the country.

Among these societies that of 'The Public-spirited Harmonious Boxers'—so-called because the practice of traditional Chinese boxing and gymnastics was their ostensible *raison d'être*—was particularly active. It originated in the province of Shantung, where German militarism made foreigners particularly obnoxious to the people, and was openly encouraged by one of the most reactionary of Chinese governors, Yü Hsien; thence it spread into the metropolitan province of Chihli (now Hopeh). Its rapid growth

¹ Letter from Sir R. Hart to H. B. Morse, 24 October 1898, quoted in Morse, H. B., *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 155.

and the extension of its aims, as indicated by the slogan 'Protect the country and destroy the foreigner,' were undoubtedly due to official encouragement and, after Tzū Hsi's return to power, imperial protection. That astute lady saw in the Boxers a heaven-sent opportunity of diverting anti-dynastic into exclusively anti-foreign activities and came more and more under the influence of the most die-hard of the Manchu princes and courtiers.

Her final surrender to the policy of 'driving the foreigners into the sea' was indicated by the appointment of Prince Tuan, the head of the Boxers, as chief of the Foreign Office (the *Tsungli-yamen*, through which all communications with the Legations were carried on), on 10 June 1900. The very next day the Chancellor at the Japanese Legation was murdered, and ten days later the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, met the same fate. This was followed by the famous siege of the Legations, which lasted, with one or two short respites, from 20 June to 14 August 1900. The dramatic story of the siege and of the heroic defence of the British Legation, with its large crowd of European and American refugees and many Chinese Christian converts, has often been told and its details cannot be recounted here.¹

For the greater part of the siege the Boxers were supported in the attack by Chinese troops, but there were divided counsels in the palace which prevented the full use of the resources at its disposal for taking the Legation by storm.

On 24 June the empress-dowager issued the infamous decree for the total extermination of foreigners in China: 'Wherever you meet a foreigner you must slay him.' To two Chinese ministers, who paid for their boldness with their heads, is ascribed the courage of altering the character for 'slay' to that for 'protect,' and in this altered form the decree reached most of the provinces. In actual fact, massacres were mainly confined to Chihli (Hopeh), Shansi, and Manchuria. Yuan Shih-kai in Shantung,² Li Hung-chang at Canton, and the great Yangtze viceroys in Central China, including Chang Chih-tung, exercised a strong restraining influence and prevented the spread of the Boxer madness.

¹ Among the many works describing the siege are Smith, A. H., *China in Convulsion*; Putnam Weale, B. L., *Indiscreet Letters from Peking*, and Martin, W. A. P., *The Siege in Peking*. A recent very graphic account by one of the last survivors will be found in Hewlett, Sir M., *Forty Years in China* (London, 1943).

² Yuan Shih-kai had succeeded the notorious Yü Hsien as Governor of Shantung. The latter, transferred to Shansi, was responsible for the worst official massacres of foreigners, which occurred in that province.



Plate 1. The Legation quarters, Peiping
An aerial view of the Legation quarters, looking to the north-east.



Plate 2. The Forbidden City, Peiping



Plate 3. The Marco Polo bridge (Lukouchiao)

This eleven-arched stone bridge over the Hun ho, nine miles south-west of Peiping, saw the first clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops on 7 July 1937. Marco Polo, in whose honour the bridge was so named by foreigners, describes it in the account of his travels through Cathay (see vol. i, pp. 343-4).




Plate 4. The Sun Yat-sen mausoleum

An abortive attempt at the rescue of the foreigners in Peking had been made in June by Admiral Seymour from Tientsin with a composite force, which was compelled to turn back when it was only 25 miles from the capital. It was not until 14 August that the beleaguered legation was relieved by a motley international army of about 16,000 men which had forced its way from Tientsin. The court fled as the foreign troops entered the city and transferred the seat of government to Sian. Chinese resistance collapsed. Peking was occupied and put under martial law, and with the consent of the other powers the German Count von Waldersee was placed in charge of the international forces and established his headquarters in the imperial palace. Diverging aims quickly appeared among the occupying powers. Large-scale looting, even worse than that which the beautiful buildings of Peking had already experienced at the hands of the Boxers and the Chinese troops, was followed by punitive expeditions into the surrounding countryside in which the Germans persisted long after the commanders of the other national units had held their hands and expressed disapproval. The Russians, on the contrary, held severely aloof and concentrated their activities on holding the coast and massing troops in Manchuria.

The Peace Protocol ultimately signed (September 1901) with the Chinese exacted heavy indemnities for the powers concerned, the punishment of culpable officials, the dismantling of the Taku forts, guarding the approaches to Tientsin, and the right to fortify the Legation quarters in Peking. The court returned to the capital, and as already mentioned, Tzü Hsi, herself appearing as a reformed character and exercising all the charm of which she was capable, began to put into effect some of the projected reforms which had brought the emperor to disaster four years before. But if the whole miserable episode of the Boxer rising did nothing else, at least it sealed the doom of the dynasty, which survived the almost simultaneous deaths of Kuang Hsü and Tzü Hsi in 1908 by only three years.

Before the Revolution of 1911 occurred, however, the 'Battle of the Concessions' had been resumed and the balance of power in the Far East had been greatly altered.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY, 1902, AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905

The Boxer rising much intensified the crisis which had been developing over the questions of Manchuria and Korea ever since

Russia had forcibly occupied the strategic apex of the Liaotung peninsula in 1898, after denying it to Japan on the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war three years before (see p. 51). Manchuria, as already noticed, was much affected by Boxer propaganda and was one of the chief scenes of anti-foreign riots and massacres. This provided the opportunity for which Russia had been waiting, and after furnishing a contingent for the international force which relieved Peking, she occupied the greater part of southern Manchuria during the autumn of 1900 and virtually controlled the whole country.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 1902

It was at this stage that Great Britain, mainly on the initiative of Joseph Chamberlain, decided on the vital and highly controversial change of policy involved in the abandonment of 'splendid isolation' and the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

It is not difficult to appreciate the motives which induced the governments of the two countries to make common cause at this juncture. Both Britain and Japan were maritime trading nations with paramount interests in the Chinese market, and both were threatened by the ominous advance of a continental power which consistently adopted a purely monopolist policy in all the lands brought within the bounds of its rapidly extending empire. From Britain's point of view it was not so much the threat to Manchuria itself that was feared as the control over the whole of Chinese economic development which Russia, once firmly entrenched in Manchuria, and thereby dominating Peking, would almost certainly be able to achieve. Chamberlain, in a speech of May 1898, foreshadowing the change of policy, contended that 'If the policy of isolation, which has hitherto been the policy of this country, is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese Empire may be, probably will be, hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our interests. If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the policy of the open door . . . we must not reject the idea of an alliance with those powers whose interests most nearly approximate to our own.'

At the time this speech was made Germany was more in Chamberlain's mind as a possible ally than Japan, and during the Boxer episode there was fairly close co-operation between Great Britain and Germany. But several factors, including the growing naval rivalry of the two countries, Germany's hostile attitude during the South African war, and her strong desire to keep Russia busy

in the Far East rather than in the Balkans, conspired to make such an alliance impracticable. Japan was the only alternative, as France was linked with Russia, and the United States was unwilling to become entangled in the dangerous interplay of European alliances.

In Japan itself there were divided views, and it was not until it seemed clear that Russia was unwilling to give her a free hand in Korea, in return for non-interference with Russian interests in Manchuria, that Japan committed herself to the proposed alliance. Repeated overtures were made to Russia to effect this bargain, but Japan could get no satisfactory guarantees.

In January 1902, Great Britain and Japan concluded an agreement, the objects of which were stated to be 'to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Extreme East,' to safeguard 'the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea,' and 'to secure equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations.' Each of the two contracting parties undertook to come to the help of the other if attacked by *two* or more powers, which meant that Great Britain would assist Japan if either France or Germany joined Russia in making war upon her. In an important clause Japan's political as well as commercial interests in Korea were expressly recognized by Great Britain.

Subsequent history would seem to show that Japan gained considerably more from the alliance than Great Britain,¹ and that the Japanese occupation of Korea and subsequently of southern Manchuria, which it helped to facilitate, have been at least as great a menace to the integrity of China and to British interests in China as the threat from Russia. In 1902, however, the development of Japan's programme for hegemony in the Far East was not foreseen, while the Russian danger seemed real and imminent.²

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905

The Anglo-Japanese agreement did not deter Russia from pushing forward her designs on Manchuria and Korea. She already held southern Liaotung by the lease of 1898 and had constructed the important railway linking Harbin on the Chinese Eastern Railway

¹ It can hardly, however, be gainsaid that in the war of 1914-18, when the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been renewed, Great Britain owed much to Japan's naval policing of Far Eastern waters, which allowed her to concentrate her own fleets in the Atlantic and European areas.

² For different views of the Anglo-Japanese alliance see Pratt, Sir John, *op. cit.*, chap. ix, and Hudson, G. F., *op. cit.*, chap. vii.

(itself virtually a part of the Trans-Siberian) via Mukden with Dalny and Port Arthur. By a convention made with China in April 1902 she undertook to withdraw the troops with which she had occupied the country after the Boxer outbreak by three stages, and she did in fact withdraw them from the south-west of Manchuria. But instead of carrying out the rest of the agreement, she heavily reinforced her garrisons at Mukden and elsewhere and—even more ominous for Japan—in the same year (1903) she sent troops across the Korean frontier. Japan had been strenuously preparing for the struggle that now seemed inevitable, and the news which reached Tokyo in February 1904 that another Russian squadron was on its way to the Far East decided her to spring at the colossus before Russia had completed her preparations. In the event, these preparations were shown to be very far from complete.

Even in a century so prolific in wars as the twentieth has so far been, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 stands out as of signal importance. The masterly naval strategy which led to the capture of Port Arthur and subsequently to the almost total destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet in the straits of Tsushima and the grim tenacity of the Japanese armies in the Battle of Mukden and the other battles fought out on the plains of Manchuria, convinced the most sceptical that a new and most formidable World power had indeed arisen in Eastern Asia. The crushing defeat for the first time for many centuries of a Western by an Oriental nation had an electrical effect throughout the East, and not least in China. The whole balance of power in the Far East was changed, and Russian imperialism was diverted once more to Europe.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth in the United States, through whose mediation it was negotiated, Russia ceded to Japan (September 1905):

- (1) The southern half of Sakhalin.
- (2) The lease of the critical apex of the Liaotung peninsula (henceforward known as Kwantung).
- (3) The section of the railway linking Harbin with Dalny (Dairen) and Port Arthur lying to the south of Changchun and the rights associated with it.
- (4) A free hand in Korea.

These opportunities were quickly utilized by Japan. Korea was first made into a protectorate, and in 1910 annexed and incorporated in the Japanese Empire (Fig. 4). The South Manchuria Railway,

as it now came to be known, was linked with the Korean railway system and made the basis for the rapid economic development and industrialization of the considerable section of South Manchuria




Fig. 4. The expansion of Japan

Based on Hudson, G. F., and Rajchman, M., *An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics*, p. 65 (London, 1940).

The Japanese Empire in or about 1870 is shown in black, while the shaded areas indicate acquisitions up to 1932. The dates are those of acquisition or, in the case of Shantung, of control. K.L.T. Kwantung Leased Territory.

which now came under virtual Japanese control. There was, indeed, much bitterness in militarist circles in Japan that, because of the terms of the agreement with Britain and of the anxiety both of

Britain and America to preserve the integrity of the Chinese Empire, she was not in a position at that stage to annex Manchurian territory. It was only under stress of necessity that China agreed to the transfer of the lease of Kwantung and the railway zone from Russia to Japan, and events were to show that she felt no gratitude to Japan for saving her territory from the grasp of the great northern nation. Nevertheless, Japan had now become a continental as well as a maritime power, and had acquired a most important base on Chinese territory which she was determined to exploit to the utmost. The new Republic, which came into existence so shortly after the events just described, was quickly to discover that China's most formidable foe was no longer the group of acquisitive European powers that had harrassed the latter days of the Manchu dynasty but the neighbouring island empire which had derived the principal part of its culture from her own.

For Bibliographical Note see pp. 154-5.

Chapter II

OUTLINES OF MODERN CHINESE HISTORY

1912-37

The First Chinese Revolution, 1911-12: The Failure of the Constitutional Reformers; The Early Career of Sun Yat-sen; The Abdication of the Manchus and the Inauguration of the Republic.

China between Two Revolutions, 1912-26: The Dictatorship of Yuan Shih-kai; China and the War of 1914-18 (The Alinement of the Great Powers, The Twenty-one Demands, China's Entry into the War, 1917); China and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919; The Washington Conference and Treaties, 1921-22; Cultural Renaissance and Political Chaos.

The Second or National Revolution, 1926-28: The Later Career and Teaching of Sun Yat-sen (The Three Principles of the People, Sun Yat-sen's Place in History); The Reorganization of the Kuomintang under Bolshevik Influence; The Northern Expedition: First Phase, 1926-27; The Rupture between the Kuomintang and the Communists, 1927; The Northern Expedition: Second Phase, 1928.

The Nanking Government, 1928-37: The Significance of the New Regime; The Character and Outlook of the Nanking Government; The Struggle for Unified Control; The Communist Issue.

THE FIRST CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1911-12

The term 'Chinese Revolution' is an elastic one. In the widest sense it denotes the whole complex movement of change, experiment, adaptation, and reconstruction which began at the extreme end of the nineteenth century and, although temporarily checked by the reactionary Boxer rising, was ultimately stimulated by the dismal failure of that final effort to put the clock back. In this broad sense the Chinese Revolution is still in progress, and has gathered momentum from the present Sino-Japanese war. Not for some generations to come will the final form of China's reaction to the invasion of her ancient civilization by the Western world become apparent.

In the narrower and more purely political sense there have been at least two 'Revolutions.' The first was that of 1911-12 which expelled the Manchu dynasty, abolished the imperial office, and technically inaugurated the republican regime. The second was the triumph of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) party in the campaigns of 1926-28 which culminated in the establishment of the Nanking government in the latter year. The year 1928 is certainly quite as important a landmark in the history of Modern China as 1911, and

the future may well show that 1937, the year of Japan's invasion of China Proper, is of even greater significance, at any rate from the standpoint of social change.

THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS

It has already been shown that the leaven of Western ideas had affected the outlook of some of the *litterati* long before the collapse of the old regime. The missionaries were to some extent exponents of Western civilization and their teaching had inspired some of the central ideas of the Taiping rebels. But, on the whole, their cultural influence in the nineteenth century was less than it had been in the Jesuit phase of the seventeenth century, when a relatively small handful of priests with outstanding mathematical and scientific attainments had made such a deep impression on the more open-minded of Chinese scholars (see vol. i, pp. 348-9 and 423). The great dynamic of the active Protestant missions of the nineteenth century in China, as elsewhere, was the Evangelical Movement, and their intense concern for saving souls left them little time or inclination for studying or influencing the solution of the problems confronting the old civilization. There were a few conspicuous exceptions such as the well-known Welsh Baptist missionary, Timothy Richard of Shansi, who, like Father Matteo Ricci in the seventeenth century, set himself to understand and appreciate the characteristics of Chinese culture and, in relation to them, to expound Western learning and science as the products and expression of a Christian civilization. Men with his outlook were regarded with some suspicion by the majority of their fellow-missionaries, and it was not until the whole outlook of the missionary enterprise was greatly broadened in post-Boxer times that it began to exert a profound cultural influence, particularly through its educational work. Even in the late nineteenth century, however, several of the Chinese reformers, and notably Sun Yat-sen, owed to missionaries much of their early knowledge of Western ideas.

Meanwhile more direct contacts were beginning. The reluctant acceptance by China in 1860 of accredited envoys of foreign governments at the court of Peking had many consequential results. A new Department of Foreign Affairs (the *Tsungli-yamen*) came into existence to transact business with foreign diplomats and, in order to equip it with a properly trained *personnel*, a college (the *Tung Wen Kuan*) with a staff of foreign professors was established at

Peking, and, for the benefit of its students, a number of European books on history, international law, and Western institutions were translated into Chinese. From this corps of young diplomatists, usually selected from the most distinguished *literati* families, came the envoys whom China now began to send as her accredited representatives to foreign governments, the first being the scholarly and urbane Kuo Seng-tao, appointed to Great Britain in 1867. Equally important for the diffusion of Western ideas was the influence, on their return to China, of the first batches of students sent to Britain and America. They were very small in number and mainly despatched by the Manchu government in order that they might acquire knowledge of Western naval and military progress and of technical subjects closely associated with it, this being the only aspect of Western civilization which the authorities judged it essential to acquire. But inevitably they learnt a great many other things about the West, and one of the most distinguished of them, Dr Yen Fu, a naval cadet, after his return to China, translated, into finished classical Chinese, Darwin's *Origin of Species* and some of the most important works of Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and John Stuart Mill.

It was from this small section of the *literati* who were endeavouring to make a real synthesis between Chinese and Western culture and who envisaged a gradual adaptation of the old civilization to its new world environment that the constitutional reformers who supported K'ang Yu-wei and the emperor in the abortive reforms of 1898 were drawn. The complete failure of that effort and the obvious incapacity of the Manchu regime to give a lead dispelled the hope that the regeneration of China would come through its traditional ruling class and on evolutionary lines. The way was now open for the more drastic methods and cleaner break with the past advocated by the real author of the Revolution of 1911, Sun Yat-sen.

THE EARLY CAREER OF SUN YAT-SEN

This remarkable man, whose influence has been even greater since his death than during his lifetime, and who is to modern China what Lenin is to modern Russia, was born in a small village in Kwangtung in 1866. His father was a Christian convert, a preacher in the service of the London Missionary Society, and one of his uncles, as already noticed, had fought with the Taiping army. The memories of that rebellion and the detestation of the Manchus characteristic

and, after some protracted negotiations and much saving of 'face,' agreement was reached as follows :

(1) The boy emperor abdicated the throne (12 February 1912), after issuing an edict to the effect that the constitution should be henceforth republican. With the consent of the provisional government at Nanking he was to retain the imperial title for life and receive a pension ; for several years he continued to live in a portion of the royal palace.

(2) To avoid the threatened disruption of China between north and south Sun Yat-sen resigned his presidency of the provisional republican government in favour of Yuan, who was given full powers to organize the new government and himself took the oath of office as president (10 March 1912) 'to endeavour faithfully to develop the Republic, to sweep away the disadvantages of absolute monarchy, to observe the constitutional laws, to increase the welfare of the country, to cement together the five races.'¹ On the same day the National Council at Nanking adopted a provisional constitution.

Thus rapidly, and with comparatively little bloodshed, disappeared the oldest monarchy in the world and one of the most ancient and traditionally minded of the nations was given the most modern type of constitution. In actual fact the Revolution of 1911-12 was no more than a beginning. Many unhappy years were to pass away before any really constructive political work was done, even by way of preparation for giving reality to the programme which was then theoretically adopted. But the enthusiastic annual celebration of the 'Double Tenth' by the Chinese from that time to this has been no empty form. It is noteworthy both that two subsequent attempts to restore the old imperial regime encountered the immediate and unmistakable hostility of articulate public opinion and that, behind the chaos of the political scene in the years that followed the First Revolution, the movement for educational reform and cultural renaissance made steady and almost uninterrupted progress.

CHINA BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS, 1912-26

The period of about fourteen years with which this section deals is well called 'China Between Two Revolutions,' a title which suggests the turbulence and anarchy that characterized it. The

¹ The 'five races' were the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Moslems, symbolized in the first national flag of the Republic with its five stripes.

ancien regime had been overthrown, but as yet there was nothing effective to take its place. Neither the old mandarinate, corrupted and weakened as it had become nor the new revolutionaries, visionary and inexperienced, could cope with the vast problems confronting the nation. Power fell into the hands of military despots who for the most part had no sympathy with either the discarded classical tradition or the political democracy which was projected in its place. The long-suffering peasantry, the real people of China, suffered the extremities of misrule and oppression. The position was complicated and worsened by the outbreak of the war of 1914-18, three years after the Revolution. Japan seized her opportunity to press on the distracted country demands which threatened to reduce her to almost complete vassalage and did, in fact, greatly cripple her power of recovery and industrial expansion. Brought into the war on the side of the Allies, in the expectation of better treatment and of sharing the benefits of the more stable and equitable world order that was promised, China was cruelly disappointed at the Treaty of Versailles, which confirmed Japan's control of one of her most vital provinces. By way of war's aftermath, the discarded and superfluous armaments of Europe were cheaply acquired by China's own war-lords and used to intensify their struggle for power.

Yet these appalling misfortunes stimulated the forces which were ultimately to work for reconstruction. The injustice of the Versailles award brought into existence the organized Student Movement which, whatever its crudities, achieved by its propaganda the beginnings of national self-consciousness for China and placed the demand for reform on a wider basis than before. This coincided with the remarkable Literary Renaissance, which both stimulated a new and critical inquiry into and reassessment of China's own cultural heritage, and provided a far more satisfactory linguistic medium for acquiring knowledge of the West.

The educational and cultural revival anticipated by many years any outward signs of economic and political reconstruction. The distractions and anarchy of the war-lord phase of the early 'twenties, when China had no government which any foreign power, however favourably disposed towards her, could regard as stable or representative, prevented the agreements which sprang from the promising Washington Conference (1921-22) from being properly carried out. Yet many of the original revolutionaries had not lost faith and were still active, and some at least had learnt from sad experience and their own mistakes. In particular, Sun Yat-sen, the prime mover

of the Revolution of 1911, disillusioned but still ardent and confident, came down to earth and formulated the simple but constructive and stimulating programme which inspired the best elements in the Second or Nationalist Revolution and is still the avowed objective of 'Free China.' With Russian Soviet help he also achieved the political and military organization necessary for the attainment of power. He himself did not live to see its fruits, but within three years of his death the Kuomintang armies had swept victoriously through Central China, captured Peking and established at Nanking, under an able leader, who was a disciple of his own, the most representative government that China had yet seen, and one which friendly foreign powers were prepared to recognize. Notwithstanding the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists in the hour of victory and the ominous cleavage in Chinese society which it portended, it could at least be claimed that the Second Revolution had brought on to the horizon the goal which Dr Sun had pictured when he instigated the First.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF YUAN SHIH-KAI

When Sun Yat-sen resigned his provisional presidency of the newly established Republic, he recommended to the Assembly Yuan Shih-kai as his successor on the following grounds: 'The abdication of the Ch'ings (i.e. the Manchu dynasty) and the union of north and south are largely due to the great exertions of Mr Yuan. He has declared his unconditional adhesion to the national cause. He was our opponent yesterday, but to-day he is our friend. He would surely prove a most loyal servant of the Republic. He is a man of experience toward whose constructive ability our nation looks for consolidation.'

Sun was well aware that he himself was not 'a man of experience,' and had no standing either with the older mandarins or with the foreign powers, whose attitude towards the new regime would be a crucial factor. He was willing to step aside and take a relatively minor post as Director of the new Railway Bureau, in the hope that Yuan had the will as well as the power to put the Republic on a firm foundation.

He was destined to be quickly undeceived. Both by temperament and by training Yuan Shih-kai was the last man to have any real sympathy with the aims of the revolutionaries. He had first come

to the front as Chinese Resident at Seoul, where he had acted as the militant custodian of China's interests in Korea against Japanese designs. He had been prominently associated with Li Hung-chang, whose right-hand man he was, in the reorganization of the Chinese army on Western lines, in the necessity of which both men firmly believed. After Li's death in 1901, he succeeded him as governor of the metropolitan province of Chihli (Hopeh), in many ways the most important official post in China. There he concentrated on the development of a new Officers' Training School at Paoting. Among its graduates were several of China's future war-lords and three future presidents with militarist leanings.

Yuan's recall to power by the Manchus in their last desperate plight (see p. 71) and the willingness of the revolutionary leaders to entrust their cause to his hands made him complete master of the situation. Moreover, he was regarded by the foreign legations as China's one 'strong man' who had ruthlessly suppressed the Boxer rising in Shantung and who held safe and moderate views. He had a wonderful opportunity, but he used it to impose on China a type of administration which was destined to be her curse for many years to come and which still forms a dangerously attractive model. While he had no faith in the revolutionaries, and no belief in the capacity of the Chinese for democratic government, he was equally out of sympathy with the classical tradition of civil administration by Confucian scholars. For this, indeed, there was considerable excuse, so degenerate and corrupt had the old mandarinat become in the last century of Manchu rule; moreover, it was no longer recruited in the time-honoured way, for the empress-dowager, as one of the preliminaries to the constitutional reforms planned in her post-Boxer phase, had totally abolished the classical civil service examinations in 1905. In this situation Yuan (holding the views described) relied for his helpers and supporters neither upon mandarins nor revolutionaries but upon the graduates of his own military college.

Events moved rapidly. Under the provisional constitution adopted at Nanking, a 'Peoples' Parliament' was chosen and assembled at Peking. It was mainly representative of Sun Yat-sen's political party, the *Kuomintang* (National Peoples' Party), which in 1912 had taken the place of the older *Tung Meng Hui* (Revolutionary Alliance). The provisional constitution contemplated a president with powers hardly greater than those of the president of the French Republic, but Yuan almost at once began to take the reins of power

into his own hands. In April 1913, thanks to the confidence imposed in him by the foreign powers, he secured a large 'Reorganization Loan' from a financial group representing Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan. This made him almost completely independent of parliament, which fruitlessly tried to obstruct the loan. An attempted Kuomintang revolution in the south, in which Sun Yat-sen participated, against his usurpation of power was quickly suppressed, and in the autumn of 1913 Yuan proceeded to dismiss the Kuomintang members and proscribe the party, and shortly afterwards he disbanded parliament in favour of an administrative council of his own choosing. The provincial assemblies were also dismissed, and in May 1914 he devised a new constitution which gave the president very great powers and a tenure of ten years of office.

Yuan's dictatorship was now almost complete, and at the winter solstice of 1914 he performed the historic ceremonial sacrifice at the Temple of Heaven associated from time immemorial with the imperial office. This foreshadowed the final step of himself establishing a new dynasty. An active campaign by Yuan's friends in favour of the restoration of the monarchy culminated in requests by the carefully packed Council of State to re-establish it in his own person, two diplomatic refusals on his part, a so-called 'referendum,' and, finally, his acceptance of the honour (December 1915).

Yuan, however, had miscalculated the position. His prestige had already been weakened by his forced capitulation to a large part of the humiliating 'Twenty-one Demands' made by Japan earlier in the year (see p. 80). Even such a moderate constitutional reformer as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the chief advisers of the emperor Kuang Hsü in the attempted reforms of 1898, was strenuously opposed to what was clearly a reactionary move and used his powerful pen to incite the *intelligentsia* and the growing student body of China against it. The feeling of the country was unmistakable. The news of the intended restoration was followed immediately by a serious revolt in distant Yunnan, and very soon by a declaration of independence by several neighbouring provinces (Fig. 5). Realizing his mistake too late, Yuan first postponed his coronation and then consented to the restoration of parliamentary government. But he had now hopelessly lost 'face,' and the first of the long list of modern China's war-lords died, a broken and deeply disillusioned man, in June 1916.

For the moment, unity and the forms of constitutional government were restored by the succession to the presidential office of the vice-president, Li Yuan-hung, a sincere and well-intentioned, but by no means strong man. The military machine, however, which Yuan had built up was far more powerful than any other organization that had yet come into existence. Many of his former




Fig. 5. China, 1915

Based on *Political Maps of China*, map i.

In Figs. 5-8 the area bounded by the black line is roughly that controlled by the dominant government of the period, while the shaded areas are those controlled by opposing or neutral factions. The boundaries of the 'Eighteen Provinces' are shown.

colleagues and associates in the Officers' Training School were anxious to succeed where he had failed, and China was to be their battleground for several years. Meanwhile external events contingent on the war of 1914-18 were making their influence felt and introducing new factors into the shaping of her future.

CHINA AND THE WAR OF 1914-18

The Alinement of the Great Powers

After Japan had succeeded to Russia's concessions and rights in Liaotung and south Manchuria as a result of their victory in the war of 1904-1905, there was a remarkable change in the Far Eastern alinement of the Great Powers. Russia and Japan reached a comprehensive and far-reaching understanding in respect of both their actual and their potential spheres of influence. Outwardly it took the form of a treaty of agreement (July 1907) to abstain from strife and respect each other's treaty rights. Secret clauses, however, later disclosed, went much further. These envisaged the partitioning into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence of the entire Chinese Empire beyond the Great Wall. Japan's sphere was to be southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia¹ adjacent to it, while the Russian was to include northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang.² For the time being it was the division of Manchuria that was most important. Japan concentrated, as already noticed, on the development of the South Manchuria Railway zone and linked it with Korea, which she annexed in 1910, while Russia remained in virtual control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, with Harbin as the organizing focus in north Manchuria.

In the same period Great Britain's attitude to both France and Russia was materially changed. The year 1904 was memorable for the Anglo-French Entente, which brought to an end the long period of strained relations between the two countries. The Franco-Russian alliance had long been in existence, and from 1904 onward to the outbreak of war, Great Britain, impelled by the growing menace of Germany, was moving towards its orbit. In 1903, as a part of this understanding, she reached agreement with Russia regarding their respective positions in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

Russian aspirations and designs in the Far East were no longer

¹ For the vital distinction between Inner and Outer Mongolia, on either side of the Gobi desert, see vol. i, pp. 3, 7-8, and 360-1.

² Actually the term used was the vague one of "West China." While it was primarily meant to denote Sinkiang, i.e. Chinese Turkestan and Dzungaria, there seems no doubt that it was also intended to cover possible Russian expansion in the north-western provinces of China Proper, e.g. Kansu and Shensi. For striking evidence that at an earlier date Russia very seriously contemplated the absorption of this part of China, see Hudson, G. F., *The Far East in World Politics*, pp. 160-1 (London, 1939).

feared, but Germany's hold of the naval base of Tsingtao was regarded as a great menace, since the growing strength of her fleet implied the certainty of important naval operations in the Pacific in the event of war. To Japan also Germany appeared as the chief danger to her interests in China now that a bargain had been made with Russia. It was, therefore, the common fear of Germany, replacing that of Russia, which maintained the Anglo-Japanese Alliance after its original purpose had been served. From this point of view the Anglo-Japanese and Franco-Russian alliances were complementary, and, in the same year (1907) that Great Britain and Russia settled their differences, Japan and France made an agreement to respect each other's special spheres of influence in South-west China and Manchuria respectively. Great Britain, Russia, France, and Japan thus formed a united front in the Far East against the German danger.

One important power, however, stood severely aloof and regarded both the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Agreement with misgivings. In America there was a steadily growing suspicion of Japan's intentions. The sympathy felt with her in her original struggle against Russian imperialism was replaced by resentment and fear when it became clear that Japan was pursuing a completely monopolist policy in southern Manchuria and Korea, to the detriment of American commercial interests; it was also already suspected that Japan harboured designs upon the Philippines. Moreover, the sinister implications for China of the new understanding between Japan and Russia became apparent immediately after the Revolution of 1911-12. The abdication of the Manchus and the establishment of the Republic were quickly followed by a revolt of the Mongols against Chinese authority. The allegiance of the Mongol princes had been to the Manchu dynasty as such¹ and not to the Chinese Empire over which it ruled, and the encroachment of Chinese farmers on the Mongol grazing grounds in recent years had caused much bitterness. Yuan Shih-kai took prompt measures to suppress the rebellion, and Chinese troops quickly restored the position in Inner Mongolia.² Any attempt, however, to reassert Chinese control of Outer Mongolia was rendered impossible by an agreement made by Russia at Urga in November 1912 to support the Mongol claim

¹ For the help given by Mongol tribes to the Manchus in their original conquest of China, see vol. i, pp. 352-3.

² It was after this that the Chinese Republic took the preliminary steps for partitioning Inner Mongolia into provinces of China Proper, e.g. Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar, and Jehol (see vol. i, p. 3).

for autonomy. China was compelled to yield, and although Russia, a year later, recognized Chinese suzerainty over the country, on condition of its being given a completely autonomous status, Outer Mongolia became and still remains virtually a Russian protectorate. The general result of these developments was to divert American sympathies in the Far East to China, both on commercial and sentimental grounds, although in the ensuing Japanese aggression the United States was not in a position to uphold the interests of the new Republic in any effective way.

The Twenty-one Demands

Within two weeks of the outbreak of the war of 1914-18 Japan, as one of the Allies, delivered an ultimatum to Germany demanding *inter alia* the return of Kiaochow to China. No answer was returned, and Japan declared war on 23 August 1914. She immediately proceeded, in conjunction with a small British force, to invest Tsingtao, which fell on 7 November. Japan then assumed the administration of the whole leased territory of Kiaochow and took control of the important Shantung railway constructed by Germany from Tsingtao to Tsinan. Difficulties arose with China over the extensive 'war zone' which she established and over the pressure and arbitrary conduct of Japanese troops stationed far behind the leased territory. Chinese protests were unavailing, and Japan, whose government had now come completely under militarist control, then seized the opportunity of the preoccupation of the European powers with their own life-and-death struggle, to present to China the notorious 'Twenty-one Demands.'

In their original form these Demands, the true nature of which was as far as possible concealed from foreign governments, were of such a character as to involve the complete economic and political vassalage of China to Japan. China was to consent to the appointment of Japanese 'advisers' in political, financial, and military matters, to admit Japanese garrisons in the important Chinese cities, to grant special facilities for the purchase of land by Japanese corporations, and to undertake to purchase from Japan a fixed proportion of whatever munitions she might need. China would in fact have become a Japanese protectorate.

Yuan Shih-kai temporized and played for time and gradually a truer version of the Demands reached Britain and America. To Great Britain, however, Japan's adhesion to the cause of the Allies

was vital¹ and the hands of her government were thus completely tied. America was in a rather stronger position but feared entanglement in the war, and a break with Japan would have been tantamount to helping Germany at a time when the opinion of the country was becoming more and more hostile to her. Neither government, therefore, made any effective protest, but public opinion in both Great Britain and America was aroused, and Japan, aware of the resentment against her and the danger which this portended for the future, considerably modified the original Demands. The revised version of them, however, was delivered in the form of an ultimatum, and Yuan, abandoning hope of foreign intervention, was compelled to yield.

The concessions made to Japan were very material. In broad summary they comprised :

(1) The renewal and extension of the privileged position held by Japan in the north. This included the extension of the leases (to a period of 99 years) by which Japan held Kwantung, at the base of the Liaotung peninsula, and the South Manchuria Railway, the right to construct new Manchurian railways and an expansion of her economic field into eastern Inner Mongolia with its large iron-ore resources.

(2) An undertaking by the Chinese government not to give permission to foreign nations, other than Japan, to acquire naval bases, dockyards, etc., on the coast of Fukien or itself to borrow foreign capital for setting up such establishments. The intention of this concession was to earmark for future Japanese industrial development the valuable Fukien coast opposite the Japanese island of Formosa.

(3) The confirmation and extension of the interests which Japan had already acquired in the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company. This was the one great metallurgical enterprise that China had so far developed and comprised the large iron and steel works at Hanyang, the rich Tayeh iron mines, and important coal mines. The Chinese government was now forced to promise 'not to confiscate the said company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.' It is important to notice that this control of the promising metallurgical development of the Central Basin of the Yangtze, in conjunction with her hold of

¹ It was known that there was a strong pro-German party among the Japanese militarists.

the iron-ore fields of Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, has enabled Japan to grasp by far the greater part of the iron resources of China and so to throttle the development of the heavy basic industries, the lack of which has been one of China's greatest handicaps in the present war.

(4) A guarantee to Japan that she should enjoy all rights and privileges hitherto held by Germany in the province of Shantung, whether acquired by treaty or otherwise. At the end of the war the Kiaochow territory would be at the free disposal of Japan, who undertook to restore it to China on certain conditions (Fig. 4).

China's Entry into the War (1917)

Japan's control of Shantung for the remainder of the war gave her a highly strategic position for influencing the development of the Chinese political situation in her own interests. The Peking government, after the death of Yuan Shih-kai, became the coveted instrument of rival cliques and groups, most of which originated among ambitious members of the military schools for which he was mainly responsible. At first the most powerful of these groups was the so-called Anfu party, headed by Tuan Chi-jui, one of the ablest of Yuan's protégés. The Anfu group was notoriously in the pay of Japan, from which source they obtained subsidies and loans to maintain their authority on condition of pursuing a policy favourable to Japanese interests.

Japan's major object at this time was to secure support for her claims on Shantung at the Peace Conference on the conclusion of the war. For this purpose she made secret agreements with her allies, exacting this support as the price of her continued assistance in the war itself.¹ One such agreement was made with France in the spring of 1917. France was willing to support Japan's claim but stipulated that Japan should promote China's entry into the war, since a Chinese labour corps would be of very material assistance to her. Accordingly Japan, although she had previously opposed any such move on China's part, offered strong inducements to Tuan, who declared war on Germany and Austria without obtaining parliamentary sanction (14 August 1917).

¹ Great Britain at this stage of the war greatly needed Japanese destroyers in the Mediterranean to protect convoys against German submarines. These Japan was willing to send on condition that Britain would support her claims to the German concessions in Shantung and the island possessions of Germany in the Pacific north of the Equator. An agreement to this effect was reached in February 1917.

This arbitrary action, the interested object of which was perfectly well understood, was naturally resented. On the other hand, the Peking parliament had already broken off diplomatic relations with Germany and strong feeling had been aroused through the sinking by a German submarine of a French ship with 500 Chinese coolies on board. The hope was also widely cherished that China's entry into the war, especially now that the United States had entered it also, would give her better prospects at the Peace Conference. Partly on these grounds and partly to preserve the appearance of national unanimity, the Kuomintang government, which had now been set up at Canton, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, in opposition to the puppet government at Peking, made a similar declaration of war on Germany.

Apart from the seizure of German and Austrian vessels interned in Chinese ports and the placing of some of her own ships at the service of the Allies, China's chief contribution to the war was some 175,000 coolies, used as labour corps in France, the Middle East, and Africa. It was in connexion with the Chinese labour corps in France, mainly drawn from Shantung and other northern provinces, that a striking episode occurred, destined to have an important influence on the future social history of China. Y. C. James Yen, a prominent young educationalist, was asked by the Chinese Y.M.C.A. to go to France as a welfare officer among the Chinese coolies. Impressed by their inability, owing to their almost complete illiteracy, to communicate with their own people, Yen made a careful selection of approximately 1,000 Chinese 'characters,' the simplest and most useful for this purpose. This experiment in adult education was so successful and answered such an obvious need that, after the war, under the name of the 'Thousand-Character System,' it was applied and developed on a large scale in many parts of China and with equally good results. Out of it there developed the National Association of the Mass Education Movement, of which Yen became the general director.

CHINA AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

Much the most important gain to China of entering the war on the side of the victorious Allies was her right to be represented at the Paris Peace Conferences. The Japanese had entirely miscalculated when they imagined that her delegation would be subservient to their wishes. Public opinion had been aroused to an extent never

before known. The crucial importance of the Conference for China's future status in the world was fully realized, and a great effort had been made to present a united front. The rival 'North' and 'South,' as represented by the Peking and Canton governments, had so far agreed to sink their differences as to hold joint conferences, as a result of which the Chinese delegation at Paris was representative of both sides and more national in character than could have appeared possible a year or two earlier. The delegates were men of conspicuous ability, and China's case for the unconditional restoration to her of the Kiaochow territory was argued with telling effect. The monstrous character of the Twenty-one Demands was exposed and appeal made to the principle of self-determination, which was avowedly the criterion for settling territorial issues.

Japan's claim was based on the Treaty of 1915 made with Yuan Shih-kai's government, when the revised Demands were accepted, on subsequent undertakings by Tuan Chi-jui and on the secret agreements with Great Britain and France and verbal assurances by Italy. These completely tied the hands of all the major powers except the United States, whose representatives alone were free to support China's case on its own merits.

It was not the merits of the case, however, which decided the issue. Vainly did President Wilson strive against a decision that was clearly a flagrant contravention of the much-vaunted principles which he had laid down and which the Allies had accepted. He yielded at last because on no other terms would Japan join the League of Nations, which he considered of paramount importance.¹ His surrender, however, was exploited to the full by his enemies and became an important factor in the subsequent refusal of the American Senate to support his League of Nations' policy.

The vital clause of the Treaty of Versailles relating to China was as follows: 'Germany renounces in favour of China all privileges and indemnities resulting from the Boxer Protocol of 1901, and the concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, and other Chinese territory; and cedes to Japan all right and titles as to Kiaochow and also the railways, mines, and cables acquired by her by treaties with China in regard to Shantung.' The benefits to China of the liquidation of the German Boxer Indemnity and of the German concessions at Hankow and Tientsin were considerable, but the crucial issue was of course the Shantung award. In consequence of it the Chinese

¹ He was probably influenced also by a verbal assurance on the part of Japan that it was intended to hand over Kiaochow to China at an unspecified date.

delegates refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. They signed, however, the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, and China became a member of the League of Nations.

The Student Movement

The action of the Chinese delegates at Versailles was followed with close attention in China and evidenced the rapid rise of a nationalist spirit among the young *intelligentsia*. At a critical stage of the Conference, when it seemed likely that the Peking government delegates might yield to Japanese and Allied pressure, a large crowd of students and schoolboys attacked the residences of ministers known to belong to the pro-Japanese Anfu clique. Arrests were made, but when it was known that it was proposed to execute the ringleaders a storm of unprecedented magnitude broke out. Not only were student unions formed all over the country and the universities and schools deserted, but the principal Chambers of Commerce, merchant guilds, and banks showed their sympathy in no uncertain fashion; the banks made no payments for ten days, and commerce was almost completely suspended. The government was paralysed and completely capitulated. The three ministers were dismissed, the imprisoned students released with apologies and thanks for their patriotic action by the President (Hsü Shih-chang), and the policy of the Chinese delegates at Paris in refusing to yield to pressure was publicly approved by the Peking government. This occurred a few weeks before the actual refusal of the delegation to sign the Treaty of Versailles (June 1919), and their action was undoubtedly influenced by the knowledge that they were supported by the most remarkable demonstration of public opinion that China had yet known.

The Student Movement, as it is usually called, followed up this success by organizing a boycott of Japanese goods on a national scale. Once again they had the support of the mercantile organizations, without which it would have been doomed to failure. The boycott was carried out with efficiency and ingenuity. While huge bonfires destroyed Japanese products, factories were set up in the larger cities to supply cheap consumers' goods, the Chinese market for which had been largely captured from Europe and America by Japan in the course of the war. Many Japanese firms went bankrupt, and the threat to Japan's market in China was all the more serious because Great Britain and the United States were once again in a position to compete with her in it. Japanese industrialists and

merchants were so badly hit that they began to lose confidence in the wisdom of the militarist group which had controlled the foreign policy of their country. This was undoubtedly one of the factors in the change of the Japanese attitude conspicuous at the Washington Conference (see p. 87), and for some years afterwards.

The evidence of a new national consciousness in China was now clear to the world, and had an important effect on the subsequent policy of the Great Powers towards her. For this the activities of the Student Movement were primarily responsible. The crudities and excesses of some of its later manifestations may be forgiven in face of the remarkable achievement of Chinese solidarity at a most critical stage, and of the tremendous impetus which it gave to the formation of an articulate public opinion.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND TREATIES, 1921-22

The Background

In the years following the peace treaties at Paris many circumstances combined to make the summoning of a conference to consider the international relations of China and the many grave problems connected with the future of the Pacific both desirable and practicable. It was clear that, from the standpoint of the hopes of humanity for the avoidance of another titanic conflict, the Far East was one of the most critical regions in the world, and that, unless its affairs could be placed on a more stable and equitable basis, there was little prospect of establishing a better world order.

The sordid struggle for concessions and spheres of influence which had characterized the pre-war years was now generally condemned, and the fact that a new China had come into being, which intended to have a decisive voice in her own destiny, was also widely admitted. At the same time it was obvious that the decision registered at Versailles was entirely contrary to the spirit in which the League of Nations was conceived. The essential justice of the contention, made in a striking petition addressed to Great Britain by an important group of Chinese *intelligentsia*, could not be gainsaid :

'No future statesmanship can prevent an irredentist agitation of the most violent kind developing both far and wide and poisoning the life of the nation. . . . Everyone had confidently believed that the design of the League of Nations and the public denunciation by Western statesmen

of all the bad treaties made since 1914 meant the end of power politics, the termination of secret trafficking among the strong at the cost of the weak. For the nation to be told now that expediency requires China to be sacrificed is to do it mortal hurt which no blandishments can disguise.¹

In Great Britain there was a growing feeling that the Anglo-Japanese alliance ought to be terminated. Apart from the fact that the obligations of the secret agreement made with Japan in 1917 had placed the British representatives at Versailles in a thoroughly false position over the Shantung award, the alliance had now become so unpopular in the United States as to constitute a serious obstacle to Anglo-American co-operation, on which so much depended. At the Imperial Conference held in London, in the summer of 1921, the Canadian government also strongly pressed for its dissolution. At the same time it was realized that the alliance must be replaced by a wider agreement which, in doing justice to China and safeguarding legitimate British interests, would not antagonize Japan.

In Japan, too, the situation had materially altered. Strategically, it is true, Japan now seemed to be in a stronger position than ever before, for she virtually controlled the three critical peninsulas of Korea, Liaotung, and Shantung which commanded the maritime approaches to Tientsin and Peking, and she had secured the lion's share of the concessions wrested from China. But diplomatically, apart from the alliance from which her partner now wished to withdraw, she was completely isolated. She had antagonized America only less than China. Her friendship and agreement with Czarist Russia had been replaced by the open hostility of the new Soviet Russia, a part of whose Far Eastern territories her armies still occupied.² Her markets in China, as noticed in the previous section, were threatened by a formidable and widespread boycott, the consequence of her own policy. In these circumstances, the stock of the Japanese militarists, whose German model it was also noticed had come to grief, fell lower than ever before in modern Japanese

¹ Quoted in Whyte, Sir F., *China and Foreign Powers*, pp. 20-1 (London, 1927).

² In common with Great Britain, the United States, and France, Japan had sent troops into the part of the U.S.S.R. east of Lake Baikal in 1918 to assist the counter revolution against the Soviet governments, and to give aid to the Czechoslovak force which was fighting its way eastwards, in order to get back to Europe to join the Allies. The British, Americans, and French withdrew long before the Japanese, who were suspected of wishing to annex much of eastern Siberia. The Japanese finally withdrew from Vladivostok in October 1922, some months after the Washington Conference. They continued to hold northern (Russian) Sakhalin until 1925, when they withdrew in return for concessions relating to the exploitation of coal and oil in that part of the island.

history, and the more liberal elements in the political life of the country recovered a considerable measure of control. Without any intention of surrendering the substance of Japan's gains, they were willing to consider the possibility of new agreements.

The Conference

The Government of the United States had already taken the initiative in arranging a new Four-Power Consortium (United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan), signed at New York in October 1920, the objects of which were to place the loans essential to China during the period of weakness and instability that must endure until she had evolved a strong central government, on a fair and equitable basis, and to avert the fatal struggle for the advantage of individual nations as the price of financial help.¹ It was the United States also which, through President Harding, now sent out the invitations to the Washington Conference to deal with the still wider political issues of China and the Pacific. There is, however, good reason to believe that the real initiative in this step came from Great Britain who had strong motives for taking it.² In the event all the powers, large and small, including China itself, with vital interests in the Far East and the Pacific, were represented at Washington, with the one important exception of the U.S.S.R., then at the height of the Comintern phase of militant Communism and enmity to all capitalist nations, and with a policy of her own in China (see p. 107).

Of the two major issues with which the conference was concerned, naval disarmament as it affected the Pacific Ocean and the future status of China, including the inter-relations of the powers in their dealing with her, only the latter falls to be briefly considered here.³

The Chinese delegation, which in addition to the official representatives of the government had two special 'Peoples' delegates'

¹ This consortium was constituted for the purpose of political loans, i.e. to assist in the development of a stable government. It was regarded with a good deal of suspicion by Chinese nationalists.

² See Whyte, Sir F., *op. cit.*, pp. 23-4.

³ This is not to imply, however, that China was unaffected by the naval agreements. Their total result, as summarized by Tonybee, Arnold J., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-23, p. 490 (London), was: 'to make the defensive position of Japan in the Western Pacific absolutely impregnable by sea, and thus not only to safeguard Japan against any attack or invasion, but to assure one of the chief objects of her policy—the object for which she had been building up her great navy—which was the uninterrupted security of her communications in war-time with her continental possessions and with China.' This view was not realized at the time but since then has been generally endorsed.

(David Yü, National President of the Chinese Y.M.C.A., and Chiang Meng-lin of the Peking National University), was allowed to put China's case very fully and to review not only the Shantung question, which was not on the official agenda, but all matters concerned with the recovery of rights yielded in the 'unequal treaties' of the nineteenth century. They asked for the complete restoration of tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality, i.e. of foreign consular jurisdiction.

The Treaties

The final results were embodied in three official Conference Treaties and a special treaty between Japan and China relating to Shantung.

The Nine-Power Treaty (6 February 1922), signed by the British Empire as a whole, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, and China, bound the signatory powers :

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the right of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

The Four-Power Treaty (13 December 1921), signed by the British Empire, the United States, Japan, and France, to guarantee the 'insular possessions and insular dominions' of the respective powers and pledging them to confer together on disputes arising between any two of them. It was this treaty which took the place of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, although it did not itself create a similar relationship between any of the powers concerned.

The Nine-Power Treaty on the Chinese Customs' Tariff. This made some relatively minor immediate concessions and promised a general revision of the tariff to be settled by a subsequent conference in China, the abolition of *likin* (local dues in the nature of

octroi) being made a condition of a substantial increase in the Chinese Customs' revenue. A commission was also to be appointed to examine afresh the whole question of extraterritoriality and to make recommendations to the foreign powers concerned. It was to suggest 'judicial reforms such as would warrant the several powers in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality.' (Germany and Austria had already relinquished theirs in the peace treaties made with China, and Russia had renounced hers in 1920.)

The Sino-Japanese Shantung Treaty. By this treaty Japan restored the Kiaochow leased territory to China and undertook to withdraw her troops from Shantung and to transfer the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, in return for a payment of forty million yen within fifteen years. Until the railroad debt was redeemed in the form of treasury notes, China was to employ a Japanese traffic-manager.

Japan thus had the credit of fulfilling the assurance made at Versailles that she intended to retrocede Kiaochow to China. She retained, however, her large mining and industrial interests in Shantung, covered by her extraterritorial rights, and a sufficient hold on the vital railway for several years to come to afford a pretext for intervention on any supposed provocation.

The Washington Agreements in Retrospect

At the time the Washington Conference and Treaties seemed a great landmark and undoubtedly they did represent an important advance. The sincerity of Great Britain and the United States in wishing to inaugurate through them a new era in the relations of the Western powers to China and the Far East was clearly demonstrated in the years which followed. There was no looking back or breaking of the promises which they then made, in spite of severe provocation during the fierce outbreak of anti-foreign fever in China in the middle twenties. That the treaties failed to achieve a great regional agreement for the Far East was due in part to the same deep-seated causes of defective international organization that wrecked the Locarno Pact, which was intended to achieve a similar purpose in Western Europe, and in part to the return of the militarists to power in Japan and her refusal to redeem the pledges which she made at Washington. It must be admitted that they also failed to satisfy China. The treaties were signed at a time when political anarchy and civil war made the quick fulfilment of the undertaking to deal with the customs' tariff and extraterritoriality almost impossible, and

when the Nationalist movement, under Russian Communist influences, was becoming uncompromising and intransigent. The warning, already quoted, of the Chinese *intelligentsia* at the time of the Shantung award that 'no future statesmanship can prevent an irredentist agitation of the most violent kind developing both far and wide' was strikingly vindicated.

(Note.—The foreign relations of China since 1922 (i.e. since the Washington Treaties) are treated in Chapter iv under that heading. The constitutional aspects and the evolution of the modern system of government in China are discussed in Chapter v, entitled 'Government and Administration,' and other chapters deal with the modern educational and legal systems.

In order, however, to present a broad picture of the trend of events as a whole and of the inter-relations of the different aspects of the life of the country, it has been thought well to continue this 'Outlines of Modern Chinese History' down to the present time, although this necessarily involves a certain amount of overlap. References to international relations after 1922 will be mainly incidental, and attention will be chiefly concentrated on the emergence and salient characteristics of contemporary China.)

CULTURAL RENAISSANCE AND POLITICAL CHAOS

The China of the early and middle 'twenties presented a bewildering scene, very variously interpreted by different observers according to their angle of approach and scale of values. The political situation seemed to be going from bad to worse and was dominated by the conflicts of many war-lords and by civil war between two rival governments, both claiming to be national. Corruption, inefficiency, and oppression, with all the miseries that these entailed for the masses of the people, were even greater than in the last days of the Manchus, and gave apparent justification to the view which was still expressed in the treaty ports that the Chinese were incapable of evolving a strong central government or of giving adequate protection to legitimate foreign interests. But contemporaneously there occurred a remarkable and many-sided cultural renaissance which, while it primarily affected the educated classes and particularly the rapidly growing body of students and modern scholars, was intended in some of its most important aspects to reach the peasants and city workers as well. To those foreign observers who felt that in China, where such great importance had always been attached to ideas and teaching, a revision of cultural and educational values was the necessary preliminary to all other kinds of progress, this movement seemed in a high degree hopeful. Perhaps the nearest analogy to

this phase of the evolution of modern China in the ancient history of the country is the turbulent and anarchic period of the 'Warring States,' which was also the age of Confucius, Mencius, and other great sages and a time of remarkable intellectual activity (see vol. i, pp. 307-11 and 373-84).

The Cultural Renaissance

This movement is known by a variety of names such as 'The New Tide,' 'The New Civilization Movement,' and 'The Literary Revolution.' The last denotes one of its most important aspects. Although it became the focus of intellectual, social, and later on of political reform movements of different kinds, its origins were mainly literary, and this remained its most fundamental contribution.

The outstanding figure in its inception and early development was Hu Shih, professor of philosophy in the National University at Peking, whose chancellor, Ts'ai Yuan-pei, himself one of the most distinguished of modern Chinese *savants*, warmly supported him. Hu Shih, a graduate of Harvard, is one of a not inconsiderable number of modern Chinese scholars who have combined a profound knowledge of the philosophy and literature of their own country with a remarkable mastery of Western learning. He and some of his associates had become impressed with what has been described as 'the essentially vernacular spirit of current Western literature,' and they became convinced that, in order to provide a key to modern knowledge for the rank and file of educated Chinese, it was essential to discard the classical language as the medium of written thought, whether in philosophy and history or in modern science, economics, sociology, and politics. The classical language (*Wên-li*), they contended, had been virtually 'dead' for 2,000 years, whereas there existed a living and expressive vernacular in which many popular novels and plays had been written from the time of the Yuan dynasty or even earlier (see vol. i, pp. 349-50). It was this vernacular, *pai hua*, or 'clear speech,' which they now proposed to adopt as the national language and the recognized medium of literary intercourse.

Inevitably this revolution provoked the passionate opposition of many of the older scholars and of the old-style Confucian teachers all over the country. More serious criticisms have been made by sinologues of the adequacy of *pai hua* to express the finer shades and subtleties of meaning, particularly in poetry (see vol. i, p. 450). But of the importance of the revolution which its adoption effected in

making modern knowledge accessible and in providing a medium for the interchange of thought on current questions, there can be no doubt at all. The view expressed by the well-known American educationalist, Paul Monroe, that: 'This transformation is similar to the service performed by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio for the Italians and by Chaucer and Wyclif for the English—the substitution of a local dialect for an obsolete classical language as the living medium of literary expression of a whole people'¹ has been echoed by the great majority of foreign observers.

The Literary Revolution, first launched in 1916, caught on with extraordinary speed, and was quickly followed by a vast output not only of translations of Western works but of newspapers, periodicals, and books on current problems. Before long, *pai hua* was officially adopted for text-books by the Ministry of Education. Hu Shih, in order to show its adequacy for the most serious type of literature, published in it his well-known *Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy*.

The 'revolution,' however, has been by no means confined to the introduction of a new medium of expression. Its authors were equally interested in producing through it new habits of thought and a new intellectual outlook. Their aims in these respects are perhaps best expressed in the words used by Hu Shih himself to describe what he claimed to have been actually accomplished in the minds of Young China, when the movement had been in existence for some years:

'All traditional values are now being judged from a new standpoint and by new standards. From small feet and concubinage to Confucianism and Christianity nothing is free from this new process of transvaluation. Some of the judgments may be too subjective or superficial—others may be too harsh or unhistorical. But the existence of the evaluating attitude cannot be denied. At present the whole movement is still in the stage of largely destructive criticism. The young men and women are suffering bitterly in this age of transition. . . . It is true there is a great deal of cheap iconoclasm and blind faddism. All that is inevitable. The saner and more far-sighted leaders are trying to inculcate into the people what they regard as the only safeguard against these dangers, namely, the historical and evolutionary point of view and a truly scientific attitude of life. But that requires education—a slow process, too slow for impulsive souls.

'All we can say is that there is a Chinese Renaissance and a new China is being born. There is no longer mere modernization of externals, but a great change in the whole fabric of national life.'²

¹ Monroe, P., *China, a Nation in Evolution*, p. 280 (New York, 1928).

² *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 August 1925, quoted in Gowen, H. H., and Hull, J. W., *An Outline History of China*, pp. 420-1 (New York, 1926).

It is important to emphasize that the objective of these leaders of thought has not been to advocate the wholesale adoption of Western ideas and views; their standpoint is that Young China should critically evaluate, in relation to the present needs of their country, both their own inherited culture and the culture and dominant conceptions of the West, that they should think for themselves and neither slavishly adhere to the old nor slavishly copy the new. This conception of the critical examination and revaluation of the ancient culture has been fruitfully applied in the research departments of several universities to Chinese history, literature, and philosophy.

The movement had the active support of some of the older scholar-reformers, particularly of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, whose lectures and books on Chinese political philosophy and related subjects had a great influence on the thought of many students. It is Hu Shih, however, who is known as 'The Father of the Chinese Renaissance,' and the significance of his work for Modern China is hardly less than that of Sun Yat-sen in the political sphere.

Closely connected with the Literary Revolution has been the movement for making *Kuo Yü*, or 'National Language,' based upon *pai hua*, the *lingua franca* for all China. At a great educational conference held in Canton, attended by representatives from all the Chinese provinces, there was unanimous agreement that it should be taught in all the schools, including those of the non-mandarin-speaking provinces of the south-east, although other subjects of the curriculum could continue to be taught in the local vernacular. The importance of this movement can hardly be overstressed (see vol. i, pp. 454-6).

Many of the students attracted by the Literary Revolution also participated eagerly in the third great linguistic reform which began to make rapid headway at this period, that of the 'Thousand-Character System,' whose value as a means of mass education had been so strikingly demonstrated among the Chinese coolies in France (see p. 83). Its progress may be gauged by the fact that by July 1929 fifteen million copies of the *Thousand Characters*, as printed by the Commercial Press of Shanghai, had been sold. Many experiments were tried, including that of a phonetic script, and, in general, there was great enthusiasm for the cause of adult education. It became customary for large numbers of students both of the middle schools and universities to devote a part of their vacations to literacy campaigns among the peasants and the city workers.

In the province of Shansi, which had been reckoned among the most backward in China, attendance at continuation schools for all adults up to twenty-five years of age was actually made compulsory, but for the most part the movement has depended on voluntary effort and private initiative.¹

It was in many ways unfortunate that the Literary Revolution and the other movements for social reform, such as the abolition of foot-binding, the emancipation of women, and reduced expenditure on marriages and funerals, which became closely associated with it, should have been reaching their climax in the period of the middle 'twenties when the world of Young China was swept by the fierce tornado of 'anti-foreignism' and 'anti-imperialism.' It was inevitable that the movement for political reform should become an essential part of the programme, but, under the influence of militant communist propaganda, it tended to divert student activities from essential tasks of social and cultural reconstruction to irrational, extravagant, and usually barren agitation and demonstrations. This phase, however, was comparatively short-lived, and under the Nanking government (1928-37) the movement recovered its sanity.

Rival Governments and War-Lords

In strong contrast to the renaissance in the cultural and educational field with its many promising features, was the contemporary political world of China with its incessant strife, confusion, and apparent hopelessness. In broad outline the position was as follows: From 1917 onwards, with certain interruptions, there was a Kuomintang government in Canton under the direction of Sun Yat-sen, and it was from this direction that the hope of better things was eventually to come. But the Peking government was still considered by the external powers as the nearest approach to a central executive that China possessed. The control of this government was therefore the prize for which the war-lords were competing. There were still statesmen who hoped and worked for the establishment of parliamentary institutions and for reconciliation and compromise between Peking and Canton. The real power, however, lay in the hands of the military leaders who controlled fragments of the army machine which Yuan had devised and who were able to increase their strength

¹ In conjunction with this section should be read the important chapter on the modern educational system of China (Chapter vii). In general, the Ministry of Education, although greatly handicapped by the political chaos, was able to pursue a fairly continuous policy.

by the acquisition of armaments from Europe after the close of the war of 1914-18.

Some of these war-lords were mainly actuated by motives of personal ambition, but others genuinely believed that they had a mission to unify China by force. There were occasional combinations of the more powerful chiefs for this purpose, but sooner or later they were nearly always broken up by personal quarrels and there were frequent shiftings of allegiance. There were other military governors, with more restricted ambitions or objectives, who were content with supreme power in their own provinces, many of which were virtually independent of both Peking and Canton. Such was General Yen Hsi-shan, who for many years was Governor of Shansi, and by his untiring exertions for social and economic improvement earned for it the title of the 'Model Province.'

In the light of this *rationale*, the complexity of political events between the death of Yuan Shih-kai in June 1916 and the capture of Peking by the Nationalist armies under Chiang K'ai-shek in June 1928 can readily be imagined, and as many of the events were of purely ephemeral interest, it is not necessary to do more than give a brief indication of their trend.

Power, as we have already seen, was at first in the hands of the Anfu faction, with Tuan Chi-jui as its leading spokesman, who relied mainly upon Japanese support. Their regime was temporarily interrupted by an attempted Manchu restoration by a free-lance Manchu general. For a week (1-8 July 1917) the boy Hsüan Tung once more sat on the throne of his ancestors. It was quickly apparent that there was no popular support for this move, and Tuan, who had assumed command of the northern armies, had no difficulty in investing the capital, forcing the emperor's second abdication, and again becoming premier. In 1920, however, the Anfu regime, intensely unpopular owing to its collusion with Japan, was overthrown by a combination of three northern military chiefs: Ts'ao K'un, Governor of Chihli (Hopeh), his able supporter, Wu Pei-fu, and the notorious Chang Tso-lin. The last-named, said to have been originally a bandit chief, had made himself master of Manchuria, from which he could at any time threaten Peking (Fig. 6).

These men expelled the Anfu clique but they also insisted that the president, Hsü Shih-chang, a scholar of liberal and progressive tendencies, should discontinue his attempts to reach a compromise with Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang at Canton. Their conception of government was that of a military dictatorship. Soon,

however, Chang Tso-lin was involved in a violent quarrel with Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-fu, and was forced back to Manchuria. He declared the independence of Manchuria from the Peking government, and for several years was its dictator. He pursued an adroit policy which avoided clashes with the Japanese, but in his later years his construction of lines more or less parallel to the South Manchuria Railway




Fig. 6. China, 1924

Based on *Political Maps of China*, map iii.

The boundaries of the 'Eighteen Provinces' are shown.

and development of independent outlets aroused their resentment and suspicions, and it was at their hands that he eventually met his death.

Meanwhile Ts'ao K'un had become president at Peking (September 1923), supported by the armies of Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang, the latter a picturesque figure known as 'The Christian General,' who had the merit of keeping his troops under strict discipline and preventing depredations on the peasantry, the helpless victims of these incessant conflicts.

In 1924 conflict between the Ts'ao K'un-Wu Pei-fu combination and Chang Tso-lin again broke out, and the sudden defection of Feng Yu-hsiang to his side this time gave the Manchurian war-lord the advantage. Chang and Feng, masters of the situation, then made overtures to Tuan Chi-jui, who had for some time been living in retirement, and he again became premier. An invitation was then extended to Sun Yat-sen to attend a conference at Peking. The motives of his acceptance are still somewhat obscure, for by this time the Kuomintang had been reorganized and a national army was coming into being at Canton. Plans were maturing for the great march to the Yangtze valley and the North which was destined to be victoriously achieved within a very short time. Sun, who was now a very sick man, may well have hoped to achieve his long-cherished objects and to reunite North and South without again plunging the country into civil war. He reached Peking but died (12 March 1925) before any negotiations could be held, bequeathing to the Chinese nation on his death-bed the famous last will and testament which was henceforth to be the slogan of the Kuomintang (see p. 100).

Soon after Sun's death Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang fell out, and for a short time prior to the 'March of the Kuomintang' Chang was in control not only of Manchuria but of the greater part of North China (Fig. 7). When he was at last compelled by the advance of Chiang K'ai-shek's forces, to which were now added those of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan (of Shansi), to withdraw from Peking to his own Manchurian domain (June 1928), he was killed by a Japanese bomb as his train was entering Mukden. The adhesion of his son and successor, Chang Hsüeh-liang, the 'Young Marshal,' to the new national regime and his admission of Kuomintang propagandist agents into Manchuria was one of the principal causes which determined the Japanese militarists to seize that country in 1931.

The suffering inflicted on the unfortunate peasantry by the wars accompanying the kaleidoscopic changes briefly outlined in the preceding paragraphs were of indescribable intensity. North China was particularly affected (with the conspicuous exception of Shansi under the long-continued and beneficent rule of Yen Hsi-shan), and droughts and famines of exceptional severity added to the prevailing misery. Inevitably the tortured countrysides were rife with banditry. It was at this period that there occurred the mass migration of peasants, particularly from Shantung, Hopeh, and Honan,

to Manchuria, of whom some settled in the vacant lands of the central plain and the northern valleys and some found employment in the new industrial developments of the Japanese in the South Manchuria Railway zone and the oil-pressing mills and dockyards of Dairen (Dalny). Manchuria, just on the point of coming under Japanese control, became overwhelmingly Chinese in speech and culture.

In China Proper, however, a new regime was at hand which, whatever its imperfections, held definite prospects of a brighter future and was equipped not only with arms but with a constructive economic and political programme.

THE SECOND OR NATIONAL REVOLUTION, 1926-28

The major factors which made possible the National Revolution and determined its general character were the later career and teaching of Sun Yat-sen and the reorganization of the Kuomintang under Soviet Russian advice.

THE LATER CAREER AND TEACHING OF SUN YAT-SEN

As Sun Yat-sen was the principal author of the Revolution which launched the Republic, so also it was he who inspired the movement which culminated shortly after his death in the triumph of the national armies and the establishment of the Nanking government. The closing years of his life were the most fruitful, but the greatest achievement of all has been his posthumous influence, and in adhesion to the spirit, if not to the letter, of his national programme lies probably the chief hope of the ultimate unity of China.

Sun's later career was hardly less chequered than had been its early phases. After Yuan Shih-kai had played him false in 1913 his main object was to develop a government in the south embodying the principles of the revolution. From 1917 onwards Canton was his main base of operations. Here he had many supporters, and the Student Movement (see p. 85) gave a fresh impetus to his work. But he had also many enemies, and the southern militarists were only a degree less formidable than those of the north. On at least two occasions his government was broken up and he had to escape from Canton for his life. It was on his return in 1923 from the second of these exiles, when he had definitely accepted Russian help

and advice in the reorganization of the Kuomintang, that most progress was made towards giving effect to his schemes. But, in the main, their practical execution was left to his disciples, and much the greatest contribution of his own was the formulation of the philosophy of the National Revolution and of the programme which he wished it to achieve. The criticism that he was a theorist and not a practical man is in some ways misleading. Admittedly he was not a man of action in the sense of his much-trusted follower, Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek, to whom the actual success of the Second Revolution was so largely due. But China is a country where the influence of ideas has always been peculiarly potent and where the dictum that 'the pen is mightier than the sword' has much greater validity than in most. The real test of the practical character of Sun's work lies probably in the correctness or otherwise of his diagnosis of the troubles afflicting China and of the efficacy or otherwise of the prescription which he devised in his later years to cure them. Both the diagnosis and the prescription represented a very considerable revision of the ruling conceptions of his youth and were made in the light of bitter experience and of closer study alike of China and the West.

Sun Yat-sen's famous 'Will and Testament,' signed in Peking on 11 March 1925, the day before his death, runs as follows :

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the National Revolution, the object of which is to raise China to a position of independence and equality (among the nations). The experience of these forty years has convinced me that, to attain this goal, the people must be aroused, and that we must associate ourselves in a common struggle with all the peoples of the world who treat us as equals.

The Revolution is not yet finished. Let all our comrades follow (the principles and methods set forth in) my writings, the *Plans of National Reconstruction*, the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, the *Three Principles of the People*, and the *Manifesto*, issued by the First National Convention of our Party, and continue to make every effort to carry them into effect. Above all, my recent declaration in favour of holding a National Convention of the People of China and abolishing the unequal treaties should be carried into effect as soon as possible.

This is my last will and testament."¹

The Will draws attention to the principal documents which form the Charter of the National Revolution and the official programme of Chinese reconstruction. Of these documents the *Plans for National*

¹ Version as given in Holcombe, A. N., *The Chinese Revolution*, Appendix A (Cambridge, Mass., 1931).

Reconstruction was published in three volumes in 1918-19, dealing respectively with 'Psychological,' 'Material,' and 'Social' Reconstruction; a fourth on 'Political' Reconstruction was to follow, but the materials for it were destroyed in the military revolt of Ch'en Chiung-ming against Sun in 1922. The *Three Principles of the People* (*San Min Chu I*) was based upon lectures which Sun gave at Canton in 1924 and contains the essence of his teaching in popular form. The *Manifesto* referred to in the will is in the nature of a solemn official endorsement of the leader's doctrines by the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in January 1924, which was attended by about 200 delegates representing all the provinces of China and the overseas branches of the Party.

The *Plans for National Reconstruction* give perhaps the fullest expression to the development of Sun's political philosophy in his later years. He had not lost his faith in democracy, but he had come to realize how difficult it is to achieve. The emphasis is now placed on preparation and education. 'We must realize,' he says, 'that political democracy is not given to us by nature; it is created by human effort.' A democratic state must be carefully planned. He elaborates at length his favourite aphorism, that, contrary to general Chinese belief, 'understanding is difficult, action easy.' It is given to few to understand the nature of things, whether the principles of natural science, the laws of economics, or the architecture of human society. It is important first to train the leaders who are capable of this kind of understanding. Of the three great attributes of good citizenship in a democracy—wisdom, courage, and love of one's fellows—wisdom, in the full sense, can at first be expected only from a limited number of men who should be selected for their capacity for statesmanship and trained for their task. If a good lead is given the people will follow.

He stressed the point that the education of the masses as a whole presupposes a general raising of the standard of comfort. For this reason he laid great emphasis on the economic development of China, devoting one volume of the *Plans* to it and writing a separate well-known work, *The International Development of China*, on the same theme, specially intended for foreign consumption after the war of 1914-18, when capital was again available for investment. In this he outlined an elaborate scheme, with particular emphasis on the development of railways. He always maintained the importance of international collaboration in the regeneration of China, and the phrase in the will: 'We must associate ourselves in the common

struggle with all the peoples of the world who treat us as equals' is significant of his point of view.

Sun's ultimate goal, however, was the full participation of the people in political rights and responsibilities. This goal was to be attained by education, and here is seen his divergence from Marxist doctrine and his sympathy with much of the traditional teaching of the Chinese sages. On the one hand, he repudiated scientific materialism and the economic interpretation of history, and on the other, believed with Confucius and Mencius that human nature is responsive to the force of example and is capable of moral training.

The Three Principles of the People

The Three Principles of the People (*San Min Chu I*) was intended by its author for popular consumption, but subsequent events gave his 'Principles' a notoriety and a dramatic propaganda value such as Sun himself could hardly have anticipated in his most optimistic moods. They have, however, the intrinsic merit of being simple, reasonable, and clear in intention, if somewhat vague in definition, and of defining the goal of national reconstruction in a form capable of wide acceptance.

1. *The Principle or Doctrine of Nationalism* (*Min Ts'u*). This has two implications. On the one hand, China must be a really independent nation, controlling her own destiny and freed from foreign pressure. On the other, the Chinese must learn to put national before family and sectional interests. 'The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to family and clan, with the result that in China there has been familyism and clanism, but not real nationalism. Foreign observers say that the Chinese are like a sheet of loose sand. Why? Simply because our people have shown loyalty to family and clan but not to the nation. . . . The unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and has not extended to the nation.'¹

Probably the most difficult application of this principle in the case of China concerns the ultimate relationship of the different 'peoples' comprised in the Chinese political entity. Sun seems to have agreed with the general thesis that the boundaries of states should coincide, so far as possible, with the limits of cultural nationality. But while he recognized that there were important differences between the Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and Mohammedans, he thought that they could enjoy political, social, and economic equality

¹ Sun Yat-sen, *San Min Chu I*, p. 5 (Shanghai, 1928).

within the Chinese entity, which stood for a distinctive type of civilization in which they all shared. Hence the symbolic significance of the five-bar flag at first adopted as the national emblem of the Republic, but later superseded. At any rate the definite recognition by Sun Yat-sen of this concept of sub-nationalities within a wider national synthesis is important, and the degree of adherence to it may be an important factor in the solution of difficult problems of this character which will undoubtedly confront the China of the future.

It remains to add that Sun's inculcation of 'nationalism' in the *San Min Chu I* is of loyalty to the state and of pride in the highest ideals and achievements of its historic past. Some of the references to the 'imperialist' powers were unwise and inflammatory, but there is no trace of the exclusive, arrogant, and irrational nationalism or racialism characteristic of Nazi Germany.

2. *The Principle or Doctrine of Democracy (Min Ch'uan)*. Sun Yat-sen's general conception of democracy has already been indicated in the remarks on *The Plans for National Reconstruction*. The phrase, so familiar in the West fifty years ago: 'Government of the people, for the people, by the people, under the leadership of the best and wisest,' denotes his ideal, and he expressly states his admiration of Abraham Lincoln.

He discusses at some length the Western concepts of liberty and equality in their applicability to China. He thought that, unlike most European nations in the past, the Chinese had had too much liberty, in the sense of doing what they pleased, and that they had used it in the interests of the family to the detriment of the state. This had greatly impeded his own efforts to unify China, and the development of a new sense of public obligation, upheld by legal sanctions, was imperative. He rejected the idea of natural equality among men, but maintained that the fact of inequality had been so exploited by kings and despots that existing inequalities were largely artificial and of man's creation. In the direction of the affairs of state attention must be paid to the actual intellectual endowments and inherent capacities of individuals, but equality of political status is an essential ideal. 'Equality is an artificial and not a natural thing and the only equality which we can create is equality in political status.'

Sun had become critical of parliamentary institutions as a result not only of the unfortunate experience of them in China but of his more careful study of their working in the West; he had also become impressed by the efficiency and material progress of autocratic

states such as Germany and Japan. In order to harmonize efficiency with popular control, he laid it down that 'the government of a nation must be built upon the rights of the people, but the administration of public affairs must be entrusted to the experts.' In the actual constitutional machinery which he recommended and which remains the professed objective of the present Kuomintang government, he sought to safeguard these fundamental 'rights of the people' by conferring upon them the four powers of election and recall (of officials) and of initiative (of legislation) and the referendum.¹

In the end, however, full representative government was to be achieved by building it up on local units, an essentially sound conception, since the Chinese from time immemorial have been accustomed to self-government in their village communities and local organizations, which they have worked with remarkable success. (See vol. i. pp. 397-402.)

3. *The Principle or Doctrine of Livelihood (Min Shêng)*. In some ways this is the least explicit of the 'Three Principles,' and Sun's interpretation of it was left incomplete. Yet his general position is reasonably clear, and there is no doubt that he attached as great importance to it as to the other two. At a conference in which it was suggested to him that it might be dropped, he is said to have vehemently exclaimed: 'The Revolution aims at the welfare of the people and the solution of the problem of livelihood. If we discard the Principle of Livelihood we may as well give up the whole Revolution.'²

The term *shêng*, usually translated as 'Livelihood,' has sometimes been rendered 'Socialism,' but it is only in a very general and loose sense that it can bear that interpretation. Sun himself seems to have avoided the use of the word 'socialism' precisely because it was capable of so many interpretations. To Marxism, in spite of the help which he was receiving from Russian Communists at the time the lectures on the 'Three Principles' were being given, he was quite definitely opposed. He rejected the conception of the class war and gave examples to show that the capitalist organization of industry might sometimes make for the well-being of shareholders, workers, and consumers alike. He repeatedly advocated the investment of foreign capital in Chinese railways.

¹ For a discussion of these in relation to the Kuomintang government see Chapter v, 'Government and Administration.'

² T'ang Leang-li, *Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 171-2 (London, 1930).

The closest parallel to Sun's conception of 'Livelihood,' as the wide diffusion of material prosperity, is probably to be found in the policy and attitude adopted in the years before the war of 1939-45 by the Labour parties of the Scandinavian countries, and particularly, perhaps, of Sweden; the discarding of abstract and doctrinaire formulas, the judgment of every project of social reform on its own merits, the assertion of the general control of the state and advocacy of state enterprise, but the tolerance and even encouragement of private capitalist enterprise where it could be adequately supervised for the public good. Sun advocated the nationalization of many public services and the promotion by the state of heavy industries and large-scale national works of irrigation, drainage, and afforestation, as well as the progressive taxation of large incomes and charges on inheritance. He was definitely opposed, however, to the socialization of Chinese agriculture. He was, indeed, deeply concerned about the position of the peasantry, which he realized to be one of the most vital of China's problems. He described his programme for rural China as 'the equalization of land ownership,' i.e. he wished to maintain and develop the principle of peasant proprietorship and to provide guarantees for the protection of farmers against the exploitation to which they had been so frequently subjected. In coming years there will be no more acid test of the loyalty of the Kuomintang government to the founder's teaching than the character of the agrarian policy which it pursues.

Two essential addenda to the 'Three Principles' remain to be noticed: (1) *The Three Stages* by which the new China was to come into being: military unification of the country, which was to be achieved by the revolutionary armies; political tutelage, i.e. the preparation of the people for self-government by carefully trained members of the Kuomintang, who would take the local districts (*hsien* and other units) as their initial field of work and gradually build up strong provincial organizations; and finally, full constitutional government. (2) *The Five-Power Constitution* (legislative, judicial, executive, impeachment, examining), i.e. the constitutional machinery by which Sun Yat-sen sought to give effect to his conception of Political Democracy. This subject is fully discussed in Chapter v on 'Government and Administration.'

Sun Yat-sen's Place in History

Sun Yat-sen's character has been very variously estimated. That he was impetuous and often lacking in political judgment, and that

he made many blunders, is generally admitted. His critics have accused him of being a 'schemer,' a bad judge of character, and unstable in his alliances and associates, equally admiring at various stages of his career countries so radically different as the United States, Japan, and Soviet Russia; his 'hazy idealism' has been contrasted unfavourably with the singleness of purpose and firmly based political creed of Lenin. Whatever truth there may be in these charges, it cannot be gainsaid that, through all the vicissitudes and disappointments of his tempestuous career, he was sustained by an ardent faith in China and a constant desire to work for her regeneration; that he was both a fervent patriot and a good internationalist and that his outlook was essentially humane. Fate, so unkind to him during his lifetime, may have been largely responsible for the halo which surrounds his memory. Even so, to have fired the imagination of a country containing one-fifth of the human race, and to have bequeathed to it an inspiring and reasonable programme of reconstruction, which can serve as the focus and rallying-point of all types of sincere reformers, and which, in its broad essentials, is at once appropriate to China's present needs and in harmony with many of her best traditions, is an achievement to which history affords few parallels.

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE KUOMINTANG UNDER BOLSHEVIK INFLUENCE

Sun Yat-sen furnished the charter and watchwords of the Revolution, and epitomized in his central ideas and teaching the aspirations of the majority of the supporters of the national movement, which was now widespread over the whole country and the only vital force which animated it. His practical leadership, however, was undoubtedly weak, and the Kuomintang was equally deficient in organization, financial resources, and military backing. It was these which its short but eventful alliance with Russian Communism supplied, and, however disastrous were some of its consequences, it is doubtful whether the Revolution could have been achieved without it.

To the Bolsheviki Russia of the early 'twenties, after the initial failure to produce a Red Revolution in Europe, China seemed a likely field for the spread of Communist propaganda, using the growing antipathy to Western imperialism as its chief weapon. In 1921 Lenin sent to China his secretary, Mahlin, who not only secretly

organized a Chinese Communist Party, but interviewed several leaders, including Sun Yat-sen, and, on his return to Russia, reported that the only vital organization in the country was the Kuomintang and the one man with a constructive programme was Sun Yat-sen. This was followed up by the despatch in 1922 of an experienced Soviet diplomat, Adolf Joffe, who first visited Peking, where he had little success, and then Shanghai, where he had a momentous conference with Sun Yat-sen, out of which developed the *entente* between the Kuomintang and the Comintern. Sun at that time was in exile, having been recently driven from Canton for the second time. He was desperately short of funds and conscious that without foreign help his plans were not likely to succeed. He was naturally deeply interested in the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and in the means by which it had been achieved. He was only too ready to accept Russian advice and financial help, provided it did not involve a departure from the essential principles of the Chinese Revolution. To this Joffe readily agreed, and a joint statement was issued to the effect: (1) that Sun Yat-sen did not believe Communism or the Soviet political system to be suited to Chinese conditions, and that in this view Joffe concurred; (2) that the achievement of Chinese national independence was the primary task; and (3) that Russia reaffirmed her earlier promise to renounce the privileges exacted from China by the Czarist government.

Different views have been taken as to the underlying motives of the *entente*. It has been represented as a deliberate Bolshevik trap into which Sun Yat-sen fell. More usually it is regarded as having been a purely opportunist alliance, from which both sides saw that they would for the time being derive important advantages. That the Communist International hoped to exploit the foothold which it gave them in China to undermine the power of the Western imperialist countries and to promote the cause of world revolution can hardly be doubted.

Whatever the precise motives of the *entente*, the consequences for China were profound. The Joffe-Sun Yat-sen agreement was followed by the arrival in Canton in the autumn of 1923 of the astute, able, and energetic Michael Borodin as a Soviet emissary and adviser to the Kuomintang. Events at once began to move very quickly. The most important developments may be summarized as follows:

(1) Sun Yat-sen was persuaded to expound his ideas and objectives in a more systematic form than heretofore, and prepared (a) a

summary statement for adoption by a party convention, and (b) a more elaborate interpretation and exposition for purposes of popular propaganda. The former, after adoption, became the *Manifesto* of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang to which he later called attention in his 'Will and Testament' (see p. 101), and the latter became, in the form of his published lectures at Canton, the *Three Principles of the People*, discussed in the preceding section (see p. 102).

(2) A thorough reorganization of the Kuomintang on lines reminiscent of the Russian Soviet system, the enforcement of strict party discipline under a Central Executive Committee, and the establishment of a political training institute for party organizers and propagandists working through a network of local committees.

(3) The foundation of a military academy at Whampoa, near Canton, for training the officer personnel of the new National army that was coming into being. Russian officers, familiar with the rigid discipline of the Red Army, were employed as instructors, but the direction of the academy was placed in the hands of one of the most trusted of the younger disciples of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang K'ai-shek. The future Generalissimo was a native of Chekiang and had been a cadet in Yuan Shih-kai's military school at Paoting. He had continued his military studies in Japan in the years immediately preceding the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and, on his return to China, was appointed to the command of one of the brigades of the revolutionary army. When Sun Yat-sen re-established his government at Canton in 1921 he made Chiang commander of his personal bodyguard and his principal military adviser and secretary. Before his appointment as Director of the Whampoa Military Academy, Sun had sent him on a special mission to Moscow, where he had intensively studied the organization of the Red Army. In spite of his youth he was already recognized as one of the coming leaders of the Kuomintang and as the probable commander of its armies.

(4) The decision at the First National Party Congress, held in January 1924, to admit Chinese Communists to membership of the Kuomintang, on condition of their taking an oath of obedience to the Party authorities. This important decision was Borodin's greatest triumph, for, in spite of the safeguards by which it was hoped to restrain illegitimate activities, the admission of Communists to the inner councils and organization of the Party immensely increased the opportunities for Comintern propaganda. A complementary step, which again followed Soviet models, was the organization of Peasants'

and Workers' Unions, which found their chief support in the districts which had suffered most from exorbitant taxation and oppression by the war-lords and where rural misery was most acute.

Several of these developments were watched with great uneasiness by a large number of the older adherents of the revolutionary movement. It is essential to note that the Kuomintang throughout its history has been, and still is, a highly composite party, with pronounced right and left wings and many intermediate grades. Its policy at any particular period has been determined by the group which for the time being has been able to control the machinery of its administration. Common to the great majority of its members and supporters has been the desire to unite China on a national basis, to free it from any form of external control, to modernize its institutions and to develop its resources for native as distinct from foreign interests. Apart from agreement on these cardinal issues there has always been wide diversity of aim.

The strongest element within the Party has tended to be the bourgeoisie, representing the banking, mercantile, and landed interests, the potentially strong middle-classes of China. Their aspirations closely correspond to those of their counterparts in Europe and they favour a capitalist organization of agriculture and industry. At the opposite pole, the extreme left-wing has included a considerable section of the younger *intelligentsia*, largely drawn from the Student Movement, who, on the one hand, have been attracted by the concepts and slogans of the Russian Revolution, and on the other, have been impressed by the sufferings and the exploitation of the peasantry and of the new urban proletariat of China. The Comintern early recognized the potential importance of this student group and carefully fostered and increased it by the foundation in Moscow in 1925 of the Sun Yat-sen University as a training school for young Chinese revolutionaries. There already existed in Moscow a 'Communist University for the Toilers of the Orient,' for the purpose of training organizers and propagandists in Asia as a whole.

Between these two extremes many adherents of the Kuomintang have held views corresponding more or less closely to those of Sun Yat-sen himself, advocating radical reforms and the removal of agrarian abuse, but anxious not to disturb overmuch the social structure of the country and to retain, in a modified form, the principle of private or family ownership of land.

The removal of Sun Yat-sen from the scene by his death at Peking

in March 1925 played into the hands of the left-wing of the Party. The fact that he now became its patron saint gave the movement new inspiration, but, for the time being, the extreme radical and communist elements had a freer hand and the influence of Borodin as political adviser and almost 'Party boss' perceptibly increased. The Canton government was reconstituted and the Party organization was developed still more closely on Soviet lines. Portraits of Lenin and Marx began to appear side by side with that of Sun Yat-sen in public places. This shift to the left produced its inevitable reaction, and the great split that was to come two years later was anticipated by the virtual withdrawal from the Kuomintang of an extreme right-wing group known as the 'Western hills faction.'¹ For the time being, however, outward harmony was restored by a compromise reached at an important plenary session of the Central Executive Committee in May 1926, when the moderates were appeased by the devising of new machinery for limiting the activities of the Communist members. At the same time Chiang K'ai-shek became Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive and shortly afterwards commander-in-chief of the long-planned Northern Expedition to overthrow the Peking government and the war-lords and to unify the country under Nationalist rule. Henceforth the destiny of the Kuomintang and, indeed, of China was to be largely in his hands.

THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION: FIRST PHASE, 1926-27

The actual revolution in its military aspect was accomplished in two distinct phases, separated by a fateful year in which occurred the abrupt severance of the alliance between the Comintern and the Kuomintang and a radical change in the organization and orientation of the Nationalist Movement.

Until 1926 the authority of the National or Kuomintang government was virtually confined to Canton and the province of Kwangtung, although it had local committees and active propagandist agencies scattered throughout the country. The time was now propitious for its bid for the control of all China. The best elements in the nation had for some time been looking to Canton as the source from which deliverance from the devastating conflicts between rival war-lords and the achievement of national unity was alone likely to come. Even the appearance of constitutional and legal

¹ So called from their place of conference in the Western hills near Peking.

government had disappeared from Peking. Chang Tso-lin was the undisguised and unscrupulous dictator of the greater part of the north, although Yen Hsi-shan still controlled Shansi. The provinces of the lower Yangtze were under the dictatorship of Sun Chuan-fang and those of Central China in dispute between We Pei-fu and a new




Fig. 7. China, 1927

Based on *Political Maps of China*, map v.

The boundaries of the 'Eighteen Provinces' and of Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar, and Jehol are shown.

military adventurer, Tang Sheng-chih. The redoubtable 'Christian General,' Feng Yu-hsiang, was in Moscow when the Kuomintang expedition set forth, but still retained control of his formidable and well-trained army and was known to be favourable to the Nationalist cause. The Kuomintang itself had recovered its unity, and its political adviser, Borodin, and the commander-in-chief of its armies, Chiang K'ai-shek, still acted in harmony.

The expeditionary armies began their march from Canton in July

1926. The main forces advanced through the passes of the Nanling and down the historic valley-corridors of Hunan and Kiangsi towards the central Yangtze. The relatively well-trained, well-disciplined and keen Nationalist troops, in spite of deficient equipment, everywhere triumphed over the mercenary war-lord armies of much lower morale opposed to them. The conquest of Hunan in August was followed by the capture first of Hankow and then of Wuchang, the possession of the critical Central Yangtze Basin, with its control of routes to the south-west, and the virtual destruction of Wu Pei-fu's army. The invasion of Kiangsi by way of the Kan river was almost equally successful and culminated in the fall of its capital, Nanchang.

On the resumption of hostilities in the spring the Kuomintang armies from their new bases in Central China swept, like those of the Taiping rebels three-quarters of a century earlier, down the Yangtze valley to capture Nanking (24 March 1927). Meanwhile a separate force from Canton, advancing through the coastal provinces of Fukien and Chekiang, helped Chiang K'ai-shek to take the vital metropolis of Shanghai, which had always eluded the Taipings. Thus, within nine months of the start of the expedition, the whole of the Yangtze valley below the gorges, the south-eastern coastal provinces and the critical provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi, linking Central and South China, had come under the control of the Kuomintang. Nor did this represent the full extent of its success, for Feng Yu-hsiang, returning from Moscow, prepared the way for its triumph in the north by driving Chang Tso-lin's forces out of Shensi and co-operating with a Nationalist army from Hankow in wresting Honan from his control.

THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE KUOMINTANG AND THE COMMUNISTS

Before, however, the conquest of North China was accomplished, the uneasy partnership between the Kuomintang and the Communists had been severed and the Party itself threatened with complete disintegration.

The effect of the insidious and ever-increasing propaganda of the extreme left-wing and Communist elements became apparent immediately after the initial successes in Central China. 'Revolutionary Mass Action' of the Comintern pattern was by this time unrestrained and all the familiar devices were used to incite the poorer peasants and the workers in the industrialized Wuhan cities to join the

Communist ranks. In particular, the latent anti-foreign and anti-imperialist passions, which earlier events had incited, were deliberately fanned to fever-heat and concentrated especially upon Great Britain as the arch-enemy.¹

The result was a series of outrages and excesses which greatly alarmed the merchants and bourgeoisie of the Yangtze cities and alienated foreign sympathy. Hospitals under foreign control, even when exclusively devoted to Chinese patients, were occupied, missionaries were forced to leave their posts, and the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang were seized. The climax was reached when the capture of Nanking was followed by the pillage of the city, the looting of the British and American consulates and the murder of six foreigners, including the American vice-president of the University of Nanking. A wholesale massacre of foreigners was averted only by the fire of British and American gunboats in the Yangtze.

There is much reason to believe that many of these anti-foreign outrages were deliberately planned in order to discredit Chiang K'ai-shek, as the responsible leader of the expedition, in the eyes of the foreign powers, to provoke their intervention and thus to divert the Nationalist movement into a Red Revolution in the hands of the extremists. While Chiang was directing the campaign in Kiangsi, the left-wing leaders of the Kuomintang² had obtained control of the Party machine and, against his known wishes, had moved the seat of government from Canton to Hankow in November 1926, two months after its capture. The significance of this transference was that Wuhan was the greatest industrial centre of interior China, possessing at Hanyang the largest iron and steel works in the country and having a considerable urban proletariat, and was thus a more promising centre for revolutionary activity of the Soviet type than Canton, which had few modern industries but a large, wealthy, and influential merchant class strongly opposed to socialist ideas.

¹ The unhappy 'Shanghai Incident' of 30 May 1925 had been exploited to rouse the passions of the student class against Great Britain. The incident occurred in connexion with a street demonstration, said to have been organized by Communists, over a labour dispute in a Japanese cotton-mill. Apparently anticipating a riot, the Englishman in charge of the police (in the International Settlement) gave the order to fire, and twelve Chinese were killed and more injured. Violent protests against the shooting led to other 'incidents,' in one of which, at Shameen, the foreign settlement near Canton, there was much heavier loss of life, among the victims being twenty-four cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy.

² At their head was Wang Ching-wei, subsequently to become notorious as China's chief 'Quisling' in the present war.

These events precipitated the grave and prolonged crisis of 1927. Chiang K'ai-shek, who from the beginning had wished to avoid any clash with foreign interests in China, openly repudiated and condemned the outrages which were being committed under the Kuomintang banner. He reached Shanghai in time to prevent any interference with the International Settlement or the French Concession, and ordered the arrest and execution of several Communist agitators. Expelled from his offices by the Central Executive Committee of the Hankow government, Chiang then took the bold step of establishing the nucleus of a new regime at Nanking, which Sun Yat-sen had always wished to be the capital of Nationalist China.

From April 1927 there were thus two rival governments, each claiming to be the official organ of the Kuomintang. For several months the situation remained extremely critical, but gradually it became apparent that Nanking was waxing and Hankow waning. The latter was weakened by growing dissensions between the left-wing Kuomintang members and their professed allies, the Communists. The Peasants' and Workers' Unions got entirely out of hand and incessant strikes paralysed industry and commerce. Much of South China relapsed into anarchy. Finally there was an open rupture with the Russian advisers of the government, and Borodin, broken in health and bitterly disappointed after his early successes, returned to Moscow. A steady drift of the more moderate members of the Kuomintang administration from Hankow to Nanking had for some time been in progress, and it was clear that the government which Chiang had established had the support of the mercantile interests and many of the *intelligentsia*. The way was open for a new reconciliation of the right and moderate left wings on the basis of the complete exclusion of Communist and extreme left elements.

In August, Chiang made the politic move of resigning his position as commander-in-chief and head of the Nanking government, and shortly afterwards left China for Japan. This undoubtedly facilitated the reconciliation of the two groups, which was officially consummated in September by the decision to establish a united 'National' government at Nanking. Chiang's leadership, however, was soon recognized as indispensable, especially in view of the still unachieved conquest of North China, and he was invited back to resume the direction both of the government and the army. Just before he did so, he married at Shanghai, in December 1927, Meiling Soong, a sister of Sun Yat-sen's widow and also of T. V. Soong, who had already made his reputation as a brilliant finance minister

in the Canton government and was now to occupy a similar position at Nanking.

THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION : SECOND PHASE, 1928

The reconstituted government of the Kuomintang had innumerable problems awaiting solution, and was as yet by no means firmly established, but the most immediate task was to complete the programme for the unification of China by the subjugation of the hostile northern war-lords. These were now Chang Tso-lin, still entrenched at Peking and with the resources of Manchuria behind him, and Chang Tsung-chang, the dictator of Shantung. On the other hand, the Kuomintang armies under Chiang K'ai-shek could count on the co-operation not only of Feng Yu-hsiang, who had already rendered material assistance, but of Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi, who had by this time also declared his allegiance to the Nationalist cause. Both of them were represented on the new Political Council established at Nanking. In the event, the swift success of the military campaign in North China was in large measure due to their help.

The drive to the north began in April 1928, and the Kuomintang armies under Chiang K'ai-shek followed the route of the trunk railway from the Yangtze opposite Nanking via Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, towards Tientsin and Peking. Good progress was made as far as the important city and railway junction of Tsinan, which was abandoned by the troops of the opposing war-lords. But then the advance was unexpectedly held up by a considerable force of Japanese, for, in spite of the undertaking to return it to China by the treaty signed at Washington (see p. 90), Japan had continued to claim the right of policing and moving troops on the strategic railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan. Despite great provocation and some loss of life, Chiang avoided open conflict with the Japanese and withdrew his troops from the city. The whole incident, by inflaming afresh the feelings of the people against Japan, tended to enhance the popularity of the Nationalist cause in North China and to discredit any opposition to it.

The check to the northward advance of the main Kuomintang army was fortunately offset by the complete defeat of Chang Tso-lin's mercenary forces by the troops under Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan in the west. Chang Tso-lin evacuated Peking on 3 June and retreated to Manchuria, where, as already noticed, he met his death from a Japanese bomb on entering Mukden (see p. 98). A

few days later Yen Hsi-shan's troops occupied Peking and the way was prepared for the formal entry of the Kuomintang.

Technically, at any rate, the first of Sun Yat-sen's three stages in the evolution of a democratic China, that of military unification, had now been accomplished, and the occasion was seized for a dramatic glorification of the dead leader. Chiang K'ai-shek, having first resigned his command at the end of the campaign and received it back from the Party authorities, was instructed by the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang to visit the temporary resting-place of the remains of Sun Yat-sen in a temple in the Western hills near Peking and to inform his spirit of the victory of his cause.¹ A few months later the remains were brought with great ceremony in a special train from Peking to Nanking and, after lying in state in the hall where Sun had taken the oath as the first President of the Republic of China, were interred in the costly mausoleum that had been prepared for them amid the beautiful surroundings of the new National Park on the slopes of the historic Purple mountain. The act might be taken to symbolize, amongst other things, that the Nanking government stood for the undiluted gospel of 'The Three Principles of the People' (Plate 4).

THE NANKING GOVERNMENT, 1928-37

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW REGIME

The success of the Northern Expedition and the elimination of the Peking regime, whose claim to speak for China, ridiculous though it had long become, persistently stood in the way of the popular movement, set a kind of national seal on the government which Chiang K'ai-shek had established at Nanking in the name of the Kuomintang. On the 'Double Tenth,' 10 October 1928, the seventeenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolution, it was solemnly inaugurated as the 'National Government' of China, and Nanking was proclaimed the capital city of the Republic in place of Peking. It assumed control of the external relations of the country and was in due course recognized by the foreign Powers as the legal government of the country, reluctant though many of them were to

¹ Sun Yat-sen had himself delivered a similar message to the spirit of the founder of the Ming dynasty when the Manchus were overthrown in the Revolution of 1911 (see vol. i, p. 344).

transfer their legations from their comfortable and spacious quarters in the northern metropolis.

Without question this is a really significant date in the long, chequered, and unfinished story of the evolution of Modern China. For the first time since the overthrow of the old empire there was a single government which, in a broad but real sense, could be called representative. It was not a popularly elected government, and there was no attempt to revive the parliamentary system which earlier experience had shown to be almost inevitably farcical in relation to the existing conditions and historical experience of the Chinese people. It was avowedly the government of a party, whose total membership represented a very small fraction of the whole population. But this party embraced by far the greater part of the politically conscious portion of the nation, and its organization was spread over practically the whole country and among the important overseas Chinese communities of Malaysia and North America. Its district committees (*Tangpu*) were in close touch with the intensive local life of the countryside and market towns. It was pledged by its founder and its avowed programme to regard itself as the trustee not only of the people's interests but of their education in citizenship, so that within a comparatively short period of time they might be able to exercise the four powers (election, recall, initiative, and referendum) assigned to them in his constitution. That constitution, in the form of the Organic Law governing the organization of the National Government of China, was officially promulgated on 4 October 1928, a few days before its formal inauguration, and at the same time the second of Sun Yat-sen's three stages of evolution, that of *tutelage*, i.e. of the training of the people for full political citizenship, was to begin. Judgment of the extent to which sincere efforts have since then been made by the government to make this tutelage a reality, by the development of genuinely representative local councils and in other ways, is beyond the province of the present sketch, but it should be emphasized that since 1928 there has been a touchstone by which its fidelity to the principles of the Revolution can be gauged.

Neither the Government nor the Party, however dictatorial, has been able to afford the complete irresponsibility or indifference to criticism characteristic of the earlier war-lord regimes. There have never been wanting critics to remind them of the sources from which they derive their authority, and, even under war-time conditions, when the conferment of exceptional powers has increased their

totalitarian character and favoured reactionary influences, the People's Political Council, set up in 1938 'as an interim step' towards the promised democratic regime, has acted as an important check and been a forum for discussion and much plain speaking.¹

THE CHARACTER AND OUTLOOK OF THE NANKING GOVERNMENT

The new National Government was destined to have nine years of strenuous life before the descent of the great Japanese avalanche in July 1937. How far in that period did it succeed in grappling with the tremendous problems which confronted China and in bringing within sight the real consolidation and unification of the enormous and, in some respects, amorphous country which it sought to control? This central question is very difficult to answer and can be approached from more than one angle. That the government did have conspicuous success in modernizing the machinery of administration, unifying the currency and such things as weights and measures, creating the framework of a national system of communications and, generally, in the eyes of the Western world making China an entity, with which it was far easier than ever before to have normal diplomatic relations and conduct trade, is beyond question; that it had begun to lay the foundation of a new social order and, by seriously attempting to solve the grave economic problems connected with the status and well-being of the peasantry and the new urban proletariat, to guard against the growing menace of class war, is much more doubtful. The bitter struggle with the Communists and the strong criticisms of many genuine Chinese social reformers of the continued tolerance of agrarian abuse and exploitation² must be set against the achievements which rightly earned the applause of many Western experts in the realms of finance, administration, and the conduct of foreign relations. If the 'Three

¹ For a full discussion of the Organic Law of 1928 and of the changes in the constitution affecting the war-time government of China, see Chapter v, 'Government and Administration.' Special attention is directed to the section of that chapter ('The Constitutional Movement') dealing with the respective roles of the Government and the People under the Constitution.

² Much evidence of the worsening of the position of the peasant farmers in the decades preceding the present war, as a result of the growing commercialization of agriculture in China, is to be found in the collection of essays and articles brought together in a volume entitled *Agrarian China* (A Report in the International Research Series of the Institute of Pacific Relations), London, 1938. Some of them are based on field-surveys by young Chinese scholars and economists. There is also good reason to believe that the proportion of landless labourers has very considerably increased in recent times.

Principles of the People' be taken as the test, then, in general terms, it may be said that the Nanking government made much greater progress towards the realization of the principle of 'Nationalism' than towards that of the 'People's Livelihood.' This bias of the government's activity was in part determined by the circumstances of the time, and particularly by the imperative need for military unification and financial stability in view of the ever-growing menace from Japanese militarism. But it also reflected the fact that it derived its chief backing from the right wing and central groups of the Kuomintang and its adherents, from the bankers, merchants, industrialists, and landed interests, though with a considerable leavening of *intelligentsia*, who formed, on the whole, the most liberal and critical of its supporters.

The Selection of Nanking as the National Capital

The transference of the seat of the government from Peking to Nanking in 1928 was significant from several points of view. In the historical geography of China, Peking, at the extreme northern limit of China Proper and close to the old nomad border, had always functioned as a frontier capital, whether it was held by a steppeland dynasty such as the Yuan (Mongol), drawing its reserves from the grasslands behind it, or by a native dynasty such as the later Ming,¹ guarding the threatened frontier. Its remoteness from the main currents of Chinese life had been a great source of weakness in the period of active European contact. In the eyes of the Chinese of the Yangtze basin and the south it was associated with alien rule (Tartar, Mongol, and Manchu) and, more recently, with a Legation Quarter which symbolized the hold that foreign Powers had acquired in the 'unequal treaties' of the nineteenth century. Nanking ('Southern Capital'), on the other hand, had great native prestige and had been the metropolitan city of the founder of the Ming dynasty who had expelled the Mongols from China. It was in close touch with the strong mercantile and growing industrial interests of the lower Yangtze valley and delta, the richest and most developed part of China. At the same time it was within comparatively easy distance of Shanghai, the great centre of foreign financial enterprise, whose help and support the new regime was anxious to secure.

¹ The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) was first established at Nanking, but the capital was transferred to Peking early in the fifteenth century (see vol. i, pp. 346-7).

Relations with the Western Powers

As a National Government it was pledged to the recovery of full sovereignty for China at the earliest possible moment, and its initial relations with the foreign Powers presented some difficult problems. The conciliatory attitude, however, of Great Britain, which had been conspicuously shown at the time of the Hankow and Nanking incidents of 1927 when the extreme left-wing of the Kuomintang was in control, quickly facilitated the establishment of a *modus vivendi*. Several of the British concessions were surrendered, the leased territory of Weihaiwei was handed back to China, and the government regained full control of the Customs' tariff.¹ The principle of extraterritoriality still remained in dispute, especially in relation to Shanghai, but the issues were narrowed down and considerable progress towards a final settlement was made. Great Britain gave ample proof that she intended to fulfil the promises made in a celebrated memorandum issued in December 1926,² which defined the principles governing her future policy to China, and the Western powers in general showed increasing confidence in the stability of the new Chinese regime.

In this happier atmosphere the relations between Nanking and Shanghai became more intimate and several of the ministries established important sub-offices in the commercial metropolis. This understanding greatly facilitated the extensive series of measures dealing with much-needed financial reconstruction which were carried out under the direction of T. V. Soong, the very able Minister of Finance. The services of foreign advisers were freely employed to help in the unification of the banking and currency system and similar undertakings, and a new era of railway and road construction began. The beneficial results of these measures on foreign trade were beginning to be shown when the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and the alarming artificial rise in the price of silver,³ which became marked from that year onwards, threatened disastrous consequences. The Government, however, gained further prestige by its bold and highly successful policy of abandoning the silver standard and stabilizing the currency on the basis of 1s. 2½d. as the

¹ For a fuller discussion of these points see Chapter iv, 'The Foreign Relations of China since 1922.'

² For the full text of this 'British Memorandum on China' (communicated to the Representatives of the Washington Treaty Powers), see Whyte, Sir F., *China and Foreign Powers*, Appendix V. (London, 1928).

³ For a discussion of the causes of the crisis and the measures taken to meet it, see vol. iii, Chapter vi, 'Currency and Finance.'

foreign exchange value of the Chinese dollar (November 1935). This important step, which for the first time gave China exchange stability, was carried out without the help of a foreign loan or any promise of assistance, but its success was facilitated by the promptitude with which the British government made the new currency law binding upon British subjects. Financial reconstruction was accompanied by many important administrative reforms, the beginnings of a modern civil service, the amendment of the civil law, and the promulgation of a new criminal code and procedure calculated to allay foreign fears of the consequences of abandoning extra-territorial rights.

On the eve of the fateful Japanese attack of July 1937, the stock of the Nanking government among the Western powers stood high, and strong hopes were entertained of a great increase of trade with China.

THE STRUGGLE FOR UNIFIED CONTROL

Equally important with the task of recovering China's national rights and sovereign status was that of achieving national unification under a single government, whose authority should be a reality in all parts of the country and among all sections of the population. The difficulties of this task were colossal. Much more was involved than an attempt to regain the degree of unity represented by the very loose organization of the old Chinese Empire, even at its strongest. It was now sought to give China a modern type of centralized administration approximating to that of a single European country, but controlling an area and population equivalent to those of Europe as a whole. Standing in the way of such an achievement was the ancient legacy, coming down from imperial times, of provincial separatist tendencies and dislike of intervention in local affairs and the more recent tradition, the product of the prolonged war-lord phase, of particular provinces and regions being dominated by powerful military chiefs possessing their own armies. Most serious difficulty of all, as events were to prove, was the existence of guerrilla bands, formed of discontented peasants and workers, under the direction of able and sincere leaders pledged to the creation of a new social order and regarding the Nanking government as the embodiment of the capitalist system which they wished to destroy. In the background was the ever-increasing menace of Japanese militarism and the certainty of its hostility to the evolution of a strong, stable, and unified China.

At the outset the direct authority of the Nanking government hardly extended beyond the provinces of the lower Yangtze basin. Szechwan and the south-western provinces were still the scene of conflict between rival war-lords and, although the two principal military chiefs of the north, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, had assisted in the triumph of the Kuomintang cause and acknowledged the new regime, they retained their own armies and the substance of their regional power. The Communist guerrillas, gradually coalescing into a formidable Red Army, were entrenched in the south-central provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi and, in the extreme south, the two Kwang provinces (Kwangtung and Kwangsi) were controlled by local leaders who were intensely critical of Nanking and, at every crisis, tended to establish governments of their own.

From the standpoint of Chiang K'ai-shek, as the real head of the Nanking government and commander-in-chief, the first essential was military unification, and to the dual task of bringing the numerous provincial and regional armies under his central control and building up a strong, well-disciplined national army, the greater part of his energies and much of the government's revenue were devoted. His earlier work as Director of the Whampoa Military Academy was repeated at Nanking, and efficient officers' training schools, for which experienced German instructors and advisers were obtained, came into being. In order to foster an all-China outlook and a disciplined sense of patriotism among the officer personnel, the so-called New Life Movement, combining an appeal to Confucian ethics with the inculcation of a rather austere moral code, was actively propagated. To get sufficient recruits the government also revived an ancient law of virtually compulsory military service which had been in abeyance for many centuries.

The foundations of an efficient national army, which might eventually be a match for the seasoned troops of Japan, were steadily laid, but to secure the disbandment or transfer of the forces under control of the regional military chiefs was a far harder matter. The first great challenge to the government on this issue (apart from that of the Communist guerrillas) came from Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, who, after helping the Kuomintang to achieve the final victory of 1927, had become chairmen of their respective provincial administrations under the new regime. They resisted the efforts made at a Military Disbandment Conference, summoned by the government in 1929, to secure the peaceful dissolution of their armies, and in 1930 were in open rebellion. At one stage this revolt

threatened to be very serious, but the government troops received valuable help from what might appear as a very unexpected quarter. Chang Hsueh-liang (the 'Young Marshal'), who had succeeded his father, Chang Tso-lin, as the ruler of Manchuria, after the latter's assassination at Mukden (see p. 98), not only openly pro-




Fig. 8. China, 1931

Based on *Political Maps of China*, map viii.

The boundaries of the 'Eighteen Provinces' and of Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar, and Jehol are shown.

claimed his allegiance to the Nanking government but sent his troops to assist it in suppressing the revolt of the two generals who had previously aided the Kuomintang in expelling his father from North China. Subsequently both Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan returned to the national fold and have taken an active part in resisting the Japanese in the present war.

In the autumn of the following year (September 1931) came the

Japanese attack on Mukden, quickly followed by the absorption of Manchuria and Jehol and the creation of the puppet-state of 'Manchukuo' ¹ The apparent inactivity of Chiang K'ai-shek at this crisis and his refusal to risk his new national army on an attempt to recover Manchuria, have been generally attributed in part to his preoccupation with the campaigns against the Communists, and still more to his realization that China was not yet ready for a major struggle with Japan. His attitude, however, provoked violent criticism, particularly in the Kwang provinces. Kwangtung, indeed, always jealous of Nanking, had announced its secession some months before the Manchurian disaster and had formed a rival government known as the South-west Political Council. For a time the Generalissimo's position seemed gravely menaced, but when, in December 1931, he repeated the tactics of 1927 and resigned all his offices, it was again clear that public opinion as a whole regarded him as the indispensable leader. He was recalled once more (March 1932) and given even greater powers than before, and in the years immediately preceding the Sino-Japanese war, the authority of the Government steadily expanded. Particularly important was the elimination of the war-lord regimes in Szechwan and the assertion of Nanking's control, for the potential significance of this vast fertile and mountain-girt western province, in the likely event of a Japanese occupation of the eastern seaboard, was foreseen by the Generalissimo, who was able to take preparatory measures to make it the centre of Chinese resistance.

The Kwang provinces, however, continued to give trouble almost to the eve of the war. An understanding had earlier been reached with Canton and the South-west Political Council had disappeared, but in June 1936 the general commanding the Kwangtung army, Chen Chi-t'ang, headed a fresh revolt. It was joined by two outstanding generals from neighbouring Kwangsi, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who had transformed what had long been regarded as one of the most backward into one of the most progressive provinces of China and had built up in the 'Kwangsi army' an extremely efficient fighting force. The opposition of these well-known Kwangsi generals to Chiang K'ai-shek seems to have been based upon their dislike of the ruthless policy adopted towards the guerrillas and their sympathy with the latter's demand for a united

¹ For the Manchurian issue and Sino-Japanese relations during the period covered by this section, see Chapter iv, 'The Foreign Relations of China since 1922.'

front in active resistance to further Japanese encroachment in the north, where a part of Hopeh had recently been virtually detached from China.

This crisis, too, was successfully surmounted by the Generalissimo. Chen Chi-t'ang was defeated, and a conference was arranged with the Kwangsi generals, in which they seem to have been convinced of the sincerity of Chiang's intention to meet the Japanese challenge when he felt that the country was sufficiently prepared. On the outbreak of war, the Kwangsi army became an important factor in the national defence, and General Li Tsung-jen was the hero of the notable victory at Taierhchwang in April 1938, which, at a very critical stage of the conflict, did so much to hearten Chinese resistance (see p. 134).

Thus by the summer of 1937 very considerable progress had been made towards closing the regional cleavages of China, and the authority of the Nanking government was recognized over much the greater part of the country. This result, if primarily due to the genius of the Generalissimo, was facilitated by the great improvement in the means of communication, the new military roads, which were systematically constructed, and particularly the new air services, which received great attention. The aeroplane, indeed, was revolutionizing the conditions of government in this vast realm of China. Only a few years earlier it had taken several days to reach Canton or Sian from Nanking, and several weeks to reach Chêngtu in distant Szechwan; now the Generalissimo or a departmental chief could make the journey from the national capital to nearly all of the chief regional centres of China within twenty-four hours.

THE COMMUNIST ISSUE

More bitter and far more protracted than the conflicts with recalcitrant generals and disaffected provinces was the grim struggle with the Communist guerrillas. It was also more ominous. Better communications and increased contacts might reasonably be expected to improve the relations between the different regions of China, but this portended a deepening cleavage within Chinese society as a whole and had already developed into the class war which Sun Yat-sen had always been anxious to avoid.

It had begun in 1927 immediately after the Kuomintang-Comintern split, the purge of the Kuomintang itself, and the formation of the Nanking government under predominantly right-wing auspices

(see p. 119). The Communist leaders had gathered together their adherents and consolidated their position in the hill-country south of the Yangtze, in Hunan, Kiangsi, and the adjacent districts of Fukien, a part of China where many Peasants' Unions had already been formed and with a relatively small proportion of peasant proprietors.¹

Several of the Communist leaders were men of outstanding personality, whose sincerity of purpose, grim determination, and organizing ability have been generally recognized.² Some came from the richer landed families and had joined the movement out of genuine sympathy with the sufferings of the people. Most had espoused definite Marxist principles and thought that Sun Yat-sen's programme of social reform was not sufficiently radical or explicit. But the peasantry, from which the movement derived its strength, had the desires almost everywhere characteristic of their class. They wished for relief from intolerable taxation³ and oppression by the rich, but also to own the land which they cultivated and to increase their minute and inadequate holdings. The Communist movement rapidly acquired the characteristics of a Peasants' Revolt, and its leaders, while in most cases retaining their Marxist principles, have been sufficiently realistic to accept the more restricted goal thus indicated as at any rate their immediate objective. This also has made it easier for them, since resistance to Japan became the dominant issue, to offer co-operation with the government on the basis of a genuine implementation of Sun Yat-sen's programme of agrarian reform.

From the outset the Communist revolt was regarded by the Generalissimo as one of the most serious challenges to the authority of the National Government. Beginning with local risings in Hunan

¹ For a discussion of the distribution of peasant proprietorship in China, see vol. iii, Chapter i.

² Among the best known names are: (1) Mao Tse-tung, a native of Hunan. He was the principal founder of the Chinese Communist Party at Shanghai in 1921. Before the split of 1927 he was Secretary of the Peasants' Committee of the Kuomintang and afterwards the organizer of the Hunan rising and of the Red Army; (2) Chu Teh, a native of Szechwan, who joined the movement in early middle life as a result of a change of outlook. He was the leader of the first Kiangsi rising of 1927 and commander-in-chief of the Red Army from 1931. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he was in command of the well-known Eighth Route Army; (3) Chou En-lai, a native of Kiangsu. He was a student of Waseda University, Japan, and later of Nankai University, Tientsin. Afterwards he went to Germany and France where he joined the Communist Party. In recent years he has acted as the chief liaison between the government and the guerrillas in the various attempts that have been made to reach a *modus vivendi*.

³ In Szechwan and other provinces which had been dominated by war-lords the peasants had frequently been taxed many years in advance, and their crops were always liable to be seized without compensation.

and Kiangsi in 1927, it developed into an organized Soviet regime, based principally upon Kiangsi and with its seat of government at Juichin in the difficult mountainous country of the Nanling ranges, where Kiangsi, Fukien, and Kwangtung meet, but with outlying areas in adjacent provinces.¹ Here a formidable Red Army came into existence and rapidly increased in numbers.

Continuously from 1930 to 1934 Chiang K'ai-shek directed a series of offensives against this *imperium in imperio*, using some of his best troops for the purpose. The skilful guerrilla tactics of the Red Army leaders, fighting in country which was well adapted to this type of warfare, again and again prevented any decisive results from being reached, and it was not until a rigid blockade of the territory was established that they were finally driven out. The Red Army then made a trek of several thousand miles which has become historic; first westwards, following the Nanling mountain zone, into Kweichow and the Yunnan-Szechwan borderlands, and then northwards along the edge of the Tibetan massif, far to the west of the Red Basin, until they finally reached Kansu and northern Shensi. Here another Soviet regime was set up, covering an area much larger although more thinly peopled, and in the part of China Proper nearest to the U.S.S.R. by way of Lanchow and the Kansu corridor. It still functions under the name of the Border Government.²

By this time, however, the attitude of the Red leaders had to some extent altered. The seizure of Manchuria and Jehol had been followed by further Japanese encroachment on Hopeh and Inner Mongolia, and repeated offers were made to the Generalissimo by the Communist authorities of co-operation against the common enemy. Chiang K'ai-shek, however, directed Chang Hsüeh-liang, the 'Young Marshal,' to lead his troops, which had had to withdraw from Manchuria, against the new Soviet stronghold in the northwest, and, when the expected operations did not materialize, he made a personal visit to the front (December 1936). There followed the strange episode known as the 'Sian Incident,' so called from Sian, the capital of Shensi, which was the base of operations. Near this city the Generalissimo, with some of his generals, was kidnapped,

¹ In 1934 Mao Tse-tung estimated the maximum population of the different districts directly controlled by the Soviet Central Government as follows: Kiangsi Soviet, 3,000,000; Kiangsi-Hunan Soviet, 1,000,000; Hunan-Kiangsi-Hupeh Soviet, 1,000,000; Hunan-Hupeh Soviet, 1,000,000; Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, 2,000,000; Chekiang-Fukien Soviet, 1,000,000. Total, nine millions. See Snow, E., *Red Star over China*, p. 82 (London, 1937).

² Its full name is the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Government, from the three provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia, parts of which are under its control.

not by the Communists themselves, but by soldiers of Chang Hsüeh-liang's army, who had come to sympathize with their demand for reorganization of the government and immediate resistance to Japan. The news of his capture created a profound sensation throughout China. For several days all the politically conscious part of the nation held its breath. It was realized, not only by whole-hearted supporters of the government, but by the great majority of those who criticized his policy of refusing to reach an agreement with the guerrillas, that his removal from the scene at the crisis which the country was now reaching would be a national disaster.

On Christmas Day, 1936, however, Chiang K'ai-shek arrived back at Nanking in a plane, and others carried the generals captured with him. Chang Hsüeh-liang, who, as commander of the Manchurian troops, took full responsibility for the occurrence, had procured his release after putting the Communist case for co-operation. The Generalissimo, although still in some danger, had refused to compromise, but after his return to Nanking he adopted a more conciliatory attitude. The outlines of a United Front began to appear. Six months later (July 1937) occurred the incident at the Marco Polo bridge which precipitated the titanic conflict still in progress. This time the Generalissimo accepted the gauntlet thrown down by the Japanese militarists, and on 22 September the Communist leaders issued a declaration of their co-operation with and loyalty to the government in common resistance to the aggressor. The acknowledged leader of the nation could then speak of 'the closing of the last gap in our national armour.'

Subsequent events have unhappily shown that the gap was not permanently closed and that the fundamental social and political issues at stake are still unresolved. In the two years (1937-39), however, that the understanding was more or less maintained, China demonstrated to the world the value of her new-found unity which went far to compensate for many grievous deficiencies of resources and equipment.

For Bibliographical Note see pp. 154-5

Chapter III

WAR-TIME CHINA, 1937-44

The Course of the Sino-Japanese War: The Significance of the Conflict: Bibliographical Note.

THE COURSE OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

In the course of the seven and a half years which have elapsed since the initial Japanese attack on North China the Sino-Japanese war has passed through many phases. Its vicissitudes have been determined by many factors, of which three may be specially noted:

(1) The degree of unity and co-operation in the resistance of the Chinese, particularly as between the Government troops, directed by the Generalissimo, and the guerrilla forces, for the most part under the command of the former leaders of the Communist armies. In the early stages of the war, from 1937 to 1939, Chinese unity was undoubtedly far greater than had been anticipated by the Japanese militarists. They had hoped to achieve the 'limited objective' of detaching the northern provinces from allegiance to the Nanking government without becoming involved in a major war, and long maintained the fiction of the 'China Incident.' They were unprepared for the tenacity of Chinese resistance which, although it could do no more than temporarily check the initial occupation by the Japanese, with their greatly superior equipment, of the key cities and railways of the North China Plain and the lower Yangtze valley, prevented them from consolidating their gains and ultimately produced a position of virtual stalemate, with Japanese armies bogged in the interior and liable to have their lines of communication cut by the guerrillas.

The unhappy revival of the feud between the Government and the Communist leaders, which became marked from 1940 onwards, considerably dissipated Chinese military energies. It has undoubtedly been one of the factors favourable to that renewed advance of the Japanese armies through the vital rice-bowl region round the Tungting lake and along the important corridor to the south via Changsha and Hengyang which culminated, before the end of 1944, in a complete passage-way for Japan between Manchuria and French Indo-China and the separation of the Chinese forces to the east and

west of this avenue. At the same time, there is clear evidence that articulate public opinion in China ardently desires the closing of the breach, and at the time of writing (January 1945) the prospects of a new *modus vivendi* are brighter than for some years.

(2) The degree of assistance received by China for her war-effort. This assistance covers not only the supply of the many instruments of war which China, with her lack of basic metallurgical industries, cannot herself produce, but also the means of maintaining her system of transport. It has been one of the ironies of the situation that, in the early stages of her struggle with Japan, China was less cut off from such essential supplies than after her cause had become merged in that of the Allies. The isolation produced by the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, Malaya, Siam, and Burma was followed by a growing deficiency of spare parts, and especially of petrol, which ultimately resulted in the breakdown of internal transport. This, together with the gradually mounting inflation, resulted also in the arrest of the promising development of new industries in the west that had been so marked a feature of the first four years of the war. There is now, however (January 1945), the prospect of greatly increased supplies, especially from the United States, both by transport planes and by the restoration and expansion of land-communications with Burma and India.

(3) The extent to which Japan has been able to concentrate her energies on the war in China. Before she entered the war against the United Nations she was free to employ the greater part of her air force with telling effect, and its diversion to other theatres of war since the episode at Pearl harbour (December 1941) has been one of the chief benefits to China of the wider setting of her struggle. On the other hand, Japan felt it necessary in the earlier stages of the war to maintain a large proportion of her best troops in Manchuria to protect the long frontier of 'Manchukuo' with the U.S.S.R., and it is generally agreed that many of those used in China were of comparatively inferior quality. One of the chief factors in her successful renewal of the offensive in China in 1944 has been the employment of crack troops brought south from Manchuria for this purpose.

First Year, 1937-38

On the night of 7 July 1937 the Japanese in the Peiping area held large-scale manœuvres near the Marco Polo bridge (Lukouchiao) south-west of the city (Plate 3). One of the Japanese soldiers was alleged to be missing, and a demand was made to search the Chinese-

held town of Wanping close by. When this request was refused hostilities broke out, but ceased after a few days when the Chinese withdrew their small garrison from Wanping. During the next fortnight or so there was considerable diplomatic activity, but the Japanese strongly reinforced their troops in the Peiping area, and seized strategic points in the vicinity of the city. On 25 July the Japanese demanded, without success, that Chinese troops should withdraw from the whole Peiping area, and later launched an attack on the Chinese forces in the city and at Nanyuan, south of Peiping. Fierce fighting went in Japan's favour, the Chinese were compelled to evacuate Peiping on 29 July and retired to Paoting.

On 29 July also strong Japanese forces began an attack in the Tientsin-Taku area, where they made extensive use of mechanized units and an aerial bombardment, during which Nankai University was razed to the ground. After two days the Chinese evacuated Tientsin and the Japanese were left in control of the two most important cities of North China.

Large reinforcements from the Kwantung army in Manchuria continued to pour into Hopeh, and the Japanese began a westward drive into Shansi along the strategic Peiping-Suiyuan railway. Bitter fighting took place at the important Nankow pass from 16-24 August, and the Chinese eventually evacuated the pass and the town of Kalgan a few days later. During September and October the Japanese, in spite of Chinese resistance, pressed westward along the railway, capturing Kweisui on 14 October and Paotow, the terminus, on 17 October. One column turned southward at Tatung, but was halted by the Chinese defence in the mountainous country near Hsinkow, north of Taiyuan, and was virtually surrounded. Better co-ordination on the part of the Chinese might have helped to win a victory, but another Japanese column, advancing west from Shihkiachwang on the Peiping-Hankow line through Niangtzu pass, closed in on Taiyuan from the east, and the Chinese were forced to evacuate the city, the provincial capital of Shansi, on 8 November. In late December the Japanese also occupied Tsinan and Tsingtao and easily gained control of the key points of Shantung; the governor of Shantung was later executed at Hankow for disobedience and maladministration. By the end of 1937 Japan accordingly controlled most of the railways and main roads of North China, and commanded the eastern termini of the caravan routes from Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. In the early stages it is likely that Japan planned the seizure of the five northern provinces of Hopeh, Shansi, Shantung,

Suiyuan, and Chahar only. This was in accordance with her previous policy of attaining limited objectives with a minimum expenditure of the man-power and resources reserved for a sterner conflict.

Hostilities, however, were not destined to be limited to North China. At Shanghai, where Japan maintained a naval landing party of considerable military strength, Sino-Japanese relations became very strained after 7 July. The incident which eventually provoked the conflict here took place on 9 August near the Chinese aerodrome at Hungjao, south-west of Shanghai, where two Japanese marines were shot dead by a Chinese sentry. Both sides had been strengthening their forces in the Shanghai area and fighting broke out in the suburb of Chapei, four days later. At first the Japanese naval landing party, aided by warships in the Whangpoo, with difficulty held its positions, and one Chinese counter-attack almost reached the Whangpoo at Wayside wharf, but on 22 August the Japanese landed strong reinforcements in the Woosung area and commenced a drive southwards. During the whole of September and October the struggle raged north of Shanghai and, by reason of the most determined resistance by the Chinese, the Japanese made very slow headway. It was not until 26-27 October that the Shanghai-Nanking railway was cut and the Chinese forced to retreat south of Soochow creek.

On 5 November, however, the decisive blow was struck by a Japanese landing on the north shore of Hangchow wan and an advance northward to take Sungkiang, thus rendering their Shanghai position untenable for the Chinese, who withdrew from the area in December.

The Chinese losses in the battle of Shanghai, particularly amongst the best-trained units, were especially heavy and much criticism has been directed against the Chinese decision to fight at Shanghai, where the enemy had an established base and could bring reinforcements easily, rather than on a line from Chapu, on Hangchow wan, to Fushan, on the Yangtze near Kiangyin, which would have allowed the full use of Tai hu and other water obstacles. On the other hand, by refusing to give ground without fighting at Shanghai, China commanded the loyalty of her own people and the respect of the outside world.

The Japanese, having now gained control of the strategic Yangtze delta, advanced rapidly westward along the Yangtze valley, and by 7 December were converging on Nanking. An outflanking move secured Wuhu, and the national capital itself fell on 13 December




Fig. 9. The Sino-Japanese war, 1937-41

Based on *A War Atlas for Americans*, p. 47 (New York, 1944).

In Figs. 9-11 the stippled area denotes roughly the maximum extent of Japanese control during successive years of the war. This control was largely limited to lines of communication and large towns and zones of varying depth bordering them.

T. Taierhchwang.

and was followed by the most brutal mass atrocities; before the end of the year Hangchow, capital of Chekiang, also fell.

The spring of 1938 was used by both sides for preparing themselves for the campaigns of summer. In spite of the great losses in territory, property, and man-power the National Government showed no disposition to seek peace terms, and Japan was committed to even greater struggles. Japanese strategy throughout aimed at obtaining possession of the key railways, and in the early part of 1938 attacks were mainly concentrated on the Tientsin-Pukow and the Lunghai railways. In the fight for the important junction between these two lines, Hsuehchow, the Japanese suffered their most serious defeat yet experienced at Taierhchwang, near the Kiangsu-Shantung boundary, on 7 April, which delayed their occupation of Hsuehchow by forces advancing north and south along the Tientsin-Pukow railway until 19 May, when the drive along the Lunghai Railway was well under way. Kaifêng, capital of Honan, was taken on 6 June, but a further advance to the west was balked by the Chinese destruction of the Hwang ho dykes at Chungmow, and the Japanese attempt to reach Chengchow, junction of the Lunghai and Peiping-Hankow railways, was also prevented. In February a further drive was made in Shansi down the Fên ho valley along the Tatung-Puchow railway. The Chinese were forced to retire to the mountains—the Communists to Wutai shan and Taihang shan, the National Government troops to Chungtiao shan, north of the Hwang ho.

Second Year, 1938-39

When the second year of the war opened, a strong Japanese drive up the Yangtze valley from their newly acquired bases in the Yangtze delta was already in progress. One force advanced along the north bank of the Yangtze with the objective of approaching the Wuhan cities from the north of Hankow. Another force advanced along the south bank of the Yangtze, to attack Wuhan from the south and to gain control of the Kiukiang-Nanchang railway. A considerable naval force moved up the Yangtze at the same time and reduced in succession the fortified Chinese positions along the river banks by naval and aerial bombardment, by assaults from landing parties under cover of guns and aeroplanes, and by mine-sweeping and destruction of boom defences in the river. Anking was occupied on 12 July, Hukow at the entrance to Poyang hu on 20 July, and Kiukiang on 26 July, but the advance on Nanchang had got no farther than

Teian in October. Until October the Chinese grimly held on to their positions in the Lu shan, south of Kiukiang, and in the hilly country (Tapieh shan) along the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border, but Sinyang fell on 12 October, and Yanghsin, south-east of Wuchang, on 19 October. The Chinese positions in the Wuhan area were now rendered untenable and the Japanese entered Hankow on 25 October. Yochow, at the entrance to Tungting hu, was captured on 12 November, but no further advance was made.

In the north the Japanese consolidated their hold on the railway system by the capture of Fenglingtu, the southern terminus of the Tatung-Puchow railway, but Chinese guerrilla forces were very active in Shansi, Hopeh, and Shantung. Similar units were also operating behind the Japanese lines farther south in the Yangtze delta and southern Anhwei.

The first extension of hostilities to South China occurred on 12 May, when the Japanese landed troops at Amoy, the best deep-water harbour south of the Yangtze. During the summer, however, large forces were assembled at Japanese bases in Formosa, and on 12 October a landing was made at Bias bay in Kwangtung, south-east of Canton; Chinese resistance proved exceptionally weak, and by 21 October Canton itself was occupied and the blockade of the South China coast rendered more easy.

This blockade was advanced a step further early in 1939. On 10 February, Japanese forces began a series of landings on Hainan, which was weakly garrisoned. By June the invaders were in control of the entire coastline of the island and of important communication centres in the interior. Hainan constituted an important base not only for the blockade of the South China coast, but for future operations against French Indo-China. The occupation of the Spratley islands, in the South China sea, nearly 700 miles south of Hainan, on 31 March, further strengthened Japan's position *vis-à-vis* French Indo-China and Singapore. The seizure of Swatow on 21 June, and of Tinghai, in the Chusan archipelago, on 23 June, was also directed towards the cutting of China's supply lines with the outside world by sea.

In February the Japanese launched an offensive in northern Kiangsi to remove the threat to their Yangtze supply line to Hankow. After bitter fighting Nanchang was occupied on 28 March, thus interrupting east-west traffic along the Chekiang-Kiangsi railway, but no further moves east or west along the railway were made. At the beginning of May a similar attempt was made north of the

Yangtze in northern Hupeh in the valley of the Han kiang, by two drives west from Sinyang and north from Anlu. After about a month's fighting the Chinese gained several successes, and the Japanese offensive petered out, but Hsiangyang remained in their hands.

In North China the first six months of 1939 were distinguished by a series of mopping-up campaigns in Shansi designed to strengthen the Japanese hold on the vital railway lines. These actually continued until November but made little headway against the Chinese forces utilizing the natural defensive advantages of the mountainous Shansi plateau. The Chinese, on the other hand, were unable to sever permanently the Japanese lines of communication or to force them to release their grip on the chief towns of the provinces.

By the end of the second year of the war the Japanese had thus acquired important additional territory, especially in the Yangtze valley and South China, and had made her blockade of the China coast much more effective. Losses on both sides had been considerable, but China's resistance still continued and Chinese morale was still high in spite of the defection of Wang Ching-wei in December 1938 (see p. 165).

Third Year, 1939-40

The first serious campaign in the third year of the war took place in Kiangsi and Hunan, when the Japanese directed a strong offensive against Changsha, the capital of Hunan. Attacks were made westward from the Nanchang area and southward from Wuchang, but the main drive was along the east side of Tungting hu from Yochow, supported by landings from Japanese craft on the lake. By the end of September the Japanese had captured Siangyin and were within sight of their objectives, but a vigorous Chinese counter-attack met with complete success and by the middle of October the Japanese were thrown back to their original lines.

In November a new theatre of operation was opened in Kwangtung and Kwangsi with a Japanese effort to sever China's communications with French Indo-China. Troops and naval craft were concentrated on Hainan island, and on 15 November landings were made at Pakhoi and near Yamchow, and Japanese forces advanced northwards to capture Nanning. The Chinese won a victory at Kunlunkwan pass in the hills north of Nanning at the end of the year, but were unable to recapture Nanning itself.

Another Japanese local offensive in Kwangtung was launched in

December in northern Kwangtung, directed mainly along the Canton-Hankow railway, but was repulsed before Yingtak at the end of the month, and by mid-January the Chinese had regained their former positions.

A number of local Chinese offensives were also undertaken during the winter of 1939-40 in Suiyuan, in Hupeh and Kiangsi, on the Japanese lines defending the Wuhan cities and Nanchang, and at various other points along the middle and lower Yangtze. Guerrilla forces continued to operate behind the Japanese lines in the Yangtze delta area from bases in the hills of western Chekiang and southern Anhwei, in Shantung from bases in the Tai shan, throughout the North China Plain, and in Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan. In Hopeh and Shansi guerrilla units of the Communist Eighth Route Army were especially active.

Further fighting in Hupeh took place in May and June, ending in the Japanese capture of Ichang, and in Kwangsi their forces pushed west to occupy Lungchow near the French Indo-China border.

Fourth Year, 1940-41

In the summer of 1940 no further large-scale offensives were undertaken by Japan. In September an agreement was concluded by which the Japanese were permitted to use vital bases in French Indo-China. These superseded the significance of their positions in western Kwangsi and the Chinese were able to recapture Lungchow on 28 October and Nanning on 29 October.

In January 1941 the Japanese opened an offensive from Hupeh northwards to gain control of the Peiping-Hankow railway between Chengchow and Sinyang. A small local offensive was launched west of the Han kiang to divert attention from the main blow which came in southern Honan. The Japanese advance covered about half the distance northward from Sinyang to Chengchow, but by mid-February the Chinese counter-attacks had driven the enemy back almost to their starting point. In March another strong Japanese force made a foray south-west from Nanchang in the direction of Shangkaio, and in May heavy fighting once more raged in southern Shansi. In northern and central Shansi, however, considerable headway was made by Chinese Communist forces operating from their bases across the Hwang ho in Shensi and in the mountains of central Shansi.

In April the Japanese made landings on the south shore of Hangchow wan and overran the coastal plain of northern Chekiang in-

cluding the towns of Ningpo and Shaohsing. Meanwhile the blockade of the coast was further strengthened by the occupation in April and May of a number of other coastal towns in Chekiang and Fukien, of which the most important was Foochow, captured on 21 April, but the majority of these, including Foochow, were abandoned by September.

Fifth Year, 1941-42

In September the Japanese staged their second invasion of the 'rice bowl' of the Tungting lake-basin. By the end of September the gates of Changsha were reached, but in early October, harried by Chinese counter-attacks, the invaders withdrew once more northward to Yochow. The Chinese, however, were frustrated in an attempt to recapture Ichang in the same month. Communist guerrilla forces of the Communist New Fourth Army were in operation behind the Japanese lines in southern Kiangsu, near the Tai hu, in northern Kiangsu and Anhwei, in the Hwai ho basin, in eastern Hupeh and along the Lunghai Railway near Kweiteh. An offensive in northern Honan was also opened in October, and Chengchow, the strategic railway junction, was captured, but abandoned after four weeks. In the north there was also Japanese activity against Chinese guerrillas in Hopeh and Jehol and against Communist forces along the Hupeh-Shansi border.

The outbreak of the Pacific war on 7 December 1941 was accompanied by a Japanese attack on Hong Kong, which eventually fell on Christmas Day.

Although Japanese forces were now heavily committed in the Pacific area, a strong raid was once more launched on Changsha in December 1941-January 1942. The enemy had penetrated to the outskirts of the city by 4 January, but as in October 1941, were then counter-attacked and forced to withdraw to their base at Yochow.

During the first five months of 1942 Chinese forces fought in Burma with British forces and took part in the retreat from Toungoo and Mandalay. Japanese troops entered Lashio on 29 April and advanced along the Burma Road, entering western Yunnan on 3 May and capturing Tengyueh on 11 May.

Sixth Year, 1942-43

When the sixth year of the war opened a major campaign by the Japanese in Chekiang and Kiangsi was already under way, designed partly to seize air bases which might be used by the American air

forces for bombing objectives both in Japanese-occupied China and in the Japanese mainland itself, and partly to gain control of the Chekiang-Kiangsi railway. By the end of May the Japanese had overrun much of central Chekiang, capturing Kinhwa on 28 May and Shangjao in eastern Kiangsi on 15 June.

At the same time other strong forces moved east and south-east from Nanchang and by 29 June had captured Iyang in eastern Kiangsi. On 1 July the two Japanese drives had linked up at Heng-




Fig. 10. The Sino-Japanese war, 1941-43

A Amoy; F Foochow; S Swatow.

Based on *A War Atlas for Americans*, p. 47 (New York, 1944).

feng, and the whole railway from Nanchang to Hangchow was under their control. In central Chekiang Lishui was occupied on 24 June, and Wenchow, at the mouth of the Ou kiang, fell on 11 July. Japanese flying columns also penetrated well south of the railways in Kiangsi, destroying crops, burning towns, and wrecking airfields. The later summer, however, saw another Chinese recovery. The Japanese retreated to their bases, Wenchow was retaken on 15 August, Shangjao on 19 August, and by 23 August the railway line from Chuhsien in Chekiang west along to Nanchang was again in Chinese hands, although the Japanese continued to hold the important base of Kinhwa.

In July the Japanese were once more forced to undertake preventive measures against Communist guerrillas in Chahar and central Hopeh. From September to December there was comparative stagnation on most sectors of the China front apart from a large Japanese punitive expedition in November against guerrilla forces in Shantung.

In December the Japanese began a drive in western Yunnan from their base of Tengyueh along the Salween river to outflank the important Chinese base of Paoshan. Simultaneously another drive was launched 300 miles farther south from the Japanese base of Kengtung in the Shan States by a combined force of Japanese and Thais. Though some headway was made in both sectors, the mountainous nature of the country favoured the defence and the offensives petered out after some months.

In January there was renewed fighting in the Tapiéh shan, the old battle-grounds north of the Yangtze, in the course of which the Japanese captured Lihwang, but the main Japanese offensive in the spring occurred in February on the middle Yangtze between Ichang and Shasi, and in March along the west shore of Tungting hu. An advance, supported by naval craft on the lake, was made south from the Yangtze between Yochow and Shasi into the rich rice country west of Tungting hu and important bases south of the Yangtze were secured at Ochikow and Hwayung. From these bases further attacks were made in May westward along the south bank of the Yangtze directed against Enshih, but were eventually checked in June at Yuyangkwan south-south-west of Ichang.

In the south a foray was made northward towards Yingtak along the Canton-Hankow railway from Canton, and on 17 February Japanese forces occupied Kwangchowwan and later extended their control over parts of the Luichow peninsula. The usual series of punitive expeditions against Chinese guerrilla forces was undertaken in the spring and early summer in south-west Shansi, in the Taihang shan area, in both northern and southern Kiangsu, and in Shantung.

Seventh Year, 1943-44

The first few months of the seventh year of war passed without any serious fighting, though guerrilla forces were active in many areas, especially in the area from Tai hu west to the Yangtze at Wuhu; here the Japanese occupied Suancheng and Kwangteh.

In October fighting again broke out on the Salween front, where the Japanese reached a point 80 miles north of Tengyueh. A more

serious offensive was opened in November in the Tungting lake-basin, where the Japanese occupied Changteh and drove up the Yuan kiang valley to Taoyuan ; in the following month, however, they withdrew from both these towns.

Early in 1944 Chinese troops under General Stilwell began their southward advance in Burma down the Hukawng valley, which, by the end of the year, had resulted in the capture of Kamaing, Mogaung, Myitkyina, and Bhamo.

During the spring considerable Japanese forces were moved south from Manchuria, and their first major offensive of the year began on 18 April in northern Honan. A large Japanese force crossed the Hwang ho and advanced toward the railway junction of Chengchow, which was captured on 22 April. From Chengchow one force pressed west along the Lunghai Railway, entered Loyang on 20 May, and by 8 June, supported by further attacks from the north bank of the Hwang ho, had reached Lingpao, about 90 miles west of Loyang, but a further advance along the railway to Tungkwan was checked. The second Japanese force pressed south from Chengchow, and by 6 May had got a distance of 85 miles along the Peiping-Hankow railway to Yencheng. A complementary offensive northward along the railway from Sinyang made equally good progress, and on 11 May the two forces linked up and the whole Peiping-Hankow line was in Japanese hands. Later in the month, however, the Chinese succeeded in recapturing several points on the line and preventing free communication, but by December the Japanese were reported in full control.

Meanwhile large concentrations of Japanese troops from Manchuria had been completed in the Hankow and Yochow area, and on 28 May the greatest Japanese offensive since 1938 began. From 1939 to 1943 Japanese campaigns had strictly limited objectives, the completion of their hold on the railway systems, the rounding-off of portions of occupied territory, and the destruction of crops in rice-producing areas and of air bases, but this summer offensive of 1944 was much more ambitious. It was undertaken with the avowed intention of splitting the Chinese-controlled area south of the Yangtze into two, and of securing a land route from Peiping to Singapore to offset the threat to Japanese sea communications with south-east Asia caused by the American successes in the western Pacific.

The main offensive, as in previous years, was directed along the east side of Tungting hu, but landings were made on the south shore

of the lake, particularly at Yuankiang, to threaten Changsha from the west. On 18 June, Changsha was entered, and by 25 June the outer defences of Hengyang, the important junction of the Canton-Hankow and Hunan-Kwangsi railways, was reached. Hengyang fell on 8 August after a siege of 47 days, but considerable Japanese forces had already by-passed the town; one section advanced south along the railway to Canton reaching Leiyang in mid-July, while the other and larger force proceeded south-west along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway.

Eighth Year, 1944-45

The eighth year of the war thus opened gloomily for China, the only bright spot being the continued success of Chinese troops in Burma and of the Chinese offensive against the Japanese in western Yunnan. A new Japanese offensive against the southern end of the Canton-Hankow railway petered out on reaching Yingtak, but the drive along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway to Kweilin proceeded steadily. Early in September a strong Japanese column advanced west from Hengyang to the road centre of Shaoyang, to protect the right flank of the advance to the south-west, while the force which had taken Leiyang turned west to capture Lingling.

In September also the Japanese made a southward advance from their bases in north Cheklang to capture Lishui and Wenchow. The further occupation of Foochow in October seemed to suggest that these moves were intended to guard against possible American landings on the south-east coast, should the Philippines and Formosa fall.

The prospect for China grew still darker when late in September the Japanese began a drive from the Canton delta along the Si kiang valley, coupled with a thrust northward from bases in the Liuchow peninsula. Wuchow fell on 22 September, and the Japanese advanced rapidly up the Kwei kiang valley towards Kweilin. Kweilin was also threatened from the north-east, where the Japanese forces, pressing down from Hengyang, had reached Hsingan only 40 miles away. A further enemy force advanced west along the Si kiang, captured Sunchow on 13 October and then turned north-west along the Liu kiang valley in the direction of Liuchow.

By early November the Japanese had reached and by-passed Kweilin from the north while the forces from the south cut the Liuchow-Nanning road. Kweilin fell on 10 November and Liuchow on 13 November, while the Americans were forced to evacuate Nanning, their last air-base in south China, as the Japanese also

moved northward from French Indo-China. A strong Japanese mobile force immediately began to push north-west along the Kweichow-Kwangsi railway in the direction of Kweiyang, capital and chief communication centre of Kweichow. Ishan was reached on 15 November, Hochih on 27 November, and Tushan, the railhead, on 4 December. It was not until the Japanese had reached Tuyun,




Fig. 11. The Sino-Japanese war, 1943-44

A Amoy; F Foochow; K Kweilin; S Swatow.

As a result of the campaigns of 1944 the Japanese gained complete control of the Peiping-Canton and Hunan-Kwangsi railway lines, and thereby of a land route from long-established bases in North China and 'Manchukuo' to the Malay peninsula. The completion of a rail link between the existing Hunan-Kwangsi railway and the French Indo-China system would give rail connection between Peiping and Singapore.

about 50 miles south-east of Kweiyang, that the tide turned. The Japanese troops were by this time handicapped by the length of their supply lines, and were forced to withdraw back to Hochih at the end of 1944. The immediate threat to Kweiyang was thus removed, but the position for China still remained grave. A stronger Japanese thrust towards Kweiyang was still a possibility, the American air-bases

in Hunan and Kwangsi were effectively neutralized, and the land route from Peiping to Singapore was secured. The Japanese were also reported in full control of the Canton-Hankow railway by the end of the year.

In Burma the southward drive of British, American, and Chinese forces continued, and the Japanese, driven from Lungling and Tengyueh, had lost their hold on western Yunnan, though the frontier town of Wanting, on the Burma Road, did not fall until January 1945.

The position of China at the end of 1944 was sufficiently serious to bring about a considerable reshuffle not only in the Chinese Army Command but also in the Government itself. The continued defeats of Japan in Burma and the Pacific promised a brighter future, and the Japanese hold on occupied China was still largely confined to the districts bordering the ports, large inland towns, railways and other lines of communication. Behind the Japanese lines Chinese guerrilla forces continued to operate effectively and the occupation was by no means as thorough and complete as it appeared to be on paper.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONFLICT

No just appraisal of the profound and far-reaching consequences for China of the effects of the present Sino-Japanese and World wars will be possible for several years. The most tangible of the immediate consequences are those of an economic character, which are analysed in some detail in the chapters of vol. ii of this Handbook. It would be difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of the changes involved in the blockade by Japan within the first two years of the war of practically the whole of the eastern sea-board, and the occupation not only of the North China Plain, but of the rich provinces of the lower Yangtze, which were the scene of the greatest industrial developments of modern type and where nearly all the factories run on Western capitalist lines were situated.

Economic and Social Consequences

The invasion rendered homeless a population at least as large as that of Great Britain and set in motion what has been described, probably with strict truth, as 'the greatest mass movement in history.' The mighty stream of refugees escaping to the still 'Free China' of the western provinces represented every class of the population—scholars, peasants, artisans, and merchants. It was accompanied by the transference of the seat of government, first

to Hankow and then to Chungking, and by the epic treks of professors and students to re-establish in Szechwan and Yunnan the universities of the north and east which, as the training schools of China's future leaders, had been the special targets of Japanese 'precision bombing.' The western, south-western, and north-western provinces, hitherto the most isolated and backward in China, now became the centres not only of resistance but of reconstruction, for the Generalissimo and other national leaders have repeatedly emphasized this dual character of the role imposed on China by the war. The schemes for a national economy, which had just begun to take shape under the Nanking government of 1928 to 1937, had now to be both altered in character in relation to the more limited but still extensive resources of 'Free China' and greatly intensified to meet the imperative demands of the war. The one involved fundamental changes in economic geography, a new location of industry and a new pattern of communications, including the development of overland contacts with the outside world to replace the blocked maritime outlets; the other involved equally drastic changes in the methods and organization of output. Of these perhaps the most revolutionary, in relation to the traditions and history of China, was that the state not only took over the general control and direction of production but became its principal agent and the greatest employer of labour. All these and many cognate developments are considered in detail under their appropriate headings at a later stage, and are mentioned here only to emphasize the fundamental changes in the economic structure of China which the war has already produced.

The picture of the economic geography will be again modified by the recovery of 'Occupied China' and the restoration of the importance of the lower Yangtze provinces, but the pattern will be materially different from that of 1936. It will be no longer true to speak of 'a modern fringe' (of Western-sponsored industrialism) 'stitched along the hem of the ancient garment.' The unbalanced concentration of industry on the eastern sea-board, so significant a characteristic of pre-war China, is unlikely ever to return. Szechwan may rival Kiangsu in manufactures no less than in agriculture, and several other provinces far in the interior may be scarcely less important as industrial centres. So too the extreme isolation of the great peripheral provinces of the south-west (Yunnan and Kweichow) and of the north-west (Kansu and Shensi) will have been removed.

It seems certain also that, if China hangs together as an entity,

there will be applied to it long-period plans of industrialization similar in scope if not in intensity to those actually achieved by Soviet Russia. Such is the announced intention of the government which may, as forecasted by T. V. Soong, conscribe for industrial labour a large proportion of the armies at present in the field. The exigencies of war have put the state in the position of controlling the basic industries and means of communication, which was advocated by Sun Yat-sen and towards which the Nanking government was already beginning to move.

The economic consequences of the war must of themselves have profound repercussions on the social and political future of China, but to estimate the relative importance and strength of the psychological factors which it has brought into prominence is a task of supreme difficulty. The immediate effect of the Japanese invasion was undoubtedly to accelerate very greatly the growth of the national self-consciousness which had been born in the revolutionary era. China made a great spurt towards unity. For the time being the ominous rift in the social cohesion of the country, which had so impaired the unification programme of the Nanking government, was closed. The Generalissimo became a national hero, the symbol of China's hopes, and the 'Communist' guerrillas co-operated with the forces under his command. For the first time the great and hitherto inert peasant populations, or at any rate large sections of them, were roused to organized resistance. To this result the vandalism and brutality of the Japanese soldiers, as senseless as it was barbarous, largely contributed. The Generalissimo could say with truth that it was a 'People's war,' and the same kind of exhilaration came to China that animated the Russia of 1812 and 1941. The world was not only impressed by the tenacity and heroism of Chinese resistance, in the face of overwhelming odds, but astonished by the high degree of its unity under circumstances so propitious for traitors. The universal execration of the treachery of Wang Ching-wei, the former leader of the left wing of the Kuomintang, who was induced by personal ambitions and bribes to sponsor the puppet Japanese-controlled regime established at Nanking for the conquered region of the lower Yangtze, emphasized the prevailing spirit.

In this earlier phase of the war, moreover, reconstruction was no less conspicuous than resistance. A large number of factories, originally located in the Japanese-occupied east, were moved to new sites in Szechwan and other interior provinces by the help of the government, which partly financed the factory owners and

supplied transport and technical assistance (see vol. iii, Chapter iv). The government also established many factories of its own, including cotton mills, cement works, electrical undertakings, and plant for the production of petrol by a synthetic process. The survey and exploitation of the very considerable and hitherto largely untapped mineral resources of Szechwan and the south-west (see vol. iii, Chapter iii) proceeded apace, and for this the services of geologists, mining engineers, and other technical experts, drawn from the ranks of the new *intelligentsia* trained in Western methods, were invaluable. The Burma Road was completed with almost incredible speed and other arteries linking the vital centres of 'Free China' were constructed (see vol. iii, Chapter x).

The war-time development which, apart from the making of the Burma Road, attracted most attention in Great Britain was the initiation and promising early progress of the Chinese Industrial Co-operative movement. This was primarily designed to give employment to, and to utilize the skill of, refugees displaced from the east, many of whom were artisans, and also to feed and supplement the government-sponsored factories by a chain of small, semi-mobile industrial units, extending in arc-like form round the widely extended battle fronts from Kansu and Shensi in the north-west to Fukien in the south-east. Many friendly observers, however, saw in this movement a real prospect of China's industrial structure being largely rebuilt on much sounder foundations, more in keeping with the traditions of craftsmanship and genius of the people than those of the exotic mass-production factory system, which in recent times had grown up in the treaty ports, and had already given rise to social evils of the kind characteristic of the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in England. Parallel to the Industrial Co-operative movement, but originating earlier, was that of the agricultural co-operative societies, and it was confidently hoped that the government was about to embark on an active programme of much-needed agrarian reform (see vol. iii, Chapter i). The Chinese author of a masterly study of the social and economic conditions of a typical village community in the lower Yangtze valley concluded his book, published in the early phase of the war, with these words :

The hunger of the people is the real issue in China. Agrarian problems have not disappeared since the present Japanese invasion. During the struggle agrarian problems have in fact become vital. The victory against Japanese aggression can be ensured only by removing internal conflict through relieving the peasants by a reasonable and effective land-reform.

Thousands of villages have already been destroyed by the invaders, but in their ruin our internal conflicts and follies should find their last resting-place. From the ruins a new China will emerge.”¹

Among many well-wishers in Great Britain the hopes based on all these promising aspects of China's initial response to the terrible challenge of Japanese militarism tended to foster too optimistic a view of the rate of her progress. The more complex and in some respects more sombre picture presented during the later phases of the protracted struggle may give rise to equally exaggerated misgivings.

One, at least, of the major causes of the deterioration of the position after 1941 was due to external factors beyond the control of the Chinese themselves. The blockade and isolation of China did not become complete until the Japanese, after flinging down the gauntlet to the United Nations in December 1941, achieved the conquest of Malaya and Burma. The Chinese not unnaturally hoped that the merging of their struggle, sustained so long single-handed, with that of the United Nations for common objectives would be followed by speedy relief. But in fact the completion of the blockade, through the Japanese control of south-eastern Asia and the absorption of China's great Western allies in one of the most critical phases of the European war, reduced, instead of augmenting, the stream of essential supplies. The consequent shortage, particularly of petrol, led to a general break-down of transport, which hampered military operations and brought to a standstill the new industrial expansion in 'Free China.' The effect upon morale of this unforeseen intensification of the miseries of a war which had already lasted five years can easily be imagined.

For the civil servants and salaried classes the conditions of life were rendered infinitely worse by the colossal rise of prices consequent upon the inflation, which began to assume alarming proportions from 1939 onwards. Among the hardest hit of all have been the scholars and scientists in the transplanted universities, struggling against the heavy odds of almost complete isolation from their fellow-workers in other lands and, in many cases, the almost total loss of libraries and equipment, to maintain the intellectual traditions of their country and the scientific research essential alike to the war effort and to future reconstruction. To these grave handicaps were now added famine prices and an insufficiency of food and clothing which has taken a heavy toll of the *intelligentsia*, on whom China's future so largely depends. Yet the struggle has been bravely main-

¹ Fei Hsiao-tung, *Peasant Life in China*, p. 286 (London, 1939).

tained, and much may now be expected from the renewal of foreign contacts which the reconquest of Burma and the acceleration of air transport are making possible.

The phenomenal inflation and its causes are considered elsewhere (see vol. iii, Chapter vi), but there can be no question that its effects have been disastrous. In a country so vast the government has been impotent to control commodity prices and the pernicious activities of profiteers. The 'orgies of the new rich' have been in flagrant contrast to the prevailing poverty. The abnormal conditions and isolation have favoured corruption, the selfishness of vested interests, and the exercise of power by the most reactionary elements in the Kuomintang. Yet progressive public opinion, in spite of a rigid censorship and a heavy ban upon freedom of speech, has not been stifled. Chinese criticism, better informed than much that has appeared in the foreign press, has found expression in the People's Political Council, whose elective element is now to be increased, and in some at any rate of the *hsien* (county units) representative assemblies have been formed.

The Yen'an Regime

China's greatest handicap, however, since at least 1940, has been the unhappy recrudescence of strife between the Kuomintang, as represented by the Chungking government, and the 'Communist' guerrilla organization, with its focus of administration at Yen'an in northern Shensi. Its adverse effect upon both the efficient prosecution of the war and the development of the programme of national reconstruction is beyond dispute, and it still remains (January 1945) the most disquieting factor in the Chinese outlook.

Since the famous trek of the Red Army from south-central to north-west China in 1934-35 and the 'Sian Incident' of December 1936 (see pp. 127-8), there have been important developments in the character of the guerrilla activities of the Chinese 'Communists.' The initial successes of the Japanese in North China in 1937 destroyed the authority of the Kuomintang government and left the Communist Eighth Army as the one effective champion of Chinese independence in the area lying to the north of the Lunghai Railway. The desertion to the Japanese-sponsored puppet government of North China of several generals, commanding isolated units of 'regular' troops, has increased the importance of this role, and together with the later-formed Fourth Army and Local Defence Corps, it has sustained almost the whole burden of resistance in

this vast region of China. While shortage of munitions and particularly of light guns has curtailed its operations and prevented many spectacular successes, it is due to the Eighth Army that North China has remained a battle front and that, even in the so-called 'occupied' area, Japanese authority is still very limited and precarious. The position has fluctuated considerably, but large districts of North China have remained outside enemy control and acknowledged allegiance to Yen-an. The most important of these great enclaves are: (i) the nuclear area of the Border Government in north Shensi and the adjacent parts of Kansu and Ninghsia; (ii) the mountainous zone known to geographers as 'The Peking Grid' (see vol. i, pp. 69-71), comprising much of northern Shansi, northern Hopeh and southern Chahar, but extending down into the apex of the North China Plain; (iii) a zone linking the plateau of south-east Shansi across the plain with the Shantung massif. There are also smaller isolated areas of resistance in north-west Shansi and eastern Shantung.

The organization of these areas for successful guerrilla warfare is only part of the story. Of even greater ultimate significance is the fact that there has been applied to them a type of administration which, on the lowest estimate, is an extremely interesting and important experiment in agrarian democracy. This term seems the best description of the regime of the Yen-an administration. Most of the leaders of that administration are admittedly men with strong Communist convictions, and the organization exhibits certain features borrowed from that of Soviet Russia. But it is far from conforming to the pattern of a pure Communist state. The desire of the peasants for their own land and their repugnance to collective farms are frankly recognized. Non-Communists, including members of the Kuomintang, occupy important official positions, and, in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh government, even the local gentry, landlords, and merchants are entitled to a share in the administration. In a recent book, *New Democracy*, Mao Tse-tung, the original organizer of the Red Army and the head of the Yen-an administration, recognizes the unsuitability of Communism for present Chinese conditions and contemplates a long period of 'development under democratic capitalist institutions.'

The vast majority of the population in the districts administered by Yen-an are peasants, and it is as a democratic peasant state that it has achieved so large a measure of success. That it has won the confidence and support of the farmers is generally admitted, and

the accounts of competent observers show that this is due not only to the character of its agrarian policy but to the equitable system of taxation¹ (based on a progressive income and property tax, mostly payable in grain), the honesty of the administration, official corruption being severely punished, and the great importance attached to genuine local self-government. This is quite elaborately organized in elective village, *hsien* and regional governments, and the central council of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border government is directly elected, with representation also of special interests, such as the army, factory workers, and university, and of special groups, such as the Mongols and Moslems. There is no discrimination between the sexes, and the prominence of women in public activities has been particularly noticed.

Great stress is laid on the campaign for literacy (using a modified form of 'The Thousand Character System'), and a fairly complete system of primary schools has come into existence, with growing provision for higher education. The revised Chinese civil and criminal codes are used in legal administration, and several important laws, adopted by the Nanking government before the war but never put into practice, such as prescribed limitations of rents and rates of interest, are here enforced.

In the economic sphere also there has been considerable progress, in spite of great difficulties and frequent interruptions by actual or threatened Japanese attacks. Agricultural research work, experimental farms, and extensive irrigation schemes have widened the basis of production, and the development both of agricultural credit, sponsored by the government, and of co-operative societies has reduced the farmers' dependence on money-lenders. Stock-rearing, appropriate to the semi-arid lands of the north-west, has been encouraged. The growing production of woollen cloth, locally spun and woven, and its replacement of imported cotton, is also an appropriate adjustment to the severe winter climate of the highland districts.

Such seem to be some of the chief features of the Yen'an regime.² It is no doubt true that a system which works well among simple peasant communities would meet with greater difficulties if applied

¹ It is said that in the guerrilla areas the amount of taxation is about one-eighteenth of that in the areas really controlled by Japan.

² The description is based on the first-hand evidence of Michael Lindsay in his *North China Front* (China Campaign Committee, London, 1944). It is definitely sympathetic with the regime, but is well-balanced, and receives corroboration from other sources.

to the more complex and sophisticated societies of other parts of China. But China is, and is likely to remain, predominantly a peasant country, and the Yen-an administration certainly seems to exemplify the practical application of Sun Yat-sen's 'Principles' of 'Democracy' and 'Livelihood' (see pp. 103-4) to the conditions of rural life. That the central government should come to terms with it and establish a *modus vivendi* is undoubtedly desired by the public opinion of China as a whole, no less than by her allies of the United Nations, who are anxious to see the unity of the country restored, in the interests alike of the successful termination of the war with Japan and the importance of the role which awaits her at the peace conference.

The Outlook for China

The considerable and growing section of the British public interested in China has recently been confused and mystified by the conflicting nature of the reports as to dominant political tendencies in that country, and particularly as to their bearing on the cardinal issue of whether or not China is trending towards a democratic goal. In truth, the conflicting reports reflect conflicting factors. In China vested interests are deeply entrenched and the forces of reaction are strong. A militarist element, believing in authoritarian methods and rigid controls, has been powerful since the last days of the Manchu dynasty. The protraction of the conflict with Japan has to a considerable extent revived the opportunities and traditions of the war-lord era. The conception of public service as an obligation which must override family and sectional interests is still relatively weak and corruption in high places not uncommon.

But against all this must be set many considerations. From time immemorial there has been a strong democratic element in Chinese institutions and outlook on life. There is not and never has been the servility of spirit characteristic of some Eastern peoples. The rights of the people and the obligations of rulers have been the themes of China's greatest sages from the 'Classical age.' In recent times the Chinese Revolution was conceived and finally brought to at least partial fruition by a man deeply impregnated with modern conceptions of democracy, although aware that they must be adapted to conditions very different from those of many Western societies. These conceptions are undoubtedly upheld by the majority of the modern Chinese *intelligentsia*, whose outlook as a whole is liberal and progressive and whose influence on the future course of events is likely

to be greater when peace is restored. Nor must it be forgotten that the Kuomintang, at present the only recognized political party, is deeply committed to the programme embodied in the 'Three Principles of the People' and that there is a steadily rising tide of public opinion demanding of the government more than lip-service to it. The Generalissimo, on whom so much still depends, has again and again emphasized his allegiance to it and never more strongly and explicitly than in his New Year Message of 1945 :

I have never forgotten the need for a constitutional Democracy. I hold that, so long as the Three People's Principles and the Quintuple Power Constitution are not put into effect, the revolutionary work of our National Father remains incomplete, and I have not fulfilled my duty towards my nation.

After nearly eight years' armed resistance, the Three People's Principles have sunk into people's hearts and their sense of civic responsibility has been much increased. I do not feel the necessity to wait until the end of the war to call a People's Congress. I am ready to propose at once to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang that, as soon as the military situation has become stabilized enough for us to launch counter-offensives with greater assurance of victory, we should convene a People's Congress and adopt a Constitution which would enable the Kuomintang to transfer the power of government to the people. We must use all our strength to beat back the enemy and introduce a Constitutional Government, with complete national unity."¹

In thinking about China's future it is essential to take long views and to recognize the magnitude of the changes involved in the transition from the traditional and self-contained civilization of imperial times to a modernized nation-state in intimate contact with external powers and with heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace and order. Much misunderstanding about China arises from failure to imagine the vastness of the canvas which the name indicates. Emphasis on Chinese 'disunity' may well seem misplaced when we remember that China is the equivalent of Europe in size and population and reflect on the conspicuous lack of unity in our own continent. The real marvel, indeed, is not that there should be disunity in China, but that so vast a population, spread over so great an area, should have been knit together into a homogeneous civilization which makes the ideal of nationhood in the Western sense practicable at all. Causes of friction arising from differences of race, religion, and culture are conspicuously few, and the spread of communications is likely to reduce those that spring from regional contrasts of economic interests. What seems now the

¹ Extract from the verbatim report in *China Newsweek*, 11 January 1945 (published by Chinese Ministry of Information).

most formidable obstacle to unity is a conflict of ideologies which China shares with many infinitely smaller nations. The issues at stake between Chungking and Yenan are not different in kind from those that distract Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, and other European countries, but the stage is so large that they can more easily assume a regional expression.

Without doubt China has many grave economic, social, and administrative problems to solve before she can give full political expression to the cultural unity which has long distinguished her, and the form which it may eventually take is still in doubt. But although in the course of her long history she has often been divided into separate states for considerable periods of time, political unification has always been ultimately achieved. The growth of national self-consciousness, so marked a feature of her recent development, makes it probable that she will presently attain a much higher degree of integration, perhaps on federal lines.

The removal of Japanese militarism must restore to China her natural place as the greatest power in the Far East, that vast human province which holds more than a quarter of the inhabitants of the world. The fact too that most of the smaller surrounding nations have derived the essentials of their culture from her, and have in the past acknowledged her suzerainty, must still further enhance the significance of her role. Great Britain, in her turn, represents the interests and the culture of far more than the inhabitants of these islands. It is, indeed, difficult to overestimate the importance for the future of humanity of understanding and friendship between these two great peoples.

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Chapter IV

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF CHINA SINCE 1922

China's Prospects after the Washington Conference, 1921-22 : Treaty Revision and its Issues, 1922-26 : The Rapprochement with the Western Powers, 1926-31 : China's Relations with the U.S.S.R., 1921-29 : Sino-Japanese Relations in Manchuria, 1922-31 : The Japanese Seizure of Manchuria, 1931-33 : The Continued Aggression of Japan, 1933-37 : The Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937-41 : China's Appeals to the League of Nations, 1937-38 : China and the Allied Nations, 1939-1941 : The End of Extraterritoriality, 1943-44 : Bibliographical Note.

China's Prospects after the Washington Conference, 1921-22

In 1922, at the termination of the Washington Conference, the prospect seemed fair for an early realization of the hopes of the Nationalist elements in China—the preservation of their country's political and administrative independence, so sorely menaced by Japan during 1915-21, and the achievement of a status of equality among the Powers through the revision of the extraterritorial and tariff provisions of the treaties. Although China had not gained all that her ardent patriots had expected, she had secured an opportunity to set her house in order unimpeded by external aggression. By the Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922 the British Empire, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, and China herself had all pledged themselves to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, and to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity for her to develop an effective and stable government ; to use their influence for the establishment and maintenance of the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations, and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges which would abridge those of other friendly Powers. Of the Powers not signatory to this Treaty, Germany, deprived of her leased area in Shantung and her extraterritorial rights by the Treaty of Versailles, had in 1921 concluded a fresh treaty with China on an equal basis, while the Soviet Union in 1920 had renounced all the concessions, indemnities, and special privileges appertaining to Imperial Russia and had proposed a new treaty concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway. By the agreement of 4 February 1922 Japan restored the former German leased territory in Shantung to China

and relinquished her preferential rights there, in return for the opening of the area to foreign trade, and for an undertaking by China to reimburse to Japan the value of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway. Chinese membership of the League of Nations also appeared to provide a further safeguard against a renewal of external aggression. Could China have achieved a strong and stable government in the years immediately following the Washington Conference, the opportunity for a reversal of its decisions would not have arisen; it was her tragedy and, indeed, that of the world in general, that she failed to do so before the international situation had changed terribly to her disadvantage.

Treaty Revision and its Issues, 1922-26

The Powers at Washington had formulated a programme of treaty revision in China. By the Customs Tariff Treaty of 1922 they had agreed to appoint a Tariff Commission within three months, while a resolution provided for an International Commission to examine the extraterritorial question. Unfortunately a dispute between China and France, as to whether the instalments of the Boxer indemnity due to France should be paid in gold or in paper francs, prevented the Washington Nine-Power Treaty and the Customs Treaty from being ratified until 5 August 1925. The Tariff Commission met in Peking in the autumn of that year and agreed that China should recover tariff autonomy in 1929, in return for the abolition of the internal transit tax called *likin*, but no final decision could be reached on interim tariff rates. The Extraterritoriality Commission also met and reported in September 1926. This body, while recommending the removal of various abuses and deficiencies connected with foreign consular jurisdiction in China, pronounced against its abandonment until there was adequate security that Chinese civil and criminal jurisdiction would be free from executive or military interference.

This policy of making treaty revision depend upon, and keep pace with, the establishment of political stability and of judicial reform in China was no longer adequate to meet the situation which had developed by 1925. While the internationally recognized Republican government at Peking had become more and more the plaything of the northern war-lords, the reorganized Kuomintang administration at Canton, trained in Soviet propaganda methods, was fanning the fires of Chinese nationalism and fulminating against the 'imperialist' powers, especially Great Britain. Its weapons

were the trade boycott and the general strike, as exemplified at Canton and Hong Kong in 1925-26, in consequence of the Shanghai and Shameen (Canton) shooting affrays in May and June of 1925. In 1926 the Nationalists swept up to the Yangtze valley and established their headquarters at Hankow, and their successes inspired the Peking government to collect higher customs duties without the formal consent of the Powers and to claim the right to terminate treaties unilaterally if the other party concerned would not agree to revision in the sense desired by China.

The Rapprochement with the Western Powers, 1926-31

Two events operated to prevent a general armed clash between China and the Treaty Powers. The first was the British Government's Memorandum of 18 December 1926, inviting the Washington Treaty Powers to open negotiations for treaty revision as soon as the Chinese had constituted a government with authority to negotiate, and in the meantime to recognize the Chinese right to tariff autonomy and to grant unconditionally the surtaxes which had been agreed upon at Washington. The new British policy was implemented by the rendition of the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, which had been overrun by Chinese mobs; but the despatch of a strong and preponderantly British Defence Force to guard the International Settlement at Shanghai was a clear indication that the tactics of mob violence would not serve the Chinese cause there. The second event was the breach between the Nationalist and Communist Parties in China. This was begun by General Chiang K'ai-shek at Shanghai in the spring of 1927, and was followed by the expulsion of Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang Party and by the dismissal of Soviet advisers decreed by the Wuhan (Hankow) government in June of that year. Consequently, despite the Communist-inspired attack on foreigners at Nanking in March 1927, Chiang K'ai-shek's policy of moderation and his appointment as President of the National Government in 1928 ensured that the Kuomintang triumph would be followed by negotiations with the Powers and not by conflict.

This rapprochement with the foreign Powers having the greatest financial and commercial interests in China was of the first importance in enabling the new government to make headway against a host of internal enemies, for the important Maritime Customs revenues, especially those of Shanghai, were diverted to them even before the formal recognition accorded them by the Powers in December 1928.

At the same time the breach with the Communists and the abandonment of a policy of violence towards foreign interests gained for the National Government the confidence and support of the influential Chinese banking and mercantile interests in Shanghai. By May 1930 the Chinese government had concluded new commercial treaties with all the principal Powers and had secured tariff autonomy, subject to special agreements in the treaties with Great Britain, France, and Japan, which fixed the duties on their chief articles of import into China over a definite period; China in return agreed to abolish *likin* and other internal dues on imports and exports.

The extraterritorial question presented greater difficulties, particularly because it was inextricably connected with that of the foreign-administered areas, above all the International Settlement and French Concession at Shanghai, in which are located the bulk of British, United States, and French investments in China. The Powers were not prepared to abandon consular jurisdiction or the treaty port system until Chinese law courts were free from the arbitrary interference of local militarists and *Tangpu* (local Kuomintang associations). The Chinese government, faced with this reply, threatened the abolition of extraterritorial rights by unilateral mandate at the beginning of 1930, but had no real desire to force an issue in this way if it could be avoided, while Great Britain, the chief Power affected, was willing to enter into negotiations. These continued during 1930-31, and appeared to have made considerable progress when the outbreak of the 'Manchurian Affair' relegated the extraterritorial question to the background. In May 1941 the United States government expressed their intention to enter into negotiations for the relinquishment of their extraterritorial rights in China when peace should be restored there, and a similar declaration was made by the British government in July. However, these declarations were superseded by those of October 1942 (see page 169).

China's Relations with the U.S.S.R., 1921-29

While Chinese relations with Great Britain and the United States were thus growing more cordial, those with the U.S.S.R. and Japan were taking a different course. In 1921 Soviet forces entered Outer Mongolia in pursuit of Baron Ungern, a White Russian leader who had taken refuge there. They defeated him, and then assisted the Young Mongol Party to overthrow the rule of the Mongol princes and to set up an administration on the Soviet model. The Chinese

government protested against these developments which turned Outer Mongolia into a virtual protectorate of the U.S.S.R. In 1922, when M. Joffe came to Peking as Soviet envoy, this Outer Mongolian question, as well as that of Soviet interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway, prevented any Sino-Russian agreement from being reached. In the autumn of the next year M. Karakhan succeeded M. Joffe as Soviet envoy to Peking, and in May 1924 two agreements were concluded between China and the U.S.S.R. These provided for diplomatic relations between the two governments and for the reversion to the Soviet government of the diplomatic and consular properties in China of the former Czarist regime. The Chinese Eastern Railway was declared to be a purely commercial enterprise, and all matters affecting jurisdiction, civil administration, and police were to be regulated by the Chinese authorities, but the manager and one of the two assistant managers were to be Russians. Five members of the Board of Directors, including the President, were to be chosen by the Chinese government, and the other five, including the Vice-President, by the Soviet government. The future of the railway was to be determined by the government of China and that of the U.S.S.R. to the exclusion of any third Power. Protests on account of financial interests in the railway on the part of France, Japan, and the United States were of no avail. The Soviet government also recognized Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, and, while that country remained politically and economically dependent upon the U.S.S.R., Russian troops were withdrawn from it in 1925. A further provision of note was that by which each government agreed not to permit within their territory groups whose aim was to overthrow the regime of the other by force, and not to engage in propaganda against the political and social system of the other.

These arrangements were followed by a short period of friendly Sino-Soviet relations; the Russians supported the efforts of the Peking government at treaty revision, while, in consequence of the conversations between M. Joffe and Dr Sun Yat-sen at Shanghai in 1923, Soviet political and military advisers, of whom the chief were M. Borodin and General Blucher, went to Canton and played a leading part in the administrative reorganization of the Kuomintang and in the training of its armed forces. In Manchuria, however, trouble soon arose over the Chinese Eastern Railway, largely owing to the Russian unwillingness to allow the *de facto* ruler of Manchuria, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, to transport his troops on the railway free

of charge. In January 1926 a refusal by the Russian manager of the line to permit such troop transport resulted in his arrest by Chang, but a threat of armed intervention by the U.S.S.R. procured his release. This episode confirmed Chang Tso-lin in his anti-Communist tendencies and, as his troops at that time controlled Peking, in April 1927 he raided a building used by the Soviet Embassy and seized and published a number of documents which revealed Soviet plans for bolshevizing China. This resulted in a rupture of relations between Moscow and the Peking government, which was soon followed by the breach between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. The Canton Commune of December 1927, in which the Soviet Consulate there was involved, resulted in the closing of Russian Consulates, but diplomatic relations between the Nationalist government at Nanking and the U.S.S.R. were not entirely suspended.

In 1928 Chang Tso-lin was assassinated and was succeeded in Manchuria by his son Chang Hsüeh-liang, who declared allegiance to the Kuomintang, but remained dictator in the north-eastern provinces. The 'Young Marshal' made no secret of his resolve to break the foreign monopoly of transport in Manchuria; in May 1929 he raided four Soviet Consulates in Manchuria and claimed to have discovered proof that the Soviet employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway were plotting a Communist uprising. Chang followed this up by seizing control of the railway, displacing the Russian manager and arresting some of his subordinates. The Government of the U.S.S.R. in July sent an ultimatum to Nanking demanding the reversal of these measures and the maintenance of the 1924 Treaty arrangements. A complete rupture of diplomatic and consular relations between Moscow and Nanking resulted, and in November 1929 a Russian force invaded North Manchuria, defeated Chang Hsüeh-liang's troops, and forced him to restore the arrangements about the railway agreed upon in 1924. The Chinese government in Nanking had no choice but to acquiesce in this.

Sino-Japanese Relations in Manchuria, 1922-31

These events were watched with interest by the Japanese in South Manchuria, where a number of issues had long been in dispute between Japan and China. The Chinese had built railways to compete with the Japanese South Manchuria Railway, and, owing to the depreciation of Chinese silver currency, as compared with the Japanese yen, were able to undercut it in freight rates. In other

cases the Japanese wished to build lines of strategic and commercial importance in Manchuria which the Chinese were now unwilling to permit. Japan cited various treaties and agreements on these matters, which China contended had either been exacted from her by force or else did not bear the construction Japan put upon them. These various issues, involved though they were, might have been resolved peacefully, but the Japanese Army leaders were resolved to strike, both to ensure Japanese predominance in Manchuria and to restore their prestige in Japan, which was threatened during the years 1918-30 by the growth of party government and of anti-militarist views. They cared little for the Chinese trade boycott weapon because this would affect principally the capitalist class, with which the fascist-inclined 'young officer' group was at odds, while they calculated, and, as events proved, correctly, that the world economic depression would militate against China securing any effective aid through her membership of the League of Nations. They saw China torn by factions and in no position to resist foreign armed intervention, as the Russian episode of 1929 had shown. The Soviet forces had been withdrawn when the *status quo ante* on the Chinese Eastern Railway had been restored, but the Japanese Army had no intention of confining its action to such limits. The Japanese Navy, although it had no liking for continental adventures in which it could play only a minor part, was ready to support the Army through dislike of the naval limitation treaties of Washington and London. In face of this alliance of the powerful service elements, the Japanese Minseito politicians were helpless, while the Japanese people, sorely hit by the economic crisis, were in a mood to listen to those who urged external aggression as the remedy.

The Japanese Seizure of Manchuria, 1931-33

The bomb explosion, which occurred on the South Manchuria Railway on 18 September 1931, precipitated a storm of Japanese aggression which China was quite unprepared to meet. In execution of a long prepared plan, the Japanese Kwantung (Liaotung) Army quickly got control of the chief Manchurian cities. Although the gallant stand of the Nineteenth Route Army at Shanghai, which was the scene of Sino-Japanese hostilities in the spring of 1932, was a sign of the new spirit which was beginning to animate the Chinese armed forces, internal political disunity and civil war made effective resistance impossible. By the spring of 1933 Japan had taken the four north-eastern provinces (Manchuria) and her armies were

advancing through the Great Wall passes upon Peiping. She had ignored the representations of the League of Nations and those of the United States, had rejected the report of the Lytton Commission, and had set up the State of 'Manchukuo,' nominally an independent ally, actually a puppet manipulated by Tokyo to obviate the need for outright annexation. China had pleaded her case ably before the bar of international justice and had accepted its verdict as embodied in the Lytton Report, but, with no adequate steps to uphold that verdict forthcoming from the Powers, she was reduced to making such arrangements as she could to stay the further advance of the conqueror. This was done by the Tangku Truce of 31 May 1933, which provided for a cessation of the fighting and for a demilitarized zone of some five thousand square miles in eastern Hopeh. The Truce made no mention of Manchuria or of its relations with the territory remaining under Chinese control (Fig. 4).

The Continued Aggression of Japan, 1933-37

While the Tangku Truce gave the Chinese government a breathing space and an opportunity to create a greater measure of internal unity than had heretofore been possible, in the field of Sino-Japanese relations it marked simply the end of one phase of Japanese aggression and the beginning of another. The object of the Japanese Kwantung Army leaders was to detach the five northern provinces of China—Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, and Shansi—from the control of the Chinese central government. They hoped to achieve this by a combination of force and cajolery—the latter especially applied to the Mongols of Chahar and Suiyuan as well as to the northern Chinese generally, who regretted the lost glories of Peiping and had small love for the rule of Nanking. During 1934-35 the Chinese were forced to yield to a series of fresh Japanese demands, including the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Chahar, the dismissal of the Governor of Hopeh, the abolition of the Peiping Political Council and other stipulations all directed towards the elimination of the central government from North China. In the autumn of 1935 an attempt by the notorious Japanese General Doihara to bring about a secession of the five northern provinces miscarried, but the Japanese set up an independent regime in East Hopeh, menaced Peiping with aerial demonstrations, and in December compelled the Chinese government to establish the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council, which the Japanese hoped would prove a tool in their hands. They endeavoured by large-scale smuggling of goods to undermine the customs

administration and revenues and to render nugatory the Chinese monetary reform of November 1935, and they set up a puppet Mongol regime in East Chahar. But during 1936-37 the Chinese government, though far from ready for war, had greatly strengthened their political and economic position and were, moreover, confronted by a formidable and growing popular clamour for resistance to Japan, which the events in Kwangtung and Kwangsi in the summer of 1936, and still more the Sian affair in December of that year, showed that they would be unwise to ignore or repress. The Japanese consequently found themselves faced with a stiffening Chinese opposition; Mongol troops under Kwantung Army tutelage, who invaded Suiyuan in 1936, were driven out again and the demands by the Japanese Ambassador in Nanking for reparation on account of anti-Japanese incidents, which occurred during 1936 in various parts of China, were met by Chinese counter-demands for the cessation of Japanese aggression and protection of smugglers in North China. Even the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council contrived to avoid yielding to Japanese demands for economic concessions, particularly the building of the Tientsin-Shihkiachwang railway under Japanese auspices and the exploitation by Japanese interests of the Lungyen iron mines in Chahar. Then on the night of 7-8 July 1937, the affair at Lukouchiao, near Peiping, occurred. Japan, by the Boxer Protocol of 1901, had the right to station troops in the Peiping-Tientsin railway zone, as had the other signatory Powers, but Japan had greatly increased her forces, and while indulging in provocative night manœuvres, some of these clashed with Chinese provincial troops. Attempts at a local settlement of this affray proved futile; at the end of July the Japanese made a general attack on the Chinese forces in Hopeh, and the Chinese government resolved to fight.

The Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937-41

Although in scale and intensity the Sino-Japanese conflict which began in 1937 exceeded any previous struggle between the two Powers, no formal declaration of war was made on either side until nearly four and a half years had elapsed. For China to have declared war might have been interpreted as a contravention of her obligations as a member of the League of Nations and as a signatory of the Pact of Paris of 1928. China naturally wished to take no action which might be used, however unfairly, to prejudice her case as the victim of aggression. Furthermore, a formal state of war would have

conferred upon Japan the belligerent right of intercepting and seizing contraband goods; thus her command of the East Asiatic seas would have enabled her to cut off supplies of arms and munitions to China coming by sea in neutral ships. Japan, although she had in 1935 ceased to be a member of the League, apparently did not desire to set the seal upon her aggression by declaring war, especially as such a step would have resulted in the application to her of the 'cash and carry' provisions of the United States' Neutrality Act. Also, while disappointed in her hopes of keeping the 'incident' localized in North China, Japan expected that China would soon be reduced to sue for peace terms, but those proffered by Japan at the end of 1937 were rejected by the Chinese government. The Japanese government replied, on 16 January 1938, by a declaration that they would henceforward cease to deal with the Chinese National Government and would co-operate with a new regime in China for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. The Chinese government replied that no peace terms would be accepted which encroached upon the sovereign rights and territorial and administrative integrity of China. Each government then recalled their ambassador from the capital of the other.

The establishment of various local puppet regimes by the Japanese in the occupied parts of China was followed at the end of March 1940 by the setting up of a so-called 'national government' at Nanking under the leadership of Wang Ching-wei, who had left the legitimate National Government in Chungking at the end of 1938, and come out in favour of peace with Japan on the basis of the principles laid down by the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, on 22 December of that year. These were: the recognition by China of 'Manchukuo'; an anti-Comintern agreement which would involve the stationing of Japanese troops in China, especially in Inner Mongolia; and economic collaboration, including freedom of trade and residence for Japanese in the interior of China and the exploitation by Japanese companies of Chinese resources, more particularly in North China. These terms were unacceptable to Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek and the great majority of his colleagues, and the establishment of a rival government by Wang Ching-wei and his followers resulted in their being outlawed by the legitimate government, which on 4 April 1940, appealed to all States members of the League of Nations to accord no recognition to the Wang regime. On 30 November 1940 the Japanese concluded a 'Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between China

and Japan' with this regime, which act was immediately denounced by the legitimate Chinese government, who declared that the recognition of the Nanking puppet government by any foreign Power would be considered an unfriendly act, and repeated their resolve to fight on until victory was won. Japan's entry into war with Great Britain and the United States was immediately followed, on 9 December 1941, by a declaration of war upon her by the Chinese government.

China's Appeals to the League of Nations, 1937-38

On 12 September 1937 the Chinese government appealed to the League of Nations, and invoked Articles 10, 11, and 17 of the League Covenant. The League Assembly on 6 October pronounced Japan's military operations in China to be in contravention of her obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 and the Pact of Paris of 1928, and recommended that a conference of the signatories of the former Treaty be held. The Conference met at Brussels in November. Japan, however, refused to attend, and declared that her action 'in self-defence' did not come within the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty. The Conference achieved little beyond a reaffirmation of the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty. The Chinese government, in September 1938, again appealed to the League for action against Japan; that Power declined to attend under Article 17 of the Covenant, which refusal technically brought Article 16 into operation under the provisions of which the League Members were obliged to initiate economic and financial sanctions against her. But, although this Article still remained in force, it was clear that, in the existing international situation, it would not be applied by the Member States, and the League Council could only adopt a resolution saying that it was the duty of all Members of the League to consider how far they could individually extend aid to China.

Of these, the first to do so was the U.S.S.R., whose representative had been the staunchest champion of China at the League meetings. Since the restoration of diplomatic intercourse in 1932, the relations between the U.S.S.R. and China had grown more cordial. There were, indeed, still points of difference. Thus, in 1935, the Soviet government sold their interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway to 'Manchukuo'—which in fact meant to Japan—despite repeated protests from the Chinese government. In March of the following year the Soviet government concluded a ten-year mutual assistance pact with Outer Mongolia, providing for military aid in the case of

attack. China protested that this was a violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924, but the U.S.S.R. denied that the pact meant any infringement of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia. Soviet influence had also grown markedly in the great province of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan, in consequence of Russian aid to the local Chinese authorities in quelling a Moslem rebellion there. Despite these matters, however, both China and the U.S.S.R. were well aware that they faced a common menace in the form of the aggressive designs of Japan, and particularly of her Kwantung Army, which, once firmly installed in North China, appeared likely to lose little time in turning its attention to the Far Eastern territories of the U.S.S.R. Consequently negotiations between China and the U.S.S.R. for a Non-Aggression Pact were finally successful in August 1937. After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities, the Soviet government not only concluded barter arrangements with China, by which Russian arms, including aircraft, and munitions were sent in exchange for Chinese tea, wool, tungsten, and other commodities, but also despatched pilots and technicians to China to give aid in her struggle with the Japanese invaders. It should be noted that Russian supplies went direct to Chungking and not to the Chinese Communist forces; the Soviet government, while welcoming the united Kuomintang-Communist front in China, which came into being in 1937, were careful to avoid any intervention in the delicate relations between these two parties. Nor did the U.S.S.R. take action directly against Japan; despite border clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces at Changkufeng in 1938 and the more serious affray at Nomonhan in the summer of 1939 Chinese expectations of a general Soviet-Japanese conflict were not then realized, although the fact that Japan was compelled to keep a large proportion of her best trained troops in 'Manchukuo' as a set-off to the Soviet Far Eastern Army was in itself a constant aid to China.

One factor in determining the Chinese government to maintain resistance against Japan, in spite of heavy reverses and loss of territory, was the belief that a general war would break out between the signatories of the anti-Comintern Pact (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and the Democratic Powers together with the U.S.S.R. To this latter camp China would then adhere, and so would share in a general victory over the aggressors. For the first two years of the 'China Incident' the trend appeared to be in this direction; the British and United States governments, while for different, but

equally cogent, reasons they did not see their way to active intervention on China's behalf, were in accord in their opposition to Japan's 'new order in East Asia,' and in their steadfast refusal to recognize any of her puppet regimes. On the Axis side, Germany, although for both political and commercial reasons she was far from enthusiastic over the Japanese adventure in China, took sides with Japan after the unsuccessful German mediation effort at the end of 1937. In May 1938, Germany accorded recognition to 'Manchukuo,' and in July a number of German officers who had for some years acted as instructors to the Chinese Army were compelled by the Nazi Government to leave; while the German Ambassador was recalled. Italy had from the first been openly pro-Japanese, had in 1937 withdrawn her aviation mission from China, and had been Japan's sole supporter at the Brussels Conference.

China and the Allied Nations, 1939-41

The actual circumstances of the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 were unpromising to the Chinese cause. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, while it left Japan's anti-Comintern policy in the air, enabled her to declare a policy of non-involvement in the European conflict and of concentration on the 'China Incident.' The defeat of France by Germany in 1940 emboldened Japan to intervene in French Indo-China to prevent supplies reaching China via Haiphong and the French-owned Yunnan Railway, while the British government in July 1940 was constrained to prohibit for three months the transit via Burma and Hong Kong of arms, ammunition, petrol, lorries, and railway equipment. On 13 April 1941 the U.S.S.R., alarmed at the German advance in the Balkans and the threatening concentration of German troops in Poland, concluded a Pact of Neutrality with Japan, which was accompanied by a statement in which Japan agreed to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia and the U.S.S.R. made a similar declaration in respect of 'Manchukuo.' The Chinese Foreign Office issued a statement that the four north-eastern provinces ('Manchukuo') and Mongolia were an integral part of the Republic of China and that the Soviet-Japanese declaration had no binding force upon China. With the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in June 1941, Russian aid to China was of necessity greatly diminished.

But, on 27 September 1940, a Three-Power Pact was concluded between Germany, Italy, and Japan, under which Japan recognized

German and Italian leadership in the creation of a new order in Europe, and Germany and Italy that of Japan in the creation of a new order in Eastern Asia. The Pact also provided for mutual assistance in case of attack on any of the signatories by a Power not at the time involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict. This Pact formally united the Japanese and German aggressions, and so made the Chinese cause at one with that of the democracies. The British government replied by refusing to renew the agreement closing the route through Burma and by making arrangements to link up the Burma railway system with that of China. Increased trade credits and monetary stabilization loans were also made to China by the governments of the United States and of Great Britain.

On 1 July 1941, Germany and Italy formally recognized the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking. To this the legitimate Chinese government responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with the two powers, and by declaring that China made common cause with the anti-aggressor nations. At the end of July, Japan's military occupation of southern Indo-China, by virtue of an agreement with the Vichy government, was answered by the freezing of her assets in the United States, the British Empire and Dominions, and the Netherlands East Indies. At the request of the Chinese government Chinese assets were also frozen to prevent Japan from profiting by her occupation of Chinese territory. On 9 December, following the Japanese attack upon Pearl harbour, China, in addition to declaring war upon Japan, made a separate declaration of war upon Germany and Italy, and thus became fully ranged upon the side of Great Britain and the United States.

The End of Extraterritoriality, 1943-44

The entry of China into the war as a full partner of the western democracies strengthened the hand of her government in pressing for the removal of what they considered unequal treaty provisions, while, for their part, the governments of the United States and Great Britain were willing to meet Chinese wishes in this respect. Such a step, indeed, became advisable in order to provide a moral fillip to Chungking, which was seriously perturbed at the unfortunate course of events in the Pacific and south-eastern Asiatic theatres of war during 1942. Accordingly, on 10 October 1942, the British and American governments made public their intention each to present for the consideration of the Chinese government a draft treaty for

the immediate relinquishment of extraterritorial rights and privileges in China and for the settlement of related questions.

The negotiations which ensued resulted, on 11 January 1943, in the signature of a treaty in Chungking by which Great Britain and Northern Ireland, India, and all British colonies and dependencies agreed to relinquish all extraterritorial rights in China. Under an exchange of Notes accompanying the treaty, Great Britain also relinquished her rights of coasting trade and inland navigation in Chinese waters. A similar treaty between China and the United States was on the same day signed in Washington. It was understood that the British Dominions would in due course conclude their own treaties with China; Canada, in fact, did so on 14 April 1944.

The new Sino-British and Sino-American treaties are not comprehensive instruments of trade and navigation; these remain to be negotiated. The treaties of 1943, however, do embody the principle of equality of treatment as between Chinese nationals and foreigners in China. The post-war position of foreign enterprises in China will depend upon the degree to which this principle is fully implemented—there has been some cause for uneasiness on this score; but an illiberal and restrictive attitude on the part of Chinese officialdom would not serve the true interests of China, in view of her need of foreign technical and financial assistance in the task of post-war reconstruction.

China's prestige has been much enhanced by what amounts to the termination of foreign special rights in the country, since the few powers which have not yet relinquished such rights can scarcely long retain them. China has furthermore been elevated to the status of one of the four Great Powers; the formal seal was set on this by the conference in Cairo in the latter part of 1943, between Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek, President Roosevelt, and Mr Churchill. At this conference it was decided that, upon the defeat of Japan, China should receive Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, in addition to the restoration of all Chinese territory occupied by the Japanese since July 1937.

China has thus the opportunity of emerging from the war as the leading power in the Far East, freed from the last vestiges of what she terms a 'semi-colonial status,' and with a renewed chance of realizing the programme of political, industrial, and social regeneration outlined by Sun Yat-sen. That she will in fact do this remains uncertain, for in addition to the havoc wrought by the Japanese, China remains burdened by the traditional evils of corruption and

nepotism, as well as of political faction and local separatism. The progress towards national unity consolidated and safeguarded by efficient administration which marked the period 1935-37 and continued during the first years of the Japanese invasion has, unfortunately, not been maintained. This is ominous for the future, since the defeat of Japan will not of itself remove all possibility of external dangers in a world in which the realities of power are likely to become more accentuated. Great Britain and the United States are benevolently disposed towards China, and are sincere in their desire to see her sufficiently strong and united to safeguard her own independence and to play her part in the maintenance of world peace and order. The terms of treaties and the decisions of conferences can create the opportunity for China to achieve such a position, but whether she does in fact achieve it must in the last resort rest with her own people. The hope of its achievement lies partly in the liberal and democratic outlook of a large section of the *intelligentsia*, but even more in the slow but steady growth of public opinion and in the gradual political awakening, which the war has done much to hasten, of the great masses of the people with their many sterling qualities, their proved resilience and their essential sanity.

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Chapter V

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Historical Background: The Government of 1928: War-time Government: The Kuomintang-Communist Feud: The Constitutional Movement.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the impact of the West the Chinese had accomplished the remarkable feat of uniting into one society a population of over 400 million people inhabiting a region comparable, in size and diversity of characteristics, to the continent of Europe rather than to any single country. Their unity was due, however, to a remarkably homogeneous culture, and was not dependent on any system of highly organized political institutions directed by a central government. During the nineteenth century the Chinese system fell into decay and proved unequal to the strain of resisting pressure from the outside world. A long period of humiliation culminated in a series of disasters at the end of the nineteenth century (see pp. 50-61)—the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), the Battle of the Concessions and the Boxer Rebellion (1900)—during which the Nationalist movement began under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen.

The first fruits of the Nationalist movement was the revolution which broke out on 10 October 1911, and forced the Manchu dynasty to abdicate in February 1912 (see p. 72). Before its fall the dynasty had attempted to meet the popular demand for constitutional government. A constitution was promised in an edict issued on 1 September 1906, and two years later a further edict outlined a plan of Provincial Assemblies and a National Assembly with consultative functions, and set out a nine-year programme of reforms, culminating in a constitution and full parliamentary government in 1917. The successful inauguration of these consultative assemblies intensified the agitation for the immediate adoption of a constitution. Before the end of 1910 further edicts put forward the date for summoning parliament to 1913, but on 10 October 1911 the revolution broke out and the National Assembly faded out of existence. Most of its members departed for Nanking, where the delegates of 14 provinces in rebellion had assembled

and set up a National Council to draft a constitution for the Republic of China.

The Manchu dynasty abdicated on 12 February 1912, and on the following day Sun Yat-sen, who had been elected provisional President of the Republic, resigned in favour of Yuan Shih-kai, who had endeavoured, without success, to transform the Manchu emperor into a constitutional monarch. On 10 March 1912 the National Council at Nanking adopted a provisional constitution which provided that within ten months elections were to be held for parliament, which should adopt a permanent constitution and elect a president. At these elections, which were of a somewhat farcical character, large-scale bribery ensured the return of a large majority of members of the Kuomintang—the Nationalist Party founded by Sun Yat-sen. A committee was appointed to draft a constitution, of which one chapter relating to the president was hurriedly adopted in order that Yuan Shih-kai might be elected president and inaugurated on the 'Double Tenth' anniversary, 10 October, a date which to this day retains its mystical significance in China. The draft was completed by 23 October, but the remaining chapters were not passed until 11 years later. Serious difficulties soon arose owing to the antagonism between the radicals of the Kuomintang, whose strength lay chiefly in the southern provinces, and the conservatives and militarists who were identified with the north. In the summer of 1913 the radicals instigated a rebellion known as the Second Revolution. It was quickly suppressed, and Yuan Shih-kai then decided to rule as a dictator without parliament. The Kuomintang was dissolved in November, parliament was suspended on 10 January 1914, and on 1 May 1914 a new form of government was established under a document known as the Constitutional Compact. This had been drafted by a committee with the assistance of Dr Goodnow, an American professor who had been appointed constitutional adviser to the President. The new organs of government were a Legislature (*Li Fa Yuan*) and a Council of State (*Tsan Cheng Yuan*), one of whose functions was to draft a permanent constitution which would come into force when adopted by a Citizens' Convention.

Under the vigorous rule of Yuan Shih-kai, order and prosperity were quickly restored, but unfortunately, in 1915, he committed the folly of trying to make himself emperor. The movement in favour of a monarchy, supported by the opinion of Dr Goodnow and stimulated by a skilfully engineered agitation, made rapid

progress. Rebellion, however, broke out, and eventually Yuan Shih-kai abandoned the monarchy scheme in March 1916, and died of a broken heart on 6 June 1916.

The Vice-President, Li Yuan-hung, succeeded to the Presidency. The Constitutional Compact and all Yuan Shih-kai's creations were swept away, the provisional constitution of March 1912 was restored, parliament was recalled, and the draft constitution of October 1913 was submitted for debate. There were violent differences of opinion between the radicals, who desired semi-autonomy for the provinces, and the conservatives, who favoured a more centralized form of government. Constant scenes of disorder and irresponsible and obstructive behaviour made government impossible and brought parliament into contempt. In May 1917 six military governors (Tuchuns) determined to force the abolition of parliament, and with that object in view seceded and declared the independence of the provinces they controlled. Another Tuchun, a swashbuckler named Chang Hsun, marched troops to Peking, forced the President to dissolve parliament (13 June), and on 1 July restored the young Manchu emperor to the throne. This precipitated an open breach between North and South. The Kuomintang members of parliament departed for Canton, where they organized the 'Military Government of the Republic of China' under Sun Yat-sen as generalissimo.

In Peking, Chang Hsun's movement collapsed in less than a fortnight. Nevertheless Li Yuan-hung—well-meaning but weak and vacillating—resigned, and the Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang became Acting President with a premier and a cabinet composed of members of a clique, known as the Anfu party, entirely in the pay of Japan. A presidential mandate summoned a National Council of five delegates from each province for the purpose of revising the constitution and framing a new law for the election of parliament. A new parliament—commonly called the 'bogus' parliament—was duly elected, met in August 1918, and a month later elected a new President. This was Hsü Shih-chang, a scholar of the old regime, universally respected for his probity and learning.

Meanwhile the government in Canton was weakened by serious dissensions. It was reorganized in May 1918, when Sun Yat-sen resigned from the post of generalissimo in disgust, but consented to serve on the new Administrative Council of Seven. At the end of 1918 both Peking and Canton were impressed with the urgent need of reconciliation in order to present a united front at the Paris

Peace Conference. An Internal Peace Conference opened in Shanghai in February 1919, but the policy of Japan made it certain that the differences between North and South would not be composed. The Japanese government made large loans to the Anfu government in Peking, which had set up a War Participation Bureau for the ostensible purpose of participating in the war in Europe. The proceeds of the loans were paid direct to the War Participation Bureau, and were in fact used to carry on the civil war against the South. The Shanghai conference was finally wrecked by the decision reached in Paris in May 1919 to assign the German rights in Shantung to Japan. Effective resistance to the politicians and militarists in the pay of Japan seemed impossible, and by the middle of 1920 the Canton government had completely disintegrated. The three Kuomintang stalwarts, Sun Yat-sen, T'ang Shao-yi, and Wu Ting-fang, fled to the French Concession in Shanghai, and only the chairman of the Administrative Council, Tsen Ch'un-hsuan, a rabid militarist, was left in Canton. Tsen came to terms with a northern military faction which had just ousted the Anfu government from Peking, and in October 1920 a mandate issued by the new Peking government actually announced the reunification of China. This, however, was premature, for on the day before it appeared General Ch'en Chiung-ming, a southern militarist, who at this time was supporting Sun Yat-sen, drove Tsen Ch'un-hsuan out of Canton. The three stalwarts then returned from Shanghai to Canton, the Canton government was reconstituted, and in May 1921 Sun Yat-sen was elected President of China by the remnant of the old parliament which still purported to hold sessions in Canton.

When the Anfu government was driven out of Peking in October 1920 by the faction headed by Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao K'un the 'bogus' parliament was dispersed, but Hsu Shih-chang was retained as President. A mandate ordered the election of a new parliament under the original provisional constitution of 1912. This, by implication, admitted the illegality of the 'bogus' parliament to which Hsü Shih-chang owed his election as President. His government declined rapidly in authority and prestige, and two years later (June 1922) he was forced out of office in the course of another civil war involving the whole of North China. The new faction in control of Peking restored the 'legal' parliament and the legal President, Li Yuan-hung, but a year later (June 1923) Li Yuan-hung was driven out by a new Tuchuns' combination headed by Ts'ao K'un, and for four months the functions of President were

discharged, as prescribed by the 1912 Constitution, by the cabinet. During the previous twelve months the 'legal' parliament had accomplished nothing effective. Then, under the stimulus of an orgy of bribery on a fantastic scale, it passed in a few days the Constitution which had been under discussion for eleven years, and elected Ts'ao K'un President of the Republic (5 October 1923). A year later Ts'ao K'un was driven from office in the course of another widespread civil war, which was brought to a dramatic conclusion by Feng Yu-hsiang, the 'Christian General,' who changed sides at a critical moment, seized Peking, forced Ts'ao K'un and his cabinet to resign and dispersed the legal parliament. All pretence of constitutional government was now abandoned, and for the next four years successive governments in Peking received *de facto* but not *de jure* recognition from the foreign powers. On 24 November 1924 Tuan Chi-jui, the former Anfu leader, assumed office as chief executive of the Republic of China, and on the same day a 'constitution' was promulgated by mandate, which declared the government to be provisional and concentrated all authority in the hands of the chief executive. In April 1926 Tuan was driven out of office by yet another military combination, and for the next fourteen months the only government was a Regency cabinet, or governing cabinet, which reconstructed its own body by issuing presidential mandates on its own authority. In June 1927, Chang Tso-lin, the ruler of Manchuria, placed himself at the head of the government under the title of generalissimo (*Ta Yuan Shuai*), and a new cabinet was appointed by generalissimo's mandate. A year later, on 3 June 1928, Chang Tso-lin withdrew to Manchuria, and the Kuomintang armies took peaceable possession of Peking.

Since the return of Sun Yat-sen to Canton in November 1920, the Kuomintang and the constitutionalist government in Canton had suffered almost as many vicissitudes as the government in Peking. From 1920 onwards the influence of Japan on China's domestic affairs declined, while that of Russia increased. Under the inspiration of the Comintern, Nationalist policy in domestic affairs began to move in the direction of extreme radicalism, and in foreign relations towards immediate abrogation of 'unequal treaties,' drastic curtailment of foreign rights, and the use of violence to attain those ends. The attractions of such a foreign policy outweighed the fears, which were widespread, of Communist influence in domestic policy. Sun Yat-sen's prestige rose high, Kuomintang membership increased, and southern radical politicians filled important posts in northern

administrations. Unfortunately the prospect that Sun Yat-sen might become head of a unified government in Peking was destroyed by dissensions in the South, similar to those which caused civil wars to become endemic in the North. Shortly after Sun's election in 1921 as President of the Republic by the section of the legal parliament sitting in Canton dissensions broke out between him and his chief military supporter, Ch'en Chiung-ming, and a year later Ch'en attacked Sun and drove him out of Canton. There was much confused fighting at Canton throughout the summer of 1922, but Sun eventually fled in a British gunboat to Hong Kong, and then retreated to the French Concession at Shanghai. A few months later, in January 1923, Ch'en Chiung-ming was in turn driven out by another Southern military faction, and Sun Yat-sen, who had in the meantime made contact with Soviet emissaries in Shanghai, returned once more and resumed his position as Head of the Government at Canton.

During 1923 the Comintern began supplying arms and money in large quantities to various Chinese leaders with the object of influencing them to adopt a policy aimed both at foreign 'imperialists' and at war-lords and other reactionaries. Soviet advisers were sent to Canton and helped Sun Yat-sen to reorganize the Kuomintang, and at the same time a military academy under Soviet officers and instructors was set up at Whampoa, in the neighbourhood of Canton. In the Whampoa Military Academy and the reorganized Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen and his successors were provided with a formidable politico-military machine which made the ultimate success of the Nationalist movement certain. The chosen instrument of Comintern policy in North China was the 'Christian General' Feng Yu-hsiang, who, though a poor politician, had a high reputation for skilful generalship and for the good behaviour of his troops. When Feng seized Peking in October 1924, Sun Yat-sen immediately left Canton for North China, and had all gone well there is little doubt that he would have become head of a legally established constitutionalist government in Peking. Unfortunately he was suffering from a fatal disease—cancer of the liver—and died in a Peking hospital on 12 March 1925.

No one was elected to succeed Sun Yat-sen, and the lost leader still remains President (*Tsung Li*) of the Kuomintang. The reorganization of the Kuomintang adopted at a meeting of the party—the First National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates held in Canton in January 1924—had resulted in the disappearance of the

'Military Government' (first set up in 1917 and regularly constituted in 1918), and the establishment in July 1925 of a Nationalist government so constituted as to be capable of extending its control over other provinces as they came within the Kuomintang orbit, until eventually it should become the government of all China. It was the prototype of the present National Government of the Republic of China set up after the entry of the Kuomintang army into Peking in 1928. During the first half of 1925 there were serious clashes in Canton between rival sets of militarists and between the moderate and extreme sections of the Kuomintang. These culminated in a *coup d'état* at the end of August which placed real power in the hands of two men—Chiang K'ai-shek, Commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, who is now President of China, and Wang Ching-wei, who until his death in 1944 was the renegade head of the puppet government for occupied China set up by the Japanese at Nanking. The effects of the political and military reorganization of the Kuomintang effected by Sun Yat-sen—particularly in regard to the political education of soldiers and the skilful use of slogans and other forms of propaganda—now began to make themselves felt in increasing measure. There was a great consolidation and extension of Kuomintang influence, and in July 1926 Chiang K'ai-shek led the Kuomintang army out of Canton in the long-planned Northern expedition to overthrow the militarists who were preventing the establishment of constitutional government. In September 1926 Chiang K'ai-shek reached the Yangtze, and the Nationalist government was transferred from Canton to Hankow, the great city on the Yangtze, 500 miles from its mouth.

At this stage the movement was checked by the outbreak of dissensions between the moderates and extremists. The latter with their Russian allies gained control of the party and government machinery, and in April 1927 Chiang K'ai-shek was expelled from the Kuomintang. By this time, however, public opinion was turning strongly against the extremists, and especially against the agents of the Comintern, who, it was now discovered, were merely using the Kuomintang and the Chinese Revolution as a pawn in Comintern policy. Chiang K'ai-shek set up a rival Nationalist government at Nanking, and took drastic measures against the Communists in various important cities south of the Yangtze. The Hankow regime began to disintegrate and its members to gravitate towards Nanking. In August 1927 Chiang K'ai-shek resigned and withdrew to Japan with a view to facilitating a reunion between the two wings of the

party. At this time of weakness and disunity there seemed little to choose between the Nationalists and the so-called central government in Peking, but at length, on 28 January 1928, a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was held at Nanking to give effect to terms of reconciliation that had previously been agreed upon. A new Nationalist government was appointed, a government council and a military council were set up, and Chiang K'ai-shek, who had been invited to return from Japan, was re-appointed commander-in-chief. The northern expedition was resumed in April, the armies of the northern militarists showed no disposition to fight against the Kuomintang, and Chiang's forces entered Peking unopposed on 8 June 1928. After another plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, the Law governing the Organization of the National Government of the Republic of China was promulgated, the new Government was duly inaugurated on 10 October, and the capital of China was transferred from Peking to Nanking. After the outbreak of war with Japan the seat of the Government was transferred first to Hankow and later to Chungking, where it still remains (1944).

THE GOVERNMENT OF 1928

The National Government set up in Nanking on 10 October 1928, like its predecessors the Nationalist governments at Nanking in 1927, at Hankow in 1926, and at Canton in 1925, was established not by the people of China, but by the Kuomintang acting as trustee on their behalf. This was in accordance with the political theories of Sun Yat-sen as they finally took shape after his association with the Soviet advisers in Canton in 1923. He had by this time reached the conclusion that the mass of the Chinese people would not be fit to exercise their powers under a constitutional government without a preliminary period of education and training in the actual working of democratic institutions. The revolution, therefore, could not be carried to a successful issue until firstly the power of the provincial war-lords (Tuchuns), who ruled purely by military force, had been destroyed, and secondly, the people had gone through this period of education. Sun Yat-sen was greatly impressed with the success of the Russian revolution in establishing a new social order and a new system of government. He believed that Communism was unsuited to Chinese conditions, but that the Chinese revolution might succeed if it adopted the same methods as the

Russian revolution, and that the Kuomintang—the Nationalist Party—might play the same role in China as the Communist party had played in Russia. He therefore proposed that the Kuomintang, acting on behalf of the people, should bring the revolution to a successful issue in three stages—militarism, tutelage, and constitutionalism. During the first stage the war-lords were to be eliminated and civil war brought to an end; during the second stage democratic institutions were to be established, and after the people had received sufficient education in democratic principles and sufficient training in the working of democratic institutions, they would enter upon the third and final stage of full constitutional government.

In order to fit the Kuomintang to carry out these tasks Sun Yat-sen worked out, with the help of his Soviet advisers, a scheme of reorganization which was adopted by the First National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates held at Nanking in January 1924, and which has remained substantially unchanged to the present day. The procedure is as follows:

The National Congress elects two main committees, the Central Executive Committee (C.E.C.), and the Central Supervisory Committee (C.S.C.), which together constitute the Central Party Headquarters. The head office has a large permanent staff, and is divided into a number of departments dealing with such subjects as youth, labour, propaganda, etc. The Central Supervisory Committee has a separate office, and deals with such matters as auditing, maintaining party discipline, and supervising the work of both party and government. It is not so important as the Central Executive Committee, which is the lynch-pin of the whole party and government organization. The whole political power of the Chinese people is vested in the Kuomintang, and is exercised on behalf of the people by the National Congress, which normally meets once every two years for a session which lasts about one month. When the Congress is not in session this supreme power is exercised by the Central Executive Committee, which normally holds two plenary sessions a year (attended also by members of the Central Supervisory Committee), each lasting about ten days. Between plenary sessions supreme power rests with a standing committee of the C.E.C. of from 9 to 15 persons. As the Kuomintang both appoints and controls the government, this small standing committee is the supreme directing organ in the state (Fig. 12).

The government may be appointed either by the National Congress or by the C.E.C. In 1925 the First National Congress appointed

a Nationalist government which in theory claimed to be the government of all China, but which, in fact, exercised control over a very small part of it. The seat of this government was transferred from Canton to Hankow in 1926, and to Nanking in 1927. When the Kuomintang army entered Peking unopposed in June 1928 it was announced that the stage of militarism was at an end, and the stage of tutelage would now begin. This necessitated the organization and establishment of a new government, for which 'National' instead of 'Nationalist' was held to be the more appropriate English name. A plenary session of the C.E.C. was held in August, and a law for the organization of the National Government of the Republic was promulgated on 4 October 1928. This Organic Law conformed closely to Sun Yat-sen's 'Three People's Principles' and his theory of the Five Power Constitution. The people established a government in order to secure and maintain the three principles of nationalism, democracy, and livelihood. The first of the three principles connotes equality with other sovereign states and the recovery of sovereign rights, and the last means welfare and social justice. The people possess four powers by virtue of which they are able to establish a government—namely, election, recall, initiative, and referendum—the power to elect and recall officials and the power to initiate legislation and by referendum cancel it. During the stage of tutelage their powers are exercised by the Kuomintang on behalf of the people. The government possesses five powers, namely, executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and control. The Organic Law therefore set up five Yuan to exercise these five powers. The first three powers are of course familiar in Western political science, but the last two represent an attempt to graft on to Western forms and to perpetuate two of the most admirable institutions of Imperial China, namely, the system of examinations by which able men were selected for the service of the state, and the censorate by which the throne was informed of grievances and abuses.

The government consists of the Chairman of the National Government (commonly called the President) and 24 to 36 State Counsellors, included among whom are the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the five Yuan. There are at present 28 Counsellors. The link between the party and the government is the Central Political Council, composed of members of the C.E.C. and C.S.C., many of whom also hold important posts in one or other of the five Yuan or the various ministries and commissions under the




Fig. 12. The relationship between the Kuomintang and the National Government

The National Government (X) is appointed and controlled by the Kuomintang (A) through B, C, E, or F as circumstances permit. C wields full power through F (the supreme directing organ) when neither B or E are in session. Y (46 members elected by C) is the link between Party and Government. There is considerable overlapping between X₁, X₂, C, D, E, F, and Y. There is a Ministry of War, but all military power is centred in M.

Executive Yuan. The function of the Central Political Council is to investigate and formulate proposals, submit the proposals for the decision of the C.E.C., and refer their decisions to the National Government for appropriate action. It is divided into a number of committees—political, economic, foreign relations, finance, etc.—and has a small præsidium, which also acts as a standing committee. Owing to the necessity in war-time of centralizing control of party and government affairs under the Supreme National Defence Council, the Central Political Council is at the present moment in abeyance, but presumably its functions will be restored when peace returns. The various councils and committees into which both Party and government are organized are composed largely of the same individuals. By means of what is in effect a series of interlocking directorates, the Kuomintang and the National Government together constitute governmental machinery which, though complicated in structure, has achieved a more stable and efficient administration with greater continuity of policy than any previously known in republican China.

The powers of the *President of the Republic* resemble, generally, those of the President of the United States. During the period when Lin Sen was president (1932-43) he was reduced to a figure-head, but when Chiang K'ai-shek once more became President in September 1943, the powers of the post were restored and all functionaries were made subordinate to him. Of the five Yuan much the most important is the *Executive Yuan*, which carries on the actual government of the country and settles the final drafts of bills submitted to the Legislative Yuan. There are now (1944) 12 ministries and 6 commissions under the Executive Yuan. These are as follows :

Ministries of the Interior

Foreign Affairs

Military Affairs

Finance

Economic Affairs

Education

Communications

Agriculture and Forestry

Social Affairs

Food

Justice

Conscription

Commissions on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs
Overseas Chinese
National Relief
National Conservancy
National Health Administration
National Land Administration

The *Legislative Yuan* bears no resemblance to the legislatures of Western countries (see pp. 206-8). It has from 49 to 99 members, who are appointed by the National Government and hold office for two years. Amendments to the Organic Law providing for the election of a proportion of the members by People's Associations have remained a dead letter. The Legislative Yuan has the final say on legislation, finance, war, peace, treaties and related matters, but it does not formulate policy, and in practice has little power or influence.

The *Judicial Yuan* was originally organized with a Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Administrative Court, and a Commission for the Discipline of Civil Officials (see pp. 208-9). In November 1942 the Ministry of Justice was transferred to the Executive Yuan, in order to facilitate the carrying out of necessary reforms prior to the assumption of jurisdiction over foreigners who formerly enjoyed the right of extraterritoriality. The Judicial Yuan is empowered to give uniform interpretations to laws and decrees, and to alter court sentences and legal precedents.

Neither the *Control Yuan* nor the *Examination Yuan* (see p. 225) have exercised functions as important as their titles would suggest. The Control Yuan is composed of 19 to 29 members, who may not concurrently hold any other offices. Members of the Yuan may be appointed to reside in various parts of the country, or may be detailed to examine official records with a view to detecting abuses and filing impeachments. The Examination Yuan determines the qualifications of candidates for the public service, but both the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan have been overshadowed by the Executive Yuan and by Party organs exercising similar functions.

The office of the *Comptroller-General* was set up in 1931. Like the Military Affairs Commission referred to below (see p. 186), it is not subordinate to the National Government but derives its authority direct from the Kuomintang. Its function is to prepare the budget, supervise its execution, collect statistics, and keep accounts. Estimates are prepared by the Ministry of Finance in conjunction with

the various ministries. The Comptroller-General compiles them into a budget which (up to 1937) was submitted to the Central Political Council for consideration and revision. In its final form the budget is enacted by the Legislative Yuan and the money is then apportioned by the Executive Yuan between the various services.

Provincial Governments consist of a Commission of from 7 to 9 members, under a chairman, all of whom are appointed by the National Government. With a view to breaking down provincial opposition to control by the central government, proposals are on foot to break up provinces into smaller units and to make the *hsien* or district more independent of the Provincial Government. In this connexion the Special Administrative Inspector, who acts as the link between the Provincial Government and the *hsien*, will probably play an important role. He has been active in organizing underground resistance to Japan.

Special Municipalities exist at 7 cities (5 of which are in enemy occupation) and ordinary municipalities at many other towns. They are administered by municipal councils composed of a mayor, councillors, directors, chiefs of bureaux, and 3 to 5 representatives elected by municipal assemblies.

The *hsien*, or district, is subdivided into *hsiang* (rural area), *chen* (urban area), *pao* (borough), *chia* (ward). Little progress has yet been made in introducing elective institutions into these areas.

The Organic Law of October 1928 represented a remarkable advance towards unification and stable government, but events showed that undue optimism had been shown in proclaiming the period of militarism at an end. The Kuomintang, sharing the usual fate of political parties, lost most of its previous popularity when it ceased to be the opposition and became in effect the government. When the Nationalist government was transferred to Hankow and then to Nanking the political centre of gravity moved to the Yangtze, and a nucleus of opposition grew up in Kwangsi which, under two very able leaders, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, had become the most progressive and best governed province in China. Local patriotism was strong in other provinces and a still more serious cleavage, transcending provincial boundaries, was caused by the existence of Communist groups, some of which aspired to set up independent Soviet governments. Widespread discontent was also caused by the application in local affairs of the doctrine that the party controlled the government. This doctrine, as interpreted by

youthful politicians in charge of *Tangpu* (local party offices), caused much tyrannical interference in local administration.

The failure to overcome these fissiparous tendencies had serious results. In theory the stage of militarism was over and the stage of tutelage had begun. It was urgently necessary, therefore, to reduce the number of men under arms, to transform the various provincial armies into a small national army and to place the administration and finance of the army under the centralized control of the National Government. The provincial Tuchuns, however, were willing to accept appointments as chairmen of Provincial Administrations but were unwilling to relinquish personal control of the local armies. A Military Reorganization and Disbandment Conference convened early in 1929 was a complete failure, with the result that the Military Affairs Commission remained in being while the Ministry of War under the Executive Yuan dwindled to a shadow organization with very limited authority. The Military Affairs Commission derived its authority not from the government but from the Kuomintang. It thus enjoyed equal status with the government and subsequently when war broke out with Japan in 1937 it actually for a time superseded the government.

As chairman of the National Government, Chiang K'ai-shek was the official commander-in-chief. He was also concurrently chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, and this concentration of power in the hands of one man aroused jealousy and added to the prevailing discontent. Local revolts and mutinies broke out in 1929, 1930, and 1931. The revolt in 1930, headed by Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan (known as the model Tuchun of Shansi), threatened to develop into a large-scale civil war, but the balance was tipped against the rebels by Chang Hsüeh-liang (the 'Young Marshal'), who had succeeded his father, Chang Tso-lin, as ruler of Manchuria and who intervened decisively on the side of Chiang K'ai-shek. In 1931 the fighting was not serious, but the province of Kwangtung seceded and set up an independent government at Canton on 18 May under the style of the South-west Political Council. In the autumn of 1931 an attempt was made to heal this schism in order to face the Japanese aggression on Manchuria. At a 'Unification Conference' which met at Shanghai, it was arranged that separate Party Congresses should be held simultaneously at Nanking and Canton at which identical Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees should be elected. The Fourth National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates was accordingly held at Nanking in November 1931 and

duly carried out this programme. In order to facilitate reunion and avoid plunging the country into civil war on a personal issue, Chiang K'ai-shek resigned all his posts in December 1931, thus repeating his manoeuvre of August 1927. Shortly afterwards, however, when Japanese aggression spread from Manchuria to Shanghai, he was invited to return, and on 2 March 1932 was appointed chairman of the Military Affairs Commission and concurrently commander-in-chief of the National forces. He was also subsequently appointed concurrently president of the Executive Yuan, vice-chairman of the standing committee of the C.E.C., and vice-chairman of the Central Political Council. This concentration of power, combined with the government failure to take a strong line against Japan, again caused jealousy and discontent which under the leadership of the two Kwangsi generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi broke out into open hostility in the spring of 1936. The movement, however, was checked partly by the chorus of disapproval from all parts of the country and partly by the sagacity of Chiang K'ai-shek, who insisted that such questions as the policy to be adopted towards Japan should not be settled by force of arms but should be referred for decision to a plenary session of the C.E.C. which was held in May 1936. This session marked a considerable advance towards unification. The recalcitrant Southern generals were made members of an advisory body and the South-west Political Council, which had remained in being in spite of the cancellation of independence in 1932, was now finally abolished. The Soviet government established by the Communists in Shensi constituted a grave breach in national unity, but from 1935 onwards the Communists made overtures to the Kuomintang with a view to a closing of the ranks in the face of Japanese aggression. Nothing very definite, however, had been accomplished before the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo bridge near Peiping on 7 July 1937.

WAR-TIME GOVERNMENT

When war broke out with Japan in July 1937, the Military Affairs Commission was enlarged and organized into a number of departments, both civil and military, which took over the administrative functions of the government. This, however, was an emergency measure only. A few months later civil administration was handed back to the appropriate ministries of the Executive Yuan and the Military Affairs Commission was reorganized into four departments

—operations, military administration, military training, and political—and resumed its proper functions. At the same time a Supreme National Defence Council (*Tsui-Kao Kuo-Fang Hui-I*) was organized composed of the Presidents of the Five Yuan and members of the two standing committees of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees and members of the Military Affairs Commission. The purpose was to place party, political, and military affairs under one supreme control. The Central Political Council was superseded and the Supreme National Defence Council (S.N.D.C.) became the supreme directing organ in the state. Its standing committee of 11, of which Chiang K'ai-shek is chairman, is in effect the War Cabinet.

No popularly elected assembly had been convened since the dissolution of the 'legal' parliament in 1924. The government now felt the need, however, of enlisting popular support for, and associating the people with, the energetic prosecution of the war. The first tentative step in this direction was the appointment under the S.N.D.C. of a War Senate (*Kuo-Fang Tsan-I Hui*) or Advisory Council for National Defence, composed of persons of all shades of political opinion, including the Communists. The War Senate, however, was superseded by the People's Political Council (P.P.C.), inaugurated in July 1938 in conformity with a resolution adopted by the Extraordinary Congress of Kuomintang Delegates held in Hankow in March 1938.

The People's Political Council has continued to play an active and increasingly important part as a channel for advice and a forum for ventilation of grievances, investigation of abuses, and for public discussion and criticism. The tendency has been to increase its members, enlarge its powers, and increase the proportion of members elected by the people. The P.P.C. was originally composed of 200 members, but this was later increased to 240, and the proportion directly appointed by the S.N.D.C. reduced from one-half to one-quarter. A new Council should be convened each year, and hold two full sessions in the year, but this rule has not been observed. The first P.P.C. held five sessions between July 1938 and April 1940. The second P.P.C. (enlarged to 240 members) met on 17 November 1941, and the third P.P.C. in October 1942. The life of the third P.P.C. has been prolonged, but it has recently been announced that a fourth P.P.C. with enlarged powers and members increased to 290 is to be inaugurated shortly. Of the 240 members of the P.P.C., 60 are nominated directly by the S.N.D.C.,

75 are deemed to represent Mongols, Tibetans, and Overseas Chinese, and 105 are selected by provincial, municipal, and other subordinate governments. Seven Communist members who are deemed to represent the areas under Communist control are nominated by the S.N.D.C. In occupied China, where Provincial Assemblies cannot function, the selection is made by the Provincial Government, and the party headquarters for the province. The P.P.C. holds two full sessions a year, each lasting two weeks, and appoints a standing committee of 25 to deal with matters arising between sessions. There are four sub-committees—military, foreign affairs, economic, home, political, and education. The Council has power to call for reports, to summon and interpellate ministers, to scrutinize the budget, to appoint committees for the investigation of particular problems, initiate proposals for dealing with them, and to discuss and criticize government policies before they are carried into execution. The P.P.C. has been noted for plain speaking and fearless criticism, and the government has usually shown itself responsive to public opinion thus expressed.

Coincident with this tentative approach to representative institutions, the form of the war-time government in China has become decidedly totalitarian. A National General Mobilization Act was promulgated in March 1942, covering every aspect of the national life, and adverse criticism has been roused by the trade monopolies, the ubiquitous secret police, the press censorship, and the drastic regimentation of education. The concentration of power in the hands of Chiang K'ai-shek has become more marked than before. As Chairman of the S.N.D.C., President of the Executive Yuan,¹ and Chairman of the National Military Council, he is head of the highest policy-making organ and of the highest executive organs in both the military and civil spheres. In December 1941 the powers of a dictator were formally conferred on him by a resolution of the Central Executive Committee, granting him 'supreme authority to readjust all legislation and enactments, and to take all steps for the enforcement thereof in order to expedite the dual task of resistance and reconstruction.' In September 1943 Chiang K'ai-shek was elected President (Chairman of the National Government), on the death of Lin Sen, and by an amendment to the Organic Law the powers of that office, which

¹ On 4 December 1944 T. V. Soong was appointed acting President of the Executive Yuan, in place of General Chiang K'ai-shek, who was to devote his full time to the war.

were taken away when Lin Sen was elected President in 1932, were not only restored but enlarged. The President is responsible only to the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang, but as he is himself Director-General (*Tsung Tsai*) of the Kuomintang, he is in effect responsible to no one.

The chief obstacle to the authority of the National Government and the exercise of dictatorial power continues to be the Communists who occupy an area in Shensi, in the far north-west, where they maintain a separate army and an independent administration. This disastrous schism has its origin in what has been called the Kuomintang-Communist flirtation, which followed the arrival of Soviet emissaries in Canton in 1923 to advise Sun Yat-sen on the reorganization of the Kuomintang. As stated above, the new constitution of the Kuomintang was adopted by the First National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates held in Canton in January 1924.

THE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST FEUD

The Second National Congress of Kuomintang Delegates, held in 1926, resulted in the capture of the Party machine by the left wing extremists and their Russian allies. This resulted in the Hankow-Nanking split of 1927 (see p. 114), followed by the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang and the departure of the Soviet advisers. Many Communist groups, however, were left behind in China, and from 1927 to 1937 Chiang K'ai-shek waged almost continuous campaigns in the effort to suppress them. The most important of these groups was in Kiangsi, where they set up a Soviet government. In 1934 Chiang K'ai-shek succeeded in driving them out of Kiangsi, and they then made the famous 'Long March' all round the map of China, until they finally settled down in the barren and thinly populated region on the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border, where they again set up and still maintain an independent Soviet government—the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Government. In 1935, in obedience to orders issued by the Comintern in Moscow, the Communists began making overtures to the Kuomintang for a united front against Japanese aggression. Their suggestion, however, was that the Kuomintang and the Communist party should operate as equal allies. The overtures were therefore rejected by Chiang K'ai-shek, who has consistently maintained that national unity must be restored by the submission of the Communist party to the authority of the National Government. Much discon-

tent, however, was caused by the fact that Chinese armies were fighting against each other instead of against the common enemy, Japan. It was reported that the national and provincial forces operating in Shensi had ceased fighting and were fraternizing with the Communists, and Chiang K'ai-shek proceeded himself by aeroplane to Shensi in December 1936 in order to infuse fresh vigour into the campaign. On arrival in Sian, however, he was kidnapped and held prisoner for twelve days by the commanders of the government forces. Chiang refused to yield on any point of principle, but it appears to have been agreed that the government of which he was the head would henceforth adopt a less uncompromising attitude towards the Communists and take a firmer stand against Japan. This in effect made it certain that there would be war with Japan in the near future.

On the outbreak of war in July 1937 the 'Sian Incident' bore fruit in the *modus vivendi* which was then established with the Communists. The Communist leaders issued a declaration on 22 September 1937, which announced their complete submission to the Kuomintang, and which was welcomed by Chiang K'ai-shek 'as closing the last gap in our national armour.' Communists were appointed to posts in Chungking and new names were given to Communist armies and administrations; but though liaison between the Communist party and the Kuomintang was established and is still maintained in Chungking and Yen-an, the Communist capital, it was soon found that reunification existed more on paper than in reality. The Communist armies maintained their separate organizations, and in the thinly populated regions of the north-west, denuded of civil administration by the war, Communist forms of administration were organized. There were clashes between Kuomintang and Communist troops, and each side accused the other of being more anxious to extend its own authority than to fight against the Japanese. Kuomintang contributions to Communist armies ceased after 1940, and thus the present disastrous situation developed. The best divisions in the Kuomintang armies, under Chiang K'ai-shek's most trusted general, are not fighting against the Japanese, but are employed in maintaining a strict blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning border region. This has a population of two millions, and maintains an army of 40,000 men, and it is asserted that other Communist 'anti-Japanese regions,' with a total population of 80 millions and armies numbering 470,000, have been established throughout north, central, and south China right down to Kwangtung.

Since 1937 the attitude of the Communists has been that their aims can be attained by realizing the Three People's Principles, and that they desire to co-operate with the Kuomintang; but they insist that the Kuomintang should also co-operate and should show its sincerity by making democracy a reality and not a sham; they demand that self-government based on popularly elected assemblies should be established, beginning at the bottom, namely, in villages and districts, as enjoined by Sun Yat-sen, instead of at the top; that there should be freedom of speech, publication, and assembly; that immediate measures should be taken to redistribute the land, prevent accumulations of wealth, and improve opportunities for education; that dictatorship by a single party should cease, and that the Communist party should have legal status and not merely be tolerated as at present. Further specific demands are that the Shen-Kan-Ning Border region and the other 'anti-Japanese regions' should be recognized as local autonomous governments, and that the blockade should be raised and the Border government allowed to maintain five armies with 16 divisions. The Kuomintang leaders in reply insist on national unity; they are willing to concede autonomy, legal status, and an army of 10 (instead of 16) divisions, but insist that the Communist areas must be under the Executive Yuan, and the Communist armies under the complete control of the National Military Council. Negotiations for a settlement have been in progress for some years, but none is in sight, because each side mistrusts the intentions, military and political, of the other.

Much of the distrust of the Communists is due to their fear that they will be placed permanently at a disadvantage if, as is at present intended, the draft constitution promulgated in 1935 is put into effect when the war ends. Their opponents claim that a special responsibility will rest on the Kuomintang to defend the fundamental doctrine in the Constitution that China is to be a republic based on Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, and Chiang K'ai-shek has declared that when tutelage ceases the Kuomintang will be on an equal footing with other parties, but must continue to shoulder the major responsibilities for the political evolution of the people.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

The aim of the Nationalist movement led by Sun Yat-sen was to substitute constitutional government for the traditional system of rule by an emperor entrusted with the Mandate of Heaven to secure

the welfare of the people by calling able men to assist him in the administration of the empire. In the early days of the movement constitutional government seemed to be synonymous with parliamentary democracy, and the reformers and revolutionaries made it their chief aim to agitate for the immediate election of a parliament. This object was achieved when under the provisional constitution of 10 March 1912 a parliament was elected. This parliament—the 'legal' parliament—had a discreditable history, and was finally dispersed for the last time by Feng Yu-hsiang's *coup d'état* in 1924. By that time experience had converted Sun Yat-sen to the view that parliamentary democracy, equally with Communism, was unsuited to Chinese conditions, and that no constitutions could be successfully worked in China unless, in Plato's phrase, it sprang from the dispositions of the citizens. The mass of the Chinese people were apathetic only in the sense that, having very clear ideas of the sort of government they wanted, they were content to leave the actual work of government to a small *élite*, provided there was some way of ensuring that it would be composed of persons fit to discharge such a responsibility. The relationship of people and rulers was in Sun's view similar to that of the shareholders and directors of a limited liability company. He distinguished between *Ch'uan* (sovereignty) and *Neng* (ability). The people possessed *Ch'uan*, but only the government possessed *Neng*, and from this followed the theory (see p. 181) of the four powers belonging to the people and the five powers belonging to the government. The people used their four powers to choose the persons who should exercise the five powers of the government, but the use of their powers by a people unfamiliar with the constitutional idea caused the disasters of the period following the fall of the empire. Sun thus hit upon the idea of tutelage. The Kuomintang comprised all the politically conscious persons in China. Every shade of political opinion was represented, and policy would be debated and acts of government discussed and criticized from every angle. Therefore the Kuomintang, suitably organized for the purpose, should exercise the four powers on behalf of the people, and, acting as their trustee, appoint and control the government. After a period of tutelage the people would have received sufficient training in the working of constitutional government; they would exercise their powers themselves, and the trusteeship of the Kuomintang would come to an end. Sun attached great importance to the application of these ideas in local government. It was by the exercise of their

four powers in village, town, and district assemblies that the people would receive their training and become fit to appoint and control a national government; but from the time of the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1923 Sun ceased apparently to identify constitutionalism with parliamentary government. Neither in the Organic Law of 1928 nor in any of the subsequent provisional draft constitutions is any provision made for elected parliaments.

The Organic Law of October 1928 (see p. 181) gave effect to Sun Yat-sen's idea that the Kuomintang should establish and control the National Government, but no sooner had this been accomplished than agitation for an immediate advance to full constitutional government began. This was in part met by the summoning of a National People's Convention in May 1931, which adopted a provisional constitution deemed to be appropriate for the period of tutelage, and this was followed by the appointment of a committee to draft a permanent constitution. During the next three years successive drafts were published and formed the subject of almost continuous debate and criticism in the Press and of almost continuous discussions in various committees and councils. The fifth and final draft was published in May 1936, and a plenary session of the C.E.C. decided that it should be submitted for final approval by a National People's Congress to be convened in November 1936.

Good reasons were found for postponing the convening of the Congress from year to year, until eventually in 1940 it was postponed *sine die*. This decision, however, could not be maintained in face of the growing pressure of public opinion stimulated by the Communist demand that democracy be made a reality and not a sham. In September 1943 it was accordingly decided that a National People's Congress should be convened within one year of the end of the war in order to adopt and promulgate a permanent constitution. A Committee for the Promotion of Constitutional Government was set up and the process of revising the 'final' draft of 1936 by means of public discussion began again.

To Western eyes it seems that the chief objection to promulgating the permanent constitution in the near future is that the people have not yet had any training in the use of the franchise and that any attempt to elect a National People's Congress would probably be as farcical and as disastrous as the elections to parliament in the decade after the fall of the Manchus. Sun Yat-sen directed that there should first be village and district councils elected by the people, that constitutional government should be inaugurated only after the people

had thus gained experience in local self-government. Many misleading statistics have been published, but it is certain that the provisional local councils which have so far been established are composed of local gentry and persons of influence nominated by the government. The paucity of qualified candidates makes anything like an election impossible. The villages of China have from the earliest times been the home and nursery of democratic self-government; but it is democracy in the Chinese and not the Western tradition, and attempts to make it flow in Western moulds have so far been unsuccessful.

Another Western criticism is that the proposed permanent constitution seems designed to perpetuate, under cover of the distinction between *Ch'uan* and *Neng*, a dictatorial form of government. This, however, may well be the kind of constitution that springs naturally from the dispositions of the Chinese people, and it probably corresponds with the considered views of Sun Yat-sen. The National People's Congress elects the Presidents and members of the Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan, while the Presidents of the Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, and Examination Yuan are appointed by the President of the Republic. The Congress meets once every three years and remains in session for one month only. There will thus be very little check on the power of the President of the Republic backed by the Presidents of the Executive, Judicial, and Examination Yuns. It may therefore prove that under the proposed permanent constitution there may be fewer checks on the government and less opportunity for public criticism than under the present Five-Power Constitution.

The main objection of the Communists is that it is not at all certain that the dictatorship of the Kuomintang will really come to an end even after the permanent constitution has been adopted. They also insist that the safeguards for such fundamental democratic rights as freedom of speech, publication, and political organization are illusory, and that no adequate provision is made for the reform of land tenure or regulation of conditions of labour. The Communists claim that in the Border region all grades of councils are elected by the people by a system of general franchise, but it is difficult to believe that the same obstacles to holding elections do not exist in the Border region as in Kuomintang China. The type of local government would seem to be authoritarian, for the councils cease to exist after the village or municipal governments have been elected. One of the fundamental doctrines of the Communist party

is that power must not be given to the opponents of democracy. In the Border region 'traitors' are not allowed to vote, party control over elections and candidates is complete, and no one becomes a member of any electoral or administrative body whom the Communist leaders wish to exclude. It is often said that the Communist movement in China is merely an agrarian movement, and that the Chinese Communists are not really Communists at all. As regards the rank and file that may be true, for the Chinese peasant is not politically minded. The leaders, however, have always maintained that they are Leninist Marxians, and that Communism in China is part of the world Communist movement. Their immediate policy is one of expediency and party tactics in both political and economic affairs. This, of course, is in full accord with Marxian teaching. They declare that the object of their policy can be attained by the application of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, and they are not at present attempting to carry out a full Communist policy, including state ownership and collectivization of farms, because they realize that China is not yet ripe for such developments. Their ultimate objectives, however, are definitely Communistic. It is generally admitted that the Communist leaders in the Border region are men of high character, great ability, and lofty ideals. They have been more successful than the Kuomintang in dealing with such fundamental problems as land reform and education, and in general with putting into practice Sun Yat-sen's ideal of social justice. It is, however, easier to deal with such problems in a poor and thinly inhabited region and in relation to a population of only two millions. If Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh were faced with similar problems in a vast and densely populated country where, in a population of 450 millions, powerful vested interests were strongly entrenched, it is at least doubtful whether they could have been more successful than such a consummate statesman and politician as Chiang K'ai-shek.

For Bibliographical Note, see pp. 154-5.

Chapter VI

THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM

Historical Background : The Confucian Canon ; The Emergence of Law from Moral and Political Doctrine ; The Development of Legislative Institutions.

The Legal System under the Republic : Developments under the National Government ; The Legislative Yuan ; The Judicial Yuan.

Courts, Police, and Prisons : Courts ; Police ; Prisons.

Bibliographical Note.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Any student of Chinese legal institutions can only proceed safely by discarding at the outset those fundamentals of Western law which are axiomatic for all European nations. The basis of the Far Eastern system is essentially different from that of the West.

The Confucian Canon

The Chinese themselves base the early system of law on the Confucian Canon. This canon, it should be remembered, did not begin with Confucius (551-497 B.C.) but was set in order by him. Such legal procedure as there was in remote times in China was part of a complex nation-family structure which has been at once the strength and weakness of the Chinese throughout the many vicissitudes of their history.

The basic conception on which the social and legal structure of ancient China was reared was that of *Li*. This term has been variously translated as 'ceremonial,' 'that which ought morally to be done,' 'that which is conformable with a good social order,' 'in tune with the universal harmony,' and so on. Professor Hu Shih considers that the German *Sittlichkeit* comes as near the meaning as any single word can. If *Li* is practised generally among the people then nothing else is necessary 'for things lost on the highway will not be picked up by others,' and 'each man will consider his neighbour's good as his own.'

In its simplest form the original basis of this ideal is set out in the *Ta Hsueh* ('The Great Learning') (see vol. i, p. 386).

'The men of old who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue through the kingdom first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states they first regulated their families. Wishing to

regulate their families they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.

'Things being investigated knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated their families were regulated. Their families being regulated their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy.'

'Families regulated and states rightly governed' is thus an ancient axiom in Chinese thought. The regulation of the family was dependent on the cultivation of the individual personality. For so long as the people could be persuaded of this truth no complicated legal apparatus was necessary in the affairs of state.

The putting into effect of the principles enunciated in this quotation from the first manual of the Confucian Canon is the Chinese 'orthodox conception' of law and legal procedure. The emperor was the father of his people, the head of the family must be regulated by the cultivation of the individual's own personality. The emperor received the mandate of Heaven; he was the Pole Star, lone and immobile, round which all the other stars made their ordered way. This was an effort to realize the harmony between the natural order of Heaven and that of man. The ideas of natural rhythm and social authority dominated all the conceptions of the early Chinese. The ordered progression of the seasons and the celestial bodies must be paralleled by the activities of mankind. Rites and ceremonies defined the necessary distinctions in the social order; music showed the way to men to achieve the rhythm of the spheres.

In the great history of Ssü-ma Ch'ien (second century B.C.) it is categorically stated that 'Rites and music, punishments and laws have a common and unique aim; it is by means of them that the hearts of the people are united and from them issues the method by which they are governed.' It is, therefore, in the development of rites and music that the social order is assured and a just application of 'rewards and punishments' (the traditional antithesis of Chinese philosophical literature) brought into being. But in this conception there is no place for law in the Roman sense of that term. Nor

does there exist, properly speaking, a system of individual rights sanctioned and guaranteed by law. The whole scheme is one of duties, of mutual arrangements governed by principles of order and responsibility, and from the proper fulfilment of his duties by each citizen emerges the national harmony so highly esteemed by the ancients. In the *Lun Yü* (Analects) of Confucius (I. 2. iii) the whole matter is summed up thus :

‘ Confucius said, “ If the people be led by laws and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishments but will have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue and uniformity sought to be given to them by the rules of propriety they will have the sense of shame and moreover will become good.” ’

In the ancient *Shu Ching* (Book of History) the principle laid down reads : ‘ Punish in order that there may be nothing more to punish.’

Now this Confucian teaching of the superiority of rites to law, founded on conceptions elaborated over a long period of time, still lives vigorously in the consciousness of the Chinese people. When it marches in step with the current provisions of the law, well and good, but no appeal to the law or demand for one’s rights is considered ‘ good form ’ in China. The principle of *Yang* or ‘ yielding ’ is essentially a ‘ rites-principle ’ and will take precedence over any mere principle of law. It is preferable to give way rather than to insist on the letter of the law. If all yield there will be no place, no need, for law.

The Emergence of Law from Moral and Political Doctrine

The development of rites and music was dependent upon a perfect understanding of human relationships. But this understanding must depend, in its turn, on perfect definition, on logical method, and this latter consisted above all on the so-called ‘ rectification of terms.’ Herein lies the essential principle of the Chinese juridical mentality.

Several different philosophers (and not all of them of the Confucian school) have elaborated the theme, ‘ No subject can be properly discussed until exact terms are used ; no terms can become exact until the rectification of terms principle has shown a complete identity between individual conception and the terms used to represent them.’

Briefly stated, the theory of ‘ rectification of terms ’ consists in holding that each thing, condition, or relation shall receive a name

exactly suited to it, and the power inherent in this name will operate conformably with its orientation in the natural scheme of things. To speak a name is to evoke this power.

Yin Wen-tzu, however, in the post-Confucian years attributed a different province to the rectification of names. There was at this time a school of thought called the Legalist School (*Fa Chia*), and Yin Wen-tzu related the conception of rectification to the ideas of the legalists. For the school of law the rectification of terms had for its aim the giving of an invariable value to legalist terminology. Yin Wen-tzu said :

‘A term is that which names a corporeal entity and this entity corresponds with its name. . . . Good names determine that which is good, bad names determine that which is bad. . . . The term must belong to the entity and each subject must have differentiation from each other subject. . . . Thus men evaluate sizes and capacities by measurements, weights by scales, and by musical scales they regulate high and low notes. By means of names they delimit the spheres of the actual and the non-existent, by means of law they define good government and anarchy. . . . It is by these means that the stupid, the rebellious, the deaf and the blind can be governed together with those endowed with intelligence and discernment, hearing and sight.’

It should be remembered that although Confucius was contemporary with the Greek philosophers who developed juridical conceptions, the principles enunciated by Confucius were the legacy of earlier ages : ‘I am a transmitter and not a maker,’ as he himself said. Any comparisons, therefore, between the Confucian code and that of the Greek lawmakers will be wrong in time, but in time only.

Briefly, then, the early Chinese not only had the inner conception of a natural law system which was seen as translating the order of the universe into the social order of mankind, but to all intents and purposes they had actually put this natural law into action. From it they drew forth—and they still draw—technical solutions of positive law. This was almost the position of the ancient Greeks. In his *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence*, Sir Paul Vinogradoff justly remarks that it is characteristic of the development of juridical ideas in ancient Greece that the law of nature although invoked in the philosophic explanation of concrete facts, is not used in the development of concrete juridical deductions. According to Vinogradoff, this attitude of the ancient Greek schools of philosophy was

the consequence of a powerful feeling of equity in the jurisdiction of the democratic tribunals of the classical period. The popular juries thus enjoyed a wide latitude in their interpretation and application of primitive law.

Such, in fact, was, and still is, the case in China. Those trained in the Confucian tradition referred everything to the inner basic standard of the law of nature, even where there was a legal ruling, and even precedent. Moreover, as laws and statutes began to emerge from the purely moral and political doctrine which stood as the basis of Confucianism in practice, it became increasingly obvious that these enactments bore the imprint of the Confucian morality—they were conceived by men who had undergone the same training as the magistrates whose duty it would now be to administer the law. Even when Buddhism introduced its special laws and regulations governing its priesthood and laity, these codes were, from time to time, modified to bring them into line with the Chinese conception of that inner consciousness which had become identified with the law of nature. None the less, as Buddhism extended its hold upon the Chinese people, that faith did exert a somewhat radical influence upon the existing Chinese code. Under the Han dynasty at the beginning of the Christian era the law was severe and punishments were heavy. The introduction of the interdiction of the Buddhists' 'Thou shalt not kill' took some time to achieve its full effect, but by the Liang dynasty (A.D. 502-556) the impregnation by Buddhist ideals had affected the Chinese legal code so deeply that the laws were much less harsh and the penalties greatly lightened.

The Development of Legislative Institutions

It is a fact that from the earliest times there have existed in China legal provisions (whether codified or not). It is necessary to bear this fact in mind in reviewing the modern labours of codification as this long period of traditional legal provisions had its due effect on the development of China's modern legal system.

Chinese legal authorities group all Chinese legal enactments and statutes under four heads: *Lü*, *Ling*, *K'o*, and *Fa*.

(1) *Lü* is the term used to express the notion of permanent law or unchanging rule. The word is used for permanent enactments and Imperial codes.

(2) *Ling* has the sense of proclamation, instruction (to the people), command, order, etc. This covers detailed legal provisions and leaves aside all questions of general or abstract law.

(3) *K'o* has, as its primary sense, classification, rule, measure, etc., and is used for regulations of a particular and fairly restricted application.

(4) *Fa* has much in common with *Lü*. It connotes constant rules, regulations, and principles; uniform and abstract enunciations of invariable laws and statutes.

Leaving apart the studies on the semi-historical period (when laws were indeed in existence and enforced) and the legal references in the Book of History and the *Tso Chuan*, important as these are to the historian, we come to firm ground in the period of the 'Warring States' with the publication of the *Fa Ching* in six sections edited by Li K'uei for the Marquis Wen of the state of Wei (424-387 B.C.). This work was a compilation of the various legal codes then in force in the states neighbouring Wei. The six sections dealt respectively with (1) theft, (2) brigandage, (3) imprisonment, (4) procedure, (5) various enactments, (6) definitions.

This division is of particular interest as it contains elements which have persisted through the centuries unchanged. Section (5), for example, appears intact as part of the *Legal Code of the Great Ch'ing Dynasty* in the final edition (1910) of that work. Section (6) now heads the published *Codes* under the new title of *Ming Li Lü*, General Legal Principles.

From this time forward those elements began to appear which were to make up the traditional composition of the various dynastic codes. From the time of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 220) each succeeding dynasty developed the practice of issuing a dynastic code whether any changes, fundamental or superficial, were made or not. The Han dynasty did, in fact, add three new texts to the existing code dealing respectively with murder, mortal wounding, and a different type of theft. In addition further supplements to the earlier promulgations appeared and were incorporated therein. These dealt with (1) census matters, family affairs, marriage, etc., (2) laws on dues, taxes, tribute, etc., and (3) laws concerning the Imperial stables, the army, transport, etc.

The intervening centuries up to the beginning of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618-908) did little but change the severity of some of the penal laws in accordance with the tenets of Buddhism, whose influence was rapidly growing throughout the Empire. But from the T'ang dynasty our information is more detailed. In the early years of the dynasty the existing codes were completely revised and remodelled by Imperial order, and a horde of scholars set to work

to write a fully detailed commentary on the finished work. The T'ang Code had the following twelve sections: (1) General laws; (2) The Imperial Guard and prohibitions; (3) Duties of officials; (4) Census and marriage; (5) Regulations governing the public treasury; (6) Imperial stables and military institutions; (7) Theft and brigandage; (8) Quarrels and attacks (calumnious accusations, etc.); (9) Torts; (10) Various laws; (11) Arrest of fugitives; (12) Prisoners on remand.

This code had great influence beyond the confines of China. Neighbouring countries were so impressed by the comprehensiveness of the code that its broad outlines were adopted as a basis for the local codes.

The Sung dynasty rearranged the T'ang Code and subdivided it into 20 sections without, however, materially altering the content. Nothing of outstanding importance occurred until the Ming Code of 1509 or 1511. For the preparation of this truly stupendous compilation a committee of scholars and legal experts spent several years revising every section and rewriting much of the old commentary. Moreover, the Mings reverted to the purely Chinese tradition, removing from the Code everything which had been added during the Mongol dynasty as tending to adapt the Sung Code to Mongol manners and customary law. The *Ta Ming Lü*, the first authentic Ming Code, appeared in 1373, and it was upon this basis that the final Ming Code was built. The Ming Code strongly influenced the national codes of Korea and Japan.

The last great juridical production of the Empire was the *Ta Ch'ing Lü Li*, the Legal Code of the Manchu dynasty, first published in 1646. It was not until 1740, however, that its final title was given to it. A partial translation of the 1801 edition of this Code was published by Sir George Staunton. It was the 1890 edition which was in force during the declining years of the dynasty until the reforms of 1910 brought about changes radical in their far-reaching effects. The *Ta Ch'ing Lü Li* had 40 sections, many of these being new in substance and form, not mere subdivisions of older sections.

The great corpus of Imperial China, the *Ta Ch'ing Lü Li* is thus a work which exhibits the sum total of Chinese legislative ideas, practice, and experience from the remote beginnings up to its modern codification as a legal system comparable with those of the West. It is manifestly the T'ang dynasty Code which has formed the basis of this ancient legislation. It is equally clear that the T'ang

Code derived from the distant legislative enactments of the 'Warring States' period, a few centuries after Confucius, even as these latter were built up on the pre-Confucian traditional law and fixed court ceremonial and regulations.

The complete editions of the Chinese codes are remarkably comprehensive. They have, in bold type, the text of the laws and statutes accompanied by a triple commentary. Inserted into the text but in smaller type is the so-called 'official' commentary, and this has equal authority with the main text. There is, in addition, an 'explanatory' commentary in simpler prose style for the assistance of students and non-expert readers. The 'upper' commentary, which appears on the top margin of the pages (much as our explanatory footnotes appear at the bottom of our pages), contains ordinances, jurists' opinions and comments and case-records serving as precedents. The whole of the public and private legislation of the whole length of Imperial Chinese history is to be found herein; administrative and penal law, sacrifices and rites and ceremonies, military organization and law, public works, a well-developed penal code, rules governing marriage and succession, landed property, civil responsibility—all minutely dealt with in company with a mass of detail as to precedent over two thousand years.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM UNDER THE REPUBLIC

The vast and deep-seated changes which had gradually forced a new position in world affairs upon China made themselves felt in the domain of law. The Manchus were aware of grave disturbances among the people, and at last, in a belated effort to save the dynasty, reforms were instituted with a view to placating the people. In 1908 a general revision of the Imperial Code was undertaken, a revision which was not completed until 1910. The three main reforms were:

- (1) The bastinado (already abolished in 1905 on the proposals of various jurists and political leaders) was definitely rejected from the Code.

- (2) Penal punishments for civil offences were suppressed.

- (3) Many provisions still in the code, although they were out-of-date, were dropped by the revising authorities as survivals from a past with widely different social and political conditions.

The monumental Code of the Manchu dynasty is still of prime

importance, not merely to students of legal history and development but also to students of present-day China. The numerous attempts, during the early years of this century, to unseat the Manchu regime were so regularly unsuccessful that the success of the Chinese Revolution of 1911-12 caught the country and many of its leaders all unprepared. The old penal and civil codes, in spite of the revolutionists' distaste for everything surviving from the Empire, remained in force as there was no time, no opportunity, to prepare a new one which should give effect to the ideals of the Republicans. Even in 1931 some of the provisions of the Civil Code were still in force although in that year a Republican Civil Code was promulgated.

To all intents and purposes the *Ta Ch'ing Lü Li* enshrined in a legislative sense thirty centuries of civilization. To-day of this great store there exists, officially, merely the body of rules and traditional enactments proper to the Chinese spirit of all time as fit to be incorporated in the modern code.

Modern codification of law is about forty years old in China. At first the attempt at codification was nothing more than a groping about for a method, and during this period a tendency towards an almost literal translation of Western legal codes made itself evident. The work of codification at the beginning was almost entirely in the hands of law students returned from Japan and other countries where they had studied codes meant for other peoples and in their essence somewhat alien to the Chinese spirit as it had developed through the ages. This first stage did not last long, however, as it soon became evident that wholesale transplantation of Western codes on Chinese soil could hardly meet the needs of the citizens of the Republic.

Developments under the National Government

A second period opened in 1928 and was distinguished by the gradual appearance of codes and laws, now in force, on the basis of principles long recognized in Chinese jurisprudence. At the same time the Chinese legal authorities recognized that although it would not do to import European or American legal systems as they stood, there were, nevertheless, good points in them which were lacking in their own. A slow process of selection began, and on the groundwork of the inherently logical traditional law of the Chinese was built up a new codified legal system by a 'trial and error' method. Custom reasserted itself and assumed once more its role as the

living source of law. The reforms of the final years of the Manchu dynasty were given the same consideration as the newer ideals seen in the legal systems of the West, and an enlightened eclecticism got to work on the mass of material available. This process is still going on under our eyes, and its only logical end will be the establishment in China of a juridical system which will be chiefly Chinese.

The high lights of the modern Chinese legal system are as follows. A decree of Sun Yat-sen on 10 March 1912 promulgated the Penal Code of the Imperial Commission (with certain alterations) under the title of New Provisional Penal Code (*Chan Hsing Hsin Hsing Lü*). This was again modified in December 1914, and thereafter remained in force until its replacement by the Penal Code of 1928.

The codification Commission having been reorganized at Nanking in November 1927, it was then attached to the Ministry of Justice. In the following year the Legislative Bureau was formed, but this Bureau disappeared in October 1928 with the coming into force of the organic laws of the National Government. The present legal authority of the National Government the Legislative Yuan (Council or Assembly)—*Li Fa Yuan*—entered on its functions in December 1928.

The Legislative Yuan

China is now in the second stage of development, as laid down by Sun Yat-sen, viz. that of political tutelage (see p. 180). The generality of the Chinese people have to be prepared for democracy. During this period many of the powers which normally belong to a constitutional government are exercised by various organs of the Kuomintang. The onset of the war with Japan indefinitely prolonged the life and authority of these National Party organs, and the present arrangement is that within one year of the cessation of hostilities the Kuomintang shall automatically become one of the parties in the government which shall be a democratic one. In the meantime the whole direction of the country's effort is in the hands of the Kuomintang and the subordinate instruments of that party, and there is consequently a constant interpenetration of the organs of the party and of those of the government. These difficulties extend to all subdivisions of the government, and the Legislative Yuan is no exception. It is not easy, therefore, to find one's way through the multiplicity of legislative enactments now applicable in the country. A general summary of these is as follows :

(1) The deliberations, directions, resolutions, etc., of successive Congresses of the Kuomintang and by its various committees from January 1924 to date.

(2) The provisional constitution of 1 June 1931.

(3) The Organic Law of the National Government, promulgated on 1 July 1925, but several times revised since that date.

(4) The various texts defining the organization and the powers of the legislative Yuan.

(5) Various enactments specially concerned with legislative technique.

(6) Various texts relating to the keeping in being of laws emanating from earlier governments, and ministerial decrees in connexion therewith.

(7) The enactments upon the application of laws in general.

(8) The enactments concerning the applicability of new laws and the supersession or modification of older existing regulations.

(9) Various complementary texts dealing with regulations governing the forms of official documents, reports, etc., including public and official journals.

Briefly, the procedure followed in giving effect to legal enactments and statutes falls under four heads :

(a) All legislative provisions of importance, including those which have particular interest, politically, for the Kuomintang as a whole (*e.g.* national economy, citizens' rights, etc.), form the subject of debates in principle at the various meetings of the Kuomintang. (As an example of this the Congress of 1924 passed resolutions on the equality of the sexes before the law.)

(b) The Legislative Yuan receives direct proposals for legislative action. These come from the Central Political Council, from the government, from the Executive Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan as well as from its own members (to the number of five at least).

(c) Once the text of a legal proposal is prepared and passed by the Legislative Yuan it is submitted to the Central Political Council in order that this body may exercise its right of 'examination and verification,' particularly in regard to the 'principles governing legislation.' The Council may return the text for revision if it considers there are grounds for modification. Such a step is, however, only taken if it is considered absolutely necessary, and then only in the period prior to the promulgation of the law.

(d) Promulgation of the law is made by the National Government in the form of a decree (*Ming Ling*) and bearing the signature of the President. This decree is effective only after the signature of the President of the Legislative Yuan has been appended, together with those of the heads of the interested Ministries.

The war with Japan has, naturally, hindered the development of many of the reforms proposed by the Chinese Republic since its assumption of power. Nowhere, perhaps, is this more clearly seen than in the sphere of law. Several separate efforts were made between 1931 and 1935 to get beyond the stage of a 'provisional' code and to make a characteristically Chinese compromise between the existing Imperial Code and a radically Republican corpus. Although now a working system has indeed been adopted and the country has, for its present needs, an adequate legal system, the Chinese legal experts are far from satisfied, and are busily working with an eye on the future.

When the nations of the West began to give up, voluntarily, their extraterritorial rights in China it became obvious that a new responsibility devolved upon Chinese legists and magistrates. The current and operative Code was examined for clauses which might stand in need of revision or deletion, and it is not yet possible to do more than say that China has determined that no nation shall have cause to regret the voluntary relinquishment of this long-standing right. The Code is constantly in process of revision (witness the introduction of the Habeas Corpus principle in August 1944). With so much to do and so many obstacles in her path in the present period of conflict, it is likely to be some years before a completely satisfactory Republican Code comparable with the *Ta Ch'ing Lü Li* can be produced.

The Judicial Yuan

The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of the National Government and is responsible to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, which appoints its President and Vice-President. The Yuan is composed of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Court, and the Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Police Functionaries. The Ministry of Justice, which used to be part of the Yuan, was transferred to the Executive Yuan in November 1942.

The President of the Judicial Yuan is concurrently President of the Supreme Court and the Vice-President is concurrently chairman of the Central Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of

Public Functionaries. The President of the Yuan may, whenever he deems it necessary, personally conduct and dispose of trials before the Administrative Court or the Central Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Functionaries.

In the Judicial Yuan is unified the power of interpreting all laws and orders and the power of revising and altering Court sentences. In addition the Yuan may introduce in the Legislative Yuan bills on matters within its own competence, may petition the chairman of the National Government for amnesties, mitigation of sentence, or restitution of civil rights.

The internal organization of the Judicial Yuan consists of the Councillors' office and the secretariat which attend separately to official matters. Attached to the Yuan are the Committee for the Study of Laws and Regulations (which carries on research work on all such statutes in force) and the Judicial Officers' Training Institute.

Judicial Officials. The Judicial Officials' Training Institute aims at instilling Kuomintang principles in the trainees. The period of training varies from two months to one year. Particular emphasis is laid on fostering the trainees' courage and *esprit de corps* in face of danger and difficulty as well as on military and academic subjects. There are eight classes of judicial workers who are called upon to attend the Institute in turn :

(1) Those who have passed the high examination for judicial officials.

(2) Those who have passed the extraordinary high examination for judicial officials.

(3) Those who have passed the extraordinary examination for judicial officials.

(4) Former workers in the central and local party organs who have passed the judicial officials' examination held especially for their benefit.

(5) Workers in central party organs who have been examined and chosen by the central authorities.

(6) Active judicial officials.

(7) Assistant judges, court clerks, jail wardens.

(8) Those who have passed the entrance examination of the Judicial Officials' Training Institute.

Chinese judges are appointed from among successful candidates in government examinations for judicial officials. Following the abolition of consular jurisdiction in China there will be a demand

for judicial officials qualified to handle cases involving foreign nationals. Those legal experts and judiciary officers who are well versed in foreign languages have been registered for service in the appropriate High Courts.

COURTS, POLICE, AND PRISONS

Courts

The operative Chinese judicial system has three grades of courts and allows three trials. The three grades are (a) the District Court, (b) the High Court, and (c) the Supreme Court. Except for criminal cases and cases involving the engineering of domestic disturbance, provocation of external dangers detrimental to the country's foreign relations (the first trials of which cases are held in the High Court), the initial trials of all legal processes are held in the District Courts, in the *hsien* judicial section or by the *hsien* governments. Second trials are held in the High Court or in one of its branches. Only two trials are allowed in minor cases.

According to the 'Organic Law of Chinese Courts' there should be a court in each *hsien* and municipality. Several small *hsien* may share one court, while an unusually large *hsien* may have one main court and a number of subsidiary or branch courts. In practice, however, personnel and finance difficulties may prevent the attainment of these provisions.

Prior to July 1937 there were 417 courts of varying grades in the various provinces (excluding Manchuria). Since 1938 new courts to the number of 85 have been established, most of these being set up in the interior. At the end of 1942 there were 24 High Courts, 97 subsidiary High Courts (of which 67 were functioning), and 395 District Courts (of which 282 were functioning).

When with the spread of hostilities many courts in the occupied areas could not function, a remedy was found in the Circuit Court system. The Circuit Courts conducted second trials after the first hearing had taken place in District Courts. When cases arise in *hsien* under enemy occupation, first trials are held in courts in neighbouring *hsien*. In December 1938 and August 1939, the Judicial Yuan promulgated two sets of regulations governing the holding of Circuit Courts in the war areas and standardizing the procedure, which was greatly simplified. Since then Circuit Courts have been in session in Chekiang, Kwangtung, Hupeh, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Honan, Shansi, and Shantung provinces. Each of these

provinces is divided into a number of districts, with one or more judges assigned to handle appeals. It is part of the duty of these judges to maintain the closest contact with military and administrative authorities in the war zones.

In addition the Ministry of Justice has taken the following steps :

(a) For first trials, if the government of the *hsien* where there was formerly a District Court cannot hold trials and make prosecutions, these functions may, temporarily, be taken over by the government of a neighbouring *hsien*.

(b) For second trials, if a High Court or its branches cannot function, the Ministry of Justice may assign one of the District Courts in that area temporarily to take over these functions. In the absence of any District Court the Ministry of Justice may designate the High Court or a Branch High Court or the District Court in a neighbouring area to take over these functions for the time being.

(c) If there are no courts at all in the neighbouring area the Ministry of Justice may designate judicial sections or *hsien* governments at the seat of the provincial government or at the seat of the office of the special administrative inspector to hold the second trials.

(d) The second trials of cases must be conducted by District Courts, *hsien* judicial sections, or *hsien* governments in neighbouring *hsien*, and never by the same tribunals which conducted the original inquiry.

(e) If none of the courts in a province can function, the Ministry of Justice may designate the High Court or its subsidiaries in a neighbouring province to handle appeal cases.

As there had been a growing feeling that the old arrangement of having magistrates perform judicial functions was unsatisfactory, it was decided that, as a temporary measure, *hsien* judicial sections should be created with judges holding trials and *hsien* magistrates serving concurrently as prosecutors. In April 1936 regulations were promulgated governing the establishment of *hsien* judicial sections. A three-year plan was adopted whereby judicial sections should be established in all *hsien* having no regular courts. Later all *hsien* judicial sections were to be converted into District Courts. Before the outbreak of the war with Japan (7 July 1937), judicial sections had been established in 711 *hsien* to relieve magistrates of their concurrent judicial functions. Since 1937 judicial sections have been

set up in 151 more *hsien*, bringing the total number of *hsien* judicial sections up to 862.

At the end of 1942 no magistrates in Szechwan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, Fukien, Shantung, and Suiyuan were concurrently judges. Whether regular courts will be established in the other 562 *hsien* will depend on the actual need and the number of personnel and financial resources available. As it is possible that the procedure followed in the *hsien* judicial sections does not reach the standard of that in the regular courts it is the practice, as a precautionary measure, to review the decisions reached by the sections in criminal cases before enforcement. This review is carried out by the High Court or its subsidiary in that area. If this court finds error in procedure or decision the case is returned to the *hsien* judicial section with a demand for a re-trial. It may, if necessary, take over the case itself or assign one of its own judges to preside at the re-trial in the *hsien* judicial section.

According to the extant 'Code of Criminal Procedure' death sentences must be reviewed by the Ministry of Justice before they can be carried out. Whenever necessary the ministry may order the prosecuting authority to institute extraordinary appeals or to conduct private investigations of certain cases. When the ministry is satisfied as to the correctness of the sentences as passed it will order that they be put into effect, and this must be done within three days of receipt of the ministry's order.

Cases involving life imprisonment, prison terms over five years, cases of deferred punishment, and those involving foreign nationals all have to be reviewed by the Ministry of Justice before the sentences are confirmed and enforced.

Police

After the National Government had come into power in 1927 the police system of China was placed under the control of the Police Affairs Department of the Ministry of the Interior. A programme of reform was undertaken, which included, in particular, the establishment of a new system of police administration and the reorganization and improvement of police training.

The unit of police administration is the Bureau of Public Safety (later renamed the Police Bureau), which has its headquarters at the seat of government of the province, municipality, or district which it serves. There is a supervisory power exercised by the Civil Affairs Department of the area concerned, and in the case of Special

Municipalities, which are directly under the control of Executive Yuan, by the Ministry of the Interior itself. The administrative units are for convenience subdivided into smaller units under the control of branch offices; there is normally a further subdivision into units which each contain a police station, and in the case of cities police substations are set up for policing still smaller areas.

Nanking, the national capital, had its own special Metropolitan Police, numbering 760 officers and 5,000 constables, spread over the nine police wards of the municipality. There were, in addition, several special forms of police—railway police, salt police, revenue police, fishery police, forestry police, air police—administered by the ministry concerned in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior.

The need for trained men is very great indeed, for it was estimated in 1935 that not more than one-quarter of the total police strength of 190,000 were adequately trained. The work of police training is carried on by provincial police schools, and by the Central Police College. The provincial police schools are of three types: those for the training of officers, those for the training of the rank and file for promotion, and those for the training of constables, whether already in the force or desirous of entering. The Central Police College, founded in 1901, was formerly at Peiping, but was removed to Nanking when the national capital was established there. It is the highest institution for the training of police officers and was thoroughly reorganized in 1936.

Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war many of the provinces which had established provincial police departments have abolished them, while others have put police affairs in charge of police divisions either under the Civil Affairs Department or the Peace Preservation Headquarters. Such organizations, however, useful as they are, are too small to handle the police affairs of whole provinces. In accordance with a resolution of the Third National Home Affairs Conference, the Ministry of the Interior has requested the different provinces to strengthen their police administration and eventually to establish or restore the departments of police.

Prisons

In 1928 the National Government began a programme of prison reform and issued a series of detailed regulations for the organization and operation of the prison system. The old prisons, which were quite inadequate in number and very poorly equipped, were recon-

structed to serve as branch prisons, and many new ones on modern lines were built. In 1935 there were in China Proper altogether 78 prisons, of which 60 were modern in style and construction, 15 were branch prisons, and 3 were juvenile prisons. Eight of the new prisons had accommodation for 1,000 or more inmates; of these two were in Shanghai, two were in Peiping, and one each in Canton, Hankow, Kunming, and Taiyuan.

The outbreak of war in 1937 seriously interfered with the prison reform programme. In many districts the prisons passed from the control of the National Government, construction of further new prisons in areas exposed to hostilities had to be abandoned, and numerous temporary prisons were set up in 'Free China' as a war-time expedient. In spite of these difficulties the number of prisons under the control of the Judicial Yuan had risen to 97 in 1942. A noteworthy war-time feature was the release of a large number of convicts for military service, a large number of whom eventually won free pardons in return for merit on active service.

Model Prisons. A particular feature of the prison reform programme was the establishment of model prisons, of which two had been set up before the outbreak of war. One of these model prisons was the reorganized First Prison of Peiping, founded in the early years of the Republic, with accommodation for 500 prisoners, increased to 1,000 in 1920. Attached to the prison were a hospital, a reformatory, a library, and athletic grounds. There were also several workshops teaching apprenticeship to various trades and crafts.

The second model prison was the Second National Prison at Peisinchin, in the western suburbs of Shanghai. Work on this prison was begun, under direct control of the Ministry of Justice, in 1935 and the first unit was complete in the following year. This provided accommodation for 2,000 prisoners. Here a genuine social experiment was in process of being tried out; convicts were given an elementary education and training in trades according to choice and capacity. There was provision for the progressive amelioration of treatment dependent on the convict's behaviour while serving sentence. The Ministry of Justice appointed sociologists, psychologists, and educationalists to work in the prison, and once every six months the records of all convicts were reviewed to see whether progress had been made or not. Changes in the grading and treatment of prisoners were made on collation of all relevant reports.

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Chapter VII

EDUCATION

The Historical Background : The Problem of Old and New : Modern Developments, 1862-1937 : The Present Educational System : Bibliographical Note.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The educational heritage of modern China is rich and bountiful. She has behind her a record of forty centuries of cultural development, and her people have been taught from earliest times to regard the education of the young as their sacred duty and learning as the royal way to good conduct. 'To feed without teaching is the parent's fault,' and 'If a man does not learn he cannot know what is right,' are dicta from the *San Tzu Ching* or 'Three Character Classic,' a popular manual of the eleventh century, which have long passed into proverbs.

The Influence of Confucius

The importance thus attached to learning and education by the Chinese people is intimately linked with the Confucian conception that the well-being of society rests primarily on right human relationships and the wide diffusion of ethical principles. It was Confucius who taught the Chinese that learning is the chief joy of life and has himself been for all subsequent ages their model teacher and one of the driving forces in Chinese education. It was he who bequeathed the tradition of private lecturing, which was a predominant feature of the educational system of Old China. In an age of political strife and moral decay (see vol. i, pp. 307-12, 373-8) he instilled into his followers his essentially humanistic philosophy, and is said to have had three thousand disciples, of whom over seventy were outstanding. Thus while it has been left to the modern Chinese state to introduce *legal* compulsion into education, a *moral* compulsion to acquire it has been widespread in China for more than seventy generations.

The Part played by the State

While the chief motive force came from the people themselves and the legacy of their great sages, there was often also inspiration

and encouragement from the state itself. Every new dynasty took education as one of its first duties, once the country had been unified by force, and many emperors showed themselves great lovers of learning and did a great deal to diffuse it. Some of the very famous Chinese encyclopaedias were compiled under the auspices of the emperors. During the Ming dynasty, in the fourteenth century, the emperor Yung Lo projected a comprehensive encyclopaedia containing references from the classical, historical, philosophical, and literary works published in China up to that date. Over two thousand scholars were appointed to undertake the work, which, when completed, contained 22,877 volumes. An even larger compilation was achieved during the reign of the emperor Ch'ien Lung of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, which had more than thirty-three thousand volumes. Every dynasty appointed scholars to write the chronicles of the earlier dynasties. This royal sponsorship of learning naturally stimulated the development of education.

The Influence of Literature and Art

An equally important factor was the early invention of paper and printing, two of China's greatest contributions to civilization (see vol. i, p. 368). It must not be forgotten that great numbers of books were in wide use in China five hundred years before Europe had a single printed volume. They enshrine a rich legacy of philosophical, historical, and literary works; the almost sacred texts of the 'Classical period,' the interpretative expositions of the Han scholars and the Sung philosophers, the poems and essays of the T'ang, the polished verses of the Sung and the dramas of the Yuan dynasties, each of which had also its own chronicles. Hardly less important as an educational influence was the great tradition of painting which reached its zenith in the T'ang and the Sung. From this rich background modern Chinese education derives its inspiration.

The Examination System

For many centuries the interest of the state in education was mainly expressed in the famous examination system. Its policy was to employ the able and promote the worthy, and so it acted as an agency for selection through examination, while the schools as such were chiefly maintained by the people. There were imperial academies in the capital maintained by the central government, and

free schools in the provinces maintained by the local authorities, but the greatest number of schools was found in private homes, maintained by subscription or special endowments. By this method the best scholars became the officials, and by them the affairs of the country were administered. There were three grades or stages of examination; the first was conducted in the county (*hsien*) capital, the second in the provincial capital for those candidates successful in the county examinations, and the third in the imperial capital for all the successful candidates in the provincial examinations. Those who succeeded in the imperial examination were eligible for the imperial academy and became the higher officials. The examinations were open to all candidates, with no restriction. It was not impossible for the son of a peasant to become the ruler of a province. Talent from any source had an opportunity of demonstrating itself and of receiving recognition.

The examination system was first introduced in the fifth century and lasted until the early years of this century. It must be admitted that a system originally intended to encourage and stimulate education ended by becoming a hindrance to it. In the later centuries of its existence it became stereotyped and degenerate. It tended to deprive scholars of their creative power and to consume too much of their energies. Now the old system with all its intricacies has gone, but the underlying idea of using this method to enlist the services of the ablest men will never die. In the modern five-power constitution of republican China, examination remains one of the chief functions of the Government (see p. 184).

Private Colleges and Professional Guilds

While the examination system was the main feature of the old Chinese education, it did not cover the entire field. There were always scholars who had no ambitions for high office to be attained only in this way, and who carried on their own independent research or lectured in private colleges attended by many students. Such colleges originated in the Sung dynasty and have continued down to modern times. They have done much to promote the spirit of true research and independent thinking. There were many other agencies of education. The professional guilds, through their system of apprenticeship, conducted a good deal of what could be called vocational education, and farmers passed on to their sons the accumulated lore of centuries of agricultural experience.

The Educational Heritage

Of valuable educational ideas transmitted from Old to New China four are outstanding :

(1) The Chinese have always regarded education as a continuous process and the pursuit of knowledge as knowing no limit. There were no age limits in the old examinations, and after they had attained public office, scholars did not cease to study. 'It is never too late to learn' is a popular proverb in China, and children and adults could often be found in the same school. Through this encouragement of life-long study, people were taught not to fear old age.

(2) The aims of education were always at once social and individual, both to build up and maintain a civilized society through good customs and habits and to encourage personal development. This dual emphasis, handed down from antiquity, has saved the Chinese from being perplexed by the problem, often posed in the West, of whether society or the individual is the more important object of education.

(3) The close and intimate relationship between teacher and pupil in the traditional system is a most precious heritage. On the one hand, Chinese teachers have from time immemorial taken great interest in the lives of their pupils, and on the other, the teaching profession has always been held in high esteem.

(4) There is, finally, the valuable tradition of taking individual differences into account in education. Instruction in the schools was almost entirely individual. Teachers had profound insight into their pupils' personalities and adapted their methods accordingly.

THE PROBLEM OF OLD AND NEW

The Unchanging Pattern of Education in Old China

Education is an expression of social structure and must reflect social change. It was because the type of society in Old China remained almost the same for thousands of years that the pattern of education changed so little. Changes of dynasty did not materially affect the social structure, and there was little variation of educational policy, except in details of the examination system. So long as China was left to herself, the time-honoured traditional system broadly met her needs and its weaknesses were not too apparent. But with the coming of the West the isolation of China disappeared. In the seventeenth century her new contacts, mainly religious and cultural,

were happy (see vol. i, p. 348), but in the nineteenth she had to meet the increasing weight of Western commercial, political, and military pressure and had to suffer the consequences of painful defeats and loss of prestige. She realized that her old culture would not save her from this new peril. She had to learn hard lessons and was confronted with entirely new problems.

Modern Needs

A radical change in the educational system became imperative. Under the old examination regime education, in the full sense, was for a small minority. The need for intelligent and able administrators remained as great as ever, but it was realized that henceforth the strength of the nation would equally depend on the education of the masses. Hence the need for a complete reorientation of educational policy and for a great expansion of the activities of the state in the educational field. The old type of informal instruction for individuals must be supplemented by formal classroom teaching on Western lines and the family in part give way to the school.

Equally great had to be the change in the content of education. In the Old China it was almost exclusively literary and too largely concerned with memorizing the classics. There were students of mathematics, astronomy, and other sciences, but they were few. Most conspicuous and indeed astonishing was the lack of science in Chinese education. The reasons for it are complex, but are chiefly to be sought in the social structure of Old China and the traditional intellectual outlook of her people. A comparative study of the intellectual history of China and Europe shows a divergence of the two peoples as early as the first periods of their mental maturity. Interest in moral and political philosophy was common to the Greeks and the Chinese of the 'Classical period,' but the Greek passion for the investigation of Nature, for mathematics and mechanics, had no parallel in China. In later periods, while science was developing in the West, Chinese scholars were still deeply submerged in abstract speculations or purely literary pursuits. It was this difference of emphasis which confined the intellectual life of China to the sphere of ethical, social, and political philosophy and limited educational training to books and documents. It was the effectiveness of Western guns and ships in the nineteenth century which finally convinced the Chinese that the old type of purely literary education could no longer meet their needs and that they must learn from the West to appreciate the marvels of science. That

they are capable of scientific work, once they are convinced of its value, is proved by the emergence of a whole army of Chinese scientists under the changed conditions of recent years.

The Break with the Past

The tremendous and many-sided educational problems which modern China has had to tackle have been complicated by her entanglements in world politics, so that she has not been allowed to make the necessary adjustments peacefully. The break with the past has had to be terribly abrupt. An entirely new educational architecture has had to be devised in a hurry. This, however, has had one advantage. The strongholds of the vested interests of the old regime have not been allowed to stand in the way, as they certainly would have done if the change had been more gradual. There has been complete freedom to experiment with any system that seemed desirable. Yet the difficulties have been very great. There was first the terrific task of translating vast numbers of Western books and of compiling others about Western learning and of standardizing Western and scientific terms. There was the immense problem of illiteracy to the solution of which great efforts have been directed, for it was rightly felt to be a paradox that this problem should be so acute among a people which has always had such great faith in education and has such a rich cultural heritage. No less stupendous has been the need of training teachers with the right outlook for the new type of instruction that has to be given and for grafting Western learning on to the ancient root-stock of native culture.

Nor must the difficulties presented by the political, social, and economic conditions of modern China be overlooked. Politically, there was not until 1927 any effective central administration for the enforcement of educational laws. The political chaos and instability of the early years of the republic were reflected in the insecurity of the teaching profession. Economically, the industrialization of the country was impeded both by the lack of a strong central government and by external causes. On the one hand, the state has not had sufficient funds to carry out a universal system of education, and, on the other, the mass of the people have had all too little time to spare from the hard struggle for existence. Socially, it has been a time of acute change and unrest, with all the perplexities and problems that these inevitably bring. When the inherent difficulties of so tremendous a task of educational reconstruction and the

abnormal conditions under which it has been attempted are realized and remembered, high praise to what has actually been accomplished will not be withheld. The eulogy of the foreign educational experts sent out to China by the League of Nations in 1932, on the request of the Chinese government, to survey and advise upon the educational position, was richly deserved :

" It is with the greatest satisfaction that we take this opportunity of recording at this point our strong sense of the educational progress made since the Revolution, and our admiration for the energy shown in coping with the difficulties by which progress has been impeded. China has been the victim, for more than a generation, of a combination of misfortunes on which it is needless for us to insist. To have maintained, in the midst of civil disorder, international complications, sharp financial strains and recurrent calamities of flood and drought, the conviction that the education of the rising generation is among the principal concerns of a civilized society, and to have laboured, as circumstances have allowed, to promote its development, is an achievement of which not all Western governments have shown themselves capable." ¹

MODERN DEVELOPMENTS, 1862-1937

The development of modern Chinese education has passed through five phases :

(1) *Early Attempts at Modernization, 1862-1902*

The first phase or period lasted from 1862 to 1902. It began with the establishment of a modern language school for the training of interpreters and diplomats, and throughout it was mainly concerned with the development of higher and technical education and the introduction of new scientific subjects into the Civil Service examinations. The government still took a narrow view of Western learning, believed that China's weakness was only in the archaic character of her arms, and therefore aimed at the development of military and associated technical education.

In 1867 a college for marine navigation and engineering was established at Foochow and a similar school and an arsenal, with a translation bureau attached, at Shanghai. This bureau published 178 works between 1870 and 1904, the range of subjects covering

¹ The League of Nations' Mission of Educational Experts, *The Reorganization of Education in China*, p. 16 (London, 1932).

law, government, surgery, agriculture, chemistry, mathematics, railway and ship construction, astronomy, naval affairs, and telegraphy. Later a railway engineering college, a mining college, and schools for foreign languages were established in Wuchang, and a telegraph school and the first modern military school (1885) in Tientsin. Efforts were also made to send students abroad to America, Europe, and Japan. In 1872 thirty boys were sent to America, first to study the English language and then technical subjects. In 1877 thirty Chinese engineers arrived in England, Germany, and France for professional study, returning to China in 1880. In 1881 an admiral, sixteen officers, and two hundred marines were sent to study naval tactics in England.

As a result of these efforts by the Government, modern technical and scientific subjects were gradually introduced into Chinese schools, and mathematics and astronomy were made additional subjects for the state examination.

(2) *Education in the Last Years of the Manchu Dynasty, 1902-11*

The second period extended from 1902, when the court returned to Peking after the Boxer rising, convinced of the necessity of concessions to the reform movement (see p. 61), to 1911, the date of the Chinese Revolution. The main events of this period were the abolition of the old-style civil service examination, the establishment of a Ministry of Education and of the Imperial Peking University and the inception of a national educational system, first launched in 1902 and revised in 1903 and 1906. It provided for twenty years of schooling, ten years of primary, six of secondary, and four of university education. The aims of education were stated to be as follows: 'to inculcate loyalty to the emperor and respect for Confucius, and to develop a public spirit, a military spirit, and a practical spirit.'

(3) *Education and the Literary Renaissance, 1911-22*

The third period began with the Chinese Revolution of 1911, followed by the abdication of the Manchus and the foundation of the Republic. It was characterized by the infusion of a democratic spirit into the schools, the use of 'plain language' as the medium of both teaching and writing, and the first effort to plan for universal education. The Ministry of Education decreed that all text-books be revised so as to be in harmony with the spirit of a republican

government; that the Chinese classics be no longer taught in normal, middle, and primary schools; that manual work be emphasized in primary schools; that primary schools be co-educational, etc.

There was also a change of educational aims which were stated as 'chiefly directed towards moral training, supplemented by industrial education and military education, and rounded out by aesthetic education.' The system of 1912 consisted of four-year lower primary, three-year higher primary, four-year middle school, and three-year college preparatory, followed by three to four years at a university.

The first decades of the Republic suffered both from internal disorder and foreign aggression which seriously impeded the development of education, but they also witnessed a movement of the highest significance for its future progress—the Literary Renaissance. In 1915 a group of Chinese scholars, headed by Dr Hu Shih, began a campaign against the classical language and adopted *pai hua* ('plain language') as the medium for all literary purposes (see vol. i, p. 454). This has given a great stimulus to the expansion of the idea of universal education, to which the difficult and archaic classical language was a definite hindrance. The Ministry of Education later decreed that text-books for primary schools should be written in *pai hua*. In spite of, and in contrast to, the political disorders of this period, there was considerable unity and real co-operation in the educational world. Several national conferences were convened to discuss various educational problems, and in 1919 provision was made for a national programme of compulsory education to be completed by 1928.

(4) *The Influence of the U.S.A., 1922-27*

The next period or phase, from about 1922 to the establishment of the National Government in 1927, is marked by the predominance of American influence in Chinese education, the great emphasis laid on freedom and experiment and the beginning of the Mass Education Movement.

After the war of 1914-18 there was a great wave of enthusiasm for educational development in China. It was stimulated by a noteworthy two-year lecturing tour of Professor John Dewey of America, and by visits from other well-known American educationalists, many of whom wrote important reports. As a result American influence on Chinese education reached its zenith at this phase, and in 1922

the school system was revised on the lines then advocated in the United States : a primary school course of six years, divided between four years of lower and two of higher grade primary ; a middle school course consisting of a junior course of three years for general education, and a senior course of three years in one or more of the following departments : general, normal (i.e. teacher training), agricultural, industrial, commercial, and domestic science training ; a university course of four years.

The American ' credit system ' and free election of studies by the students were applied to both the middle schools and the universities.

The aims of the new system were thus stated : " To meet the needs of social progress, to express the spirit of democracy, to work for the development of individuality, to emphasize education for life's activities, to pay attention to the economic strength of the people, to facilitate the spread of universal education, and to allow ample flexibility for local adaptation."

Tests and experiments were widely carried out in the schools during this period and the dominating ideas were democracy, freedom, individuality, and experiment.

(5) *Education under the National Government, 1927-37*

The last period is that which begins with the establishment of the National Government at Nanking in 1927. In the nine years before the outbreak of the war with Japan educational efforts were most active, and some of them are described below. In general, the school system as devised in 1922 has been maintained, but a more effective administration has been achieved, and the scheme of education has been linked up with the programme for economic reconstruction, with great emphasis on social needs. In the early thirties there was a drive for universalizing both primary and adult education, and experimental centres for community education, as a means to social reconstruction, were set up. Readjustments were also made in university education.

Furthermore, the civil service examination system was reinstated and revitalized. The Examination Yuan of the National Government, the responsible executive organ, instituted two grades of examination for the selection of suitable candidates for the various branches of the civil service, both administrative and technical. There are the higher examinations for university graduates and persons of equal ability and the general examinations for middle-school graduates and persons of equal ability. Successful candidates take a further

course of training at the college of civil service of the Central Political Institute before being allocated to various government departments.

THE PRESENT EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The Basis of the Present System

The aims of Chinese education are based upon Dr Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People' (*San Min Chu I*), on which the programme of the government avowedly rests. 'The education of the Republic of China is based on the Three Principles of the People. Its aims are to enrich the lives of the people, to foster the survival of society, to develop the means of livelihood, and to prolong the life of the nation. Its objects are that the nation may be independent, that the rights of democracy may become universal, that the people's livelihood may be improved so as to hasten the attainment of world peace and the brotherhood of mankind.'

Twelve cardinal points were laid down :

(1) The education of the Republic of China shall be based on the Three Principles of the People.

(2) There shall be equal educational opportunity for both sexes.

(3) All educational organizations throughout the country shall be controlled by the state.

(4) All children who have reached school age shall receive compulsory education.

(5) All persons who have not received a compulsory education shall receive supplementary adult education.

(6) The central and local authorities shall make ample provision for the necessary educational funds ; those that are already independent shall be safeguarded.

(7) The state shall encourage or subsidize private institutions that have produced good results.

(8) The state shall encourage and subsidize overseas education.

(9) The state shall encourage and safeguard members of the teaching and administrative staffs of schools who have given good or long service.

(10) All state and private schools shall provide scholarships and bursaries to encourage students who have good moral and educational qualification but have not the means of further education.

(11) The state shall encourage and protect researches and inventions in knowledge and technology.

(12) The state shall protect and preserve all objects and places of interest that have a connexion with the history, the culture, or the art of the nation.

The approximate composition of the present educational system in China is shown by Fig. 13.

Primary Education

Primary education consists of six years between the ages of six and twelve with four years of lower primary education, which is made compulsory by law, and two years of higher primary education. There are also simplified primary schools and one-year and two-year primary courses which are temporary devices for universalizing primary education. The subjects in the primary schools are citizenship, hygiene, physical training, Chinese language, social studies, nature study, arithmetic, manual work, art, and music.

Secondary Education

There is a great diversity at the secondary stage. There are at least three types :

(1) The Middle Schools, most of which are further divided into junior middle school and senior middle school of three years each. There are also middle schools with a continuous six-year course. The junior middle school provides general instruction in citizenship, physical training, hygiene, chemistry, physics, history, geography, manual work, art, music, Chinese language, and English. The senior middle school divides into two streams : the arts and sciences. The subjects in the senior middle school are almost the same as those in the junior middle school, but of more advanced character.

(2) The Normal Schools, which include the three-year type for the junior middle school graduates, the one-year type for the junior middle school or the senior middle school graduates, the four-year type for the primary school graduates, and the two-year or three-year type for the training of kindergarten teachers. The subjects in the normal schools include introduction to education, educational psychology, rural education, statistics, methodology, and educational administration, in addition to the general subjects of the middle schools.

(3) The Vocational Schools, which are further divided into agricultural departments with courses on general farming, sericulture, forestry, horticulture, poultry-farming, etc. ; industrial departments




Fig. 13. The Chinese educational system

with courses on chemical, civil, mechanical, and electrical engineering, etc. ; commercial departments with courses on commerce, book-keeping, accountancy, auditing, shorthand, typewriting, advertising,

etc. ; home economics departments with courses on cooking, sewing, embroidery, nursing, housekeeping, etc.

In 1933 the Ministry of Education issued regulations concerning the allocation of funds among the three types of schools : middle schools 40 per cent., normal schools 25 per cent., and vocational schools 35 per cent. In 1934 there were 1,920 middle schools, with 415,948 students, 893 normal schools with 100,840 students, and 312 vocational schools with 42,532 students.

University Education

The university course lasts for four years, except in the case of the medical and teachers' colleges, which last five. The technical school course lasts for two to three years. A university must consist of not less than three colleges (corresponding to English 'faculties'), of which there must be at least one of the following : science, agriculture, engineering, or medicine. If there be only one or two colleges, the institution may only be called an independent college. The following are recognized colleges and departments of universities and independent colleges : The College of Arts, with departments of Chinese, foreign languages, philosophy, history, sociology, etc. ; the College of Sciences, with departments of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, geography, geology, etc. ; The College of Law, with departments of law, political science, and economics ; the College of Education or Teachers' College, with departments of education and psychology ; the College of Agriculture, with departments of agriculture, forestry, horticulture, sericulture, etc. ; the College of Engineering, with departments of civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, aeronautical engineering, chemical engineering, shipbuilding, mining, etc. ; the College of Commerce and the College of Medicine. Before the war there were 108 universities, independent colleges, and technical schools, with an enrolment of 41,922. Now (1944) there are 113 higher education institutions with an enrolment of 52,000.

The universities can also establish research institutes. In addition, there is the National Academy, *Academia Sinica*, which was established in 1927 and is the highest centre of research. It consists of nine research institutes of physics, chemistry, engineering, geology, astronomy, meteorology, psychology, history and philology, and social sciences.

Administration and Finance

The National Government and local authorities co-operate in the financing of education. Generally speaking, the National Government maintains higher education, the provincial governments maintain secondary education, and the *hsien* or county governments maintain primary education. Since the war, the National Government has established over ten national middle schools to provide secondary education. There are also private universities, private middle schools, and private primary schools, which must conform to the regulations regarding staffing, equipment, and standard of teaching. In 1936 there were 383,729 schools maintained by the public with an enrolment of 19,271,833 students, and 64,436 schools maintained by private effort with an enrolment of 331,389 students. 71.16 per cent. of the educational expenditure comes from the public and 28.84 per cent. from private resources.

The Ministry of Education is the highest authority in educational affairs. It has general control of all matters relating to education, science, and art, and is subdivided into five departments: general affairs, higher education, general education, social education, Mongolian and Tibetan education. There is also a National Bureau of Compilation and Translation. The Minister of Education is the fountain of administrative authority in education. He recommends measures to the government and issues ministerial orders and regulations to put these measures into effect. In the provinces there are provincial departments of education with three or four divisions. In the *hsien* (counties) there are *hsien* bureaux of education.

Adult Education

In her effort to provide adult education, China has developed special institutions. There are two main types of such institutions: the People's Schools and the Mass Education Institutes. The People's Schools admit men and women between the ages of sixteen and forty-five who have not had any previous education. The subjects of teaching include citizenship, Chinese language, general knowledge, arithmetic, and music. Outside regular class hours there are also lectures, exhibitions, films, and other forms of recreation. The Mass Education Institutes are the chief agency of social education. A Mass Education Institute usually consists of a reading section, a display section, an education section, and a publications section.

The establishment of the Dawn Village Normal School by Dr Dao Chih-Shing in 1927 opened a new era in Chinese rural education. The guiding principle was to be 'Learning by doing.' In the early thirties, when the Chinese Government undertook economic and social reconstruction, several experimental centres were set up. The most famous were at Tingsien (Hopeh), the home of the Chinese Mass Education movement; at Tsouping (Shantung), under Liang Sou-Ming, a leading figure in the drive for rural reconstruction; and at Wusih (Kiangsu) under the Kiangsu College of Education. The Tingsien experiment centred in the provision of health service, farming improvement, and adult education; the Tsouping experiment in the development of co-operative societies, social organization, and education; and the Wusih experiment on research into the psychology of learning by adults. In all three the greatest efforts were made to relate education to social needs.

Recent Developments

Since 1940 a new type of people's education has been developed based upon local self-government. Education is proclaimed as more than schooling. It is linked with economic and political life and local defence in one coherent system. The headmaster is to be also the chief of the local self-governing unit of one hundred families, and the school teachers are to participate in the economic, cultural, political, and defence affairs of the locality. The school is to be in close relations with the local agricultural station, co-operative society, medical service, and defence corps, and is to be a real community centre, with separate departments for children and adults. For this purpose a five-year plan was made. It was hoped that by 1942 more than 60 per cent. of the children of 'Free China' would be receiving basic primary education and more than 30 per cent. of the adults. In 1944 the percentages would be increased to 80 per cent. and 50 respectively, and in 1945 to 90 and 60.

Such are the main features of Chinese education at the present time. During these last seven years of war, China has lost many of her cultural institutions, deliberately destroyed by the enemy in occupied China. Yet in 'Free China' the light of learning is burning even brighter than before. In spite of all the hardships and difficulties caused by the war, education has steadily developed and is playing its part in China's programme of resistance and reconstruction.

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Chapter VIII

GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

General Features : The Population Problem ; Estimates of Population ; Density of Population ; Population by Provinces.

Regional Distribution : The Shantung Uplands ; The North China Plain ; The Loess Plateaux ; The Central Mountain Belt ; The Sino-Tibetan Borderland ; The Red Basin of Szechwan ; The Central Yangtze Basin ; The Lower Yangtze Valley and Delta ; The Hangchow Basin ; The South-eastern Uplands ; The Nanling Belt ; The Canton Delta and Central Kwangtung ; South-western Kwangtung and Hainan ; The Kwangsi Basin ; The South-western Tableland (Yunkwei Plateau).

Settlement : Towns and Cities ; Types of Rural Settlement.

Demographic Problems : Is the Population of China increasing ? ; Birth-Rates and Death-Rates ; The Farm Family.

Chinese Migration : Internal Migration ; The Chinese Abroad ; Emigration and the Population Problem.

Bibliographical Note.

GENERAL FEATURES

THE POPULATION PROBLEM

Every major problem in Chinese life is a population problem. The country has almost unlimited man-power with an infinite capacity for conscientious effort, but the balance between population and natural resources is so precariously poised that any interruption of normal conditions means disaster for thousands or even millions. The sufferings of Bengal in 1943-44 have been paralleled or even exceeded in China year after year. Floods and droughts, especially severe in North China, have brought misery and death to millions and been indirect causes of civil wars and plagues. The history of China from one aspect has been a repeated drama of over-population, civil war, famine, internal chaos, foreign invasion, decrease of population, temporary peace, and over-population once more. Certain clearly defined causes for this cycle of human misery lie in the natural geographical factors, and others in the spread of the Chinese as a colonizing people through the Middle Kingdom and beyond it.

The concentration of population on alluvial lowlands in China is a marked feature of its distribution (Figs. 14, 15). Figures for density of population in the provinces disguise the intensity of settlement in areas liable to be flooded at relatively frequent intervals. Millions

are made homeless when the Hwang ho, the Hwai ho, or the Yangtze kiang burst their dykes. Many of the smaller alluvial lowlands girdled by hills are equally liable to such disastrous scourges. Periods of heavy rainfall provide a volume of water too great for the river beds overloaded with silt from disafforested hillsides. An equally severe menace is the droughts which, though most numerous in North China, may cause crop failure almost anywhere in the country. The physical background of the population problem has been discussed in vol. i, Chapters iv-v.

The Chinese throughout recorded history have attempted to solve their population problem by migration. Beginning as a recognizable group in the North China Plain, they gradually extended their settlement and cultural organization through the plains, lowlands, and valleys open to them. Conquering barbarian peoples, they spread from the North China Plain to the lowlands around the Yangtze kiang and through mountain valleys to south-east and south-west China. Comparison of Figs. 109 and 110, in vol. i, shows that in A.D. 2 the North China Plain was already densely peopled, but that less than one-tenth of the Chinese lived to the south of the Yangtze; by A.D. 140 the effective settlement of the area south of the Yangtze had begun. In this process of expansion the favoured lowlands were very closely settled, and it is a reasonable assumption that over-population of certain areas has always been a feature of Chinese life.

The problem is thus by no means new. Han Fei Tzŭ, in the third century B.C., described the effect of increasing numbers on economic well-being, though whether the Golden Age he pictures ever existed is doubtful. Han Fei Tzŭ wrote :

In the ancient times people were few but wealthy and without strife; the government gave no rewards or punishments, because people were self-controlled. People at present think five sons not too much, and each son has five sons also; and when the grandfather is not dead there are twenty-five descendants. Therefore, people are more and wealth less; they work hard and receive little. Even if the government uses twice as much reward and twice as much punishment strife cannot be prevented. The wealth of a nation depends upon people having enough food, not upon the number of people.

Internal migration may have been checked to some extent by the strong family ties and the practice of ancestor worship (see vol. i, p. 398), but severe population pressure has generally overcome all obstacles to movement. Early in the Christian era the Yangtze had been crossed and lands to the south settled and the penetration and settlement of China Proper and its margins has continued throughout

the centuries. Even to-day the Chinese are expanding their area of effective settlement by pushing their agricultural way of life farther into Kansu, Yunnan, the western borderlands, and Hainan island (Fig. 32).

The cultural conquest of barbarian peoples has resulted from these long-continued, if perhaps episodic, movements. The migrations have at times become a mighty flood of humanity in flight from invaders. Nomadic peoples from Mongolia and Manchuria have repeatedly menaced the North China Plain and stimulated southward movement. The present war with Japan has led to a widespread migration westward of population, industry, and skilled workers. The stream of refugees, although perhaps principally composed of members of the wealthier, educated classes, includes a number of dispossessed merchants and craftsmen. It has already resulted in striking developments in the extreme west, and the recently established western provinces of Sikang, Tsinghai, and Ninghsia are now actual fields of colonization.

The Chinese have also penetrated a large part of eastern Asia and its margins as emigrants, and in so doing have shown their adaptability and resource. They are found in Mongolia and Manchuria, Formosa, French Indo-China, Thailand, British Malaya and Burma, and the Dutch East Indies. Doors have been closed against them by legislation or war, and at present it is difficult to see where any considerable number can find an outlet.

The pressure of population remains, and a partial solution of the problem may be found in various measures of social improvement within China itself. Afforestation will check soil erosion, river control will prevent or alleviate flooding and provide irrigation waters, improved roads will facilitate the spread of education, trade, and food distribution, industrialization will provide employment for those who cannot be supported on the land. But at least four-fifths of the population of China is supported by agriculture, and some form of rural reconstruction is an essential element in any solution of the problem.

The remainder of this chapter is given to a discussion of the inadequate statistical material available on the population of China, with a regional treatment of the actual distribution. Then follows a discussion of some of the social and economic factors involved. The population problem has its roots in history, its solution in economic and social planning, but the real question is whether any satisfactory solution is possible without some voluntary restriction

of population. Emigration, it is increasingly clear, can act only as a useful palliative either now or in the near future.

ESTIMATES OF POPULATION

Early Chinese Censuses

A reliable census of any country can be achieved only when some unified governmental control exists and educated enumerators penetrate each remote fastness of mountain and plain. Evasion of a census is likely if it is regarded as preparatory to taxation or military service. Census work in China dates back for four thousand years, but the country still lacks any count which is demographically adequate. It may be borne in mind that reliable censuses extend over little more than the past century in the British Isles and only over a few recent decades in India.

It is said that a census of the Chinese was taken in the twenty-third century B.C., and the population recorded was 4,500,000. In theory, at least, censuses were taken at frequent intervals, probably annually at some stages. One census of which records remain was taken in 814 B.C., during the rule of the Early Chou dynasty; it refers to an area to the north-west of the capital, which was probably near Sian, and covers part of the loess plateaux of Shansi and Shensi. The census apparently refers mainly to the neolithic 'under-society' and not to the Bronze Age overlords. The early census work was linked up with a feudal agricultural system, in which the king owned all the land and the fallow ground was allotted to families after the spring ploughing to plant, cultivate, and harvest at the *chi-t'ien* ceremony. The peasants lived in villages during the winter and moved to huts in the fields during the summer. The annual recording of the fields had some attributes of a census, but the *chi-t'ien* system was abolished in the days of the Ch'in dynasty (255-206 B.C.), when peasant proprietorship began.

The responsibility of the civil service for assessing the resources of the state had been recognized for several centuries B.C. The king, as the repository of all wisdom, needed to know the vital statistics thoroughly. One minister knew the current gain and loss by births and deaths, another had some kind of classified register of the nobility and subject-masses, a third studied the resources in foot-soldiers, and a fourth kept on eye on criminals. Minor officials estimated the resources in livestock and grain with a view to taxation.




Plate 5. Settlement in the Loess Plateaux

Scattered villages dot this part of the Shansi plateau; there is evidence of terracing in an endeavour to check the marked gully erosion seen in the foreground.



Plate 6. Village in the Taiyuan basin, Shansi

The Taiyuan basin is one of the fertile intensively cultivated basins in the Shansi plateau. Settlement consists of nucleated villages, characteristically surrounded by trees.



Plate 7. Village in Shansi

Settlement in the more rugged parts of the Loess Plateaux is confined to the valley floors. Where possible the hillsides are terraced, and the flat roofs indicate a scanty rainfall.




Plate 8. Paan (Batang), Sikang

This cultivated valley floor at an altitude of about 14,000 ft. is on the frontier of Chinese agricultural settlement in the Sino-Tibetan Borderland. Paan is an important caravan centre.

It has been suggested that there was less prejudice against a census in ancient than in modern China, but fear of the consequences of a census is deep-seated. Interesting records have been discovered of a military census in the state of Chu (589 B.C.), covering the Yangtze valley. This census was so unpopular that the minister responsible defended his action in a typical Chinese manner by announcing his own utter inadequacy. Even more effective than his humility was the announcement of a general amnesty and bounty.

Censuses in A.D. 2 and A.D. 140. These are sufficiently adequate to allow some deductions about the distribution of population (vol. i, Figs. 109 and 110, p. 318). It is possible to see the concentration of large groups of people in the North China Plain and the spread of migrants through the valleys of Central and South China. The early dynasties encouraged colonization by means of state-aided schemes and by the provision of roads and waterways.

Censuses, A.D. 730 to A.D. 1491. The T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) achieved a period of domestic peace and prosperity which lasted for a century and a half, and the population increased considerably. Records of three censuses between A.D. 730 and A.D. 740 indicate a total population of 43,000,000, of whom over one-quarter lived to the south of the Yangtze. Speculative as these returns must be, they show that China was then one of the most densely peopled states in the world. The people of south-east China call themselves sons of T'ang, and thus demonstrate the effective occupation of the south during this period. Census records of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 1102) and the Ming dynasty (A.D. 1491) show that a greatly increased proportion of the Chinese population lived to the south of the Yangtze, but it is quite impossible to assess the rate of growth of the population as a whole.

Census, A.D. 1710. A census taken about A.D. 1710 under the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty gives a figure of 140,000,000. Like its predecessors, this census was taken on a basis of tax-paying households. The machinery for registration was excellent in theory, for each district had its appropriate officer, each street its constable, and every ten houses its tithing man. But errors inevitably arose from the association of the census with the fiscal system. If an official had to surrender up taxes according to the population of his district, numbers would be kept down. When the amount of financial assistance from Peking depended on the number of population the figures would be augmented.

Estimates of Population since 1842

In some cases the assessment of the total population of China became an indoor sport unencumbered by any definitely established rules. Wells Williams in 1848 accepted the figure of 362,000,000 on the basis of a Chinese estimate made in 1812. Long resident in China and well acquainted with census work, Wells Williams thought that the Chinese figures, with all their discrepancies and inaccuracies, were yet the sources of information upon which most dependence could be placed. Sacharoff, in 1858, reproduced the Chinese return of 415,000,000 for 1842; a careful and thorough student of Chinese population, he thought the figure excessive. Estimates made at a distance then proceeded to soar, and in 1866 the first volume of the *Geographisches Jahrbuch* gave 537,000,000. A reaction followed, and in 1901, Supan, in *Die Bevölkerung der Erde*, suggested 320,000,000. Willcox, writing in 1928, thought that the census of 1910 furnished 'probably more trustworthy and certainly more abundant material for analysis than any earlier or later Chinese census.'¹

The 1910 Census. The Minchengpu census of 1910 arose from the belated efforts of the empress-dowager to reform the administration of China by establishing representative government. The old associations of a population count with imminent taxation were removed, and the viceroy and governors duly took the census on a basis of households and reported the results in 1911. The further census by heads, to be taken in 1911, did not materialize owing to the revolution which removed the empress-dowager and many of her works. The difficulty in a household census is to assess the average number of persons per house. In China Proper, 64,539,479 households were reported in 1910, and Willcox suggested that 322,000,000 was a reasonable figure on the basis of five persons per house. Only the most detailed and widespread sociological observations can solve the problem, especially as some Chinese families include a wide range of relatives. Buck's investigations (see pp. 287-9) suggest that an average per household is 5.67, which would give a total of approximately 365,000,000.

Increase of Population from 1650-1910

There is considerable evidence that the population increased very rapidly between 1650 and 1750 and probably even into the present century, though with some severe set-backs due to wars and famines

¹ Willcox, F., 'The Population of China in 1910,' *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. xxiii, p. 19 (New York, 1928).

during the past hundred years. But little reliance can be placed on most figures, especially as many were augmented to flatter the Manchu emperors. Less serious defects include understatement of the number of females and the general failure to count children under two years of age at all.

The census return of 1710 is regarded by Willcox as the one reliable estimate available before 1910. A group of estimates for 1650 gives figures of 50,000,000 to 100,000,000, and Willcox suggests that the population was then about 70,000,000. If so, the population doubled between 1650 and 1710, an event by no means unique in history, for Japan had 25,000,000 people in 1853 when first opened to direct Western influence, and has over 70,000,000 to-day. Japan's population has almost trebled in ninety years, and in 1938 the excess of births over deaths was 9.26 per 1,000, and therefore, in the absence of any serious loss by emigration, the rate of population growth remains high.

Even if one of the more conservative estimates of 322,000,000 for the Minchengpu census of 1910 is accepted, the population of China had increased by 130 per cent. from 1710-1910. But most twentieth-century estimates are about 400,000,000, which suggests an increase of 186 per cent. during two hundred years. The population may be increasing or it may have reached a condition of stability: the evidence available on current trends is discussed on pp. 282-9.

The China Continuation Committee and the Post Office Censuses, 1918-20

In 1918 a special committee of the China Continuation Committee endeavoured through the Police Commissioners and other official sources to obtain official estimates of population by *hsien*. These *hsien* correspond broadly to English counties in size and provide a useful regional basis for population study, although with such comparatively large units of area considerable errors may arise, especially in the less well-known provinces. The figures were checked by missionaries, and also compared with those of the Chinese Post Office organization, which was working out a census about the same time. Ultimately the two estimates were issued separately as the China Continuation Committee's estimate of 1918-19 and the Post Office census of 1920. It has been said that together they represent the most scientific and probably the most reliable computations of the population of China made up till that date, but Willcox regarded the figures given as an over-estimate (Fig. 14).

Comparison with other Estimates. The China Continuation Committee gave a figure of 421,326,847 for China Proper, and the Post Office census 411,457,816. The figures for most of the eighteen provinces agree very closely, and a discrepancy of more than 10




Fig. 14. Distribution of population, 1920

Based on China Continuation Committee, *The Christian Occupation of China*, p. 13 (Shanghai, 1922).

The heavy concentration in a few areas, such as the North China Plain, the Yangtze valley, and the south-east coast, is clearly seen, but large areas of China are sparsely peopled.

per cent. is found only in Hopeh, Fukien, Kwangsi, Szechwan, and Yunnan. For Hopeh the Post Office figure of 34,186,711 is the highest on record, and the China Continuation Committee's estimate of 27,312,673 is probably more reliable. Fukien and

Kwangsi are among the least known Chinese provinces and estimates of population, as of areas of cultivated lands, are highly speculative. Yunnan is given a population of 8,824,479 in the China Continuation Committee estimate and 9,839,180 in the Post Office census, but more recent estimates suggest that the population is about eleven million. The widest discrepancies occur in the estimates for Szechwan, which range from 23,000,000 (the Min-chengpu census, 1910), to 78,711,000 (the China Customs, 1919). The China Continuation Committee report gave 61,449,699, but suggested that this figure was too high, and the Post Office gave 49,182,810. The most recent estimates give a population of 46,820,385 (Ministry of the Interior, 1940) and 52,963,269 (same source, 1936). The figures given in these censuses are reproduced on p. 247.

The Present Population of China

There is considerable justification for believing that the population of China is about 400,000,000. The census planned for 1940, which might have solved the problem, was prevented by the war, but several useful provincial censuses were taken, mainly between 1928 and 1935. Little had been accomplished by officials of the Chinese government between 1912 and 1928, owing to civil disorders. The National Government established a Bureau of Statistics charged with the collection of material to be supplied by provincial governors, *hsien* magistrates, and mayors of towns. The enumerators were the police, the village heads or gentry (*pao*), and appointed subordinates (*chia*). Ch'eng-Hsin Chao¹ has pointed out that the personnel was inadequately equipped for the duties laid upon it and that no uniform date was laid down for the census to be taken. The latter objection is obviously the less serious of the two. Chao regarded the reports of the Post Office, the China Continuation Committee, and the Maritime Customs as unreliable. This may well be true, but the results of the provincial censuses taken between 1928 and 1935 are very similar to those of the Post Office and China Continuation Committee.

The 1928-35 work gave China a population of 387,410,718, and estimates of the Ministry of the Interior in 1936 and 1940 gave 411,040,814 and 407,867,349 respectively. Huan Yong Hu, in 1935, gave a series of figures based on provincial censuses with a

¹ Ch'eng-Hsin Chao, 'Recent Population Changes in China,' *Yenching Journal of Social Studies*, vol. i, pp. 1-48 (Peiping, 1938).

total of 410,744,043. Hu worked out a dot map and a map showing the density of population (Fig. 15). This is based on the *hsien* statistics, and is a most useful addition to Chinese population studies. The large measure of agreement about the total population masks uncertainty about certain provinces. Fukien has 9,741,794 according to the 1928-35 estimates, and 11,990,441 according to the 1940




Fig. 15. Density of population, 1934

Based on Hu, Huan Yong, 'The Distribution of Population in China,' *Journal of the Geographical Society of China*, vol. ii, facing p. 75 (Nanking, 1935).

The concentration noted in Fig. 14 is brought out still more closely in this map, which, however, must be regarded as tentative as it is based on *hsien* estimates of doubtful value.

estimate. Kwangsi had nearly eleven millions according to Hu and the 1928-35 estimates, 13,385,215 and over 14,254,609 according to the Ministry of Interior in 1936 and 1940 respectively. Szechwan's population has undoubtedly increased considerably since the beginning of the war with Japan, but yet the Ministry of the Interior reduced this estimate from 52,963,269 in 1936 to 46,820,385 in

1940. These provinces, it will be noted, are among those which offered particular difficulties to the compilers of the Post Office and China Continuation Committee reports.

DENSITY OF POPULATION

Density of Population by Provinces

The average density of population in China Proper is 291 per square mile, which may be compared with France 197, British India 217, Denmark 224, Italy 359, and Japan Proper 375. Such figures mean very little, and are given only because they are a useful corrective to vague general statements suggesting that China is the most densely populated country in the world. This is true only of certain favoured parts of China, and the admitted over-population arises from the fact that probably only 29 per cent. of the area is available for crops (vol. iii, Fig. 1). It is estimated that the cultivable area per person is only 1.6 acres in China as against 8.1 acres in the United States.

Comparisons between European countries and Chinese provinces are more apt, as all the provinces are larger than Scotland, and all save two (Chekiang and Kiangsu) are larger than England and Wales (Fig. 16). Kiangsu's density per square mile of 936 compares with Belgium 712, the Netherlands 687, England and Wales 685. Five provinces of China are more densely peopled than Japan 375, or Italy 359; they are, in order, Shantung 661, Hopeh 559, Chekiang 523, Honan 493, and Anhwei 406. All these provinces mentioned have a much smaller proportion of their population in towns than any of the European countries named. Viewed differently, a density of population of even 500 per square mile may imply that one square mile has 100 farms, supporting an average of five persons on 6.4 acres, or say 5-6 acres, allowing that some land is built over, water surface, or waste. Rural studies indicate that most Chinese farms are even smaller and average 5 acres in the north and only 2 acres in the south.

The figures for density of population are mainly indicative of the extent of cultivated land. The provinces mentioned above have extensive alluvial lowlands in the North China Plain or along the Yangtze. At the other end of the density scale are two western provinces, Kansu with 41 per square mile, and Yunnan with 89 per square mile. The former is largely arid with only scattered oases of fertility, and the latter has extensive mountains and uninviting

plateaux, but both have seen some extension of agricultural settlement in recent years. The four remaining provinces less densely peopled than France (197 per square mile) are Shensi 131, Kweichow 146, Kwangsi 163, and Shansi 185. All these include considerable mountainous areas incapable of supporting a large population. All the remaining provinces save two (Kiangsi 198, and Kwangtung 366) have between 200 and 350 per square mile, which are heavy densities for predominantly rural areas.

If the concentration of population in China may be seen from so general a survey, it is still more apparent from any map which attempts to show the regional distribution of population. Such maps are based on the figures for *hsien*, which are comparable in area with English counties, and very rarely show an even distribution of population. In maps for the whole of China one dot may represent from 20,000 to 50,000 persons (Fig. 14), but local maps can use one dot for 1,000 people and give a more detailed conception of the distribution (Figs. 18-20). The intensive use of many small lowlands in river valleys surrounded by forested or bare hills is seen in Figs. 21, 29, and Plates 18, 45.

The Five Major Areas of Settlement

Five mainly agricultural areas in China stand out as among the most densely peopled in the world (Fig. 17). They are :

(1) *The lower Hwang ho basin*, between Shansi and the Shantung uplands. This central part of the North China Plain, around the convergence of Hopeh, Shantung, and Honan, consists largely of alluvium mixed with loess. The area northward to Peiping is hardly less densely peopled, and there are also extensions of the closely settled area around the western upland of Shantung into the Weihsien corridor and southward into the upper, but not the lower, part of the Hwai basin (Fig. 18).

(2) *The Yangtze delta*, which has great wealth in agriculture and is of great industrial significance. The land on both sides of the Yangtze, at least as far inland as Nanking, and the coastal lowland of Chekiang around Hangchow are also very densely populated. Some of the islands, notably Tsungming in the Yangtze delta, are among the most densely settled agricultural areas of the world (Fig. 20 and Plates 11-13).

(3) *The coastal lowlands between the Yangtze and the Si kiang*. The extent of the coastal lowland is varied, and the south-east coastal

fringe of China is in effect a series of densely peopled small areas separated by relatively sparsely settled country. Some deltaic areas, such as those around Wenchow, Foochow, Amoy, and especially Swatow, are very closely settled (Plate 15). The Si kiang delta




Fig. 16. Density of population by provinces, 1934-40

Based on the figures of the Chinese Ministry of Interior (Chinese Ministry of Information), in *China Handbook*, 1937-1943, pp. 1-2 (New York, 1943).

This map is of strictly limited value, but it shows that the lowland provinces of North and Central China are surrounded by sparsely peopled areas.

bears some resemblance to the Yangtze delta, and its teeming population is supported by agriculture, industry, and fishing (Plate 17).

(4) *The Central Yangtze Basin.* The obvious centre of this basin is the industrial focus of the Wuhan cities, Hankow, Hanyang, and Wuchang; but the surrounding country is occupied by an agricultural population which spreads along the Yangtze and its

tributaries—the Han in the north, the Kan, Siang, and Yuan to the south. Here are some of the most famous and densely settled rice-lands of China, such as the ‘rice-bowl’ of Hunan around the Tungting lake.

(5) *The Red Basin of Szechwan.* The Plain of Chêngtu, watered by irrigation canals, has been regarded by travellers of many centuries as an earthly paradise for the many millions of industrious people who live in it. Almost equally closely settled, many other areas of Szechwan are of apparently boundless productivity. In the present war, Szechwan has become even more closely settled through the transfer of industry and skilled labour from regions farther east now overrun by the Japanese (Fig. 19 and Plate 9).

While it is difficult to assign definite figures of population density to the regions listed above, it seems certain that large parts of them have at least 1,000 persons per square mile and some considerably more. A figure commonly given for the Chêngtu Plain and parts of the Yangtze delta is nearly 2,000 per square mile. Nor are these the only areas of highly intensive cultivation and settlement. Others which will be mentioned in the regional section include the Wei and Fên valleys of Shensi and Shansi, various basins in the mountains west of Peiping, the upper Han valley and parts of the Hangchow basin. The Kan and Siang valleys carry tongues of densely settled lowland southward to the Nanling, and there are valleys in south-east China almost equally closely settled. The Si kiang valley has areas of close settlement, and the lake-basins of the Yunnan plateau are of great fertility and importance, not only for their own agriculture but also as links in trade-routes with Burma and India.

It must be apparent that discontinuity of settlement occurs in China, even if the closely peopled areas of the country are as large as such familiar units of Europe as the English Lowland, the Paris basin, or the North German Plain. Some indeed are much smaller and resemble both in size and in density of population such areas as the fertile lowlands around Italian cities, such as Naples, Palermo, or Bari, or again the *huertas* of eastern Spain. Especially in South China mountains offer formidable barriers, sparsely settled and in many places long since denuded of their forests and exposed to devastating soil erosion. Fig. 15 shows that a very large part of South China is sparsely peopled. Six-sevenths of the total population, it has been estimated, are concentrated on one-third of the total land, and it is said that the population per square mile of cultivated land is 1,479 persons.

POPULATION BY PROVINCES ¹

Province	Area in 1938 (sq. miles)	China Con- tinuation Committee, 1922	Post Office Census, 1923	Chinese Ministry of the Interior	Density per sq. mile	Date of C.M. of I. estimate
<i>China Proper</i>						
Anhwei .	56,274	20,002,166	19,832,665	22,704,538	404	1940
Chekiang .	41,615	22,909,822	22,043,300	21,776,045	523	1940
Fukien .	47,495	17,067,277	13,157,791	11,990,441	253	1940
Honan .	64,956	32,547,366	30,831,909	31,805,621	493	1939
Hopeh .	56,301	27,312,673	34,186,711	31,412,614	559	1936
Hunan .	82,236	29,519,272	28,443,279	27,186,730	330	1940
Hupei .	74,545	28,574,322	27,167,244	24,658,988	331	1940
Kansu .	156,024	6,083,565	5,927,997	6,255,467	41	1940
Kiangsi .	69,357	24,490,687	24,466,800	13,794,159	198	1940
Kiangsu .	44,210	33,678,611	33,786,064	41,215,226	936	1940
Kwangsi .	87,570	10,872,300	12,258,335	14,254,609	163	1940
Kwangtung	88,523	35,195,036	37,167,701	32,338,795	366	1939
Kweichow	71,912	11,470,099	11,216,400	10,487,367	146	1940
Shansi .	62,568	10,891,878	11,080,827	11,601,026	185	1934
Shantung .	58,994	30,955,307	30,803,245	38,912,362	661	1936
Shensi .	74,964	9,087,288	9,465,558	9,799,617	131	1940
Szechwan	148,300	61,444,699	49,782,810	46,820,385	316	1939
Yunnan .	121,472	8,824,479	9,839,180	10,853,359	89	1939
Total .	1,407,316	421,326,847	411,457,816	407,867,349	291	
<i>The New Provinces</i>						
Chahar .	107,677	2,305,957	22	1935
Ningshia .	106,115	735,763	7	1940
Sikang .	172,863	1,755,542	10	1940
Suiyuan .	112,493	2,083,693	19	1940
Tsinghai .	269,117	1,512,823	6	1940
Total .	768,265	8,393,778	11	
Grand Total .	2,175,581	416,261,127	191	

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

In this section the distribution of population is discussed in relation to the major features of regional geography: in Fig. 17 the areas very densely, less densely, and sparsely peopled are related to the regional scheme enunciated in vol. i. (Fig. 15, p. 47, and

¹ The figures used for provinces in this chapter are those of the Chinese Ministry of the Interior unless reference is made to the contrary.

Chapters iii-v). But it would be equally reasonable to compare population distribution with crop production, since mining and industrial developments are only of significance in relation to population density in a few areas (pp. 254-61, 266).




Fig. 17. Natural regions and density of population

Based on vol. i, Fig. 15, and sources used in Fig. 16.

The highly generalized distribution of population by relative density is correlated with the natural regions discussed in vol. i, Chapters iii-v, and used in this chapter.

(A) THE SHANTUNG UPLANDS

Shantung province has a density per square mile of 661 persons, but the Shantung Upland region excludes the part of the North

China Plain included in the province (Fig. 18). The density of population is more than 600 to the square mile in the Weihsien valley, a tongue of densely populated and richly farmed country between two less closely settled uplands. Domestic industries include cotton spinning and weaving, silk weaving, the plaiting of braid from wheat straw, and the hand manufacture of hair-nets and bobbin lace. Some of these industries are practised in various towns, such as Tsinan and Chefoo. The port of Tsingtao (515,000 people) has the best natural harbour in North China, and is well equipped to compete with Tientsin and Laoyao. The Weihsien and Poshan coalfields are connected with Tsingtao, which has a variety of manufactures.

The Uplands include many barren areas, but they also possess important agricultural land on the lower slopes and in the valley basins of numerous small streams. The densely peopled southern slopes of the Western upland are especially noted for this agricultural development, but they are by no means unique, and many small areas have an intensive type of terrace cultivation similar to that of the Mediterranean. The towns are mainly trading centres, with Chefoo and Weihaiwei as ports; but fishing, although of importance, is hindered by the lack of good harbours on a dangerous coast with strong winds and occasional, but severe, storms (Plate 21).

The Shantung Uplands as a population region are immune from severe natural hazards such as droughts and floods. The inhabitants, having the resources of home industries as well as agriculture, are not poverty stricken even though cultivated areas are very closely settled. New factories are absorbing labour, and given the construction of railways and good roads a fuller economic development will be possible.

(B) THE NORTH CHINA PLAIN

The North China Plain includes one of the five most densely populated areas in the whole country. This, the Middle Plain, between the Shantung Uplands and the Taihang shan, is the richest and most fertile part of North China, and, except in a few marshy areas, cultivation on innumerable small farms is intensive. To the north and south of the Middle Plain the density of population is generally less, but fertile areas are closely settled. The lower Hwang ho and the basin of the Hai and its numerous tributaries have many marshy areas or patches of saline alluvium supporting only a small

population. In some places occupation of the land is light as, for example, around the Hwang ho delta where a poor peasantry, living in small villages, wrest a precarious living from marshy or sandy soils. On the Plain as a whole, nearly 90 per cent. of the population live outside towns and depend directly on agriculture.

The Hwai valley is a traditional marshland barrier, thinly peopled, between the Middle Plain and the Yangtze valley. The area is




Fig. 18. Shantung, density of population

Based on China Continuation Committee, *The Christian Occupation of China*, p. 196 (Shanghai, 1922).

Part of the North China Plain is included in the province; the low density of population around the mouth of the Hwang ho and on the Shantung Uplands contrasts with the high density in the fertile lowlands surrounding the uplands.

perhaps comparable with the Pripet marshes of Poland, but projected reclamation schemes may change it into an extremely fertile region. If this happens, the lower Hwai basin will be interesting not as a thinly peopled borderland, but rather as a transition belt between the rice-growing Yangtze lands and the wheat-kaoliang country of the North China Plain (vol. iii, Fig. 6).

The hazards to which the population of the North China Plain are subjected are numerous and severe. The Plain has frequently been a battleground between the Chinese and invading hordes from Manchuria and Mongolia. It has been the scene of heavy fighting

in the present war against Japan. Civil disturbances in North China brought widespread distress during the nineteen-twenties. The natural hazards are droughts and floods. Droughts are more severe in the north-east of the Plain, and floods have affected the basins of the Hai, Hwang, and Hwai at fairly frequent intervals (see vol. i, pp. 29-34, Figs. 12, 31). These distresses stimulated a movement to Manchuria that reached the rate of nearly a million a year before 1931. The pressure on the land has been relieved to some extent by the growth of a few great cities such as Tientsin, but the present industrial development cannot absorb the surplus population. The most hopeful signs of relief are the projected drainage schemes that will remove the recurrent fear of disastrous floods and make the application of irrigation water more widespread and practical.

(C) THE LOESS PLATEAUX

The plateaux cover the provinces of Shansi, Shensi, and part of Kansu. The density of population per square mile is 185 in Shansi, 131 in Shensi, and 41 in Kansu. These figures are mainly an index of the extent of cultivated land available in each province. Agriculture throughout this area is mainly dependent upon a precarious water supply except where irrigation is possible. The settled areas consist mainly of valleys and basins filled with alluvium and loess. Some of the hill slopes are terraced, and in places the plateaux themselves are covered with farmlands (Plates 5, 7).

Shansi is a mountainous province, but agriculture flourishes in a number of fertile basins, of which the largest and most famous is the Taiyuan basin in the Fên ho valley (Plate 6). The Chiehchow basin is also fertile, and there are others scattered through Shensi, of which some are of quite small extent. In the north of the province the Ningwu, Hinhsien, Pingting, and Tatung basins are oases of cultivation. The population map (Fig. 15) reflects the intensity of settlement in these separated basins and in the Fên ho valley around Taiyuan (population probably over 100,000), the natural and historic capital for Shansi province. The great coal resources are not reflected in the population map; but Shansi is, according to some estimates, a prospective Pennsylvania. As yet, it has only three railways, of which one connects Taiyuan with the Peiping-Hankow line, a second traverses various basins in the north on the way from Paotow to Peiping, and a third runs the length of the province from Tatung to Puchow.

In Shensi, the Wei valley is very fertile and densely populated. Around Sian, the provincial capital, a town of about 200,000 people, there are said to be as many as 4,000 people to the square mile, with market towns or villages at intervals of about a mile. Elsewhere the population is confined mainly to small areas both in valleys and on the plateau, with some terraced lands. Communications are generally poor, and the types of settlement reflect the need for defence against predatory hordes from the heartland of Asia (see pp. 276-7). The potential resources in coal and petroleum remain unexploited.

In Kansu settlement is almost entirely restricted to oases, for water supply is of supreme importance; even if irrigation water is available the heavy evaporation tends to bring salts to the surface, and agricultural land is coated with a hard alkaline crust. High winds remove the surface soil of ploughed land, and efforts to push the agricultural frontier farther along the desert road have led to many tragedies. But the province has some good well-farmed lands, notably around its capital, Lanchow (estimated population 100,000), the Timbuktu of China.

The difficulties of settlement in the Loess Plateaux are numerous. The main natural enemies of man are drought, soil erosion, and earthquakes. Always precarious, a plentiful supply of rain will encourage the expansion of settlement in good years, followed only too soon by dry years. Sudden rains remove valuable soil, and many gullies are eating slowly but surely into precious agricultural land. Earthquakes may be a major disaster, causing the deaths of thousands of people at times. The disasters of human origin include invasions from the surrounding deserts and revolutions. Both have occurred several times in the history of China; among the most serious was the Mohammedan rebellion of 1862-70, which decimated the population in Kansu, and had serious effects in Shensi. A more hopeful future depends upon the maintenance of more stable political conditions, and also upon the irrigation schemes projected upon the checking of soil erosion, and possibly also in mining developments. All these would be aided by an extension of roads and railways through the three provinces.

(D) THE CENTRAL MOUNTAIN BELT

The Central Mountain Belt is an effective divide and barrier between North and Central China. The Tsinling shan and the




Plate 9. Agricultural settlement in the Red Basin

A scene near Chêngtu with farm buildings, surrounded by trees, set here and there among cultivated fields.




Plate 10. Village in the Anhwei hills

The village stands on a small patch of level land near a river. The hillsides are partly forested and some areas are sharply eroded.



Plate 11. The Yangtze delta

An aerial view of the delta plain between Nanking and Shanghai, showing the close relationship between settlement and canals.



Plate 12. Siccawei creek, Kiangsu

Siccawei creek, a tributary of the Whangpoo river, is here shown crowded with a variety of craft, many of which are the permanent homes of their owners.

Tapa shan are separated from one another by the upper Han valley, which alone is closely settled, especially in the Hanchung basin, a fertile plain about sixty miles long and twelve miles wide. Here the agricultural life is of the Central Chinese type, with rice and wheat as the main crops. Elsewhere in the Tsinling shan and Tapa shan there are few valleys with agricultural land, but any small alluvial lowland is used for crops. Only on the southern and eastern margins are there any considerable extensions of settlements and cultivation from the surrounding lowlands in a few valleys draining the mountains.

(E) THE SINO-TIBETAN BORDERLAND

This mountainous frontier between the historic China and the Tibetan plateau includes considerable areas of the new provinces of Sikang and Tsinghai. Thickly forested, it is thinly peopled as yet, and it can never carry close agricultural settlement; but already Chinese farmers have pushed agricultural life into many of the valleys, especially on some fertile alluvial fans in the wider mountain valleys where irrigation and terracing is possible (Paan, Plate 8). The movement of Chinese settlers into this area has been accelerated by the widespread migration westward since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. At present the Chinese are greatly outnumbered by the tribespeople, and maintain a precarious foothold in an inhospitable country where bandits are numerous. But trade with the tribespeople is strongly developed in such centres as Tatsienlu, whence human carriers from Chêngtu bring tea, cloth, and tobacco from lowland China and return with wool, skins, and hides brought by yak caravans from Tibet.

(F) THE RED BASIN OF SZECHWAN

This well-defined basin, sheltered on all sides by high mountains, is the agricultural Eden of China, and its considerable industrial potentialities have proved of supreme importance during the present war with Japan. The Red Basin is less extensive than the province of Szechwan which, with a population of 46,820,385, has 316 people to the square mile (Fig. 19). The density per square mile of cultivated land is about four times as great; even so, the Red Basin does not show the intense population pressure of many Chinese regions. In spite of some long-established industries and the existence of

some large and important towns nearly 90 per cent. of the population is rural (Plate 9).

The rural population cultivates a variety of crops on terraces or in small lowlands in the deep river valleys of the basin. Two crops a year are generally grown, and even the terrace banks are cultivated. While irrigation is not universal, the most famous part of the basin, the Chêngtu Plain, owes its fertility to a wonderful irrigation system (see vol. i, Fig. 29), and has about 1,500 people to the square mile living in prosperous villages, hamlets, and isolated farms. Elsewhere the agriculture is scarcely less prosperous, and many of the larger towns are major route centres, such as Chêngtu (*c.* 315,000) to the east of the Chêngtu Plain, Sui (over 100,000), Luchow (over 100,000), Chungking (*c.* 1,000,000) at the respective junctions of the Min, Lu, and Kialing rivers with the Yangtze. All these are river ports; a fourth river port is Wanhsien, a town of more than 200,000 people near the entrance to the Yangtze gorges.

The industrial development of Szechwan has been accelerated by the transference into the province of various factories from regions farther east. Even though some of these may return after the war, a large industrial expansion is planned for Szechwan. It has a long-established salt industry around Tzeliutsing, where there are over half a million people within an area of sixty square miles around the town. Tzeliutsing is in the south-western Szechwan industrial area, which stretches from the lower Min kiang to the Lu ho. Coal is mined and there are a number of industries connected with salt (chemicals), sugar, paper, and silk. The inhabitants of this part of Szechwan are said to have a greater purchasing power than those living in other parts of the province. The south-western Szechwan industrial area is centred around Chungking. Coal and iron are available, but most of the mining has been merely a spare-time activity for farmers in the off-seasons. Though the coal and iron development lies in the future, there are a number of small-scale industries in and around Chungking. Only around Tzeliutsing and Chungking has the industrial development achieved so far had more than a very limited effect upon the distribution of population.

(G) THE CENTRAL YANGTZE BASIN

This basin is centred upon the Wuhan group of cities and includes the Tungting and Poyang lake basins, the Hupeh basin and the lower Han valley. It consists of the greater part of the provinces of Hupeh,

Hunan, and Kiangsi. These provinces have a total population of nearly 70,000,000, about 250 to the square mile. They include a large extent of upland country and a vast area of lake waters; over most of the settled farmlands the density is at least 1,000 per square mile. There are a number of large towns, such as Changsha (popu-




Fig. 19. Szechwan, density of population

Based on China Continuation Committee, *The Christian Occupation of China*, p. 221 (Shanghai, 1922).

The limits of the closely settled agricultural areas are clearly apparent, but the contrasts shown within the densely peopled areas are perhaps too striking.

lation variously estimated, but probably about 300,000) and Nanchang (population 100,000 to 200,000). The basin has an intricate system of waterways leading to river ports on the Yangtze, which carries ocean-going ships as far inland as Hankow. The Hankow-Canton railway traverses the area from north to south, and has a connexion from Chuchow to Nanchang. The basin, well provided

with river transport and possessing also a useful skeleton railway network, is well suited to be an agricultural and industrial region, densely populated, with a balanced economy. As yet, approximately 90 per cent. of the population live in rural areas.

The area to the west of the Wuhan cities includes the lower Han valley, a complicated lake country to the north of the Tungting hu, and the basin of the Siang kiang. The most densely peopled areas are the ricelands around the lakes, which are liable to fluctuate considerably in extent and area from year to year and may fuse into one vast flooded area. But the farmers push their fields hopefully as near to the waters as possible, and the lowlands around the Tungting hu form the richest 'rice bowl' in the country. The Siang kiang valley carried tongues of closely settled alluvial lowland southward through Hunan, but south of Hanchung the cultivable land is greatly restricted by mountains. To the east a railway leads to the Pinghsiang coalfield in the Siang basin on the mountainous Hunan-Kiangsi border. This is so far the most important of several coalfields in the Siang basin likely to feed both the Wuhan cities and the Canton area.

The two other main rivers flowing into the Tungting basin, the Tzu and the Yuan, have restricted valley lowlands, and it is highly probable that the population, in the area they drain, is less dense than most published maps suggest. But the west of Hunan is a little-known area of considerable importance as one of the few remaining timber reserves of China.

To the east of the Wuhan cities, the Yangtze lowland is a densely peopled area devoted mainly to rice and wheat cultivation. The cultivated lowlands are more extensive on the north side of the river. The Kan valley is very similar to the Siang, and has extensive cultivated lowlands, densely populated, to the south of the Poyang. The Kiangsi province as a whole is hilly, but there are extensive areas of cultivated lowlands. The hills on the west side of the Kan Basin make a population divide between Kiangsi and Hunan; those on the east side separate Kiangsi from the Hangchow Basin and the uplands of south-east China. But the population maps bring out the line of more densely peopled valleys followed by the railway from Hangchow to Nanchang and Chuchow (Figs. 14-15).

The industrial development of the Central Yangtze Basin is slight and centred mainly in the Wuhan cities, which together have over 1,000,000 people. The porcelain industry of the Kingtechén area, east of the Poyang hu, employed 150,000 workmen in 1936. The



Plate 13. Farm village, Yangtze delta
Boats moored in one of the many canals of the Yangtze delta near a typical delta settlement.



Plate 14. Typical hill village, Chekiang
Settlement in the mountainous interior of the South-Eastern Uplands is limited to the narrow valley floors. The hills are thickly wooded, but there is some evidence of clearing and terracing on the lower slopes.



Plate 15. Settlement on the coastal plain, Chekiang

The small lowland areas on the coastal margins of the South-Eastern Uplands are amongst the most densely-peopled parts of China.



Plate 16. Fishing village, Fukien

This village on Chuanshih tao (Sharp Peak island), at the mouth of the Min River, is typical of many coastal settlements in South China.

population is spread through a number of closely linked towns and villages. It is one of the few areas in China where a famous and historic industry has left a definite mark in the settlement pattern. But if the coalfields develop, and some development has already taken place around Pinghsiang, mining villages and towns may become a feature of the Kiangsi landscape.

The problems of population in the Central Yangtze Basin centre mainly around flooding. A rise of a few feet in the rivers may flood hundreds, or even thousands, of square miles, making at times several million people homeless. The pressure on the land is such that farmers push their fields to the very edge of the invading waters. Given control of the Yangtze, an engineering problem comparable with, if not greater than, control of the Mississippi, one may envisage even fuller agricultural prosperity linked with industrial development centred upon the Wuhan cities, the great natural focus of the region.

(H) THE LOWER YANGTZE VALLEY AND DELTA

The lower Yangtze valley extends from Kiukiang to Chinkiang, a distance of nearly two hundred miles. The lowlands near the river are given to rice and wheat cultivation, and the menace of floods is as severe as in the Central Yangtze Basin. There is a wider extent of lowland on the north; the Anhwei hills are close to the river on the south side. These hills are famous for tea cultivation on mountain sides, with patches of ricelands in the lowlands. The density of population in the rice-growing areas is at least 750 per square mile, and almost double this per square mile of cultivated land. In the Anhwei hills the cultivated area is so restricted that the density drops to as little as 150 per square mile (Plate 10).

Over 90 per cent. of the population is rural in the lower Yangtze valley, and the main towns are river ports, such as Anking (estimated population 23,000, 1938) and Wuhu (population probably about 300,000). These towns gather up the trade of the hinterland to the north and south, and goods are carried by river steamers to Shanghai. Nanking, with over a million people, has become one of the great industrial centres of China.

The Yangtze delta is perhaps the most densely peopled area in the whole of China (Fig. 20). It is a rich agricultural area, and probably about half the modern factories of China are located in Shanghai and other manufacturing centres, such as Wusih, which

has cotton and silk factories. Other important towns include Soochow (population estimated at 600,000 by the China Continuation Committee, but probably less) and Chinkiang (c. 200,000). Soochow is an historic centre of great charm and interest, Chinkiang a river port situated where the Grand Canal crosses the Yangtze. Railways




Fig. 20. Kiangsu, density of population

Based on China Continuation Committee, *The Christian Occupation of China*, p. 134 (Shanghai, 1922).

Kiangsu is the most densely populated province in China, and the modern industrialization has added to a concentration rivalled in few parts of the world.

link these centres and motor roads carry bus routes through the delta. But most of the traffic is by water, and Shanghai, as a great port of international significance, has a position of complete dominance in the economic life of the delta.

The rural population of the delta is probably about 80 per cent.

of the total in spite of its industrial significance, past, present, and future. The adjustment of agricultural production to urban demands is far from complete, though cotton is grown for spinning both at home and in factories. Vegetables and rice are grown for the Shanghai market, but much of the farming is of a subsistence character. The pressure on the land is intense; in some parts, such as Tsungming island, there are said to be as many as 7,000 persons to the square mile of cultivated land (Plates 11-13).

The delta has a population problem, but it lies chiefly in the excessively small size of the farms and not in any natural hazards such as droughts and floods. Two main features provide some relief for economic stringency in individual homes. One is the gradual reclamation of land from the sea and the other the absorption of labour in growing towns. Reclamation has made a great part of the 'delta' through past centuries, and the towns will develop still further when peace is restored.

(I) THE HANGCHOW BASIN

The Hangchow Basin is a relatively small, but important, region covering most of the northern half of Chekiang province, and drained by the Tsientang kiang and its tributaries. Agricultural land is restricted to about 30 per cent. of the whole area. The Chekiang province has traditionally been one of the most prosperous and enterprising in China, and the National Government built 2,000 miles of roads between 1933 and 1937 to make the interior of the province more accessible. These roads supplement the extensive series of navigable waterways used in the province. The railway from Hangchow to Kinhwa and Nanchang connects a number of fertile inner basins, and there is also a line to Ningpo along the coastal lowland.

All available land is intensively cultivated and closely settled. The coastal lowland to the south of Hangchow wan has about 2,000 persons to the square mile; the river basins, such as the Kinhwa, surrounded by mountains, have 1,000 per square mile; and even in the hilly country, where quite steep slopes are terraced, there are several hundreds per square mile. No serious population problem exists in the Hangchow basin. Agriculture is the main resource, forestry is carefully fostered, and there are many tea plantations (vol. i, Plate 57). About 85 per cent. of the population live in rural

areas, but there are some important towns of which the most famous is Hangchow, which, with a population of more than half a million, is an administrative, educational, and commercial centre, and has silk manufactures of note. Smaller towns, with silk and cotton factories and general market functions, are Shaohing and Ningpo, both of which have populations of about 200,000.

(J) THE SOUTH-EASTERN UPLANDS

The South-eastern Uplands include the south-eastern part of Chekiang, the whole of Fukien, and the eastern third of Kwangtung. The area of cultivable land is small and has been estimated to be 15 per cent. of the whole area. The mountains dominating the landscape have a considerable extent of forest which is actively exploited. There are also many areas producing tea, a crop now figuring less predominantly among Chinese exports than formerly owing to Indian competition. Most of the inland areas are very little known, though it is believed that there are extensive, highly cultivated, and densely settled lowlands in valleys parallel to the coastline (Plate 14). The speculative character of most population estimates for Fukien has been noted on p. 242.

The coast is much more familiar than the interior to the western world, partly because its ports have been visited by traders and missionaries in considerable numbers from the sixteenth century onwards. It is one of the five most densely peopled areas in China. Agricultural productivity is high, with two crops of rice each year and a third winter crop such as rice or beans. Fishing is widely practised, both from the mainland and from numerous islands offshore (Plates 15, 16). Four large towns, which are also ports, serve the region and gather up the trade of the interior valleys. These are Wenchow (*c.* 200,000), Foochow (estimates 323,000–600,000), Amoy (*c.* 200,000), and Swatow (179,000).

Nearly 90 per cent. of the population of the South-eastern Uplands lives in rural areas, and it has been estimated that the density of population per square mile of cultivated land is 2,500–3,000. Such densities are only possible with minute fragmentation of the tilled lands, and many farms are far too small even though three crops a year are produced. There are obvious signs of over-population, such as excessive pressure on the land, abundant emigration to Nan Yang (the South Seas), and in the towns, the presence of boat-

dwelling communities of people who rarely, if ever, set foot on land. Fishing is more general along the coast than elsewhere in China, and the maritime outlook characteristic of large sections of the population has encouraged emigration. Adversity is the chief driving force in many cases, and emigration is stimulated by unemployment or such events as the typhoon damage of 1922 in Swatow, which caused the death of 50,000 persons and widespread distress. Once begun, emigration begets itself, for relatives and friends follow in the wake of former emigrants. There are some village communities in Kwangtung and Fukien which are largely financed by members of the family overseas; some estimates suggest that in certain cases as much as 75 per cent. of the family income comes from the Nan Yang. The villages sending out emigrants are generally more enterprising in various ways; in particular, their schools are superior to those elsewhere.

The improvements due to the remittances from emigrants have affected the towns as well as rural areas. In Amoy about three-fifths of the population receive remittances from the Nan Yang. The town has been largely modernized with the help of capital provided by the Chinese overseas. Swatow has several commercial and industrial enterprises similarly financed and it, too, is a modernized town. Other improvements due to capital from those overseas include bus services and the provision of new steamships on the Han kiang. For the position of the Chinese overseas see pp. 289-301.

(K) THE NANLING BELT

The Nanling Belt is a mountain barrier cut by three major passes, the Meiling, Cheling, and Kweilin, with a number of minor passes. It is a thinly peopled region, though there are some cultivated valley lowlands. There are considerable timber reserves, but many hillsides are heavily eroded through indiscriminate cutting, and the timber resources are only of local significance. As yet, the mineral reserves, such as tin, copper, zinc, antimony, and wolfram, are not exploited, though the construction of railways from Hankow to Canton through the Meiling pass and from Hengchow to Liuchow may encourage mining developments. Kweilin, the provincial capital of Kwangsi province and a city of over 100,000 (250,000 according to one estimate), is situated at the southern end of the Kweilin pass route on the Kwei kiang.

(L) THE CANTON DELTA AND CENTRAL KWANGTUNG

There are many similarities between the Canton 'delta' and the Yangtze delta, both of which are densely peopled, probably with as many as 3,000 people to the square mile (Plate 17). The Canton delta is largely a man-made landscape, and reclamation of mudbanks still continues as it has done for many centuries past. Floods which break dykes and cover ricelands are not unknown in the Canton delta, and an additional menace is occasional typhoons. The Canton delta is surrounded by a girdle of hilly country drained by the Tung kiang, Pei kiang, and the lower Si kiang. These river valleys have restricted areas of cultivation, but the hills are mainly disafforested and subject to severe erosion. Fig. 21 shows a part of the New Territories, Hong Kong, in which only a few small areas are cultivated and the hills are almost entirely devoid of trees (Plates 18, 33).

The high density of population in the Canton delta is made possible by the growth of two or even three crops a year. Fishing is a valuable and well-used resource. The towns have various industries and tap the commerce of a wide hinterland. Canton, the historic centre, is a very progressive and modernized town with 852,000 inhabitants (some estimates over a million). About 100,000 people live permanently on boats, forming floating communications similar to those in Swatow and Foochow (Plate 24). While in Chinese judgment 'everything new comes from Canton,' it has a still more modern competitor in Hong Kong, which has grown within a century to be one of the great ports of the world. In 1939 the population of Hong Kong (including the New Territories) was 1,050,000.

(M) SOUTH-WESTERN KWANGTUNG AND HAINAN

The only really tropical part of China, this region is not densely peopled. Estimates of the actual density vary considerably however, though it is known that there are some fertile and closely settled lowlands, such as those in the Liuchow peninsula and around Kwangchowwan. In all these rice is the chief crop, with sugar-cane and sweet potatoes as the main subsidiaries. In other lowland areas there are poor and infertile soils of a lateritic character (Plate 19).

Hainan island is one of the areas within China able to absorb an immigrant population that has come mainly from the coastal fringe of the south-eastern uplands. Already there are about two million Chinese who have settled the lowlands in the north of the island.




Fig. 21. Settlement and cultivation near Hong Kong, New Territories. Based on 1 : 20,000 G.S.G.S., Series 3868, *Hong Kong and New Territories*, sheets 1 and 5 (1940).

Settlement is mainly on the edges of the irrigated ricefields, but treeless hills dominate the area, which is typical of many parts of South China.

Their main crop, rice, is exported through Kiungchow. The interior of the island is inhabited by various groups of aborigines, with whom the relations of the Chinese are not invariably friendly. But a half-caste element, already important, is able to settle successfully in the unhealthy interior valleys. The Japanese are building railways in Hainan and its economic future is assured.

Plantation agriculture may ultimately develop in this region of China, for rubber and other tropical products. There are also great timber reserves, and the forests include some tropical timbers of high value, but the exploitation of forest resources must be carefully planned to guard against the destructive soil erosion that may ruin many hillsides. There are considerable possibilities of agricultural expansion by individual farmers both in Hainan and on the mainland.

(N) THE KWANGSI BASIN

This region corresponds fairly closely to the province of Kwangsi which, with a population of 14,254,609, had a density of 163 people per square mile. Only four provinces of China Proper are less densely peopled, the two north-western provinces of Shensi and Kansu and the two south-western provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan. Many factors contribute to the relatively sparse population, by Chinese standards, of Kwangsi. It was until recently torn by internal strife, with wars and massacres at relatively frequent intervals. Again, the areas of cultivable land are restricted by the complicated and hilly relief, in which deep valleys alternate with residual limestone hills and uplands resembling mountain ranges.

There are, however, some intensively cultivated areas supporting large populations, mainly in valleys of the east and south-east, especially around river ports and on gentler hill slopes, some of which have elaborate terracing if irrigation water is available (vol. i, Plates 74-75, pp. 127-8). The forests have been largely removed and bare denuded surfaces ravaged by soil erosion are widely seen, though on some hillsides the wood-oil tree and the tung-oil tree are raised. Camphor trees and pines are cut for export to Canton.

At least 90 per cent. of the population of Kwangsi lives in rural areas, and the major towns are river ports and markets. These include Kweilin on the edge of the Nanling; Yungning (Nanning), the provincial capital with 80,000 people; and Wuchow, a town of similar size. The people of 'the two Kwangs' (i.e. Kwangsi and



Plate 17. Settlement and land utilization, Canton delta

Flooded paddy fields and settlement on patches of higher ground can be seen in this aerial view of part of the delta.




Plate 18. Settlement, New Territories, Hong Kong

This view of Fanling valley, New Territories, shows villages located near the hillfoot or on patches of better drained land among the ricefields.



Plate 19. Suwen, Kwangtung

The closely packed town of Suwen in the southern part of the Liuchow peninsula.



Plate 20. The Mekong valley, Yunnan

There are patches of cultivation on the valley floor and on small terrace areas, with several nucleated settlements.

Kwangtung) have always been regarded as enterprising. Kwangsi province has a number of new roads especially around Yungning, and some of the cities, such as Wuchow, have recently been modernized. It is doubtful whether any considerable expansion of population may be expected in Kwangsi, though there are important resources in such rare minerals as antimony and wolfram.

(O) THE SOUTH-WESTERN TABLELAND (YUNKWEI PLATEAU)

The South-western Tableland covers the provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan: in Kweichow the population is 10,487,367, 146 to the square mile, and in Yunnan there are 10,853,359 people, 89 to the square mile. The relative sparsity of settlement is explained partly by the extent of mountainous country and unproductive plateau areas, but the Yunkwei Plateau has been for many centuries a region of Chinese penetration, now accelerated by movements from the east. The many schemes for economic development include the expansion of mining, the provision of railways, and the substitution of food crops for opium on farms. These provinces have great agricultural potentialities, which include hemp and flax cultivation on the high lands, mulberry and tea plantations on hillsides. There are large grassland areas suitable for pastoral farming; and while the south-west already has more animals per unit of crop area than any other parts of China, the lack of a demand for dairy products is an important factor limiting Chinese settlement to areas suitable for arable cultivation.

In such an area it is important to distinguish between actual and potential occupation of the land. In Kweichow about half the population is Chinese, in Yunnan about one-third. The remainder of the population consists of various aboriginal tribespeople in varying stages of cultural assimilation with the Chinese (see vol. i, pp. 132, 136, 427-32). The tribespeople are found mainly on the higher ground, except in the extreme south-west of Yunnan where they occupy some of the malarial valleys, and the Chinese settlement is on the higher ground.

The Chinese settlers live mainly in fertile valleys and lake plains, where they can practise agriculture with rice cultivation as its basis. They reproduce the type of settlement with which they were familiar in Szechwan, Kweichow, Honan, Hupeh, and Kwangtung, from which provinces most of the immigrants were drawn. The Chinese are dominant in the peripheral valleys of Kweichow, where they are

rice cultivators. In addition there is some utilization of the valuable woodlands. The northern valleys have important woodlands, chiefly of conifers with some oaks and chestnuts. Much of the timber comes from plantations, and logs are floated in huge rafts down the Yuan to the Tungting hu. The valleys of the Si kiang tributaries have sub-tropical woodlands, with camphor, varnish, and wood-oil trees, and these are floated down to river ports in Kwangsi and ultimately to Canton.

Upland Kweichow is dominated by the tribespeople, but the Chinese are firmly established as traders in the market centres. Many of these are quite small, and some are little more than villages, but the provincial capital, Kweiyang, in the middle of a fertile plain, had a population of 100,000 in 1937 and has grown considerably since. It has been modernized to some extent, and enterprises financed by the Kweichow Development Company include a power station, match factory, printing works, vegetable-oil refinery, tobacco factory, silk-weaving factory, and a flour mill.

Yunnan has a number of extremely productive lake basins which are densely settled by rice-cultivating Chinese. The Burma Road links many such fertile lowlands, and the new railway system focused on Kunming, the provincial capital, has been planned partly to integrate them into an economic whole. It has been said that the density of population is 400 per square mile on the plains, and 40 per square mile on the hills. Only a small part of the plains is cultivated, and the density per square mile of cultivated land is probably as high as in any part of China (Plate 20).

The tin and copper mines have been exploited for many centuries and the Yunnan railway, now partly dismantled, formerly carried many seasonal workers to districts around Mengtsz and Kunming. The two towns, each of which has a population estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000, are the major market centres of the province. Kunming, the provincial capital, is being actively developed at present, and it will probably become the great communications centre of the south-west, especially if railways and roads are directed rather to Szechwan and Burma than to French Indo-China. It will also be a centre for Chinese influence among the tribespeople. One essential condition for the development of south-west Yunnan is the conquest of malaria. Szemao, a city in the south-west, is said to have had 100,000 people in 1925, but only 20,000 in 1941 as the result of malignant malaria. Cultivated areas had gone to waste and all development was impossible.

SETTLEMENT

TOWNS AND CITIES

Essentially rural as China may be, the towns have their vital place in the life of the country, and the Chinese have always shown a keen sense of the relative significance of towns of different sizes. A people so bureaucratically minded were quick to realize the place of towns as administrative centres for *hsien* and provinces, and various cities have been the capital of the whole country. Administrative functions were linked with the cultural and commercial significance of the towns in Chinese life.

There is a general consensus of opinion that the town population of China constitutes not more than 20-25 per cent. of the whole. Industry in China began on a domestic basis, but Chinese and foreign capital has established large enterprises, especially in such great cities as Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, Nanking, Canton, and the Wuhan group. All these have advanced very rapidly in population during the past thirty years, and a number of smaller cities, for which, however, no reliable figures are available, have also expanded considerably. A growing city forms the first and most accessible outlet for migrants from the countryside, but as yet no marked decline in the rural population has been observed. If the various schemes of rural rehabilitation by co-operative societies expands, the movement to the cities so familiar to students of western Europe may not be reproduced in China.

The China Continuation Committee suggested that 89 per cent. of the total population live in rural areas or in towns of not more than 10,000 inhabitants. These small towns are an important group throughout China, and may account for as much as 10 per cent. of the entire population. It has been argued that the China Continuation Committee over-estimated the population of many towns; but, in view of the subsequent increase in town populations, it may now be true that about 10 per cent. of the population live in towns of less than 10,000 people and another 10 per cent. in larger towns.

Buck's investigations led to somewhat similar conclusions. Sample data from 169 *hsien* gave a distribution of 79 per cent. in farm villages and hamlets, 11 per cent. in market towns, where part of the population is engaged in agriculture, and 10 per cent. in cities. An

official estimate given in 1932 by the Government Directorate of Statistics, Nanking, gave the farm population as 75 per cent. of the whole. This is not quite the same thing as the total rural population, for people may be farmers living in towns or non-agricultural workers living in rural areas. If the figure of 75 per cent. farm population is slightly lower than the percentage of dwellers in rural areas, the original figure of 20 per cent. in towns and cities remains useful in the present state of knowledge.

The towns of China include seven cities with about a million people each, well over a hundred cities and towns with more than 50,000 people, and a very large number of smaller towns. Fig. 22 shows the distribution of towns with more than 50,000 people, but it must be regarded as tentative in the absence of reliable statistics for almost all the towns. It is possible to recognize three classes of town :

- (1) Major administrative and commercial cities, with populations of a million or more.
- (2) Important commercial and route centres, with populations of 50,000 upwards.
- (3) Market towns, mainly of local significance, most of which have less than 10,000 people.

Most Chinese towns were walled, with gates at the four points of the compass. The walls were kept in a state of repair and fortified against enemies ; in some cases they were also intended to resist flood waters. The area built up inside the walls is generally only part of the area enclosed, and the remaining land is given to intensive crop production to withstand a siege. In many towns all gateways into the city are closed at an early hour in the evening. Many towns have suburbs outside the walls (Plates 22, 23), and in some the walls have been removed altogether, though a large number survive to this day.

Major Administrative and Commercial Cities

Seven cities in China have some claim to be of international importance, and all of them have populations of little less than, or more than, a million. Shanghai, Chungking, Peiping, Tientsin, Canton, Nanking, and the Wuhan cities, taken together, have only 3 per cent. of the whole population of China, even though they have increased rapidly in size and influence in recent years (Fig. 23).

Shanghai, the largest and most thoroughly international of the seven cities, has a population approaching four million people to-day, but seventy years ago it had only 250,000 people, and even in 1910 it had merely one-quarter of the present population. The major




Fig. 22. Distribution of cities and towns

S Shanghai.

Based on Shen Ju-Sheng. 'The Distribution of Cities of China,' *Journal of the Geographical Society of China*, vol. vi, p. 914 (Nanking and Chungking, 1937).

This map is tentative and there are probably many more cities of 50,000-500,000 people than shown. The general pattern is clearly related to the distributions shown in Figs. 14-15.

port and dominating industrial centre of China, Shanghai, has grown wealthy on the trade of its vast hinterland. Tientsin is another relatively new city owing its rise to the modern commercial and industrial developments in China. No population figures are avail-

able before 1928, but it is estimated to have had 60,000 people in 1860 and 320,000 in 1900. Well equipped with railways, it depends




Fig. 23. Growth of population in six major cities of China, 1929-35

Based on Kung, H. A., 'The Growth of Population: The six Chinese large cities,' *Chinese Economic Journal*, vol. xx, pp. 301-14 (Shanghai, 1937).

Tientsin and Nanking are stabilized in population but the others are increasing. The sharp drop in Shanghai in 1932 was due to the Sino-Japanese hostilities that led to a large but temporary evacuation of the city.

upon an outpost, Taku, for its major contacts with oceanic commerce. There are signs that its position is weaker than Shanghai's, as the population reached a maximum of 1,399,461 in 1933, and

has declined since (1,292,025, Ministry of Interior, 1936). A powerful potential competitor is Ts'ingtao, in the Shantung peninsula (see p. 249). In 1935 Tientsin ceased to be the provincial capital of Hopeh, and its administrative functions were transferred to Chingyuan (Paoting).

The other major cities increased rapidly in population up to the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, but they have longer histories than Shanghai and Tientsin. Chungking, the present capital of Free China, had 534,745 people in 1939 (Government Director of Statistics), but its population has been greatly augmented in the past few years, and one recent estimate is 1,900,000. Nanking, a city with many vicissitudes in its history, became the capital of Nationalist China in 1928, and almost doubled the population in the following seven years from 497,526 in 1928 to 951,645 in 1935. Peiping, the former capital, continued to gain in population from 1,358,630 in 1928 to 1,570,643 in 1935, but it appears to be stabilized around that figure. Chungking, Nanking, and Peiping have all shared to some extent in the industrialization of China.

Canton and the Wuhan cities (Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang) are old-established commercial cities tapping the trade of the Si kiang valley and the Central Yangtze Basin respectively. Canton increased rapidly in population up to 1935, partly owing to the use of capital from emigrant Chinese living abroad. The city does not appear to have suffered from the competition of Hong Kong; the functions of the two places are complementary, for Canton controls the trade of the interior and Hong Kong is a world port. The Wuhan cities had a population of approximately 1,500,000 in 1936, two-thirds of whom were in Hankow. The fall in population in 1935 was due to floods, a constant danger in the richest parts of the Central Yangtze Basin (see pp. 254-7, also vol. i, pp. 95-98).

Of these seven great cities, two are in the North China Plain, four along the Yangtze, and one in South China. They are a skeleton plan reflecting the very partial industrial development of China. Their future depends upon the provision of better transport facilities and also on the scheme of industrial location worked out in post-war China.

Towns and Cities, with Populations c. 50,000-500,000

The China Continuation Committee estimated that 173 towns in China had a population of more than 50,000; the more conservative estimates used in Fig. 22 exclude nearly fifty of these. Towns within

these limits of population may include as much as 5 per cent. of the population of China. They cover the most significant commercial and route centres, many administrative centres, and include a number of ports.

Three cities have about 500,000 people each. Soochow is an historic centre in the Yangtze delta, and Hangchow is a port and commercial town serving its own fertile region, the Hangchow Basin (Plate 26). Tsingtao has several industries, and as a port it is sufficiently strong to challenge the greater Tientsin.

There are about a dozen towns with populations between 200,000–500,000. They include some of the larger ports on the coast between the Yangtze and the Canton delta, such as Ningpo, Wenchow, and Foochow. In the Yangtze valley three major river ports, Chinkiang, Wuhu, and Wan, probably have populations of more than 200,000. Changsha, situated in the Siang valley south of the Tungting hu, is a growing city with a considerable industrial development. The other cities with more than 200,000 people are in North China—Sian, Chingyuan, and Tsinan, the provincial capitals of Shansi, Hopeh, and Shantung respectively.

The number of large towns in China is relatively small, though it may well be greater than suggested above. There are, however, well over a hundred towns and possibly nearer two hundred, with populations somewhere between 50,000 and 200,000. It is impossible to deal with these individually, but reference to Figs. 18–20 will show that they fit into the general pattern of Chinese settlement as the larger market and route centres. Some of the more significant towns are mentioned in the regional section of this chapter (see pp. 251–61). It may be added that very few are now purely industrial centres, though some of the new industrial plans may result in such developments (see vol. iii, Chapter iv).

The Smaller Market Towns

These are the most numerous if the least known group of Chinese towns. The Chinese Continuation Committee estimated that there were 170 towns of 20,000–50,000 people, but there may be many more. An even more significant group is the towns of less than 20,000 people, many of which are small market centres almost indistinguishable from villages. In relation to the total population of China, probably about 2 per cent. are in towns of 10,000–50,000, but as many as 10 per cent. in the essential small towns. The functions of these small towns are admirably illustrated by a detailed

field study dealing with two such towns in the Yangtze delta. The contrast between the old walled town and the newer unwalled town may be typical of large parts of China.¹

Feng is an old walled county seat, now decadent since the administrative functions have been transferred elsewhere (Fig. 24). The town is enclosed by a brick wall, originally built in 1386, 25 feet high with a low parapet and bastions at intervals. A moat encircles the town, and there are gate towers in the walls. The commercial centre is at the intersection of roads from these gate towers, but the




Fig. 24. Plan of Feng city

Based on Cressey, G. B., 'The Fenghsien Landscape,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xxvi, p. 410 (New York, 1936).

This plan is copied from the *hsien* gazetteer of 1756. The town wall is approximately 2,300 feet square and a moat surrounds the whole town. The Confucian temple is at the lower right, the magistrate's *yamen* above it, and various temples to the left.

shops are small and limited to domestic needs. The largest buildings are the *yamen*, or former magistrate's headquarters, a large Confucianist hall, and several temples. The town formerly possessed four granaries. The only evidence of modernity are a new school, a small reading room and public library, and one telephone.

¹ Cressey, G. B., 'The Fenghsien Landscape,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xxvi, pp. 410-12 (New York, 1936).

Not all the land inside the walls is built up, and Feng, like many other Chinese towns, has some agricultural land within the walls.

Chingtsunchiang is a modern, unwallled town spread along a canal, with a population of 4,500 (Figs. 25, 26). The town is very congested, and more than half its area is under roofs. Houses with




Fig. 25. The Chingtsunchiang district, Feng basin

Based on Cressey, G. B., 'The Fenghsien Landscape,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xxvi, p. 400 (New York, 1936).

Chingtsunchiang is an unwallled town built along a canal. The map also shows the dispersed settlement typical of the Yangtze delta.

their tiny courtyards are directly connected with the shops, and while small enterprises are most numerous, a few large firms deal in cotton and beans, which are sent to Shanghai. Rice is brought from Shanghai, timber from Foochow (poles), Hangchow (bamboo), and Hankow. The only signs of modernity are electricity in the larger shops, a new school, and a public tea-room and education hall in a former temple.

TYPES OF RURAL SETTLEMENT

About 80 per cent. of the population of China lives in rural areas, mainly in villages, though hamlets and isolated settlements occur in some parts of China, notably in the Yangtze delta. The nucleated settlement, consisting mainly of farmsteads surrounded by a few trees and grouped around a temple and a few shops, is found throughout the country. But it is extremely difficult to make any division between the larger villages and the small market towns which are so intimately linked with the surrounding countryside. The smaller




Fig. 26. Urban land utilization in Chintsunchiang

Based on Cressey, G. B., 'The Fenghsien Landscape,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xxvi, p. 411 (New York, 1936).

Retail trade is the main resource of the town, but a few firms deal in wood and cotton. Only in the centre of the town are the buildings more than one storey high.

towns are vital distribution and administration centres which, in some parts of the country, occur not 9-15 miles apart, as in the English lowland, but as close as a mile apart in such areas as the Wei ho valley and the Yangtze delta. The concentration of rural settlement is much more intensive than in any area of western Europe, and the nearest parallels are to be found in other parts of monsoon Asia or in Egypt.

Although all the descriptions of Chinese lowlands stress the presence of very numerous villages and towns, there is a complete lack of systematic field studies showing the relative significance of

the various settlement types so liberally represented. It is impossible to assess the relative significance of villages, hamlets, and isolated farmsteads in the various regions of China. Yet there are some clearly defined needs which must influence rural settlement types and certain sharply defined hazards that are also of considerable significance.

Factors Influencing Types of Rural Settlement

Water supply is the most obvious of these : in North China, wells and springs may determine the site of settlement, but in Central and South China water is generally abundant and the possibilities of irrigation or transport may be a more vital influence than the proximity of drinking water. Conversely, the dangers of flood influence the actual location of houses in many parts of the Yangtze Basin and the North China Plain, where the villages are found on patches of higher ground raised above potentially flooded areas. Some deltaic areas, notably in the Canton delta, the Central Yangtze Basin, and the deltas along the coast in south-east China, show a similar location on dykes or hills above land which may be covered by overflowing rivers or even by particularly high tides, especially when typhoons occur.

The need for protection may be partly responsible for the dominance of village settlement over the greater part of China. A village community possessing a grain store will be better able to withstand the ravages of flood or drought. But protection against enemies is even more important and many villages are fortified against bandits, invading armies, or raiding parties of aboriginal peoples. The frontier villages of the Loess Plateaux in the north-west, of Yunnan and Kweichow, of Hainan island, and of many inlets along the coasts subject to the attacks of pirates are generally walled and fortified.

Some villages have their own particular habitat determined by their function. Fishing villages, some of which are of miserable appearance, dot the coastline and islands of south-east China. But it is not possible to recognize from existing maps and other sources the route centres and market villages at road junctions similar to those in western Europe, probably because the densely peopled agricultural lowlands have few main roads, and towns are numerous and fairly easily accessible by footpaths and waterways. Villages in China generally avoid the cultivable lands on account of their scarcity and value. Reference to Figs. 21 and 28 will show that most



Plate 21. Shihtao, Shantung

A congested coastal settlement in the Shantung peninsula, with numerous fishing craft in the roadstead between the shore and the island of Tienlang tao beyond.



Plate 22. Shanhaikwan, Hopeh

Suburbs have extended outside the town walls towards the Great Wall, where here crosses the narrow coastal plain between the hills of the Peking Grid and the sea.




Plate 23. Lanchow, Kansu

The walled city of Lanchow, seen across the Hwang ho. The walled area is densely peopled and settlement has spread to areas outside the walls.



Plate 24. The Chu Kiang, Canton

Close to the south bank, in the foreground, are a number of the houseboats in which a considerable proportion of the population of the city lives. The waterfront on the north bank is lined by many modern commercial buildings.

of the villages are on hillfoots just above the level of the cultivated lands (Plate 18).

The absence of adequate maps makes it impossible to discuss the importance of these factors throughout China Proper, but five areas are here considered as samples of the general situation.

Kansu and the Loess Plateaux

In this country of sparse water supplies, settlement is influenced partly by the availability of water from wells, springs, and rivers. The need for protection is also acute, as the region is traversed by one of the historic routes for invaders entering China. In addition, banditry is a recurrent scourge. Three main types of rural settlement are represented.

(1) *Valley villages.* Walled villages are found in valleys and small depressions where springs are available or wells may be dug (Plates 7, 32 and Fig. 27).

(2) *Villages on the plateau surface.* These are strongly fortified and walled; in some cases a naturally defensive site has been chosen. Such sites are not infrequent, for the loess weathers into sharp bluffs under the local conditions of drainage (Plates 5, 27).

(3) *Cave dwellings.* This is the most curious type of rural settlement found in China. Some 'houses' consist of a series of rooms opening off from a terrace on the valley side of a ravine. In some cases they have courtyards on the terraces, and the dwellings may have doors and windows similar to those of more elaborate houses. But some are of primitive appearance, though all are said to be warm in winter and cool in summer, a most desirable asset in the extreme climate of the north-west. The smoke from fires is led through chimneys emerging in the fields of the plateau surface. Another type of loess dwelling is a series of rooms round a courtyard sunk in the plateau surface (Plates 28, 29).

Valley villages, plateau villages, and cave dwellings may all occur in juxtaposition. It is not known to what extent the population is distributed in each type of settlement, but some millions live in the cave dwellings.

The North China Plain

The general impression given by travellers in this densely peopled and continuous lowland is that it forms an infinitely delicate landscape, with a plenitude of villages and minutely divided agricultural lands. It is the home of an ancient agricultural civilization owing its




Fig. 27. Typical country village in Shensi

Based on a drawing in Wenley, A. G., and Pope, J. A., *China: Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies*, No. 20, p. 8 (Washington, 1944).

Many of the farmhouses in this valley village have court-yards, while the village walls are largely in disrepair; a few trees relieve the monotony of the scene on the valley floor.

vitality to the presence of millions of people whose forefathers have cultivated and enriched the soil for many generations.

The villages are so numerous that almost every landscape includes several of them, except in relatively unproductive areas such as salt




Fig. 28. Village settlement in the North China Plain

Based on 1 : 50,000 G.S.G.S., Series 3789, *Eastern China*, sheet 19/2,000, Tungchow (1926).

The settlement is in large villages a mile or more apart on ground raised above the general level of flood-waters around the river.

marshes and sandy tracts near the Gulf of Pohai. Villages are usually built on slightly higher ground, partly to guard against floods, and many are surrounded by groves of willows and poplars. Fig. 28 shows the distribution of settlement in a small part of the Hopeh

basin. It will be noted that the villages, less than a mile apart, are connected to one another by footpaths, and that the rivers are sedulously avoided.

Hamlets also occur in the North China Plain, but the isolated farmstead is comparatively rare. The chief building materials are soft grey bricks poorly burnt with straw or pounded earth or sun-dried cakes of mud. The roofs are commonly of mud laid on kaoliang stalks resting on wooden rafters supported by the main beams. The roof, held up by wooden beams, is independent of the walls which may soften and collapse in times of heavy rainfall, but are easily renewed. Wood is a valued resource, and in the groves of trees willows are pollarded to provide beams, including the heavy ones needed to support the roof, and lighter timber for the rafters.

The Yangtze Delta

The Yangtze delta has almost every type of rural settlement from single isolated farmsteads to large market villages grading into small towns. There is an abundant water supply throughout the delta and no need for concentration of settlement for protection against floods. The houses are generally located on canals, which are used for domestic water supplies, transport, and fishing. In the older parts of the delta the canal system has no planned regularity, and the accretions of centuries are reflected in a settlement pattern that is entirely unsystematic. Canal intersections and road junctions have not resulted in any nucleated settlements, but the density of population is so great that no one need lack neighbourly contacts (Figs. 20, 25, Plates 11-13; also vol. i, Figs. 34, 35).

The delta consists primarily of land reclaimed from the sea, and parts of it have been settled relatively recently. As the houses are constructed very simply of grey brick, pounded earth, and woven reeds, new villages may be built quickly: there are evidences that the general pattern of settlement may change with the development or decay of particular centres. Favoured sites for buildings in areas newly reclaimed are sea walls and dykes guarding the farmlands from high tides along the coast and in the estuary.

The Red Basin of Szechwan

There is a great variety of settlement types in the Red Basin; villages, hamlets, and isolated farmsteads are all widely represented. The richest part of the basin, the Chêngtu Plain, has a large part of its population in small hamlets or isolated farms surrounded by

small woods with cypress, cedars, and occasional orange trees. The basin has a rather sharper distinction between towns and rural settlement than many parts of China. There are towns consisting solely of shops and tea houses, kept closed except on busy market days which occur at intervals of a week or less. Except in the west of the basin, the lack of danger from bandits makes fortifications




Fig. 29. Settlement in the Canton delta

Based on 1 : 25,000 G.S.G.S., Series 3831, Canton (1937).

The population is gathered into villages situated on low hills or land not likely to be flooded, and large areas of great agricultural importance are devoid of population.

unnecessary. Nor is the influence of water supply or intermittent flooding apparent, for there is an adequate water supply over the whole basin, and irrigation, so widely practised, itself removes any possibility of flooding.

The Canton Delta

Floods are a menace in the Canton delta, for in times of heavy rainfalls the delta creeks are unable to carry away flood waters, and

the dykes may be broken. The embanked ricefields are the most vulnerable areas, and though they are the essential resource of the community they are generally devoid of settlement. Fig. 29 shows that large areas, including complete islands, have no resident population. Most of the settlement is in villages, and are placed at the foot of the hills scattered through the delta or on slightly higher and better drained land given to orchards and mulberry plantations. Plate 18 shows hillfoot villages surrounded by trees on the edge of a series of ricefields.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS

IS THE POPULATION OF CHINA INCREASING ?

Estimates of the rate of population increase in China have been made by various writers, but in the absence of any reliable statistics of births and deaths, and with mere computation of the total population, they can only be regarded as highly speculative. It is not unnatural that there should be a sharp division of opinion as to whether the population of China is still increasing or whether a state of saturation has been reached. Carr-Saunders has put forward the view that there is no perceptible increase at present, and that China is saturated with population, but Chiao maintains that there are substantial increases in some parts of China, offset to some extent by decreases elsewhere, though the net result is continued expansion of population¹ (see pp. 285-7, and Fig. 30).

Increase of population is due to a continued excess of births over deaths, and most experts agree that China has both a high birth-rate and a heavy death-rate. A favourable balance through the excess of births over deaths may be removed suddenly by catastrophic wars, revolutions, floods, and droughts, all of which may result in famines. Emigration is a possible check to population growth, but, though of considerable importance in some parts of China, it is not of sufficient value to cause an appreciable decline in population. Voluntary restriction of births may be practised in China, especially in the towns, but it is quite impossible to say whether this is of much significance as yet. The only indications available are that the

¹ Carr-Saunders, A. M., *World Population*, p. 289 (Oxford, 1936) and Chiao, C. M., in 'Chao Ch'eng-Hsin, Recent Population of China,' *Yenching Journal of Social Studies*, vol. i, pp. 1-48 (Peiping, 1938).




Plate 25. Amoy, Fukien

Modern buildings of Western origin are scattered among typical Chinese one-storied houses.



Plate 26. Hangchow, Chekiang

An aerial view of part of Hangchow, showing the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo railway passing through the eastern wall. Canals are seen inside and outside of the city wall.



Plate 27. Fortified village, Shansi

Many villages in North China are located on easily fortified sites as a protection against attack. On the left is a pathway leading to the narrow village entrance.



Plate 28. Cave dwellings, Shansi

The dwellings are at two levels in the loess connected by a steep pathway.

birth-rates in the large cities, such as Shanghai and Peiping, are substantially lower than those in rural areas. From 1929-37 the birth-rate was 17-19 per 1,000 in Peiping, and from 1931-37 only 11-16 per 1,000 in Shanghai. Official as these figures are said to be, they seem extraordinarily low; if accurate, they are comparable with those in some European cities where family limitation is widely practised.

The Use of Sampling Methods

The sampling method has been followed in China by various investigators, notably by J. L. Buck of Nanking University. Chi-Ming Chiao directed the work on application and vital statistics, and it is therefore significant that his widespread researches should lead to the view that the population is in fact increasing in all save four provinces (see pp. 284-5 and Fig. 30). The work was carried out in 1929 to 1931 and 119 locations were included in the population survey. These were selected from various natural regions, and every effort was made to cover as many types of country as possible. There may have been a tendency to choose samples better than the average in economic resources or in general enlightenment, because some communities regarded the investigators with considerable suspicion, and at times forced them to work elsewhere.

The samples for 119 localities, with populations ranging from 396 to 6,290 inhabitants, cover 46,601 families. In assessment of the returns, several which showed impossibly low birth- and death-rates were rejected. This elimination of all birth-rates below 10.2 per 1,000 and death-rates below 9.7 per 1,000 left 101 localities with 38,256 resident families and 202,617 persons. If the total number of families in China is somewhere around 60,000,000 to 70,000,000 (and the Mingchengpu census of 1910 gave the figure of 64,539,742) the proportion of all Chinese families investigated by this sampling method was approximately 1 in 1,700 or .06 of 1 per cent. Yet it is reasonable to assume that the investigations give a reliable cross-section of Chinese rural society. Probably the most serious objection is that the survey was done solely in areas at peace and not in the grip of war, revolution, floods, drought, and consequent famine.

There was a considerable excess of births over deaths in the areas investigated in 1929-31. The population survey records indicate a birth-rate of 38.3 and a death-rate of 27.1 per 1,000 persons, or an annual excess of 11.3 per 1,000. This would double the population of China in 65 years, a most alarming prospect in a country with

not unlimited possibilities of city expansion, and with few 'fresh woods and pastures new' available for agricultural settlements. But natural catastrophes coupled with man-made sufferings have reduced the increase, though by no means eliminated it. Chao's suggestion




Fig. 30. Increases and decreases per cent., 1913-33

Based on estimates by Chiao, C. M., in Ch'eng-Hsin Chao, 'Recent Population Changes in China,' *Yenching Journal of Social Studies*, vol. i, pp. 1-48 (Peiping, 1938).

Yunnan stands out as a province of expanding settlement. The north-west provinces have lost population through famines and civil disturbance. The Yangtze provinces are all increasing in population.

that between 1912 and 1913 the whole of China showed an increase of 17 per cent., an annual rate of 7.7 per 1,000 per annum, is of particular interest. This, if continued, would double the population in ninety years.

The incidence of increase or decrease by provinces (Fig. 30) shows a growth in the Yangtze valley, probably due to urban developments and existing with a decline in some rural areas, such as the primarily rural province of Kiangsi. In south-east China, Fukien may have lost 6 per cent. of its population between 1913 and 1933, but this province has statistics of a notoriously speculative character. Szechwan appears to have gained in population, and it is probable that a large increase occurred in Yunnan as the tide of Chinese colonization advanced south-westwards. In the provinces of North China, emigration to Manchuria has probably been responsible for low rates of increase, or actual decrease, in Shensi; but Kansu's sharp decline may be ascribed to the failure of many Chinese colonists to make a living in years of inadequate rainfall. In Hopeh, some of the large towns such as Tientsin and Peiping were steadily expanding in population.

BIRTH-RATES AND DEATH-RATES

Some recent samplings of birth- and death-rates have given interesting results which may or may not be typical. As yet, the registration of births, marriages, and deaths is practised only in the larger cities such as Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, Hankow, Canton, Hangchow, and a few others in the coastal provinces. Fifty-three samples reported by Chao gave an average birth-rate of 36 per 1,000 and a death-rate of 27 per 1,000. The infant mortality rate is high, probably about 195 per 1,000 of live births. The samples suggest that the natural increase may be as high as 9 per 1,000 under relatively favourable conditions. But for China as a whole it has almost certainly been considerably lower than this in recent years. In addition to heavy death-rates caused by civil strife, droughts, and floods, there was a mass migration to Manchuria until 1931 from North China, and smaller, but numerically significant migrations from various parts of South China.

The birth-rate of 36 per 1,000 does not seem remarkably high, in view of the early age of marriage, by Western standards, at 20-21 years for men and 18-19 for women. The average number of children per mother is 5.3. However, if a woman should become a widow, she is virtually precluded by social convention from re-marriage: it has been estimated that nearly 5 per cent. of all females between 15 and 45 are widowed. On the other hand, bachelors and spinsters of more than 30 years of age are virtually non-existent: only two or three women in every thousand had not married, and

they were presumably persons with serious disabilities. Divorce, though possible on certain grounds, affects only a negligible proportion of the population.

The traditional desire for male children is reflected in various sample counts of the population. In Buck's survey of 2,640 families (1930), there were 1,234 males to 1,000 females in the 1-9 age group, and 1,183 males to 1,000 females in the 10-19 age group (Fig. 31). Buck's wider investigations of 1929-31 showed 113 male births to 100 female births, a higher proportion than usual in Western countries




Fig. 31. Males and Females in 2,640 families

Based on Buck, J. L., *Chinese Farm Economy*, p. 340 (Chicago, 1930).

The male preponderance is marked in the lower age groups, but there is a female excess in the 20-40 groups, probably due to the absence of males seeking work in cities or abroad. The population is more evenly distributed between 40 and 60, but more women survive to old age than men.

(e.g. Great Britain, 105 males to 100 females). It is possible that the male ratio in China is higher than for Great Britain, and a record of the Central Field Health Station of the National Economic Council gives a ratio of 108.5 male to 100 female births for 54,743 infants born in 227 hospitals. Female infanticide is a possible, if partial, explanation for the high male ratio. It is most likely in times of economic stringency but possible at any time, though efforts are now being made to abolish the practice. Concealment of births for various reasons may depress the birth-rate, especially of females, in some of the investigations.

The death-rate of 27 per 1,000 seems comparatively low and it may well be much higher. Certainly at times it must be greatly in excess of this figure, but the fecundity of Chinese mothers is

sharply offset by the ravages of famine, pestilence, and war. The Taiping rebellion caused the deaths of at least 30,000,000 persons, the Mohammedan rising in Kansu (1894-95), 250,000 deaths. Famines in the first half of the nineteenth century resulted in some 45,000,000 deaths, and among the more serious famines in the latter half of the century was that of 1877-78, which caused nearly 10,000,000 deaths. Two million people perished through the flooding due to the break of the Hwang in 1887. In the present century, probably 3,500,000 people or more lost their lives through drought, flood, famine, and civil war between 1911 and 1935.

The losses of the present war in China cannot be estimated, though it is certain that the total death-roll is more than double that of actual casualties in the field. All the circumstances are favourable for disease and famine, and the bombing of cities built mainly of wood has exacted a fearful toll in human life. However, it is only possible to think of the present sufferings of China as parallel with those of unsettled periods in past history: in terms of population they represent checks in growth similar to those which have operated many times before.

THE FARM FAMILY

The fortunes of individual families are liable to sharp fluctuations, but there is a bitter struggle for survival in times of adversity and a patient tenacity in changing to the home farm, which derives its inspiration from the family system. Buck's investigations of 2,640 families, with 14,952 people, gave a median average per farm family of 5.67 with an extreme range of 1-30, though few have more than 10 members. Nearly two-thirds of the families investigated were of the 'large family' type, and included a number of relatives of the householder, his wife, and children. Thirty-two varieties of relation may occur, all of them on the male side, as the Chinese do not use the term 'relatives' of female connexions. Those most commonly represented include daughters-in-law, mothers, grandsons, brothers, grand-daughters, brothers' wives, nephews, nieces, fathers, and sisters of the male head of the family. It is doubtful, however, if these large families are as frequent as Buck's investigations suggest. In some cases large families live under the same roof, but are subdivided into many smaller units which are in effect independent entities.

The distribution of males and females in 2,640 families has been

plotted in Fig. 31. The number of infants in the 0-4 group is very small, due to the failure, noted in all Chinese census work, to report babies. The high proportion of males under 20 is due to female infanticide or the sale or gift of girl babies to orphanages, especially in the Yangtze valley. Boys are usually given more care than girls. Many girls are sent to the cities as concubines, slave girls, prostitutes or 'sing-song girls.' In the 20-30 age group an excess of females appears, due largely to the emigration of males. The age groups from 30 onwards show approximately equal numbers of men and women in middle life, and the conspicuously greater tendency of women to survive into ripe old age.

The more elaborate samples of 1929-31, covering more than 200,000 people in sixteen provinces, confirmed the general conclusions of the earlier investigations. The average of 3.96 persons per family found on the smallest farms rose to 7.31 persons on the largest farms. The distribution by age groups was also similar with an excess of males below the age of 20 and an excess of females above the age of 45 (Fig. 31). It is apparent that most Chinese farms have as many people as they can support, and advance in hygiene and medical services, though desirable, must accentuate the population problem by making the pressure on individual farms still more severe. The Chinese have recognized this fact in an adage from Tsingyuan, in Shansi:

'To feed a family of five
A farmer must work like an animal,
But to feed a family of six
Even a flogged animal will not work.'

The problem of individual households has been met by seeking various extra sources of income, either at home or abroad. In the 1929-31 samples, it was found that more than one-third of the farmers had some means additional to the sale of farm produce. Approximately three-quarters of the food consumed on all farms in China is home-grown, and at least a small cash income is needed to buy such articles as vegetable oils, sugar, animal products, clothing, and occasional luxuries. The cash income is raised by sales of surplus farm products not consumed at home: a distinction must be made here between goods actually consumed and those needed to maintain an adequate standard of nutrition, for it is certain that many Chinese farmers are obliged to sell goods which they could use to advantage at home.

The main sources of additional income are labour locally or else-

where, domestic industries, fishing, and migration to cities or overseas. Some adjustment is possible in areas where the farms are of varied size, for naturally enough the need for extra income varies according to the size of the farm: the larger farms may employ labour from the smaller farms throughout the year or seasonally, especially at times of sowing and reaping. Domestic industries are widespread and of infinite variety, but the home spinning and weaving of silk and cotton is of great social significance. Many of these domestic industries, which provide home employment during the winter months, are now organized on a co-operative basis or are linked up with factory developments in towns. Fishing is almost universal in China and provides a useful supplement to the diet. It is generally merely a spare-time activity, but there are about a million full-time fishermen, mainly operating in waters from the Yangtze southwards (see vol. iii, Chapter ii).

CHINESE MIGRATION

The Chinese have always been a migrating people in spite of the strong home attachment implanted by the training of youth in the family system. Migration may be regarded as a way of relieving population pressure: if the resources of the land farmed by a family are only sufficient to provide for some of its members, the rest, to use a phrase common in the west of Ireland, 'must travel.'

INTERNAL MIGRATION

It is possible to recognize several types of migration. The most important and the oldest of these is the settlement of new agricultural land with its resultant spread of Chinese social organization within China. The movement has been proceeding steadily for thousands of years, and it is going on to-day in the south-western provinces, especially Kweichow and Yunnan, and also in the new provinces of Ninghsia, Tsinghai, and Sikang. It is also proceeding in other parts of China, including some of the densely peopled provinces, either on land recently reclaimed from the sea or on land reclaimed from forest or desert with the aid of irrigation. But it is quite impossible to assess the number of people involved in such movements (Fig. 32).

The pioneering spirit has always been characteristic of Chinese life. The towns now offer, through their growing industries, employment to sons and daughters of farmers. In some parts of China




Fig. 32. Directions of migration movements

The natural regions are shown (see Fig. 17), and the arrows indicate the main lines of past and present migration movements. Only those within China are significant at present.

there is a seasonal movement to the towns, but this is generally a transition stage to more permanent movement. There is no doubt that internal reconstruction through improved farm methods, drainage schemes, afforestation, together with developments in

mining and industries, can offer a partial solution of the Chinese population problem.

There are considerable Chinese communities in areas that were ceded or leased to other countries in modern times. Formosa, with 4,990,134 Chinese (1935), was ceded to Japan in 1895; the Chinese came mainly from Kwangtung and Fukien in a movement comparable with the recent Chinese settlement of Hainan. The Japanese in Formosa number about a quarter of a million, but hold the key positions in the administrative and economic life of the island.

Hong Kong, Kwangchowwan, and Macao are, respectively, British, French, and Portuguese ports with a little surrounding land in each case. Their population, except for the European administrators and a cosmopolitan trading group, is entirely Chinese. There are 1,026,645 Chinese in Hong Kong (1939), 218,500 in Kwangchowwan (1936), and 152,738 in Macao (1927, but estimated at over 350,000 in 1940).

THE CHINESE ABROAD

The Significance of Emigration Movements

It is difficult to estimate the number of Chinese outside China, and estimates vary from four to fifteen millions. The Chinese living abroad may be a temporary migrant intending only to work and save money for a few years and then return home. He may be the son of a Chinese father who migrated some years previously and never intends to return to China. He may be a member of a Chinese community that originated from movement overseas several hundred years ago. Chinese born abroad are claimed as nationals by the country concerned. The Chinese law of nationality, on the other hand, regards any person of Chinese stock, wherever born, as a Chinese national.

The Chinese people are generally credited with a genius for assimilation. It would be interesting to explore fully the question of how far they are assimilable, especially as they are a minority in every overseas country in which they have settled. Links with the homeland are generally kept up for several generations, and some recent Chinese writings suggest that the closest possible co-ordination should be preserved between those at home and those overseas. The emigration is, therefore, not merely of numerical importance, for it has political implications and economic aspects. The Chinese abroad are most important as traders, and their contribution to the solution

of China's population problem is largely the provision of trading facilities giving profitable employment at home as well as abroad.

The Japanese migration movements are even smaller than the Chinese in total volume, but of much greater political and economic significance. More than thirty million Chinese live in Manchuria, but the economic and political power is held by a Japanese population numbering less than a million. The relative position of the Chinese and Japanese in Formosa is similar (see p. 291). In the Philippines, where there were approximately 20,000 Japanese and 117,000 Chinese in 1939, the Japanese have encroached heavily upon the virtual Chinese preserve in retail trade.

Chinese Emigration to the Mainland of Asia

Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) are all parts of China in its fullest extension. Manchuria and Mongolia have for many years been influenced by Japanese and Russian contacts, and Sinkiang is also penetrated by Russian traders, though it has been preserved from Japanese imperialism throughout the present war with Japan.

Manchuria. Chinese colonization of the four extra-mural provinces forming Manchuria originated before the beginning of the Christian era, and the valley of the Liao was already closely settled by Chinese farmers before the establishment of the Manchu dynasty in 1644. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Manchus had been submerged in southern Manchuria and river valleys in the north had been populated by migrants from the provinces of Hopeh and Shantung. There were nearly fourteen million Chinese in Manchuria at the beginning of the twentieth century; at present there are over thirty millions. The movement from China was accelerated by periods of drought and flood and by intermittent political disturbances. The movement reached its greatest strength during the nineteen-twenties, when nearly a million were leaving North China annually, but it virtually ceased after the Japanese invasion of 1931. The Lytton Commission, 1932, subscribed to the official Chinese view that an overwhelming majority of the people of Manchuria had the same language, customs, and traditions as the people of China Proper, to which they were in the main loyal as a political entity.

Mongolia. Inner Mongolia has been divided into the three provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia, which together have a population of 5,125,413 (see p. 247). It is estimated that more than



Plate 29. Subterranean dwellings, Honan

This settlement in the loess, south of Shanchow, Honan, consists of underground dwellings grouped around square shafts.



Plate 30. Farmstead, Hopeh

This small farmstead, in the hamlet of Chenchiafen, west of Peiping, is characteristic of many in the North China Plain.




Plate 31. Village street, Shantung
A typical paved village street in Choutsunchen, Shantung




Plate 32. Walled village, Kansu
A walled village on the banks of the Hwang ho near Lan-chow. Scattered patches of trees and terracing are evident on the valley floor.

half of this population is Chinese. Settled areas include irrigated lands around the Hwang ho, and in various upland basins to the north-west of Peiping, but no great extension of settlement seems possible in view of the uncertain rainfall and the menacing spread of the desert south-eastward through soil erosion. In Outer Mongolia, Russian influence is dominant, but there are several thousand Chinese living as traders in the towns and also as agriculturists in fertile lands.

Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan). Chinese influence is dominant in Sinkiang, and the population in 1933 was estimated at 4,360,020. The province has some cultivable land on the fringe of the Tarim Basin and along a few rivers. It has become increasingly prosperous in recent years and intensively cultivated with cereals, fruits, vegetables, wool, cotton, and silk. In addition, jade and gold are worked. The Chinese, who rule the province through a governor and officials at Tihwa (Urumtsi), are mainly traders and farmers. They are in a minority, but their exact numbers are not known.

Siberia. Little information is available concerning the Chinese settlers living in the Far Eastern territories of the U.S.S.R., but they have found an amenable field of settlement, and it has been estimated that they number 350,000-430,000. They are farmers, labourers, artisans, and merchants.

Korea and Japan. According to an estimate of 1937, there were 41,000 Chinese in Korea and 82,000 in Japan.

French Indo-China. The various regions assembled by France in the nineteenth century to form French Indo-China have all been under direct or indirect Chinese control at various periods of their history. It is therefore very difficult to estimate the numbers of people of Chinese extraction now living in Indo-China: there were 326,000 at the 1936 census, or 1.4 per cent. of the total population of 23,030,000. But this figure of 326,000 does not include scores of thousands who have intermarried with Annamites, Cambodians, and other groups. According to the 1936 census there were 73,000 Sino-Annamites and over 100,000 Sino-Cambodians, but one estimate gives 700,000 as a possible total Chinese population in Indo-China. The Chinese have acquired a large share in the retail trade, and are also important in manufacturing industries and in certain special types of crop production, such as the growing of pepper and mulberry, with market-gardening around towns. In addition, they control much of the shipping and engage in fisheries. Their general place in the economic and social structure of Indo-Chinese life is intermediate between the native population and the European

administration (see also the N.I.D. Handbook on *Indo-China*, pp. 253-5).

Siam (Thailand). The Chinese in Thailand numbered 524,062 at the 1937 census, but there are at least 2,000,000 people of Chinese extraction in a total population of about 13,000,000. The Chinese have been coming into Thailand since the thirteenth century, if not longer, and they have intermarried with the Thais so constantly that many Thais, including the nobility and chief personalities in government circles, show distinct traces of Chinese admixture. In recent times the Swatow Chinese have been the most considerable group in Thailand, but there are long-settled groups of Fukienese and Cantonese stock. The Chinese have made a considerable contribution to the economic life of Thailand; in Bangkok and other towns and villages nearly all the retail trade is in their hands. They also control much of the country's commerce, for Chinese merchants buy rice from the peasantry, sell it to a buyer or miller in a larger centre, and transport it on Chinese barges, which bring back the various goods sold in Chinese-owned stores. Many of the major enterprises in Thailand, such as rice mills, tin mines, rubber plantations, banks and shipping companies, are Chinese-owned. In addition there are Chinese artisans and agriculturists, most of whom are specialists in plantation rubber, coffee, sugar, and pepper cultivation, with the growing of vegetables and tapioca. The Chinese have been successful in such enterprises partly because the native Thai were reluctant to engage in them. In the last ten years emigration from China has been discouraged in various ways. More violent manifestations included the deporting of influential Chinese, and less violent expressions included the imposition of a fee for entry into Thailand, the levying of heavy taxes on Chinese businesses, and the prohibition of education through the Chinese language.

British Malaya. The Chinese were already in possession of Malacca when the Portuguese arrived in 1511. At present two-fifths of the population are Chinese, due to a modern immigration into British Malaya that began with the foundation in 1819 of Singapore, a predominantly Chinese city throughout its history. The immigration was stimulated by the rubber-planting boom and the beginning of tin mining at the close of the nineteenth century. It lasted until about 1930, and brought from 200,000-400,000 people annually. Many came only for two or three years as contract labourers, but at the 1931 census, 31 per cent. of all the Chinese residents in Malaya had been born there. At least half the total Chinese population is

urban, but they are also found outside towns as tin miners, traders, as independent agriculturists, and as workers on plantations, though Indian Tamils were recruited to augment the labour supply on plantations. The Chinese are found in every walk of life, but many an industrial millionaire and merchant prince has risen from the ranks of coolie labour.

Burma. The Chinese include immigrants from Kwangtung and Fukien settled in the densely populated and intensively cultivated Irrawaddy delta and immigrants from Yunnan living in the highlands of the northern Shan States (Fig. 33). In 1931 they numbered 194,000 (1.3 per cent. of the total population), and their occupational distribution was trade and commerce 58 per cent., industry 19 per cent., agriculture and forestry 12 per cent. In Rangoon, where 31,000 Chinese lived in 1931, they are mainly associated with rice milling. The immigrants from Yunnan, around the Bawdwin mines and elsewhere in north Burma, include tribesmen closer in affinity to their neighbours in Burma than to the Chinese from Kwangtung and Fukien. A third minor concentration of Chinese, around Moulmein and southwards along the west coast of the Malay peninsula, consists of coolie mining communities. The Chinese, originally from Kwangtung and Fukien, provide both a labour force and most of the commercial and other services the mining communities require.

Chinese Emigration to the East Indian Archipelago

Chinese emigration to the East Indian archipelago is largely contingent on the ebb and flow of economic circumstance. The marked decline in tin mining and rubber production in the early nineteen-thirties reduced the volume of migration to small proportions. There is a long-established Chinese community in the Netherlands East Indies, but any increase in the community from the 1,233,000 (2 per cent. of the whole population) recorded in 1930 will not be from a migrational surplus but from Chinese born on the islands (see the N.I.D. Handbook on *Netherlands East Indies*, vol. ii, pp. 165-7).

Java and Madoera. About 86 per cent. of the Chinese in Java (1.4 per cent. of the whole population) were born in the islands. They are settled primarily in the cities and towns, and control much of the wholesale and retail trade with port activities, especially in Batavia where they form 15 per cent. of the entire population. They are also important in various industries and plantation agriculture, both as owners and labourers. Smaller farming is also practised,

and there are many Chinese moneylenders, artisans, and craftsmen in various parts of Java and Madoera.

The Outer Provinces. The Outer Provinces include Sumatra




Fig. 33. The Chinese in South-east Asia (Nan Yang)

Based on Unger, L., 'The Chinese in South-east Asia,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, p. 198 (New York, 1944).

The Chinese are scattered throughout south-east Asia as traders: this map shows only those areas where they are significant groups in the total population.

and the remaining islands of the Netherlands East Indies, almost all of which are capable of greater economic development under favourable conditions of world trade. The Chinese number 650,000

(3.4 per cent. of a total population of nineteen millions). About 45 per cent. of the Chinese are engaged in the production of such raw materials as minerals and products of plantation agriculture, chiefly rubber and tobacco. Only 21 per cent. of the Chinese are employed in transport and commerce. The main Chinese groups are found in Sumatra around Medan and Palembang, in Bangka and Billiton, in western Borneo around Pontianak and Singkawang, along the south-east coast of Borneo and at the two opposite ends of Celebes (Fig. 33). The occupations of the Chinese differ considerably from place to place. In Sumatra, Bangka, and Billiton most of the Chinese are traders or coolies who have arrived since 1900. The coolies produce tobacco and rubber in plantations along the Strait of Malacca, tin on Bangka and Billiton, and petroleum around Palembang. In West Borneo the immigrants are mainly rice-growing farmers, an occupation unusual for the Chinese abroad, and they also produce rubber and copra. In south-east Borneo the Chinese are mainly employed in coalmines and oilfields. They are primarily traders in Celebes and various smaller islands such as Bali, Lombok, and Timor.

British Borneo. In Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo there are considerable Chinese communities about whom little information is available. In British North Borneo the Chinese number 48,000, nearly one-fifth of the total population, and it has been estimated that the total Chinese community in British Borneo numbers 153,000. In southern Sarawak there is Chinese subsistence rice farming similar to that in Dutch Borneo: in Sarawak and British North Borneo the Chinese are largely concerned with lumbering and plantation agriculture for rubber and copra. Brunei, governed as one of the Straits Settlements, is primarily a port and the Chinese are engaged in various activities connected with shipping. Throughout British Borneo the activities of the Chinese in wholesale and retail trade are very significant.

The Philippines. The Chinese have had trading and even political contacts with the Philippines for many centuries, and before 1898 they emigrated there in large numbers. It is estimated that at least three-quarters of a million Filipinos have some Chinese blood. The Exclusion Act of 1882 (see p. 299) was applied in the Philippines in 1896, and Chinese emigration has virtually ceased. The Chinese-born, who numbered 117,488 in 1939 and live mainly around Manila, control much of the export and import trade, and own three-quarters of the rice mills. Three out of every four retail traders

were Chinese, and they also work in manganese and iron mines, raise tobacco, hemp, and sugar, and engage in lumbering. The Japanese were not excluded until 1908, and though smaller in numbers (about 20,000) they have threatened the Chinese hold on retail trade. The menace to the security of both American power and Filipino independence planned for 1946 has been amply demonstrated since 1941.

Chinese Emigration to Non-Asiatic Countries

Chinese migration to countries outside Asia has almost ceased owing to various laws representing an effort to control migration in the interests of particular communities. The restrictions apply also to Japanese and Indian emigrants, and the net result is that some other solution must be found for the population problems of the entire monsoon fringe.

Hawaiian Islands. The Chinese in the Hawaiian islands numbered 29,380 (7 per cent. of the total population) in 1938. They were originally brought to the islands as indentured labourers, but they have steadily found their way into retail trade and other occupations. As the Exclusion Act of 1882 was applied to Hawaii, the Chinese are now much less numerous than the Japanese, who were not excluded from Hawaii until 1908, and now form 37 per cent. of the population. The course of development has been similar to that in the Philippines (see the N.I.D. Handbook on *Pacific Islands*, vol. ii, pp. 327-47).

Other Pacific Islands. A few thousand Chinese are found in various islands of the Pacific. Many of them came as indentured labourers, but in time became traders of various kinds (see the N.I.D. Handbook on *Pacific Islands*, vol. i).

Australia and New Zealand. The movement of all Asiatics into Australia was significant only in the early days of colonial development. There were about 40,000 Chinese in Australia in 1861, most of whom came to work in the goldfields of New South Wales and Victoria, but the establishment of the 'White Australia' policy at a series of conferences between 1880 and 1890 and the subsequent restrictive legislation has led to a progressive decline, and in 1933 there were only 10,590 Chinese in Australia. Similar policies have been followed in New Zealand, where there is a Chinese population of 2,874 (1937). The Chinese engage in various occupations, but market-gardening is of particular importance.

United States and Canada. The restriction of all forms of migration

into the United States and Canada became a world problem in the twentieth century. The Chinese were excluded by the Restriction Act of 1882, but they had already played a useful part in the development of the western states. Between 1850 and 1860, almost 50,000 Chinese were attracted to the Pacific coast by gold mining and ancillary enterprises, but the white settlers established a kind of social and economic boycott. The building of the trans-continental railway in 1861 brought a new demand for labour which Chinese coolie labour was well adapted to supply. Ocean transport from China was cheaper than land transport from the east coast, the labourers required little food and shelter, and Chinese emigration companies were ready to assume responsibility for the recruitment and supervision of workers. During the 'seventies the Chinese were spreading through the coast and mountain states, and fears were expressed that an Asiatic invasion of a peaceful character would swamp the white population. From 1882 there was no substantial increase in the number of Chinese in the United States: in 1940 there were 77,504, little more than half the number of Japanese, whose entry was restricted in 1908. In Canada, where legislation followed an almost parallel course, there were 46,519 Chinese in 1931, most of whom were in British Columbia. In both the United States and Canada market-gardening is practised by the Chinese, but they are found in many other occupations.

Central and South America. There were approximately 200,000 Chinese in various countries of Central and South America in 1937, of whom the largest groups were 59,000 in Brazil, and 50,000 in the West Indies. Many came as labourers, but a large number have found their way into other occupations.

Europe. There are about 38,000 Chinese in Europe, many of whom are connected with shipping, while others have found their way into various trades. The largest groups of Chinese are 17,000 in France, 8,000 in Great Britain, and 8,000 in the Netherlands.

EMIGRATION AND THE POPULATION PROBLEM

Emigration has not in the past, and will not in the future, solve the problem of over-population in China. The survey of the Chinese abroad shows their remarkable versatility in the areas where they have settled. Even if they were imported as a labour force, they have generally found their way into a variety of occupations. Their very success has led to restrictions against their entry almost everywhere,

first in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and later throughout south-east Asia and the islands of the Pacific. Manchuria will be recovered by the Chinese and the future position of the Soviet Far East is of particular interest. But Russia has an expanding population capable of settling any under-developed territories within the U.S.S.R.

The discrimination against the Chinese is partly due to the fact that they are not easily assimilated by other populations. This is especially true in areas where the Chinese remain only for a few years and then return to China complete with the savings acquired during their temporary exile. In such areas the links with the home country are strong, and the immigrants tend to bring current Chinese political problems with them. They are obviously in a different position from an old-established and stabilized Chinese community such as that in the United States where the links with the mother-country are slight. Loyalty to the Kuomintang has been strong among the various Chinese communities in south-east Asia, who may form powerful commercial groups whose political views are an embarrassment to the rulers of the countries in which they live. This has been most marked in Thailand, but it is also acute in British Malaya and the Philippines. It is likely to become even more acute if any attempt is made to link all overseas Chinese into a definite group of people conscious primarily of their unity with China.

The complete effects of migration upon the home community are as yet difficult to assess, though the researches of Ta Chen on some 'emigrant communities' are highly indicative of the benefits of outward movement (see p. 260-1). No such studies are available for any part of North China, but it may well emerge that there, too, the money and ideas brought or sent home have been a potent influence in modernizing cities and developing trade and transport. The emigrants' remittances of money are important in many families, and in parts of China, notably some districts in the south-east, they have removed the fear of want. The economic effect is to enable a greater population to be supported than the resources of the country would warrant. The economic pressure is relieved, but fundamentally the population problem is still present.

The solution of the grave population problem of China must be sought elsewhere. It has been indicated in earlier sections of this chapter (see pp. 282-91), and lies in drainage, land reclamation, prevention of soil erosion, afforestation, the development of mining and

industrial resources, and in the provision of stable government. Above all, the fundamental need is efficient transport, without which every move towards improvement is liable to fail. Even with all these improvements, the ultimate solution may only be found in regulation of the increase of population in relation to the capacity of China for sustaining it.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

There is a large but scattered literature available on the population problem of China, and this list, which does not claim to be exhaustive, gives some of the major sources under the heads used in the chapter.

1. *General Features.* Most general works on China give useful information on population problems. Among the best are: Cressey, G. B., *China's Geographic Foundations* (New York, 1934); Sion, J., *Géographie Universelle*, tome ix (*Asie des Moussons*), première partie (Paris, 1928); Buxton, L. H. D., *China, the Land and the People* (Oxford, 1929). There is also some treatment of Chinese population problems in Carr-Saunders, A. M., *World Population* (Oxford, 1936).

Articles of a general character have been written by Chinese, American, and British scholars in a variety of journals. Among those by Chinese scholars are: Yin Ting Chang, 'The seriousness of the population problem in China,' *Journal of the Geographical Society of China*, vol. i, no. 1, pp. 3-10 (Nanking, 1934); Huan Yong Hu, 'The distribution of population in China,' *Journal of the Geographical Society of China*, vol. ii, no. 2, pp. 4-5, with dot and coloured maps facing p. 75 (Nanking, 1935); Chang Hang Chen, 'A comparative study of China's land and population problems with some proposals for her economic reconstruction,' *Journal of the Geographical Society of China*, vol. ii, no. 4, pp. 9-15 (Nanking, 1935). In all the above cases the page references refer to the English abstracts of the Chinese articles.

American and British work includes some useful discussion of the relative worth of various census estimates, and most of the papers are well documented. See especially: Rockhill, W. W., 'The 1910 census of the population of China,' *American Geographical Society Bulletin*, vol. xlv, pp. 668-73 (New York, 1912); Willcox, W. F., 'The population of China in 1910,' *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. xxiii, pp. 18-30 (New York, 1928); Willcox, W. F., 'A Westerner's effort to estimate the population of China and its increase since 1650,' *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. xxv, pp. 255-68 (New York, 1930); Willcox, W. F., 'Increase in the population of the earth and of its continents since 1650,' in *International Migrations*, ed. Ferenczi, I., *International Migrations*, vol. ii, 'Interpretations,' pp. 33-82 (New York, 1931); Britton, D. S., 'The census in ancient China,' *Population*, vol. i, no. 3, pp. 83-94 (London, 1934); Roxby, P. M., 'The distribution of population in China,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xv, pp. 1-24 (New York, 1925); Roxby, P. M., 'China as an entity,' *Geography*, vol. xix, pp. 1-20 (London, 1934); Baker, O. E., 'Agriculture and the future of China,' *Foreign Affairs*, vol. vi, pp. 324-38 (New York, 1928). There are also many general articles on population problems in the *Reports of the Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences*, published biennially.

Estimates of the population of China are available in: China Continuation Committee, *The Christian Occupation of China* (Shanghai, 1922); *The Statistical Year Book*, annual (London); *The China Year Book*, published at intervals from 1912 onwards (Shanghai and Chicago); *The Chinese Year Book*, annually published 1935-41 (Shanghai and Chungking); *China Handbook*, 1937-1943, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information, pp. 1-2, 35-8 (New York, 1943). The last work also has estimates of the number of Chinese living abroad.

2. *Regional Distribution.* There are various local studies in the *Journal of the Geographical Society of China* from 1934, in the *Bulletin of the Geographical Department, Sun Yat Sen University, Canton*, from 1937, and useful information is also given in the *Chinese Economic Journal*. Many of the works listed in the Bibliographical Notes to Chapters iii, iv, and v, vol. i of this Handbook, contain useful information.

3. *Settlement.* There are no general studies of Chinese settlement types, but several works have incidental references to the problem. Many pertinent comments will be found in Sion, J., *op. cit.* See also: Shen Ju Sheng, 'The distribution of cities of China,' *Journal of the Geographical Society of China*, vol. vi, p. 914 (Nanking and Chungking, 1937); Cressey, G. B., 'The Fenghsien Landscape,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xxvi, pp. 396-413 (New York, 1936). The growth of population in the six major towns is discussed in Kung, H. O., 'The growth of population: the six Chinese large cities,' *Chinese Economic Journal*, vol. xx, pp. 301-314 (Shanghai, 1937).

4. *Demographic Problems.* Many of the general works listed above include some discussion of demographic problems. A pioneer work, still of great interest, is Mallory, W. H., *China, Land of Famine* (New York, 1926). The valuable sample counts of J. L. Buck and his staff are given in Buck, J. L., *Chinese Farm Economy*, pp. 317-54 (Chicago, 1930), and Buck, J. L., *Land Utilization in China*, pp. 358-99 (Nanking, 1937). See also the *Atlas and Statistics* volumes of this invaluable work. Two important articles by Chinese scholars are Chiao, C. M., 'Rural population and vital statistics for selected areas of China, 1929-1931,' *Chinese Economic Journal*, vol. xiv, pp. 304-336 and 391-425 (Shanghai, 1934), and Chao, Ch'eng-Hsin, 'Recent population changes in China,' *Yenching Journal of Social Studies*, vol. i, pp. 1-48 (Peiping, 1938).

5. *Chinese Migration.* A general work dealing with many aspects of the Asiatic population problem and the possibilities of emigration is Dennery, É., *Asia's Teeming Millions* (London, 1931). The only work dealing with the effects of migration upon the community at home is Ta Chen, 'Emigrant communities in South China' (English version edited by Lasker, B.), *Institute of Pacific Relations, International Research Series* (New York, 1940).

For the Chinese abroad, see Unger, L., 'The Chinese in South-east Asia,' *Geographical Review*, vol. xxiv, pp. 196-217 (New York, 1944); Pelzer, K. J., *An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area: Part I. Population and Land Utilization*, pp. 12-98 *passim* (New York, 1942); Landon, K. P., *The Chinese in Thailand* (London, 1941); Freeman, T. W., 'Recent and contemporary Chinese migrations,' *Union Géographique Internationale, Comptes Rendus du Congrès International de Géographie*, section IIIA, tome deuxième, 1938, pp. 11-22 (Amsterdam, 1938). These articles have references to the somewhat scattered sources that refer to particular countries. An interesting general statement on the position of the Chinese abroad in relation to the home country is given in Chen, Kung-Po, 'The overseas Chinese and their economic position,' *Chinese Economic Journal*, vol. xx, pp. 370-8 (Shanghai, 1937).

Appendix I

THE CULTURAL RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA

In the past the interests of Great Britain in China have been primarily commercial, and the political relations between the two countries have been conditioned and largely determined by commercial considerations. In common with most countries of Western Europe, Great Britain was affected in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the vogue for *Chinoiserie*, but it was mainly concerned with very restricted aspects of Chinese art. There have not been lacking distinguished Sinologues to make known some of the treasures of Chinese literature nor learned societies, such as the Royal Asiatic Society and the China Society, to investigate and discuss various aspects of Chinese civilization, but their appeal has been to only a very limited section of the public. For the vast majority of the British people China has remained remote and mysterious, and there has been little opportunity for intercourse or understanding even between the *intelligentsia* of the two countries.

In recent times, however, there have been some welcome signs of a new approach. The great Exhibition of Chinese Art in London in 1935 came as a revelation to the British public of its richness and originality, and aroused widespread interest. It was followed almost immediately by an outburst of sympathy with the Chinese in their heroic efforts to maintain their universities, which are the nurseries of future leadership, in face of the deliberate and devastating attacks of the Japanese on their cultural centres (see p. 145).

From a still wider point of view, the importance of close cultural intercourse between countries as a means of promoting real understanding and friendship, and of thus placing both commercial and political relations on a more secure and permanent basis, is beginning to receive greater recognition. These considerations apply with particular force to the Chinese, for no people has set a higher value on culture, which they rightly regard as the noblest and most characteristic aspect of their civilization. Their culture, however, in common with every other aspect of their national life, has to be re-orientated and adapted to meet the pressing needs of their new environment, and its synthesis with Western science and intellectual

concepts still constitutes one of their major problems. A quotation from Dr Hu Shih already given (see vol. i, p. 366), puts it so graphically and succinctly that it may well be repeated here: 'How shall we Chinese adapt ourselves to this new world which is, at first sight, so different from what we have so long regarded as our proper civilization? We must rediscover a national heritage with which to relate in an organic, not an artificial way, the systems of thought of modern Europe and America, so that we may build on this new foundation a culture which is our own and in which the new and the old shall be fused.'

The process of transition must necessarily be long and difficult. The Chinese will eventually make the synthesis which suits their own genius, but in the initial stages there are many ways in which the universities and other organizations in the West can give material help in the interpretation of occidental civilization and receive in return some insight into the sources of the rich and varied civilization of China, thus laying the foundations of permanent and fruitful cultural relations and intellectual co-operation.

The country which has so far taken most interest in the cultural aspects and educational problems of modern China and has afforded the greatest facilities for the study of Western civilization by Chinese scholars and students, is the United States of America. She was the first country to remit a large portion of her Boxer Indemnity for educational purposes, establishing thirty years ago the finely equipped and well-staffed Tsing Hua University (near Peiping) from which, as also from several American Missionary Universities in China, large numbers of Chinese students have gone to the United States for higher study and research, many of them returning later as professors to their own country.

The universities have also been active centres of inter-cultural exploration and exchange of Western and Eastern thought in China. The remission at a later date of the remainder of the American Boxer Indemnity was significantly used by the Chinese to establish the notable series of National Research Institutes, collectively constituting the *Academia Sinica*, which was one of the visions of Sun Yat-sen. More recently the Rockefeller Trustees have financed special research studies in China, and the Harvard-Yenching Institute has been created for the same purpose. Chinese studies have been recognized by the Council of Learned Societies in the United States as one of the great fields of learning, and a special organization exists, with funds at its disposal, for translating notable Chinese works.



Plate 33. Chêngtu, Szechwan



Plate 34. Kaifêng, Honan



Plate 35. Kunming, Yunnan
Narrow crowded streets in a closely built-up area of the city.




Plate 36. Kweilin, Kwangsi
A view of the provincial government offices with the Li Kiang and the characteristic limestone hills of Kwangsi in the background.

In comparison, the contribution of Great Britain to Chinese educational needs for many years was small, and facilities for the study of Chinese culture or for acquiring knowledge of the historical evolution and modern problems of China in the British universities have been few. The prevailing ignorance of China in this country is largely due to this neglect. Yet no one who has studied both countries can doubt that the distinctive attitude and methods of approach to intellectual, and also to social and political, problems of British scholars have their own particular relevance for China's needs, or that there are many affinities between the mentality and outlook on life of the two peoples.

There follows a brief survey of some of the principal agencies at present existing for the promotion of Anglo-Chinese cultural relations and of some projects for their extension.

The most direct British contribution to modern Chinese education has been through the University of Hong Kong, which for many years has enjoyed a well-merited reputation for the high standard of its teaching. Its graduates have been distinguished for their character and reliability no less than for their proficiency in English ; its Medical School was famous throughout China. The fact that Hong Kong was a British possession and that most of the staff and the prevailing atmosphere of its university were British naturally tended to make the majority of Chinese consider it as a foreign rather than a Chinese institution, although in the years before the debacle of the Japanese occupation it had formed closer links with the neighbouring universities of southern China. Few fair-minded nationalists, however, would deny the importance of the distinctive services which it has rendered by making available to Chinese the best type of British university education without the necessity of coming to Europe for it ; similar services, under altered conditions, it should still be capable of rendering, whatever the future status of Hong Kong may be.

Among the agencies for promoting Anglo-Chinese cultural relations one of the oldest and most active has been the Universities' China Committee in London. This committee originated in 1926 as an association of British friends of China who, at a time when the political relations of the two countries were severely strained and the need for removing misunderstanding was particularly evident, wished to express their sympathy with and affection for the Chinese people in a practical form. A modest sum of money was subscribed and a committee constituted under the chairmanship

of the late Sir Arthur Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge. Two of its principal aims were (1) To provide as far as possible for the welfare of the Chinese students, who by this time were coming in considerable numbers to study in the British universities, by giving such friendly advice and guidance as they needed and by creating wider openings for their contact with the best elements of English life, both public and private; and (2) To arrange for the interchange of visits by representative British and Chinese scholars so that they might make personal contacts with the intellectual leaders of each other's country and diffuse knowledge of the culture of their own. The first Chinese scholar to come to this country and to deliver lectures at several British universities under this scheme was the philosopher Dr Hu Shih, the 'Father of the Chinese Renaissance' and the pioneer of the Literary Revolution (see p. 92), later to become Chinese Ambassador at Washington.

Impressed by the value of the work which the committee was carrying on with very slender means, the British Government in 1931, on the suggestion of the Foreign Office, set aside for its endowment a sum of £200,000 out of the accumulated funds of the British Boxer Indemnity, which in that year it was decided should be returned to China. This grant greatly increased the importance of the Universities' China Committee and widened the scope of its activities. Steps were immediately taken to obtain a Royal Charter of Incorporation and a delegation was sent to China to consult with the Chinese Government, the heads of Chinese universities, and the Boxer Indemnity Board of Trustees in China as to the best methods of carrying out the purposes prescribed in the charter. It was fortunate that at about this time there was established at Nanking (then the national capital) the Sino-British Cultural Association, with the Chinese Minister of Education and the British Ambassador as joint presidents and the Director of the Board of Trustees as secretary. This association, consisting largely of Chinese who have studied in British universities, has in many ways acted as the opposite number in China of the Universities' China Committee, and its close co-operation in all such matters as the selection of lecturers, arrangement of tours, measures for the welfare of students, etc., has contributed very largely to the success of the committee's work. The Sino-British Cultural Association has continued to function through the war and has its present headquarters at Chungking, with Dr Han Lih-wu as its secretary.

The larger funds at the disposal of the Universities' China Com-

mittee in London after its windfall enabled it to broaden the scope of its work. About one-third of its income was set aside for the endowment of Chairs of Chinese in the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and London, and a Readership in the University of Manchester. A substantial proportion has been devoted to sending British lecturers to China and bringing Chinese lecturers to Great Britain. The extensive tours, which have been arranged for these lecturers in both China and Great Britain have done much to familiarize each country with all that is best in the intellectual life of the other. In this country the formation of Anglo-Chinese Friendship Societies in many of the larger cities has enabled visiting Chinese scholars to reach a much wider public than would otherwise have been the case.

The welfare of Chinese students, by giving friendly advice and assistance and providing social amenities, has continued to be one of the most important and valuable activities of the committee. Almost the first object on which the increased funds at its disposal were spent was the establishment of China House, later renamed the China Institute, to serve as the headquarters for Chinese students in Great Britain, a centre for cultural activities and a meeting-place for the Chinese and their British friends. These activities have been continued in spite of the war, and include monthly lectures, films, plays, and exhibitions. Subsidiary China Institutes have also been established in Edinburgh and Manchester, and grants have been made to Chinese student centres in other university towns. A recent development, which has proved extremely successful, is the organization of week-end courses for parties of Chinese students during the vacations in such centres as Oxford, Cambridge, and Stratford-on-Avon.

It was originally proposed to devote a part of the committee's income to the provision of scholarships for Chinese students wishing to pursue post-graduate research in British universities, but this was abandoned when the Board of Trustees for the Boxer Indemnity Fund in China announced its intention of spending some £20,000 a year on this purpose. From 1933 to 1938 about thirty such scholarship students, for the most part carefully selected through examinations held in China and of high intellectual calibre, were sent over each year to this country and distributed, through the agency of the Universities' China Committee, among universities most qualified to give them the particular research facilities which they required. Since 1938, when war conditions began to make transport to England

almost impossible, some Chinese scholarship students have been sent to Canadian universities (McGill and Toronto), but active preparations are now (1944) being made for an early resumption of the scheme in Great Britain. In addition to the research scholars sent over by the Board of Trustees, a number of Chinese students have been brought to Great Britain each year for training in practical engineering under a scheme initiated and financed by the Federation of British Industries and the China Association, working in co-operation with the Universities' China Committee. The latter body, it should also be noticed, awarded before the war one scholarship a year to British students of post-graduate standing wishing to study in China.

Apart from these activities, there should be mentioned the important contributions of the China Christian Universities' Association to the staffing and maintenance of some of the Union Missionary Universities in China,¹ and the work which has been done in Oxford by the Vice-Chancellor's Committee for Books for Chinese Universities (whose libraries have been terribly depleted and in some cases almost totally destroyed in the course of the present war) and by an informal committee of heads of colleges and professors whose object is to strengthen intellectual co-operation between philosophical circles in Oxford and China.

Within the last two or three years the British Council, one of whose primary objects is to diffuse knowledge and understanding of British culture, has actively entered the Chinese field. In this country it has undertaken to place and maintain fifty post-graduate Chinese students for study in the British universities, and has recently invited five Chinese professors to take up residence for a year in Oxford and Cambridge universities respectively. It also helps to finance the scheme for the training of Chinese graduate-apprentices in conjunction with the Federation of British Industries. It has recently sent to China three distinguished scholars to visit the university centres at a time when they are suffering actively from long-continued isolation, shortage of books, journals, and equipment, and almost intolerable privations and discomforts. Par-

¹ The Union Universities comprise the following: Yenching University, Peiping; Shantung Christian University (Cheloo); West China Union University, Chêngtu; Central China College, Wuchang; East China Group; Fukien Christian University; Lingnan University, Canton; Mukden Medical College. Eight British missionary societies co-operate with the Chinese Church and with societies in North America (the United States and Canada) and Europe in the maintenance of these colleges.

ticularly important and fruitful has been the Cultural Scientific Mission of Dr Joseph Needham, Reader in Bio-Chemistry at Cambridge University, who has established in Chungking a Cultural Scientific Office which serves a number of important functions and acts as a link between scientific associations in Britain and certain government departments as well as research institutes in China. Through the facilities which it affords much needed supplies of British scientific journals, films, and apparatus have at last begun to enter a land which war had cruelly isolated for many years, and the precise needs of Chinese scientific and technological workers have been ascertained. Although much of the activity of the Scientific Mission is at present necessarily directed to furthering the Chinese war effort, its objective is essentially cultural, and it has already laid solid foundations for close and permanent relationships between British and Chinese scientists. The translation and transmissions of papers embodying the results of Chinese scientific research is an important feature of its work, and in this and other ways British scientists have been able to form for the first time a picture of the scope and intensity of scientific investigation in China. The British Council hopes in the near future to establish similar contacts in the field of the arts, social sciences, and humanities.

Appendix II

CHIEF TOWNS AND CITIES

Estimates of the population of towns and cities in China vary within unusually wide limits by reason of the lack of reliable census returns (see p. 236). It is accordingly impossible to give a list of towns above a definite population figure, but the following includes all the most significant. Of the 28 towns listed 18 are sea ports or river ports and are described in vol. iii, Chapters vii-ix.

AMOY (pop. 219,974); see vol. iii, Chapter vii

CANTON (pop. 1,145,285); see vol. iii, Chapter vii

CHANGSHA (pop. 381,704); see vol. iii, Chapter viii

CHÊNGTU (pop. 314,962)

Chêngtu, the capital of the province of Szechwan, is situated on the Min kiang, about 148 miles above its confluence with the Yangtze at Sui. It stands in the middle of a very fertile and densely cultivated plain about 100 miles long and 30 miles wide. Its importance is primarily administrative and few modern type industries have been established.

The city is surrounded by a wall which is pierced by four gates. Within the main walls are three distinct towns, each surrounded by a wall: the Tartar city on the west side; the Imperial city in the centre; and the Chinese city, subdivided into two sub-prefectures, one to the north-west and the other to the south-east (Plate 33).

Chêngtu lies on the trunk highway between Sian and Chungking and there is an important road leading westward to Tibet. It is also a terminus of the proposed Chungking-Chêngtu railway.

CHINKIANG (pop. 216,803); see vol. iii, Chapter viii

CHUNGKING (pop. 928,668); see vol. iii, Chapter viii

FOOCHOW (pop. 348,280); see vol. iii, Chapter vii

HANGCHOW (pop. 529,663); see vol. iii, Chapter vii

HANKOW (pop. 811,761); see vol. iii, Chapter viii




Plate 37. Kweiyang, Kweichow
A view of the outskirts of the capital of Kweichow province.



Plate 38. Lanchow, Kansu
Part of the walled city and the American bridge crossing the Hwang ho in the foreground.



Plate 39. Nanchang, Kiangsi

A view of the provincial government buildings and the waterfront on the Kan Kiang.



Plate 40. The Summer Palace, Peiping

KAIFÊNG (pop. 244,844)

Kaifêng, the capital of the province of Honan, lies 3 miles from the south bank of the Hwang ho. As a protection primarily against floods the city is surrounded by strong walls of embankments. It contains the usual government offices of a provincial capital, post and telegraph offices, court houses and schools (Plate 34).

The town lies on the Lunghai Railway, about 52 miles east of Chengchow; a loopline, constructed by the Japanese in 1940, joins Sinsiang on the main Peiping-Hankow route with a town on the Hwang ho opposite Kaifêng. Trunk highways lead south-east from Kaifêng to Nanking and Shanghai, and south to Kwangtung.

KUNMING (pop. c. 250,000)

Kunming, formerly Yunnanfu, until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war a sleepy and half-forgotten provincial town, has become the largest city in Yunnan (Plate 35). It is situated on a fertile plateau, near the northern end of the Kunyang hai, a lake nearly 40 miles long and about 3 to 5 miles wide. To the east of this lake there is rich rice land extraordinarily reminiscent of a landscape in Provence for it is crossed by long lines of cypress trees which, however, border not roads but canals.

Kunming is surrounded by massive walls which are pierced by four main gateways. In 1937 it was an important centre for the distribution of foreign and native goods imported via Tongking; since then it has grown considerably, and modern type industries, which include a steel-making plant, have been established.

This city is the main route centre of the whole of south-west China. It is the terminus both of the Yunnan Railway and of the projected Yunnan-Burma Railway, and stands at the junction of the Burma Road and the highway which leads north-east to Kweichow and Chungking.

KWEILIN (pop. 107,392)

Kweilin, a walled city, is situated on the right bank of the Kweichow River, 140 miles above Wuchow. The surrounding country is characterized by picturesque scenery, and the plateau through which the river flows is hemmed in by numbers of fantastic conical limestone mountains for which this part of Kwangsi is famous (Plate 36).

Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war the importance of Kweilin as a route centre has greatly increased. It lies on the strategically important Hukwang Railway and on the highway from Hengyang to the French Indo-China border.

KWEIYANG (pop. 127,430)

Kweiyang, the provincial capital of Kweichow, is situated in the midst of a fertile plain surrounded by mountains. The city has been modernized in recent years, and factory industries have been established. The new enterprises include a power station, match factory, printing works, vegetable-oil refinery, tobacco factory, silk-weaving and flour mills (Plate 37).

Kweiyang is an important centre of communications and motor highways radiate north to Chungking, north-east to Changteh, south-east to Liuchow, and south-west to Kunming. The Kweichow-Kwangsi railway, when completed, will link Kweiyang with Liuchow.

LANCHOW (pop. 102,688)

Lanchow, the provincial capital of Kansu, is situated on the right bank of the Hwang ho, and to the south is rimmed in by high mountains. It is a frontier town of some historical importance, since it lies on the great Kansu corridor route to Turkestan. The town has experienced a rapid growth since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, and in the future seems likely to become the centre of industrial life in the north-west. The water-pipe tobacco for which Kansu is famous is prepared in Lanchow (Plate 38).

One of the most important route centres in the north-west, Lanchow lies on the China-Soviet Highway and has road communications northwards to Ninghsia and Paotow, and westwards to Sining. An extension of the Lunghai Railway westward to Lanchow is projected.

NANCHANG (pop. 206,389)

Nanchang, the largest city in Kiangsi, and also the provincial capital, is situated on the right bank of the Kan kiang, some 50 miles south of the Poyang lake. It is a prosperous and progressive city which has undergone considerable modernization resulting in the usual contrasts in such cases of wide main streets with narrow alleys off them.

Nanchang is well served by roads, and is in communication by

water with most of the main towns of Kiangsi (Plate 39). It is also an important railway centre located at the junction of the Chekiang-Kiangsi and Kiukiang-Nanchang railways.

NANKING (pop. 1,018,795) ; see vol. iii, Chapter viii

NINGPO (pop. *c.* 260,000) ; see vol. iii, Chapter vii

PEIPING (pop. 1,524,182)

Peiping, the former capital of China, is situated in the northern part of the North China Plain within a few miles of the outliers of the Western hills. It derives its strategic significance from its nearness to the Nankow pass, the principal gateway between North China and Mongolia. From Peiping the emperors of China could quickly meet any invasion which threatened to sweep over the Great Wall and pour down on the plains. There has always been a city on or near the site of Peiping, but in its present form it was built mainly in the beginning of the fifteenth century by the Ming emperor Yung Lo. Its original name, Peking, means 'Northern capital' ; it was changed to Peiping, or 'Northern peace,' after Nanking became the capital of the whole country in 1928.

Peiping is a city with many striking characteristics. Its outer walls of 50 ft. in height extend 16 miles in rectangular form ; they are pierced by 13 gates surmounted by lofty watch towers. Within them are the Tartar city in the north and the Chinese city to the south. In the centre of the Tartar city is the Imperial city, inside which again is the Forbidden city, where formerly only the emperor and his immediate entourage could dwell. Within the Tartar city and near the Chengyangmen gate, the main entrance from the south, the Legation quarter was another little city in itself, contrasting strongly with the teeming oriental life around it. In the Chinese city are the famous ' Temple of Heaven ' and the ' Temple of Agriculture.' Wide thoroughfares with metalled streets, tram-lines, and pavements intersect Peiping ; from the southernmost gate of the Chinese city there reaches inward a broad central axis 5 miles long passing through consecutive gates and leading to the Grand Throne Hall. Running off the main thoroughfares are a network of lanes, which are seas of mud in wet weather and miniature deserts in the dry season.

Although after 1928 Peiping lost its time-honoured position as the capital of China, it remained a centre of scholarship, and before 1937 was considered as the Athens of the country. It had more

educational and cultural institutions than any other city in China. Its industrial life was also considerable, and while there were no large-scale industries there were great numbers of domestic trades and handicrafts (Plates 1, 2, 40-2).

Peiping is well served with road communications, and is a large railway centre. It is the junction of the important Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Liaoning, and Peiping-Hankow trunk systems. An extension from Tientsin of the famous Grand Canal connects it with the rich provinces south of the Yangtze.

SHANGHAI (pop. 3,746,768); see vol. iii, Chapter viii

SIAN (pop. 209,236)

Sian (Siking), situated near the south bank of the Wei ho, is one of the most famous cities of China. Then known as Changan, it was the capital of the Chou dynasty during its early years. Later throughout the Chin, Han, and T'ang dynasties it remained the capital of the Chinese Empire for more than 1,000 years. The city and its surrounding country are full of the remains of ancient palaces, mausoleums, temples, and other interesting historical relics. After 1933, when the National Government began to make it into a modern metropolis, it regained much of its former importance. On 6 September 1940, Sian, along with Chungking, was created an auxiliary capital, hence the name Siking, 'Western Capital' (Plate 43).

Sian is an important centre of road communications, and lies at the junction of the China-Soviet Highway and the road to Chêngtu which constitutes the main link between the north-west and Szechwan. It is also a station on the Lunghai Railway, some 150 miles from its western terminus at Paoki.

SOOCHOW (pop. 389,797); see vol. iii, Chapter vii

SWATOW (pop. 178,636); see vol. iii, Chapter vii

TIENTSIN (pop. 1,292,025); see vol. iii, Chapter ix

TSINAN (pop. 441,374)

Tsinan, the provincial capital of Shantung, lies 6 miles south of the Hwang ho, and is connected with the Gulf of Pohai by a canalized river, the Siao-ching ho. The city is surrounded by double walls; the government offices, schools, and other official buildings are found in the central portion within the inner walls (Plate 44).



Plate 41. Yenching University, Peiping



Plate 42. Chien men, Peiping

The Chien men, the main gate of the city, opens on to a wide boulevard, leading to the Forbidden City.




Plate 43. West gate, Sian, Shensi



Plate 44. Tsinan, Shantung

Tsinan is the western terminus of the Kiaotsi Railway, and at the same time an important station on the Tientsin-Pukow line. It is well served with roads, and the prosperity of the city has grown apace in the modern period.

TSINGTAO (pop. 514,769) ; see vol. iii, Chapter ix

WENCHOW (pop. *c.* 200,000) ; see vol. iii, Chapter vii

WUCHANG (pop. 427,130) ; see vol. iii, Chapter viii

WUHU (pop. 328,803) ; see vol. iii, Chapter viii

APPENDIX III

HONG KONG

Physical Features and Coasts : Climate and Vegetation : History : Administration and Education : Population : Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry : Mining and Industry : Foreign Trade : Finance : The Port of Hong Kong : Communications : Bibliographical Note.

The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong is situated off the south-east coast of China between latitudes $22^{\circ} 9'$ and $22^{\circ} 17'$ N. and longitudes $113^{\circ} 52'$ and $114^{\circ} 30'$ E. to the east of the mouth of the Chu kiang or Pearl river. Forty miles away on the western bank of this river is the Portuguese colony of Macao, and ninety miles to the north-west is the city of Canton. The total area of the colony, including the New Territories, is 391 square miles. It comprises the island of Hong Kong, ceded by China to Great Britain in January 1841, the Kowloon peninsula, ceded in 1860, and the New Territories, which include a part of the mainland, leased in 1898 for a period of ninety-nine years, together with certain outlying islands and the waters of Deep bay and Mirs bay. In the enclosed waters between Hong Kong island and the mainland one of the foremost ports of the world has developed and ships of many nations call at the quays and wharves, which have been built on the northern shores of the island adjoining the capital city of Victoria and on the southern shores of the Kowloon peninsula. Hong Kong is not only a great entrepôt for world commerce with China, but also the most important military and naval station in the Far East (Fig. 34).

PHYSICAL FEATURES AND COASTS

The island of Hong Kong (Hsiang chiang, the 'fragrant lagoon') is about eleven miles long and from two to five miles broad, with a total area of thirty-two square miles. It consists of an irregular and broken range of hills, several summits rising to over 1,000 ft. in elevation, the highest one, known as Victoria peak (Shan Teng) reaching 1,823 ft. Although the island is watered by numerous streams, there are few valleys of any extent and little ground available for cultivation. Granite, basalt, and other volcanic rocks are the chief geological formations. These rocks also predominate in the

neighbouring islands of Lantau and Lamma to the west and south-west respectively, as well as in the Kowloon peninsula and the New Territories to the north.

The Kowloon peninsula and the New Territories are for the most part hilly, though in the north and west, near the Chinese frontier, are extensive areas of flat rather swampy land. Bare granite ranges run roughly parallel with the hills on Hong Kong island. The name Kowloon, which signifies 'Nine Dragons,' refers to nine hills which dominate the peninsula. The principal summits in the New Territories are Tai Mo Shan (3,050 ft.) and Grassy Hill (2,100 ft.), about seven miles north and north-west respectively of the city of Kowloon, and Ma On Shan (2,250 ft.), which forms a prominent landmark south of Tolo harbour. Of the many streams which drain from these hills only two, the Shing Mun and the Shum Chun, are of any importance. The Shing Mun rises on the slopes of Tai Mo Shan and Grassy Hill, flows round the southern slopes of Needle Hill and enters the sea at Sha Tin; it is important economically largely because it supplies water to the city of Victoria (see p. 333). The Shum Chun river, the headstreams of which lie in China, forms the frontier between the New Territories and Kwangtung in its middle and lower course; it is the only navigable river in the colony, being accessible to small craft drawing 3-4 ft. up to the point where it is crossed by the Canton-Kowloon railway. Other rivers are the Lam Tsun, which flows into Tolo harbour, and the Kam Tin, which enters Deep bay near Un Long and Au Tau.

The coastline of Hong Kong island and of the New Territories is in general rugged and deeply indented with many rocky promontories overlooking deep-water bays. In the north-west at the mouth of the Shum Chun and Kam Tin are mud flats and mangrove swamps. These features are the result of marine submergence in geologically recent times (see vol. i, p. 119). The largest inlet along the coast is that known as Tolo harbour (Tai Po Hoi), which extends inland from Mirs bay for nearly ten miles and round the head of which runs the Canton-Kowloon railway. This inlet and those of Rocky harbour (Lungshunwan hoi), Port Shelter (Ngaumei hoi), and Junk bay (Cheung kwan o) to the south-east provide good anchorages in sheltered waters. The eastern and southern coasts of Hong Kong island are as broken as those of the mainland, but the northern shores are more smooth in outline, and it is here that the great port and town of Victoria has developed. (For further information on the coasts see vol. i, pp. 147-9.)

CLIMATE AND VEGETATION

Hong Kong has a tropical monsoon climate similar to that of southern China. There is a regular seasonal alternation in wind direction, north-easterly winds predominating in the winter months from October to April and south-westerly winds in the summer months from May to September. Typhoons or tropical cyclones are occasionally experienced during summer, and these usually develop winds of hurricane force which make navigation hazardous and cause considerable loss of life and widespread damage to property (vol i, Fig. 77).

The mean monthly temperature curve shows a minimum of 59° F. in February and a maximum of 82° F. in July, giving a range of 23° F. The temperature seldom rises above 95° F. or falls below 40° F. During summer relative humidity is almost always high, sometimes exceeding 95 per cent., but comparatively low in early winter, so that for Europeans this is the most pleasant season of the year.

The mean annual rainfall at Hong Kong is 85 in., over two-thirds of which falls from June to September, during the period of the south-west monsoon (vol. i, Fig. 70). The summer rainfall from the monsoon is supplemented by the heavy precipitation associated with the passage of typhoons.

Except on Hong Kong island, where large sections have been afforested, the hills of the colony are generally bare of vegetation. The few plantations of forest in the New Territories lie mostly along or near the side of the main road which encircles the mountains. Among the trees planted are the banyan, Chinese pine, and eucalyptus. Many different kinds of fern and orchid are found which add greatly to the interest and beauty of the scenery.

HISTORY

Before Hong Kong island was ceded by China to Great Britain in 1841 it was commercially unimportant, and was little affected by dynastic or political changes on the mainland. Only thinly scattered groups of fishermen, agriculturalists, smugglers, and pirates inhabited the island. Hong Kong was occupied by British troops partly to provide a base from which British trade in Chinese waters might be protected and controlled, and partly as a safeguard against the insults to and humiliation of British merchants in Canton. Regular trade with South China had been carried on by the English East



Plate 45. Lowo, New Territories

The alternation of sparsely covered hills and cultivated valleys is typical of the New Territories.



Plate 46. Cheung Chau

Bays bordered by bare promontories are characteristic of much of the coast line of Hong Kong and the New Territories.




Plate 47. Happy valley, Hong Kong island

Happy valley and its racecourse, with the Kowloon peninsula in the background across the waters of Victoria harbour.



Plate 48. Victoria

The waterfront at the western part of the city with buildings crowding the lower slopes of Victoria peak, in the background.

India Company as far back as the end of the seventeenth century, through factories in the Portuguese settlement of Macao and in Canton. During the following century the company had to contend with the intense rivalry of other European merchants and with the hostility of the Chinese authorities. The attempts made to establish official trade relations with China proved abortive until 1834, when Lord Napier arrived in Canton as His Majesty's Chief Superintendent of Trade. Neither Lord Napier nor his successor, Captain Elliott, however, managed to improve relations, and the five years from 1834 to 1839 were years of undeclared hostilities. In the circumstances, and, following a suggestion made in 1834 by Lord Napier, Captain Elliott ordered the withdrawal of British merchant ships to Hong Kong, and the island was occupied without opposition in January 1841.

The cession of Hong Kong to Great Britain was recognized by the Chinese government in the Treaty of Nanking of August 1842. Eighteen years later the Convention of Peking, which terminated the 'Arrow' war between China and Great Britain, added the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters island to the colony. The area known as the New Territories was leased to Great Britain in 1898 for a period of ninety-nine years.

In the century that has passed since Hong Kong became a British colony there have been relatively few political troubles, and the formerly inhospitable, economically unimportant island has been transformed by afforestation, reclamation projects, and the construction of a road network, while at the same time the population of the island has increased enormously and the port along its northern shores has become a major centre of international commerce.

ADMINISTRATION AND EDUCATION

The administration of Hong Kong is in the hands of a governor, who has sole control of legislative and financial measures, subject only to the approval of the Colonial Office in London. The term of office of the governor is five years. He is assisted by an Executive Council, composed of six official and three unofficial members, and by a Legislative Council, composed of nine official and eight unofficial members. Five of the official members of the Executive Council, namely, the Senior Military Officer, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, and the Colonial Treasurer, hold office *ex officio*; the sixth is appointed

by the governor. The governor also appoints the three unofficial members of this council, one of whom is Chinese. The official members of the Legislative Council include the six on the Executive Council, and three others appointed by the governor. The eight unofficial members, of whom three are Chinese, include the three unofficial members of the Executive Council and five others appointed by the governor. The unofficial members of the Executive Council are appointed for five years and those of the Legislative Council for four years. Although the two councils are nominally only advisory bodies, they have a more important influence upon government affairs than their legal status would suggest, for through them the governor keeps himself informed on public opinion and almost always seeks a compromise solution if their opposition to any administrative measure is particularly strong.

The administrative affairs of the government are carried out by twenty-eight departments, the most important of which are the Colonial Secretariat, which is the central and co-ordinating branch of the colonial government, the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, which deals with questions affecting the Chinese community, the Treasury, the Post Office, the Imports and Exports, the Harbour, and the Police and Prisons departments. In addition to its control over the other branches of the administration, the Colonial Secretariat also superintends the work of the various technical departments, which include Public Works, Railways, Public Health, Botanical and Forestry, and the Royal Observatory. The predominance of the Chinese element in the population of the colony (see p. 321) has made the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs of especial importance. The head of this Secretariat is also head of a body known as the District Watch Committee, which, though legally only a body set up to manage the affairs of a Chinese police force, in practice gives valuable assistance to the governor in directing all Chinese affairs.

The judicial organization in the colony consists of a Supreme Court, five police magistrate courts and a marine magistrate's court. English Common Law, modified by local ordinances, forms the basis of the legal system. The police force numbered 2,176 in 1940, about half of whom were Chinese and over one-third Indian.

In 1937 there were altogether 1,177 schools in the colony, of which 21 were government, 303 aided, and 853 unaided schools. The twenty-one government schools consist of four vernacular and seventeen English schools. Most of the grant-in-aid schools are missionary institutions. The total number of pupils in this year

was 86,993, of whom 19,005 were in English, and 67,988 in vernacular schools. Technical education is provided by a Trade School and a Junior Technical School.

The University of Hong Kong, founded in 1911, has three faculties—medicine, engineering, and arts. There were 536 students in 1938, with a staff of 66 (see also p. 305).

POPULATION

According to the last official census, taken in 1931, the population of Hong Kong totals 849,751; an estimate in 1938 gave the numbers in that year as 1,028,619, not including over half a million refugees from China. Three-quarters of the population lives in the two towns of Victoria and Kowloon. Outside these towns the population is thinly scattered; in the whole of the New Territories there are only about 100,000 inhabitants. A striking feature of the distribution of population is the large number of Chinese (68,721 in 1931) who live permanently in junks and sampans in sheltered bays.

The Chinese form over 95 per cent. of the population of Hong Kong. They have increased rapidly in numbers since the beginning of the present century; in 1900 they totalled about 250,000, increasing to nearly a million in 1938. Since Hong Kong is a free port effective control of the movement of population to and from China is almost impossible, so that any figures for the numbers of Chinese must necessarily be inaccurate. The influx of refugees into the colony has been most marked since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937.

The Chinese of Hong Kong are almost all drawn from the neighbouring province of Kwangtung. The great majority are Cantonese, but there are also numbers of Hakkas and Hoklos (see vol. i, p. 418); about one-third are British subjects by birth.

The non-Chinese population numbered 28,242 in 1931, made up as shown in the following table:

European British subjects	14,366
Other Europeans and Americans	2,036
British Indians	4,745
Japanese	2,205
Portuguese (originally from Macao)	3,197
Eurasians	857
Others	836

28,242

Source: Mills, Lennox A., *British Rule in Eastern Asia*, p. 388 (London, 1942).

Over half of the European British subjects were in the army or navy, the remainder being civil servants, teachers, and business men. Most of the Europeans reside only temporarily in the colony.

The population of Hong Kong has grown from 456,739 in 1911 to 652,166 in 1921, to 849,751 in 1931, and to just over a million in 1938. The growth in importance of the port of Hong Kong has been the main cause affecting the increase in population. In the New Territories little change occurred in the population during these years ; in 1911, the population numbered 80,622, and in 1931 it had increased slightly to 97,781.

Registration of births and deaths is compulsory and there are twenty-nine registration offices. Owing to the Chinese custom of not registering children until they are in their second year the registration of births is still imperfect. In 1938, the birth-rate was 35 per thousand for the Chinese population and 24 per thousand for the European population ; the death-rates in the same year were 38 and 9 per thousand respectively.

AGRICULTURE, FISHING, AND FORESTRY

In both the colony of Hong Kong and the New Territories the proportion of land suitable for farming is relatively small, about one-fifth of the total area, on account of the barrenness of the soil and of the restricted area of low-lying plains. In 1931 less than 5 per cent. of the gainfully employed population was engaged in agriculture. The chief crops grown are rice, sweet potatoes, ground-nuts, sugar-cane, and various tropical fruits, especially pine-apples. The yield of all the crops is low and, with the exception of rice, poor in quality. Most of the products are consumed locally. In addition to the small Chinese farming communities in the New Territories, there are several modern agricultural enterprises, including a number of poultry farms, fruit orchards, and market gardens. The New Territories Agricultural Association, founded in 1927, holds agricultural shows each year and has sought, with some success, to improve the standard of agricultural production.

Fishing is an important occupation carried on along many parts of the much-indented and rocky coastline. In 1938 there were 5,500 fishing junks, manned by over 100,000 Chinese, a large proportion of whom live permanently afloat. Aberdeen, on the south coast of Hong Kong island, is one of the principal fishing centres. The chief fishing settlements in the New Territories are Un Long, Tai O,

Cheung Chau, Tai Po, and Sai Kung. Whitebait, cod, and sole are among the fish caught. There are large oyster fisheries along the shores of Deep bay. Twelve big *lan*, or wholesale dealers, act as intermediaries between the fishermen and the markets.

When the British occupied Hong Kong a century ago the island was almost wholly treeless, but progressive afforestation has been carried out so that to-day the greater part of the island is forest-covered. The New Territories still remain largely unforested, though certain areas in the neighbourhood of villages have been planted with trees (mainly pines). Afforestation has been encouraged to prevent further soil erosion and to assist in the conservation of rainfall. A Forest Experimental Station was established during 1938. Commercial exploitation of the forests on Crown land is not permitted. In the New Territories the forests are leased in lots at a small nominal annual rent, and the lessee is allowed to cut down and replant 10 per cent. of the timber per annum.

MINING AND INDUSTRY

The mineral resources of Hong Kong and the New Territories are meagre. Kaolin or china-clay is the chief mineral exploited, about 2,500 tons being produced annually. Small quantities of magnetite iron ore, wolfram, silver, and lead are also obtained, and there is considerable quarrying of granite for building purposes.

Manufacturing takes a subsidiary though not unimportant place in the economic activities. The principal European industries in the colony are shipbuilding and ship-repairing, sugar-refining, and cement manufacture and rope-making. Industries owned and managed by Chinese included the manufacture of textiles, rubber-soled canvas shoes, electric torches, perfumes, and preserved ginger.

FOREIGN TRADE

The importance of Hong Kong is primarily due to its role as an entrepôt for the trade of South China with overseas countries and for goods in transit from Siam and French Indo-China to Japan and the Philippines, from America to Siam, and from Japan to French Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, and the East Indies. Four-fifths of the foreign trade of the colony is concerned in this traffic. In 1938 the total foreign trade by value amounted to £69.9 million, of which £38.2 million were imports and £31.7 were exports. These figures

are only half of what they were in 1924. The principal imports in 1938 were foodstuffs, mainly rice, sugar-cane, and wheat, textile piece-goods, oils and fats, metals, Chinese medicines, coal and petroleum, machinery, dyeing materials, paper, and motor vehicles in order of their importance by value. These goods also figure as the chief exports from the colony, since most of them are goods in transit to markets in China. Chinese products exported from Hong Kong, other than medicines, include wood oils, tin, tea, wolfram, peanut oils, hides, and preserved ginger. Rice, the most important of the foodstuffs imported for re-export to South China, comes largely from Indo-China and Siam. Wheat flour imported from the United States and Australia is also destined for China. Most of the sugar for re-export comes from Java. The tin imported from China is smelted in the colony and exported to the United States, Japan, and China. Textiles, comprising chiefly cotton yarns and piece-goods, come from Japan, North China, and Great Britain, and are marketed mainly in French Indo-China and China.

The direction of foreign trade in 1938 is shown in the table on page 325.

The tables show clearly how greatly dependent is the prosperity of Hong Kong upon the Chinese market. The next largest customers are the British Empire, French Indo-China, and the United States. Among the countries, apart from China, which provided the bulk of the imports, are the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, and Japan, each of which sends a wide variety of manufactured goods.

FINANCE

The unit of currency is the Hong Kong dollar, which until 1935 was based on silver, but since the passing of the Currency Ordinance in that year its value has been controlled by an Exchange Fund. The exchange rate of the dollar is about 1s. 3d. In addition to bank notes and government dollar notes there are 10 cent and 5 cent cupro-nickel and 1 cent copper coins.

In 1938 the revenue of the colony amounted to \$36,735,854 (£2,276,852) and the expenditure to \$37,175,897 (£2,304,130). The fact that the prosperity of Hong Kong depends to such an extent on its position as an entrepôt and a free port has meant that one of the main sources of revenue in other countries, namely, duties on all imports and exports, has been denied to the colony. Moreover, Hong Kong has little agricultural or mineral wealth and only a few



Plate 49. Victoria navy yard

A view of the navy yards at Victoria with numerous administrative buildings in the foreground.



Plate 50. Kowloon waterfront

Vessels berthed at the piers on the west side of the Kowloon peninsula.



Plate 51. Taikoo docks

A general view of the docks and industrial establishments at Quarry point, with Leiu mun in the background.



Plate 52. Sugar refinery, Quarry point

Percentages of Hong Kong's Import Trade, 1934-38
(according to place of origin)

	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
China	35.2	33.8	33.6	34.8	37.7
United Kingdom	7.8	6.5	6.4	7.6	9.1
United States	7.1	7.3	7.1	8.4	8.8
Netherlands East Indies	8.3	6.2	8.5	7.6	6.6
Germany	3.3	4.5	5.2	5.0	6.3
Siam	8.0	5.6	6.6	3.7	5.9
French Indo-China	6.3	8.9	5.7	6.6	5.6
Japan	8.8	11.8	12.8	9.4	3.0
Australia	1.6	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.0
India	2.0	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.9
British Malaya	1.3	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.2
Belgium	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.0
Others	9.1	8.9	7.7	11.2	10.9

Percentages of Hong Kong's Export Trade, 1934-38
(according to place of destination)

	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
China	48.0	49.0	42.7	40.7	45.1
United States	5.7	7.8	8.1	8.8	10.2
British Malaya	7.6	6.3	7.3	8.5	7.2
French Indo-China	7.4	5.3	5.0	5.1	4.5
Macao	5.3	4.9	3.7	3.7	4.1
United Kingdom	2.0	2.8	3.8	4.5	4.1
Siam	4.5	3.9	4.1	3.0	3.1
Netherlands East Indies	2.6	2.3	2.8	3.3	2.8
Kwangchowwan	2.5	3.4	3.0	2.1	1.9
Philippines	1.6	1.8	3.3	2.8	1.9
India	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.6
Japan	3.5	4.2	5.1	4.2	0.6
Others	8.0	7.0	9.7	12.2	12.9

Source : Colonial Report, *Hong Kong*, 1938, pp. 72-3 (London, 1939).

small industries to provide revenue, so that its revenue has to be derived from a limited number of taxes and from a miscellaneous variety of other sources. The assessment tax on property is the largest single item of revenue. Import duties are applied only to liquors, tobacco, and motor spirit. There are no duties on the export of goods. About one-fifth of the receipts come from the postal

services, the government wireless station, the British section of the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the use of excess water.

Although there was a budgetary deficiency in 1938 expenditure is normally less than revenue, so that a reserve fund has accumulated which tides over financial difficulties in years of deficit. Expenditure is largest on public works, including harbour improvements, land reclamation, roads, and waterworks, while a heavy appropriation of revenue comes under the head of general administration and defence expenditure.

Hong Kong has a number of important banking institutions, including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and branches of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, and the Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. These banks provide the note issue of the colony. In addition to the British banks there are also a number of Chinese and foreign banks.

THE PORT OF HONG KONG

The port of Hong Kong or Victoria, which lies between the northern side of Hong Kong island and the mainland, is the most important port of the southern seaboard of China, and one of the largest in the world in respect of tonnage entered and cleared (Fig. 35). As already mentioned, it is a free port which serves as an entrepôt through which pass the agricultural and mineral products of China destined for export overseas and the manufactured goods of European and other countries consigned for distribution in the East. Besides being a focus of world commerce and of international trade routes, Hong Kong is also the principal British naval station in the Far East.

Approach and Access

In the outer approaches to the port are a number of rocky island groups with between them channels of deep water generally clear of dangers to shipping. The main channel of approach from the south-west passes between the Ladrone and Kaipong islands; from the south, vessels either chart a course by way of Taitami channel between the Kaipong and Lema islands, or through a channel east of the latter group of islands. As the southern shores of Hong Kong island are approached either a westerly or an easterly route may be taken. Vessels approaching the harbour from the west pass through one or other of the two Lamma channels, which lie to the east and

west respectively of the rocky island of Pokliu chau (Lamma island). There is a good sheltered anchorage in a depth of 5 fm. at Aberdeen harbour on the southern shores of Hong Kong island adjoining the East Lamma channel. The approach to Hong Kong harbour from the east is by way of the Tathong channel; vessels can anchor in this channel in a depth of 5 fm. northward of the small island of Futau chau. The depth of water is between 6 and 24 fm. at the eastern entrance, and between 4 and 17 fm. at the western entrance to the harbour.

The rise of tides at Hong Kong is 6.2 ft. at springs and 5.1 ft. at neaps. There is a large diurnal inequality in the incidence of the tides. The tidal streams vary in speed from two to three knots.

The harbour at Hong Kong is accessible to the largest class of vessel at all times of the year. Vessels with a draught of over 24 ft. are recommended to use the eastern approach channel.

Detailed Description

The port of Hong Kong extends for about five miles along the northern shores of Hong Kong island, while at Kowloon on the mainland opposite there are harbour works extending for nearly two miles. The western limits of the harbour run roughly from Sulphur channel to Stonecutters island; the eastern limits are formed by the narrow Leiumun (Lyemooon pass). The area of the harbour is about 11 square miles with depths ranging from 4 to 13 fm. In the roadstead there are 51 mooring-buoys for merchant vessels, all owned by the Hong Kong government. There were 18 'A' class, for ships of 450-600 ft. in length; 28 'B' class, for ships 300-400 ft. in length, and 5 'C' class, for ships less than 300 ft. long: 12 of the 'A' class buoys are specially for use during typhoons.

At Hong Kong the principal berths for commercial vessels are in the western section of the port, where a large number of piers extend for a short distance offshore. There are altogether over 34 of these piers, spaced along the waterfront, in Belcher bay and fronting Connaught road, at intervals of about 200 ft. for a distance of one and a half miles; vessels lie either at their heads or alongside in depths of up to 43 ft. The harbour-master's office is situated along this part of the waterfront. South-east of the commercial piers is the naval dockyard (Plate 49), which has a tidal basin with an area of about $9\frac{1}{2}$ acres and with a depth of 29 ft. at H.W.O.S.T. Details of the concrete quays at the naval yard are as follows:

Position		Length	Depth alongside below Chart datum
		ft.	ft.
North Wall	..	730	28
North Arm	..	605	27
West Wall	..	370	20
South Wall	..	500	24
East Wall	..	620	23

To the east along the newly reclaimed part of the shore between the naval dockyard and East point are a number of small piers little used by shipping. That part of the waterfront known as East point, where there are three piers owned by the Taikoo Sugar Refinery with depths alongside of 12-32 ft., bounds the shallow Tunglo wan or Causeway bay on the west. This bay, which is fronted by a breakwater, 9 ft. high, affords shelter for small craft in bad weather. More newly reclaimed land lies to the north-east of this bay; in this part there are two concrete quays over 800 ft. long with depths of 28-29 ft. alongside, and the Asiatic Petroleum Co. pier, 450 ft. long, extending offshore with a depth of 20 ft. at its head. At Taikoo dockyard in Quarry bay, about a mile farther east, there are quays 2,300 ft. in length and with a depth of 32 ft. alongside (Plates 51, 52).

On the shores of the mainland opposite Hong Kong are the harbour works of Kowloon (Plate 50). The west side of the peninsula, from the Typhoon refuge, a shallow stretch of water protected by breakwaters, southward to Kowloon point (Tsimtsa tsui) has a coaling camber, the Kowloon naval yard, and a number of piers. The Kowloon naval yard has a small tidal basin of about 2 acres with depths of 10-20 ft., three jetties and four piers with depths alongside of 8-32 ft. Some of the piers are for harbour and ferry traffic, but there are five larger piers, owned by the Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co., of which the following are details :

Pier			Length	Depth alongside at H.W.O.S.T.	Remarks
			ft.	ft.	
No. 1	750	36	{ Steel piles, wood decking
No. 2	725	31	
No. 3	562	31	
No. 4	662	31	Steel and wood piles, wood decking
No. 5	800	34	Steel piles, wood deck- ing
					Concrete

There are further piers off the south and south-east of the peninsula and at Hung Hom, of which the most important are two owned by Alfred Holt and Co., with the following dimensions :

Pier	Length	Depth alongside at H.W.O.S.T.	Remarks
No. 1 	ft. 470 }	ft. 36	Concrete
No. 2 	450 }		

There are two jetties and a quay at Stonecutters island and piers at the oil companies' installations at Tai Kok Tsui and Lai Chi Kok.

Port Facilities

Though the naval yards and the principal commercial shipbuilding and engineering works are equipped with a large number of cranes, Hong Kong is on the whole poorly equipped with lifting appliances. The majority of the ships using the port use their own derricks or power, loading or discharging into small craft, which are loaded or unloaded ashore by coolie labour.

Hong Kong naval yard has five fixed electric cranes handling loads of from 10 to 100 tons, two electric travelling cranes for loads of 2 and 30 tons respectively, five travelling steam cranes, and two other small cranes. At Kowloon naval yard there are ten cranes of various types, including three petrol electric mobile cranes ; weights of from 1 to 10 tons can be handled. The naval dépôt on Stonecutters island has four electric travelling cranes for lifts of 2-4 tons.

At the Taikoo docks there is a fixed electric crane to handle lifts of up to 100 tons, a 10-ton and a 25-ton electric travelling crane, a crane barge for lifts of up to 25 tons, and fourteen other smaller cranes. The Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Co. has an electric cantilever crane with a 100-ton lift, a steam sheer-legs to lift 80 tons, four other cranes for lifts of 7-10 tons. The same company also has a steam sheerlegs and two hand-cranes at its Cosmopolitan dock. The Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co. has three electric and sixteen steam cranes with lifts of 3-25 tons.

Extensive storage accommodation with an estimated capacity

of 537,000 tons in Victoria and 346,000 tons at Kowloon is available at godowns which line the waterfront on both sides of the harbour. Details of the principal warehouses are as follows :

Owners	No. of buildings	Floor space sq. ft.
<i>Victoria</i>		sq. ft.
Jardine, Matheson and Co.	7	51,202
China Navigation Co.	2	52,800
Taikoo Sugar Refinery	18	153,276
China Provident Loan and Mortgage Co.	22	397,290
Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co.	8	60,600
Taikoo Dock and Engineering Co.	5	50,000
<i>Kowloon</i>		
Alfred Holt and Co.	7	407,200
Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co.	27	933,000

These are generally constructed of steel or reinforced concrete, and there are also numerous small Chinese-owned godowns both in Victoria and in Kowloon.

Ample bunkering facilities are provided by stocks of coal which average about 100,000 tons, mainly from the Kaiping and Japanese mines. Coal is taken alongside the coaling camber and piers at Kowloon or the K.M.A. wharf at Lai Chi Kok ; about 2,000 tons can be loaded in 24 hours. Vessels moored in the harbour coal by baskets from junks or lighters. There are oil installations owned by the Asiatic Petroleum Co. (North point and Tai Kok Tsui), by the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. (Lai Chi Kok), and the Texas Co. (Chen wan). Stocks of fuel oil are 50,000-75,000 tons, of gasoline about 25,000 tons, and of kerosine about 40,000 tons, stored in about 40 tanks in all, and there are ample supplies of lubricating oils and other petroleum products. The installations are well equipped with facilities for berthing and fuelling.

Adequate supplies of all kinds of ships' stores are maintained at the port, and water is provided by the Waterboat Co., which has a fleet of 8 water-boats, drawing water from the colony's supply, and by three other smaller concerns.

In 1938 there were 229 launches and 200 motor boats employed in the harbour, of which 352 were licensed for the conveyance of passengers. The colonial government, naval and military authorities, and commercial firms all have craft of varying types for



Fig. 34. Hong Kong and Macao

Based on (i) British Admiralty chart 3026, and (ii) 1 : 250,000 A.M.S. L581, *China Proper SE.*, sheets 84, Chungshan, and 85, Hong Kong (Washington, 1944). The shaded areas adjacent to Macao indicate the territories claimed by Portugal; this claim is disputed by China. The dotted line across the Kowloon peninsula shows the northern boundary of the area ceded to Great Britain by the provisions of the Tientsin-Peking Treaties of 1858-60 (see p. 19). The 200 m. contour is also shown.




Fig. 35. Victoria harbour

Based on (i) 1:20,000 G.S.G.S. Series 3868, *Hong Kong and New Territory*, sheet 19, Victoria harbour (1940); and (ii) British Admiralty charts 1459, 3279, and 3280.

their own use, while there are a number of private motor boats and motor yachts and countless sampans and other small Chinese craft.

Excellent repair facilities are available at the port. At the Hong Kong naval yard there is a dry dock for the use of warships; this has an over-all length of 598 ft. 1 in., a breadth of 95 ft. and a depth on sill of 39 ft. 3 in. at H.W.O.S.T. The workshops are fully equipped for carrying out general repairs to large vessels and salvage facilities are also available. The Taikoo Dock and Engineering Company's establishment at Quarry point (Plate 51) has a dry dock 787 ft. in length, 93 ft. 4 in. in breadth, with a depth on sill at H.W.O.S.T. of 34 ft. 6 in. There are three patent slipways with the following dimensions :

Slipway				Length	Lifting Power
				ft.	tons
No. 1	1,030	2,700
No. 2	1,087	4,000
No. 3	993.6 in.	2,000

and six building berths, the two largest for vessels of up to 20,000 tons. The workshops are well equipped with machinery of the latest design for construction and repair work of all kinds.

The Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Co. has the following dry docks :

Dock				Length		Breadth		Depth on sill at H.W.O.S.T.	
				ft.	in.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.
<i>Kowloon (Hung Hom)</i>									
No. 1	700	0	93	10	30	6
No. 2	435	6	78	6	17	10
No. 3	266	6	48	0	13	6
<i>Kowloon (Tai Kok Tsui)</i>									
Cosmopolitan	..			476	0	85	6	21	9
<i>Aberdeen</i>									
Hope	433	0	78	0	23	0
Lamont	326	0	65	6	16	0

At Hung Hom there are two patent slipways with the following dimensions :

Slipway			Length	Maximum load
No. 1	ft. 600	tons 1,400
No. 2	525	900

At Tai Kok Tsui there are two patent slipways for launches and small vessels of up to 120 ft. in length. The building berths at Hung Hom are ten in number, the largest for vessels of 800 ft. long. The workshops at Kowloon are well equipped, but at Aberdeen there are machine shops only.

W. S. Bailey and Company's works, situated on the east side of Kowloon peninsula, has a sea frontage for building berths of up to 550 ft. in length and three patent slipways with the following dimensions :

Slipway				Length	Lifting power
No. 1	ft. 411	tons 400
No. 2	324	200
No. 3	870	3,000

The workshops are equipped for the construction and repair of hulls and machinery of vessels up to 200 ft. in length.

The Town

The city of Victoria, which had an estimated population of 377,659 in 1936, extends along the southern shores of Hong Kong harbour between Belcher bay on the west and Causeway bay on the east. It is built partly on land reclaimed from the sea and partly on terraces cut into the slopes of Victoria peak. Many public buildings and business premises follow the curve of the waterfront, while on the slopes of Victoria peak houses and other buildings rise in tier upon tier to a height of over 500 ft. Among the most prominent of the buildings are the Courts of Justice, the Post Office, and the University ; the building of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation is a conspicuous landmark from the harbour. The residence of the governor lies on the hill-slopes near the central part of the city, where there are many fine public gardens. The main Chinese quarter, on the western side of the city, is crowded with shops and tenements (Plates 48, 57).

Kowloon (262,899 in 1931), on the northern side of the harbour, has grown rapidly in recent years. There are many modern public buildings and business offices, and development of residential districts is proceeding rapidly.

The water supplies of Victoria are drawn partly from the Pok Fu Lam, Tai Tam (Tytam), Aberdeen, and Wong Nei Cheong reservoirs on Hong Kong island, and partly from reservoirs in the New Territories. Tai Tam, the largest of the three reservoirs on the island, has a storage capacity of 384 million gallons; water is conveyed to the city from this reservoir by means of a tunnel, over a mile long, and a conduit, four miles long. A pipe-line, laid on the bed of the harbour, carries water to Victoria from the Kowloon, Shek Lai Pui, and Shing Mun reservoirs in the New Territories north of Kowloon (Plate 54).

Electricity for Hong Kong island and Victoria is supplied by the Hong Kong Electric Co., which has its plant at North point, and for Kowloon and the New Territories by the China Light and Power Co.'s plant at Hok Un. Gas is provided by the Hong Kong and China Gas Co., which has works at West point in Victoria and also in the Kowloon peninsula (Plate 53).

There are numerous hospitals of varying types in Victoria and in Kowloon, both of which have modern sanitation. The influx of refugees in 1937-38 greatly aggravated the overcrowding and malnutrition prevalent among the Chinese, and led to outbreaks of cholera, smallpox, and other diseases. The hospital and sanitation facilities of Victoria and Kowloon were greatly overtaxed, and the general health of the colony showed a marked deterioration.

Industries

Shipbuilding and ship-repairing is the most important industry at Hong Kong (see p. 323). Other industries include a large sugar refinery, a cement works, a rope works, a soap and perfume factory, and many Chinese knitting factories.

Trade

Hong Kong is a free port, and all goods enter and leave it without duty, with the exception of tobacco, liquor, and petroleum. Its position as an entrepôt and details of its trade have already been reviewed (see pp. 323-5). In both shipping

tonnage and passenger traffic Hong Kong ranks among the leading ports of the world.

Shipping entered and cleared at Hong Kong (all ports of the colony) in 1938 was as follows :

Type	Number	Tonnage
British { ocean going	3,996	11,397,133
{ river steamers	6,238	6,510,967
Foreign { ocean going	3,132	10,787,599
{ river steamers	542	119,109
Steamships under 60 tons	1,585	48,924
Junks, foreign trade	9,177	666,652
Total, foreign trade	24,670	29,530,384
Junks, local trade	19,072	653,625
Steam launches, local trade	23,265	778,747
Grand total	67,007	30,962,756

Source : *Report of the Harbour Master and Director of Air Services for the Year 1938*, Appendix D, p. 9 (Hong Kong, 1939).

The tonnage of shipping entering and clearing at Hong Kong showed a sharp decline after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and the consequent disturbed shipping situation in China, as the following table shows :

Tonnage of all Shipping, Entered and Cleared, Hong Kong, 1934-38

	Total	Ocean-going	British ocean-going
1934	41,914,022	28,905,526	12,035,087
1935	43,473,979	30,706,571	12,510,998
1936	41,731,016	29,969,666	11,943,751
1937	37,830,760	27,630,397	11,709,589
1938	30,962,756	22,184,732	11,397,133

Source : *Report of the Harbour Master and Director of Air Services for the Year 1938*, Appendix D, p. 19 (Hong Kong, 1939).




Plate 53. Power station, North point

This power station, which supplies the city of Victoria, is built on the reclaimed land near North point.



Plate 54. Taitamuk dam, Hong Kong island

The Taitam group of the reservoirs is the most important in Hong Kong island; in the wet summer season the reservoir overflows and the surplus water runs to waste over the dam.



Plate 55. You Ma Ti railway bridge, New Territories

A passenger train of the Canton-Kowloon railway is shown leaving Beacon hill tunnel.




Plate 56. The Peak railway




Plate 57. Street scene, Victoria
Pottinger Street, which ascends the lower slopes of Victoria
peak.

The British flag predominates in Hong Kong shipping, as the following figures for 1938 indicate :

Shipping in Foreign Trade by Flags, Hong Kong, 1938

Flag	Vessels	Tonnage
British (including river steamers)	10,234	17,908,100
Japanese	416	1,718,715
Dutch	404	1,706,367
Norwegian	785	1,513,118
German	289	1,446,098
French	416	1,343,817
Italian	131	1,063,517
American	174	909,879
Chinese (junks)	9,177	666,652
Danish	223	625,631
Swedish	66	213,094
Portuguese (including river steamers)	695	210,171
Others (including steamships under 60 tons) ..	1,660	205,225
Total	24,670	29,530,384

Source : *Report of the Harbour Master and Director of Air Services for the Year 1938*, Appendix D, p. 12-13 (Hong Kong, 1939).

Hong Kong has a large passenger traffic which in 1938 amounted to a total of 2,657,084 persons arriving, and 1,952,122 persons departing. These figures do not include Chinese emigrants passing through the port, of whom 83,620 returned from ports other than in China, and 110,887 departed to them. The bulk of those travelling in both directions were males, though the number of females maintained the upward trend shown since 1934. Of the arrivals about 20 per cent. each came from the Straits Settlements, the Netherlands East Indies, Rangoon, and Calcutta, while about 60 per cent. of the departures were to the Straits Settlements and about 20 per cent. to the Netherlands East Indies. Hong Kong, along with Amoy, Kiungchow, and Swatow, has long provided the chief channel for the movement of Chinese emigrants to and from south-east Asia.

The following table indicates the amount of this emigrant traffic since early in the twentieth century :

Emigrant Traffic, Hong Kong, 1901-38

Period				Departures	Arrivals
1901-05	Annual average	}		73,105	137,814
1906-10				88,452	146,585
1911-15				109,110	151,728
1916-20				84,602	100,641
1921-25				129,004	129,106
1926-30				235,141	181,227
1931-35				99,104	176,707
1936				153,170	120,641
1937				232,325	101,629
1938				110,887	83,620

Source : *Report of the Harbour Master and Director of Air Services for the Year 1938*, Appendix D, pp. 30, 32 (Hong Kong, 1939).

Communications (see also pp. 337-9).

Light railways facilitate the movement of goods on the more important of the commercial piers and wharves. Kowloon is connected by railway with Canton, and there are direct rail connexions to the wharves. An electric tramway, 10 miles in length, and motor-bus services serve the city of Victoria; a cable railway connects Victoria with Victoria peak (Plate 56).

Good roads link the waterfront with the main thoroughfares of the towns of Victoria and Kowloon.

Ferry services operate between Hong Kong and Kowloon. In 1938 the number of passengers carried was about 48 million. At the head of Kowloon bay, on the northern reclaimed shores of Hong Kong harbour, is the Kai Tak civil airport. The approaches are easy, except from the north-east, and the surface is good, except for heavy aircraft after continuous rains. There is a seaplane anchorage near the airport with a slipway and mooring buoys suitable for the largest types of flying boats.

The following services operated from Kai Tak airport up to December 1941 :

Operating company	Service	Frequency	Remarks
British Overseas Airways Corporation (Imperial Airways)	Bangkok—Hong Kong	Bi-weekly	Discontinued October 1940
Pan-American Airways	San Francisco—Hong Kong	Weekly	Fortnightly after May 1941
<i>Air France</i>	Damascus—Hong Kong	Weekly	Discontinued 1940
China National Aviation Corporation) Chungking—Hong Kong	Daily	Frequently revised after 1937
Eurasia Aviation Corporation			

COMMUNICATIONS

Roads

In 1938 there were 371 miles of roads in the colony and the New Territories, distributed as shown in the following table :

	Length (miles)		
Hong Kong island	173		
Kowloon peninsula	106		
New Territories	92		
			371

The surface of the roads is on the whole good, over four-fifths being metalled with macadam, asphalt, or concrete, but the roads of the New Territories are likely to deteriorate after a spell of heavy traffic.

The island of Hong Kong is encircled by a broad, well-metalled road which in general follows a circuitous route close to the coast, except in the east, where it cuts across the head of the two peninsulas bounding Taitam bay. From the eastern part of the city of Victoria a winding road with steep gradients but good surface links the north and the south of the island. A number of secondary roads also cross the island, utilizing gaps in the chain of hills.

In Kowloon there are excellent roads throughout the urban area. One good road runs around the New Territories with a branch to Sha Tau Kok on the shores of Starling inlet.

In 1938 there were 4,009 private motor cars, 281 motor cycles, 350 public cars and taxis, and 945 commercial lorries in the colony

and the New Territories. Most of these were in Hong Kong island and the Kowloon peninsula.

Railways

The Kowloon-Canton railway, which is a single-track standard-gauge line about 110 miles in length, took about five years to build and was opened for traffic in 1911. Twenty-two miles of the railway are in the New Territories and are operated by the Hong Kong government. The line was difficult to construct owing to the hilly nature of the ground and to the many rivers which had to be crossed. There are an exceptionally large number of tunnels, cuttings, and bridges in the British section of the line. The station at Kowloon is at the extreme southern tip of the Kowloon peninsula. After passing north through this peninsula the line enters a tunnel (2,404 yards long) under Beacon hill, and then follows a route down the Shing Mun valley to Sha Tin (Plate 55). From here it keeps close to the head of the inlet known as Tolo harbour, turning inland near Tai Po to reach the Chinese frontier at the Shum Chun river, eighty miles from Canton. (For an account of the Chinese section of this line see vol. iii, Chapter xi.)

Large quantities of goods from South China, especially wood oil, tea, wolfram, and zinc, are carried by the railway for export from Hong Kong. The railway is now linked up with the Canton-Hankow line. This extension caused a phenomenal, if temporary, growth of through-goods traffic. Traffic on the line increased from 60,732 tons in 1936 to 166,438 tons in 1937, and to 456,146 tons in 1938. There has also been a notable increase in the passenger traffic in recent years.

The electric tramways and the Peak railway at Victoria have already been mentioned (see p. 336).

Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones

Postal communication with all parts of the world is maintained by sea and air, and in normal times with Canton by rail. The Hong Kong Telephone Co. serves local needs in Victoria and Kowloon, and there are long-distance services to Shanghai, Canton, and various Chinese towns.

Cable and Wireless Ltd. operate cables to Singapore, Cap St. Jacques (French Indo-China), Labuan, Manila, Macao, and Chuan-shih tao (Foochow), which give good communication with Europe,

Australasia, U.S.A., and eastern Asia. The Great Northern Telegraph Co. operates two cables between Hong Kong island and Kowloon and one to Woosung (via Amoy).

The colonial government operates two transmitters for both broadcasting and commercial use, one at Cape d'Aguilar on Hong Kong island, the other at Hung Hom, on Kowloon peninsula. The main receiving station is on Victoria peak. There are also military and naval W/T stations. Direct commercial services were maintained in 1938 from Hong Kong to Chinese stations at Chêngtu, Chungking, Foochow, Swatow, Wuchow, Kunming, and to the Netherlands East Indies, Formosa, Macao, Philippines, Siam, Singapore, Canton (Shameen), and Shanghai (International Settlement).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

1. The official publications which will be found most useful are the *Hong Kong Blue Book* and the *Colonial Report on Hong Kong*, both published annually at London. There is also useful statistical material in *Report of the Harbour Master and Director of Air Services*, published annually at Hong Kong.

2. The fullest and most recent account of Hong Kong is Mills, Lennox A., *British Rule in Eastern Asia*, pp. 373-513, Institute of Pacific Relations (London, 1942). Other general surveys are Peplow, S. H., and Barker, M., *Hongkong, Around and About* (Hong Kong, 1931), and Barratt, R. T., 'Hong Kong and the New China,' *Geographical Magazine*, vol. viii, pp. 419-30 (London, 1939). See also the *Handbook of Hong Kong*, published by the Hong Kong Travel Association, and the *China Year Book*, published annually (Shanghai).

3. The foreign trade of Hong Kong is discussed in Cassidy, Philip H., 'Hong Kong: Britain's Entrepôt for South China,' *Journal Royal Society of Arts*, vol. lxxxi, pp. 697-709 (London, 1933).

Appendix IV

MACAO

The Portuguese colony of Macao (Macau) lies in the Canton delta, 88 miles south of Canton and about 40 miles west of Hong Kong, from which it is separated by the approaches to the estuary of the Chu kiang. It consists of the peninsula of Macao and the adjacent islands of Taipa and Colowan (Coloane). The island of Macarira (Dom Joao), the northern part of Wongkam, and the eastern part of Lappa island, facing Macao, are also claimed by Portugal, but these claims were never recognized by China, and until the Sino-Japanese war the territories in dispute were not normally occupied by either country (Fig. 34).

PHYSICAL FEATURES AND COASTS

The city of Macao itself is situated on a hilly peninsula, extending southward from the south-east corner of the large deltaic island of Macao (Heung shan). The peninsula is separated from this island by a low narrow sandy isthmus and is distinguished by two ranges of hills, rising to 200-300 ft. and running north-south east-west respectively to meet at right angles in the north-east corner of the peninsula, which is about 3 miles long and 2,000 yards wide at its widest (Plate 58).

Of the neighbouring islands Lappa (Tulien shan), which is separated from Macao by a narrow channel, forming the Inner port of Macao, is the largest. The group of islands to the south of Macao is hilly throughout. The nearest is Taipa, which consists of two parts, the eastern rising to 525 ft. and connected to the western by a sandy ridge. To the west of Taipa and separated from it by the shallow Taipa channel is Macarira, a long narrow island with peaks of over 700 ft. South of Taipa is Colowan, joined to Macarira by a drying bank, and south-west of Colowan is Wongkam, the largest and hilliest of this group, with Adam's peak rising to 1,950 ft.

Though the islands and peninsula are hilly the coasts are by no means steep-to; they are fronted by extensive mudflats and sandbanks, which dry at low tide and make navigation between the islands difficult.




Plate 58. Aerial view, Macao

The Macao peninsula, with the Inner port and Lappa island on the west (above) and the artificial harbour on the south (lower left).



Plate 59. Waterfront, Inner port, Macao
A view of the bund near the centre of the city.



Plate 60. Fishing craft, Macao
Macao is one of the leading fishing centres of the South China coast. Fishing craft with their nets hung out to dry are moored near a landing place.

HISTORY

The first appearance of the Portuguese in South China waters was in 1514, soon afterwards trading stations were established at Chuan-chow, Liampo (Ningpo), and other points on the south-eastern coast of China. Though they were expelled from these places within a period of about thirty years, the Portuguese were allowed to establish a colony at Macao in 1557, in return, it is said, for services rendered to the viceroy at Canton in suppressing piracy. At first the authority of the Portuguese extended also to the adjacent part of Macao island, but the Chinese built a barrier across the connecting isthmus, restricted the import of supplies, and collected customs dues at the port. An arrangement was later made with the Manchu authorities in 1662, whereby the Portuguese paid a rental or tribute of 500 taels annually for the occupation of Macao. The Chinese regarded the colony simply as a trading post which remained Chinese territory, and continued to exercise judicial and customs rights. The Portuguese, however, considered it as their own property, set up a municipal government, and from 1680 appointed governors of the colony.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the colonial empire of Portugal fell into decay and Macao was neglected. Interest revived in the nineteenth century, when the colony was removed from the control of the governor of Portuguese India at Goa and its administrative system brought into line with that of other Portuguese colonies. In an endeavour to capture some of the new trade between Europe and China, Macao was declared a free port in 1845, and in 1846 the islands of Taipa and Colowan were occupied to afford the port additional security. The intermittent disputes which had long prevailed about the extent of the Chinese and Portuguese territory grew more acute and came to a head in 1848. In that year the governor of Macao, Ferreira do Amiral, suppressed the Chinese Customs house and refused to pay the annual rental. This cost the governor his life, but a Chinese attack on the colony was successfully repelled.

By the Lisbon Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1887 China formally recognized Portuguese sovereignty over Macao, in return for co-operation in collecting the tax on opium, and for an undertaking that the territory would not be alienated without Chinese consent. Negotiations as to the precise delimitation of the boundaries took place at various times between 1901 and 1910, but owing to a

dispute as to the control of the adjacent islands no agreement was ever reached. Portugal, however, adhered to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 (see p. 156) and concluded a further 'preliminary treaty of amity and commerce' with China at Nanking in 1928.

ADMINISTRATION

The colony of Macao is administered by a governor, assisted by a council of government (*Conselho do Governo*) of eight members. Of these four are *ex officio*; two, of which one is Chinese, are appointed by the governor, and two are elected. There are a number of departments dealing with Public Health, Education, Public Works, Justice, Posts and Telegraphs, Port Affairs, Military Affairs (Macao has a small Portuguese garrison), and other functions of government. For the purpose of local administration the colony is divided into two *concelhos*; one comprises the city of Macao, and is subdivided into eleven wards or *bairros*, the other consists of the islands of Taipa, Colowan, and Macarira. For ecclesiastical purposes Macao forms a diocese, suffragan to the Archbishop of Goa.

POPULATION

The vast majority of the population of the colony is found in the city itself, the adjacent islands being thinly peopled. Slightly over 97 per cent. of the total population is Chinese by race. True Portuguese are few in number, being principally officials, but there is a mixed race peculiar to the colony, known as Macaists or Nhons, having Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese, Malay, Filipino, and British blood and speaking a dialect of Portuguese. The Macaists are also found employed in business in other Portuguese colonies and in Hong Kong.

The following table shows details of the population of Macao at the last three censuses:

	Macao	Taipa	Colowan	Total
1910	66,499	6,002	2,365	74,866
1920	76,972	4,854	2,158	83,984
1927	148,756	5,595	3,124	157,175

Source: *Anuário de Macau*, p. 307 (Macao, 1939).

The large increase between 1920 and 1927 is apparently due to the extension of the area covered by the census from about $4\frac{1}{4}$ to about 6 square miles.

In 1927 the number recorded as being of Portuguese nationality was 3,486, the number of Chinese nationality was 152,738, and the remainder amounted to 591. Males outnumbered females by 87,548 to 69,627, as many of the Chinese are male immigrants, who return to their homes in Kwangtung after a sojourn of some years in the colony. About one-third of the total was stated to be 'maritime' population, evidently Chinese who spend their existence permanently on boats, a phenomenon characteristic of many cities of South China and of Hong Kong (see p. 321). The outbreak of hostilities in the Canton delta in 1938 saw a large influx of Chinese into Macao and the population of the colony was reported to have swelled to about 375,000 by 1940.

INDUSTRIES

Fishing and the salting of fish is by far the most important industry of the colony. A large number of fishing junks have their headquarters at Macao and the islands of Taipa and Colowan, which rank among the leading centres of the Kwangtung area. Agriculture is relatively unimportant, and though rice is grown on Colowan, large quantities of foodstuffs are imported from the neighbouring parts of Kwangtung. Of recent years there has been some development of manufacturing industries on a small scale, mainly in Macao itself. There are factories for the making of matches, cement, bricks, joss-sticks, batteries, insecticide, and knitted goods, and numerous small Chinese industrial establishments. Taipa is well-known for the manufacture of fire-crackers, in which about 2,000 persons are estimated to be employed (Plate 60).

After the decay of Macao as a trading centre the colony became a favourite resort for wealthy Chinese, who spent their leisure and their fortunes in opium and gambling dens and at the race-track. The Portuguese have made an effort to promote a tourist industry by the provision of modern hotels and of other amenities for the use of tourists.

THE OPIUM TRADE

The majority of the industries of the colony are in the hands of government-controlled monopolies. By far the most profitable is opium monopoly. In 1926 this accounted for 33 per cent. of the

total revenue of Macao, in 1929 and 1930 25 per cent., and in 1932 20 per cent. In spite of this relative decline Macao was, in 1932, the country deriving the largest percentage of its revenue from the trade in prepared opium.

In 1935 there were stated to be in Macao 27 licensed retail opium shops and 69 smoking-dens. In the same year the government monopoly was said to hold 46.2 tons of opium, the quantity of prepared opium manufactured was estimated at 18.8 tons, and the quantity sold at nearly 14 tons. This latter amount was slightly below that consumed in all the Netherlands East Indies, and rather less than half of that consumed in French Indo-China.

At a meeting of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium in May 1936, the opium trade in Macao came under discussion. The Portuguese representative declared that his government was dissatisfied with the working of the monopoly, particularly since instructions about the gradual reduction of opium imports had not been observed. An inquiry had been set on foot which resulted in the resignation of the governor. The new governor declared his wish to suppress the opium traffic, but could effect little unless alternative revenue were found.

COMMERCE AND FINANCE

The foreign trade of Macao for the period 1936-38 is summarized in the following table :

Foreign Trade of Macao, 1936-38 (millions of pacatas)¹

	Imports	Exports	Total
1936	15.7	9.1	24.8
1938	20.3	15.4	35.7
1938	28.4	20.7	49.1

Source : *Anuário de Macau*, 1939, pp. 362-3 (Macao, 1939).

In 1937 almost seven-eighths of the import trade and three-quarters of the export trade of the colony were with Hong Kong. The great bulk of the remainder was with China through Canton. In the trade

¹ The unit of currency at Macao is the *pacata*, which is equivalent in value to the Hong Kong dollar.

with Hong Kong oils and fats, textiles, tobacco, metals, and miscellaneous manufactured goods appeared both as imports and exports, a normal feature of entrepôt trade. From China, Macao bought mainly poultry, fish, charcoal, and fruit, and sold to her chiefly salted fish, oils, and fats. As will be seen from the table above, the blockade of the China coast after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 diverted a considerable amount of trade to Macao.

As already indicated (see p. 343), government monopolies, particularly that in opium, provide the largest share of the revenue of Macao. In 1939 the opium monopoly together with gambling taxation accounted for 60 per cent. of the revenue; income tax, various other assessments, rents, duties, and dues contributed much smaller percentages. The most important items of expenditure were administration, public works, and services and defence.

THE PORT OF MACAO

The port of Macao, though once of considerable significance (see pp. 6, 341), is now quite overshadowed by its neighbour, the great entrepôt of Hong Kong.

Approach and Access

Ships approaching Macao from the sea travel by the Great West channel as far as Colowan. To the north-west of Taipa a dredged channel leads directly to the artificial harbour. This dredged channel forms part of the improvements to the port planned since 1910; the channel in 1927 had a depth of 13 ft., but is liable to constant silting and consequent shallowing. Between Colowan and Taipa is the shallow Taipa channel, which leads to Canal Sud da Rada, the southern part of Macao roadstead, which is separated from the northern part, Canal Norte da Rada, by a drying spit extending eastwards from the Malau chau islands, a small group to the south-west of the peninsula.

At Macao the tidal rises at neaps are $9\frac{3}{4}$ ft., and at springs are $8\frac{1}{2}$ ft.; tidal streams run strongly across the outer end of the dredged channel. The Macao area is liable to experience typhoons during the summer months; one such typhoon, on 2 September 1937, caused great damage to fishing and trading junks anchored in Macao, with considerable loss of life.

Detailed Description

The harbour of Macao consists of an artificial harbour on the eastern side of the peninsula and the Inner port on the western side, between the city and Lappa island; the roadstead (*rada*), which lies south of the peninsula, has become so shallow from silting that it is of little value.

At various dates between 1912 and 1923 attempts to improve and modernize the existing harbour were carried out, involving dredging, reclamation, and the construction of basins for launches and other small craft. In 1923 construction was begun on the artificial harbour by the Netherlands Harbourworks Company of Amsterdam, and concluded in 1926. This harbour is enclosed by moles running along its eastern, southern, and western sides. There is an extension of the eastern mole, about a mile long, running south-eastwards along the northern side of the dredged channel, which is also protected on its southern side by a detached mole, about half a mile long. In 1927 depths in the central part of the harbour were 18 ft. at H.W.O.S.T., but by 1935 had decreased to 15 ft. Constant dredging is essential to maintain depths, and the western part of the harbour is much silted up.

The Inner port can be approached from the inner end of the dredged channel by another channel running west-south-west, with a reported depth of 6 ft. The Inner port is much encumbered by sandbanks, but is accessible to vessels of 8 ft. at all times, and to vessels of 14 ft. draught at high water; there are depths of 7 ft. at the quays on the west side of the city, and depths of 8 ft. at the mooring berths. There are 35 wharves in the Inner port, but no details are available.

Further plans for the improvement of Macao have been mooted, but in view of the difficulties caused by excessive silting a proposal has been made that a deep-water harbour should be constructed at Colowan.

Port Facilities

Except at the quays in the Inner port all vessels at Macao are discharged and loaded by means of lighters, and lifting appliances are quite inadequate. Coal and fuel oil are available in small quantities only; limited quantities of ships' stores can be obtained, and fresh water is supplied by water-boats. In addition to lighters and water-boats there are tugs and motor-boats at the port. There is



Plate 61. Naval yard, Barra point
The small naval dockyard near Barra point, with fishing craft in the background.



Plate 62. Street scene, Macao
A view of the Avenida Almeida da Ribeiro, one of the main streets of the city.



Plate 63. Macao city, southern part

The southern part of the city with the quarter bordering the Baia da Praia Grande, and the Inner port and Lappa island in the background.



Plate 64. Macao city, northern part

The northern part of the city looking westward towards Lappa island.

a government naval yard close to Barra point, at the southern tip of the peninsula, which executes repairs in its workshops and has a slipway to accommodate vessels 160 ft. long with a draught of 7 ft. at H.W.O.S.T. (Plate 61).

The Town

Macao, properly Cidade do Santo Nome de Deus de Macao, is built on the hills of the peninsula. The administrative and residential quarters, in which are situated the governor's residence, other official buildings, and the hotels, lie along the Baia de Praia Grande, which is fronted by a fine promenade and boulevard. The commercial centre lies in the west of the city, facing the Inner port. The remainder of the city consisted mainly of narrow straggling streets, but many have been widened and reconstructed with more modern buildings in recent years as part of the policy of improving the city. Considerable reclamation work has been undertaken, especially along the foreshore of the Baia de Praia Grande, and further construction, especially of warehouses and other commercial buildings, is planned for the reclaimed areas (Plates 62-4).

The provision of drinking water for the city has always been a problem, and in the past supplies have been drawn from the islands ; a modern system has now been installed, which draws river water from near Green island, which is purified before storage in tanks. There are adequate hospital facilities, provided by six hospitals in all, which include a tuberculosis and two leper hospitals.

There are 115 primary and secondary schools in the colony, the most of which are in the city. The colonial government, the Macao municipality, and Roman Catholic mission societies control the majority, but there were in 1938 18 Chinese schools removed from Canton and neighbouring localities, serving the needs of refugee children.

Electric light and power is provided by the Macao Electric Lighting Co., which also supplies Taipa and Colowan.

Industries

For the industries of Macao see the account of the colony's industries on p. 343.

Trade

Entrances and clearances at the port of Macao for 1935-38 were as follows :

Entrances and Clearances, Shipping, Macao, 1935-38

	Steamers		Junks		Total	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
1935	4,610	2,627,172	5,286	548,079	9,896	3,175,251
1936	4,386	3,018,100	4,238	400,952	8,624	3,419,052
1937	4,596	4,198,244	3,905	353,048	8,501	4,551,292
1938	5,544	5,824,700	6,006	410,281	11,550	6,234,981

Source : *Anuário de Macau*, 1939, p. 323 (Macao, 1939).

The effect of the hostilities in South China is apparent in the increased figures for 1937 and 1938.

Normally the port of Macao handles about 90 per cent. of the foreign trade of the colony, for details of which see p. 344.

Communications

The sea provides by far the most important lines of communication to and from Macao. There are regular steamer services with Hong Kong, Canton, and Kongmoon, while launches towing cargo-boats operate to and from Kongmoon, Shekki, Towmoon, and Tickhoi. There are about 55 miles of motor roads of recent construction in the colony and Macao city. The motor road to Shekki, along which a motor-bus service operates, provides a useful link with the nearby parts of Kwangtung. A railway to Canton has long been planned, but no construction has ever been undertaken. From 1937 to 1941 the seaplanes of the Pan-American Airways San Francisco-Hong Kong services called regularly at Macao on the outward journey from Manila.

There is a modern automatic telephone system in the city, which is connected by cable to similar systems on Taipa and Colowan. The Macao W/T station operates three commercial short-wave transmitters, which maintain regular communication with Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Manila, Hanoi, Fort Bayard, Dili (Portuguese Timor), Goa, Lourenço Marques, and Lisbon, and a shortwave broadcasting transmitter, which was inaugurated in 1933.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Much useful official information on various aspects of the colony is available in *Anuário de Macau* (annually, Macao), written mainly in Portuguese, but with some English. Other works which may be consulted are: *China Sea Pilot*, vol. i., pp. 552-6 (London, 1937); Woodhead, H. G. W. (editor), *China Year Book* (annually, Shanghai); Montalto, C. A., *Historic Macao* (Hong Kong, 1902); Tien-tsê Chang, *Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1511 to 1644* (Leyden, 1934).

Appendix V

KWANGCHOWWAN LEASED TERRITORY

General Description. The territory of Kwangchowwan, which lies to the north-east of the Luichow peninsula and forms part of the Chinese province of Kwangtung, was leased to France by China, in 1900, for a period of 99 years as a naval station and coaling depot.¹ It has an area of 460 square miles and consists of a narrow, low-lying strip of land enclosing the Matshé estuary, with a group of islands (Nam sang, Tan hai, and Nao chow) close offshore. There are two prominent hills, the Massif de la Surprise (510 ft.) on the right bank of the Matshé near Fort Bayard, and the Mont Jacquelin (336 ft.) on the eastern side of Tan hai. The coasts are for the most part flat and muddy, though Tan hai and Nam sang have stretches of sand and the shores of Nao chow are rocky.

Administration. Kwangchowwan is under the control of a Chief Administrator, representing the Governor-General of French Indo-China. This official is assisted in his duties by the heads of the three administrative districts into which the territory is divided. As in Annam, the districts are split up into communes, each under a *Conseil de Notables*. The judicial organization, for the Chinese population, is directed by a judge of the court of first instance and by a mixed Franco-Chinese tribunal; a *Juge de paix* with extended jurisdiction handles cases affecting French subjects. Education is provided at numerous Chinese schools and at the *Collège Albert Sarraut*, a large institution with more than 500 pupils. There are native hospitals at Fort Bayard and Chékam.

Population. The population of Kwangchowwan in 1936 was 219,151, made up almost entirely of Chinese, as is shown in the table on page 351.

Chékam (Chihkan), the commercial centre, and Fort Bayard (Hsiying), the seat of the local administration, are the only towns.

Products. Kwangchowwan produces small quantities of rice, maize, potatoes, groundnuts, and sugar-cane. Poultry and livestock, especially swine, are reared, and salt-water fishing is also carried on. Sugar refining, sack making, dyeing, and the preparation of salt are the principal industries.

¹ Kwangchowwan was occupied by the Japanese in February 1943.

	French	Foreigners	Chinese	French subjects	Total
Fort Bayard and environs	71	2	9,000	510	9,583
Chékam and district	7	—	99,000	47	99,054
Potao	4	—	61,500	3	61,507
Tan hai-Nao chow	4	—	49,000	3	49,007
Total	86	2	218,500	563	219,151

Ports. Fort Bayard (pop. 20,000), the chief port of the territory, is situated on the right bank of the Matshé estuary. The main approach to the estuary is made by the narrow channel known as 'Le Goulet' between Tan hai and Nam sang islands. Vessels may anchor in this channel in a depth of about 7 fm., sheltered from northerly and north-easterly winds and with good holding ground. Another anchorage is available in 6½ fm. off the port itself. West of the Tan hai shoals obstruct the passage to the estuary, and the Chenal de l'Estoc can only be used by small vessels.

The port of Fort Bayard has a pier about 660 ft. long, extending to the outer edge of the drying shore bank. Fuel, oil, and water can be obtained. The exports include livestock and various agricultural products; manufactured articles comprise the great bulk of the imports. Fort Bayard is a free port.

Chékam (pop. 40,000) lies on the right bank of the Matshé about 7½ miles above Fort Bayard. It is accessible to boats of shallow draught only.

Trade. The trade of Kwangchowwan is mainly with Hong Kong and only to a small extent with French Indo-China. The total exports, including straw sacks, swine, cattle, sugar, and groundnuts, were valued at 2,100,000 piastres in 1937; the imports, chiefly cotton yarn, petroleum, matches, and refined sugar, were valued at 2,860,000 piastres in the same year. About two-thirds of the ships calling at the territory are of foreign origin, principally British, Portuguese, and Norwegian.

Finance. Although the currency of the territory is the same as that used in Kwangtung (Chinese dollars), the budget is expressed in French Indo-Chinese piastres.¹ The budget has increased in amount from about 40,000 piastres in 1913 to 400,000 piastres in 1929, and to nearly 900,000 piastres in 1940.

¹ One piastre = 10 French francs = 1s. 2d. (1939).

Communications. Kwangchowwan has nearly 200 miles of roads which serve the larger centres. There is a seaplane base on Nam sang and an airfield near Fort Bayard. Telephone and telegraph lines connect Fort Bayard with Chékam. Fort Bayard and Nao chow have wireless stations for radio communication with French Indo-China.

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
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